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Dist. 18, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus
p. 393

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Meruit a conceptione non modo gloriam impassibilitatisp393-7 corporis, sed etiam impassibilitatem animae; quia «ubi unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum»p393-8; sed immortalitas non est in corpore nisi per animam, sicut nec vita; passibilitas etiam non est in anima nisi per corpus, cum anima sit substantia incorporalis: restat ergo, quod idem est omnino mereri impassibilitatem corporis et impassibilitatem animae. — Praeterea, corpore existente impassibili, necesse est, animam esse impassibilem: ergo non videtur, quod impassibilitas corporis debeat connumerari impassibilitati animae.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cui per prius inest impassibilitas? Et quod carni, videtur, quia impassibilitas est dos corporis; quod autem animae, videtur, quia gloriap393-9 est per influentiam animae in carnem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in anima passibili duplex est genus passionum: unum, quod patitur in se per affectiones; aliud, quo compatitur corpori propter corporis laesionesp393-10. Ad hoc autem, quod anima efficiatur perfecte impassibilis, necessarium est, quod ab utraque passione efficiatur perfecte immunis; et ita duplex impassibilitas reperitur in anima: una, quae est proprie ipsius animae; altera, quam communicat cum corpore. Et istas duas intendit Magister in littera connumerare. Et sic patet responsio ad primo quaesitum.

Ad illud vero, quod quaeritur secundo, cui per p. 394 prius insit impassibilitasp394-1; dicendum, quod per prius inest animae, sicut et passibilitas quantum ad causam primam, utpote in homine primo, in quo per corruptionem animae facta est corruptio corporis; quamvis in aliis anima efficiatur passibilis propter coniunctionem sui cum carne corrupta; e contrario vero est gloria impassibilitatis, quae quidem est a superiori, et magis inest corpori ratione animae quam e converso. — Quod ergo obiicit, quod impassibilitas est dos corporis; dicendum, quod dos corporis est, sed non sic praecise est corporis, quod non sit animae; dicitur tamen magis esse dos corporis, quia anima habet dotes secundum se multo excellentioresp394-2.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Meruit etiam sibi donari nomen, quod est super omne nomen. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia nomen illud, quod est super omne nomen, habuit ab aeternop394-3. Si tu dicas, quod meruit illius nominis manifestationem in humana natura; hoc videtur esse falsum, quia daemones in Evangelio frequenter dicebant, ipsum esse Filium Dei, sicut colligitur ex multis locisp394-4: ergo iam nomen eius ante passionem erat manifestatum. — Item, in Lege promissus erat Filius Dei, sicut dicit Isaias nonop394-5: Vocabitur admirabilis, consiliarius, Deus, fortis. — Item, primae ad Corinthios secundo: Si cognovissent; dicit Glossa, quod maiores Iudaei sciverunt, quod esset Christus: ergo videtur, quod nomen eius ante passionem fuerit manifestatum. — Sed contra hoc est quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios secundop394-6: Si cognovissent, nunquam Filium Dei crucifixissent; et Anselmus in libro Cur Deus homo dicit, quod tantum scelus, sicut est Filii Dei occisio, nunquam per poenitentiam expiassent, nisi ignorantia excusasset.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio Christus per passionem suam meruit sui nominis clarificationem. Clarificatio autem nominis ipsius Christi in hoc consistit, ut communiter homines noverint, illum qui in humana natura apparebat, esse Filium Dei et redemptorem mundi.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod illud iam notum erat; dicendum, quod est notitia certa, et est notitia per quandam coniecturam; et Christus ante passionem cognitus fuit habere nomen, quod est super omne nomen, notitia coniecturali, sed notitia certitudinali non nisi post passionem. Et per hoc dissolvi possunt rationes et auctoritates ad utramque partemp394-7. — Vel aliter. Est notitia universalis, et est notitia particularis; quamvis autem Christus esset notus aliquibus, quod esset vere Christus; tamen non fuit universaliter cognitus usquep394-8 post passionem. — Vel aliter. Est notitia nominis duplex, quantum ad vocem et quantum ad imponendi rationem: quantum ad vocem, cum cognoscitur, quod aliquis sic vocetur; et sic multi cognoverunt, Christum vocari Iesum ante passionem; sed rationem, quare sic vocaretur, videlicet quia venerat salvare populum a peccatis eorump394-9, non cognoverunt usque post passionem.

Et sic clarificatio nominis Christi est manifestatio cognitionis habitae de Christo, qua cognoscitur esse Dei Filius et Christus et Iesus; et quodlibet istorum nomen super omne nomen. Nam Filius Dei nominat personam in una natura: Christus autem et Iesus nominant personam in duabus naturis; sed Christus nominat personam in humana natura relatap394-10 ad divinam, quia dicitur unctus. Iesus autem nominat personam in divina natura relata ad humanam, quia Iesus dicitur Salvator esse; et ideo in nomine Iesu Christi debet omne genu curvarip394-11, sicut in nomine Filii Dei.

p. 395 Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, quia nomen Filii Dei tripliciter dicitur clarificari secundum triplex eius nomen, sive quantum ad certificationem, sive quantum ad diffusionem, sive quantum ad rationis nominandi expressionem, ita quod certificatio respicit notitiam nominis Filii Dei, diffusio notitiam nominis Christi, expressio rationis nominandi notitiam nominis Iesu. — Patet etiam responsiop395-1 ad obiecta, quia Christus secundum haec tria nomina fuit cognitus quodam modo, fuit etiam quodam modo ignoratus. Secundum eum modum, secundum quem ignoratus fuit, meruit, nomen suum per passionem clarificandum essep395-2.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In qua enim forma crucifixus est, in ea forma exaltatus est; quia exaltatio Christi est ad aequalitatem Patris, sicut dicitur in Psalmop395-3: Dixit Dominus Domino meo: sede a dextris meis; sed non est aequalis Patri secundum formam servi, sed secundum formam Divinitatis: ergo secundum eam exaltatus fuit. — Item, ei competit exaltatio, cui omne genu flectitur caelestium, terrestrium et infernorump395-4; sed hoc est divina natura: ergo etc. — Sed contra hoc est, quia eius est exaltari, cuius est humiliari; sed «divina natura non potuit humiliari», sicut dicit Anselmus in libro de Incarnatione Verbip395-5: ergo nec exaltari. — Praeterea, quod est altissimum quomodo potest exaltari? Si igitur divina natura est huiusmodi, videtur etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut nominatio debetur personae ratione alicuius naturae, sic etiamp395-6 exaltatio. Sed attendendum, quod exaltatio dupliciter habet intelligi circa Christum: aut secundum rem, aut secundum nostram cognitionem. Exaltatio Christi secundum rem est sublimatio Christi de statu praesentis vitae ad dexteram Patris; et haec quidem fuit in ascensionep395-7, et haec quidem exaltatio convenit ei secundum humanam naturam, quae fuit elevata in caelum; et sic exaltari ad dexteram Patris est sublimari ad potiora bona Patris. — Alio modo est exaltatio secundum nostram cognitionem; et sic dicitur Christus exaltari in cordibus nostris, quando credimus eum aequalem Patri; et sic exaltari ad dexteram Patris est exaltari ad aequalitatem Patris; et hoc modo exaltatio convenit Christo secundum eam naturam, secundum quam habet aequari ipsi Patrip395-8.

Et secundum hanc distinctionem patet determinatio controversiae apparentis inter Augustinum et Ambrosiump395-9, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Augustinus enim loquitur de exaltatione reali, et sic currunt rationes ad secundam partem; Ambrosius vero de exaltatione secundum cognitionem nostram, et sic currunt rationes ad primam partemp395-10.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nam alii homines debitores erant, et vix unicuique sua virtus sufficiebat. Obiicitur enim contra hoc per hoc quod dicit Anselmus in libro Cur Deus homop395-11: «Nullatenus potest homo magis honorem dare Deo, quam cum se tradit morti ad illius honorem». Si ergo servitia, quanto magis debita, tanto minus grata; videtur, quod homines non sunt debitores mortis. — Item, quilibet est debitor omnis eius quod est et quod potest, quia totum a Deo accepit: ergo videtur, quod nullus possit aliquid apud Deum mereri nec moriendo nec aliquid faciendo. — Item, Christus debebat obedire Patri: sed Pater praecipiebat, quod morereturp395-12 pro salute humani generis: ergo videtur, quod Christus esset debitor mortis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est debitum ex caritate, et est debitum ex necessitate. Debitum ex caritate non tollit perfectionem meriti; debitum vero ex necessitate quodam modo diminuit. Quoniam ergo omnes alii debitores erant mortip395-13 debito necessitatis, quae quidem provenit ex reatu et obligatione culpae; ideo dicit Magister, quod nullus po- p. 396 terat Deum placare, quamvis voluntarie perferendo mortem posset Deo placere. Christus autem, quia sine debito mortis pertulit mortem, et placere potuit et placare: placere, quia ex bona voluntate; placare vero, quia praeter necessitatem.

Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur de Anselmo, dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex ipsa serie textus, Anselmus loquitur ibi de Christo; attamen, esto quod illud de aliis intelligeretur, non sequitur propter hoc, quod homo non sit debitor mortis, quia potest homo facere per bonam voluntatem de necessitate virtutem. — Praeterea, aliquis est moriendi modus, ad quem non sumus necessario obligati.

Et per hoc patet sequens, quia debitum non tollit meritum simpliciter, sed meritum illius perfectae placationis, qua Deus reconciliatus est toti humano generip396-1.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de obedientia, iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta suntp396-2.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius: Salvari non possemus, nisi unigenitus Dei Filius moreretur pro nobis debitoribus mortis. Contra: nullus debitor mortis est dignus vita: ergo si Abraham fuit debitor mortis, non ergo fuit dignus vita. — Item quaeritur: de qua morte intelligi- <!-- page 396 R --> tur? aut de morte corporali, aut de morte spirituali. Si de morte spirituali, falsump396-3 est, quia viri iusti non sunt digni morte spirituali; si de morte corporali: aut naturali, aut violenta. De violenta non est verum, quia non omnes debitores sumus talis mortis. Si de naturali, tunc videtur, quod nihil faciat ad propositum, quia mors illa naturalis non impedit meritum, nec aliquis ab illa liberatur per Christum; omnes enim moriuntur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mors dicitur multipliciter. Est enim mors separatio animae a corpore; et est mors separatio animae a Deo propter peccatum; et est mors separatio animae a visione Dei in perpetuum; et est mors separatio animae a visione Dei ad tempusp396-4. Cum ergo dicit Ambrosius, quod «Christus mortuus est pro debitoribus mortis»; accipitur mors primo et quarto modo. Omnes enim sumus debitores mortis primo modo; et omnes debitores erant mortis quarto modo; et nos ipsi debitores essemus, nisi pretium solutum esset.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad ea quae obiiciuntur, quia debitum talis mortis non opponitur dignitati vitae aeternae. Patet etiam, cuius mortis sumus debitores. Et si obiicit, quod mors naturalis non tollit perfectionem meriti; dicendum, sicut priusp396-5 dictum fuit, quod non tollit perfectionem cuiuscumque meriti, sed meriti perfectae satisfactionis pro salute generis humani.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says: He merited from his conception not only the glory of the impassibilityp393-7 of the body, but also the impassibility of the soul; since «where one [is granted] on account of another, there is but one [thing]»p393-8; but immortality is not in the body except through the soul, just as neither is life; passibility also is not in the soul except through the body, since the soul is an incorporeal substance: it remains, therefore, that it is altogether the same thing to merit the impassibility of the body and the impassibility of the soul. — Moreover, the body being impassible, it is necessary that the soul be impassible: therefore it does not seem that the impassibility of the body ought to be reckoned together with the impassibility of the soul.

In keeping with this it is asked: in which does impassibility inhere first? And that it is in the flesh seems [the case], since impassibility is an endowment of the body; but that it is in the soul seems [the case], since the gloryp393-9 is through the influence of the soul into the flesh.

I respond: It must be said that in the passible soul there is a twofold kind of passion: one, which it suffers in itself through the affections; another, by which it suffers along with the body on account of injuries to the bodyp393-10. But for the soul to be made perfectly impassible, it is necessary that it be made perfectly immune from each passion; and so a twofold impassibility is found in the soul: one, which is properly of the soul itself; the other, which it shares with the body. And the Master intends to reckon these two together in the text. And thus the response to the first thing asked is evident.

But as to that which is asked in the second place, in which impassibility inheres firstp394-1; it must be said that it inheres first in the soul, just as passibility also does as regards the first cause, as for instance in the first man, in whom through the corruption of the soul the corruption of the body came about; although in others the soul is made passible on account of its conjunction with the corrupted flesh; whereas, on the contrary, the glory of impassibility is from above, and inheres rather in the body by reason of the soul than the reverse. — As to what he therefore objects, that impassibility is an endowment of the body; it must be said that it is an endowment of the body, but it is not so precisely of the body that it is not of the soul; yet it is said to be rather an endowment of the body, because the soul has endowments in itself far more excellentp394-2.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: He merited also that there be given to him a name which is above every name. For this seems to be false, since that name which is above every name he had from eternityp394-3. If you say that he merited the manifestation of that name in human nature; this seems to be false, since the demons in the Gospel frequently said that he was the Son of God, as is gathered from many placesp394-4: therefore his name was already manifested before the passion. — Likewise, in the Law the Son of God had been promised, as Isaiah says in the ninth [chapter]p394-5: He shall be called wonderful, counsellor, God, mighty. — Likewise, in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the second [chapter]: If they had known; the Gloss says that the chief among the Jews knew that he was the Christ: therefore it seems that his name was manifested before the passion. — But against this is what is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the second [chapter]p394-6: If they had known, they would never have crucified the Son of God; and Anselm in the book Why God [Became] Man says that so great a crime as the killing of the Son of God they would never have expiated by penance, had ignorance not excused them.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt Christ by his passion merited the glorification of his name. But the glorification of the name of Christ himself consists in this, that men commonly come to know that he who appeared in human nature is the Son of God and the redeemer of the world.

But as to that which is objected, that it was already known; it must be said that there is a certain knowledge, and there is a knowledge through a kind of conjecture; and Christ before the passion was known to have a name which is above every name by conjectural knowledge, but by certain knowledge not until after the passion. And by this the reasons and authorities on either side can be resolvedp394-7. — Or otherwise: there is a universal knowledge, and there is a particular knowledge; for although Christ was known to some to be truly the Christ, yet he was not universally known untilp394-8 after the passion. — Or otherwise: the knowledge of the name is twofold, as to the word and as to the ground of its imposition: as to the word, when it is known that someone is so called; and thus many knew that Christ was called Jesus before the passion; but the ground for which he was so called, namely because he had come to save the people from their sinsp394-9, they did not know until after the passion.

And thus the glorification of the name of Christ is the manifestation of the knowledge possessed concerning Christ, by which he is known to be Son of God and Christ and Jesus; and any of these is a name above every name. For Son of God names the person in one nature: but Christ and Jesus name the person in two natures; yet Christ names the person in the human nature relatedp394-10 to the divine, since he is called anointed. But Jesus names the person in the divine nature related to the human, since Jesus is said to be Saviour; and therefore at the name of Jesus Christ every knee must bowp394-11, just as at the name of the Son of God.

And by this the response to the question proposed is evident, since the name of the Son of God is said to be glorified in a threefold way according to his threefold name, whether as to certification, or as to diffusion, or as to the expression of the ground of naming, so that certification regards the knowledge of the name of the Son of God, diffusion the knowledge of the name of Christ, the expression of the ground of naming the knowledge of the name of Jesus. — Evident also is the responsep395-1 to the objections, since Christ according to these three names was known in a certain way, and was also in a certain way unknown. According to that manner in which he was unknown, he merited that his name be glorified through the passionp395-2.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: For in the form in which he was crucified, in that form he was exalted; since the exaltation of Christ is to equality with the Father, as it is said in the Psalmp395-3: The Lord said to my Lord: sit at my right hand; but he is not equal to the Father according to the form of a servant, but according to the form of the Godhead: therefore according to it he was exalted. — Likewise, exaltation belongs to him to whom every knee is bent, of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earthp395-4; but this is the divine nature: therefore etc. — But against this is the fact that his it is to be exalted whose it is to be humbled; but «the divine nature could not be humbled», as Anselm says in the book On the Incarnation of the Wordp395-5: therefore neither [could it] be exalted. — Moreover, that which is highest, how can it be exalted? If therefore the divine nature is of this kind, it seems etc.

I respond: It must be said that just as naming is owed to the person by reason of some nature, so alsop395-6 is exaltation. But it must be noted that exaltation has to be understood in a twofold way concerning Christ: either according to the thing, or according to our knowledge. The exaltation of Christ according to the thing is the elevation of Christ from the state of the present life to the right hand of the Father; and this indeed took place at the ascensionp395-7, and this exaltation belongs to him according to the human nature, which was lifted up into heaven; and thus to be exalted to the right hand of the Father is to be elevated to the higher goods of the Father. — In another way there is exaltation according to our knowledge; and thus Christ is said to be exalted in our hearts, when we believe him to be equal to the Father; and thus to be exalted to the right hand of the Father is to be exalted to equality with the Father; and in this way exaltation belongs to Christ according to that nature according to which he can be made equal to the Father himselfp395-8.

And according to this distinction the determination of the controversy apparently existing between Augustine and Ambrosep395-9 is evident, and the response to the objections is also evident. For Augustine speaks of real exaltation, and so the reasons run to the second side; but Ambrose [speaks] of exaltation according to our knowledge, and so the reasons run to the first sidep395-10.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: For other men were debtors, and his own virtue scarcely sufficed for each one. For it is objected against this by what Anselm says in the book Why God [Became] Manp395-11: «In no way can a man give greater honour to God than when he hands himself over to death for his honour». If therefore services, the more they are owed, the less are they pleasing; it seems that men are not debtors of death. — Likewise, everyone is a debtor of all that he is and that he can do, since he received the whole from God: therefore it seems that no one can merit anything before God, neither by dying nor by doing anything. — Likewise, Christ was bound to obey the Father: but the Father commanded that he diep395-12 for the salvation of the human race: therefore it seems that Christ was a debtor of death.

I respond: It must be said that there is a debt from charity, and there is a debt from necessity. A debt from charity does not take away the perfection of merit; but a debt from necessity in a certain way diminishes it. Since therefore all other men were debtors to deathp395-13 by the debt of necessity, which indeed arises from the guilt and obligation of fault; therefore the Master says that no one could propitiate God, although by voluntarily enduring death he could be pleasing to God. But Christ, because he endured death without the debt of death, could both be pleasing and propitiate: be pleasing, because [it was] from a good will; propitiate, because [it was] beyond necessity.

But as to that which is objected first about Anselm, it must be said that, as is evident from the very tenor of the text, Anselm there speaks of Christ; nevertheless, granted that it were understood of others, it does not follow on that account that man is not a debtor of death, since a man can make of necessity a virtue through a good will. — Moreover, there is a manner of dying to which we are not necessarily obligated.

And by this the following [point] is evident, that a debt does not take away merit simply, but the merit of that perfect propitiation by which God was reconciled to the whole human racep396-1.

To that which is objected about obedience, the response is already evident through the things that have been saidp396-2.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this which Ambrose says: We could not be saved unless the only-begotten Son of God should die for us, the debtors of death. On the contrary: no debtor of death is worthy of life: therefore if Abraham was a debtor of death, he was therefore not worthy of life. — Likewise it is asked: of what death is it understood? either of corporal death, or of spiritual death. If of spiritual death, it is falsep396-3, since just men are not worthy of spiritual death; if of corporal death: either natural, or violent. Of violent death it is not true, since not all of us are debtors of such a death. If of natural death, then it seems that it contributes nothing to the point, since that natural death does not impede merit, nor is anyone delivered from it through Christ; for all die.

I respond: It must be said that death is said in many ways. For there is death [as] the separation of the soul from the body; and there is death [as] the separation of the soul from God on account of sin; and there is death [as] the separation of the soul from the vision of God forever; and there is death [as] the separation of the soul from the vision of God for a timep396-4. When therefore Ambrose says that «Christ died for the debtors of death»; death is taken in the first and fourth way. For we are all debtors of death in the first way; and all were debtors of death in the fourth way; and we ourselves would be debtors, had the price not been paid.

And by this the response to the things that are objected is evident, since the debt of such a death is not opposed to the dignity of eternal life. Evident also is of what death we are debtors. And if one objects that natural death does not take away the perfection of merit; it must be said, as was said beforep396-5, that it does not take away the perfection of any merit whatever, but [only] the merit of perfect satisfaction for the salvation of the human race.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Magister hic in lit. addit et immortalitatis, ad quod in sequentibus respicitur.
    The Master here in the text adds and of immortality, to which reference is made in what follows.
  2. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 639, nota 2. — Mox pro per animam codd. A K propter animam.
    Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2. Cf. tome II, p. 639, note 2. — Presently, for per animam (through the soul) codices A K [read] propter animam (on account of the soul).
  3. Cod. O supplet corporis; cfr. IV. Sent. d. 19. p. II. a. princip. I. a. I. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro inest impassibilitas cod. T inest passibilitas.
    Codex O supplies of the body (corporis); cf. Sent. IV, d. 19, p. II, principal a. I, a. I, q. 2. — A little above, for impassibility inheres (inest impassibilitas) codex T [reads] passibility inheres (inest passibilitas).
  4. Cfr. supra pag. 354, nota I. — Paulo superius pro unum, quod patitur codd. H K N bb unum, quo patitur. Inferius pro una, quae est proprie cod. A una, quae est propria, codd. G I L T aa una, quae est improprie. Subinde pro altera, quam cod. A altera, in qua, cod. K altera, cum qua.
    Cf. above p. 354, note 1. — A little above, for one, which suffers (unum, quod patitur) codices H K N bb [read] one, by which it suffers (unum, quo patitur). Below, for one, which is properly (una, quae est proprie) codex A [reads] one, which is proper (una, quae est propria), codices G I L T aa [read] one, which is improperly (una, quae est improprie). Thereupon for the other, which (altera, quam) codex A [reads] the other, in which (altera, in qua), codex K [reads] the other, with which (altera, cum qua).
  5. Ita cod. X, quae lectio respondet ipsi obiectioni nec non subnexis; alii codd. et edd. passibilitas. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 2. et 3. atque Alex. Hal., loco infra cit. — Paulo inferius pro corruptio corporis cod. O corruptio carnis.
    Thus codex X, which reading corresponds to the objection itself as well as to what is appended; the other codices and the editions [read] passibility. Cf. Sent. II, d. 19, a. 2 and 3, and Alexander of Hales, at the place cited below. — A little below, for corruption of the body (corruptio corporis) codex O [reads] corruption of the flesh (corruptio carnis).
  6. Scil. visionem, dilectionem et comprehensionem (sive tentionem vel fruitionem), quae respondent tribus partibus animae: rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili, nec non tribus virtutibus theologicis. Cfr. infra d. 26. a. I. q. 3. in corp., et IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 5. in corp. — De solut. dubii cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 17. m. 4. a. I. § 2; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. I. quaestiunc. 5; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Namely, vision, love, and comprehension (or holding or enjoyment), which correspond to the three parts of the soul: the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible, as also to the three theological virtues. Cf. below d. 26, a. I, q. 3, in the body, and Sent. IV, d. 49, p. I, q. 5, in the body. — On the solution of the doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 17, m. 4, a. I, § 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 8; St. Thomas, here a. 4, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. I, sub-question 5; Richard of Middleton, here near the text.
  7. Ut dicit Ambrosius, qui a Magistro hic in lit. c. 3. allegatur.
    As Ambrose says, who is cited by the Master here in the text, c. 3.
  8. Matth. 8, 29; Marc. 5, 7; Luc. 8, 28. — Mox pro manifestatum codd. G H L T V aa bb manifestum. Eandem lectionem variantem paulo inferius exhibent codd. F G H.
    Matthew 8, 29; Mark 5, 7; Luke 8, 28. — Presently, for manifested (manifestatum) codices G H L T V aa bb [read] manifest (manifestum). The same variant reading is exhibited a little below by codices F G H.
  9. Vers. 8. — Seq. Script. locus est I. Cor. 2, 8. Glossa, quae est ordinaria, apud Strabum et Lyranum sic sonat: « Si enim cognovissent vel minores, illum esse Messiam in Lege promissum, vel maiores, Deum esse vel Filium Dei, nunquam Dominum gloriae crucifixissent ». Quibus verbis Petrus Lombard., in hunc loc., praemittit haec: Vel de Iudaeis potest accipi, quorum quidam cognoverunt Christum, alii vero non cognoverunt... Maiores vero, ut principes sacerdotum, scribae et pharisaei, cognoverunt, ipsum esse qui in Lege promissus erat, sed Deum esse vel Filium Dei nescierunt. Et ideo de utrisque sic potest accipi. Cfr. Quaest. ex novo Testam. (inter opera August.) p. I. q. 66, nec non II. Sent. d. 40. dub. 3.
    Verse 8. — The following Scripture place is 1 Cor. 2, 8. The Gloss, which is the ordinary one, in Strabo and Lyra reads thus: «For if either the lesser had known him to be the Messiah promised in the Law, or the greater [had known him] to be God or the Son of God, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory». To which words Peter Lombard, on this place, prefixes these: Or it can be taken of the Jews, some of whom knew Christ, but others did not know [him]... But the greater, such as the chief priests, scribes, and Pharisees, knew that he was the one who had been promised in the Law, but did not know that he was God or the Son of God. And so it can be taken of both. Cf. Questions on the New Testament (among the works of Augustine) p. I, q. 66, as also Sent. II, d. 40, dub. 3.
  10. Vers. 8. — Anselmi sententia habetur loc. cit. lib. II c. 15.
    Verse 8. — Anselm's statement is found at the place cited, book II, c. 15.
  11. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum ad Matth. 8, 29. observat (secundum Hilar. Comment. in Matth. c. 3.): Magis suspicati quam nosse credendi sunt [scil. daemones scivisse, Iesum esse Filium Dei].
    The ordinary Gloss in Strabo and Lyra on Matthew 8, 29 observes (following Hilary, Commentary on Matthew c. 3): They are to be believed to have suspected rather than to have known [namely, that the demons knew Jesus to be the Son of God].
  12. Codd. A K N bb nisi.
    Codices A K N bb [read] unless (nisi).
  13. Matth. 1, 21.
    Matthew 1, 21.
  14. Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. relatam. Subinde post quia edd. repetunt Christus. Paulo inferius ante ad humanam [naturam] auctoritate codd. A K bb substituimus relata, pro relatam, quod est in edd. et aliis codd. Nostra lectio comprobatur his verbis Alexandri Hal. (S. p. III. q. 17. m. 4. a. I. § 3.): Potest signari persona Christi dupliciter: vel ratione divinae naturae in comparatione ad humanam, secundum quam dicitur Iesus, id est salvator, Verbo enim in humana natura convenit salvare; vel ratione humanae naturae in comparatione ad divinam; et hoc modo nominatur Christus, quod dicitur ratione humanae naturae per unionem ad divinam.
    The Vatican [edition] with one or two codices [reads] related (relatam, fem. acc.). Thereupon, after since (quia) the editions repeat Christ. A little below, before to the human [nature], on the authority of codices A K bb we have substituted relata, for relatam, which is in the editions and other codices. Our reading is confirmed by these words of Alexander of Hales (Summa p. III, q. 17, m. 4, a. I, § 3): The person of Christ can be designated in two ways: either by reason of the divine nature in comparison to the human, according to which he is called Jesus, that is, saviour, for it belongs to the Word to save in the human nature; or by reason of the human nature in comparison to the divine; and in this way he is named Christ, since he is so called by reason of the human nature through union with the divine.
  15. Respicitur Phil. 2, 10. — August., XIII. de Trin. c. 10. n. 14: Qui est Hebraice Iesus, Graece σωτήρ, nostra autem locutione Salvator.
    Reference is to Phil. 2, 10. — Augustine, On the Trinity XIII, c. 10, n. 14: He who in Hebrew is Jesus, in Greek σωτήρ, but in our speech Saviour.
  16. Cod. V solutio.
    Codex V [reads] solution (solutio).
  17. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 17. m. 4. a. I. § 3; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 4. quaestiunc. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. I. quaestiunc. 2. 3.
    Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 17, m. 4, a. I, § 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 9; St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 4, sub-question 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. I, sub-questions 2, 3.
  18. Psalm. 109, 1. Apud Petr. Lombard. habetur in hunc loc. Glossa haec: Sede a dextris meis i. e. conregna coaequalis mihi, ut per dextram accipiatur aequalitas, quam habet Christus cum Patre.
    Psalm 109, 1. In Peter Lombard this Gloss is found on this place: Sit at my right hand, i.e. reign as co-equal with me, so that by «the right hand» is understood the equality which Christ has with the Father.
  19. Phil. 2, 10. — Subinde multi codd. sed haec pro sed hoc.
    Phil. 2, 10. — Thereupon many codices [read] but these (sed haec) for but this (sed hoc).
  20. Sive de Fide Trin., ex cuius libri c. 4. et 5. elici posset. Lector melius delegaretur ad I. Cur Deus homo, c. 8: Divinam enim naturam absque dubio asserimus impassibilem, nec ullatenus posse a sua celsitudine humiliari etc. — Pro non potuit edd. non potest.
    Or [from his work] On the Faith of the Trinity, from c. 4 and 5 of which book it could be drawn. The reader would better be referred to Why God [Became] Man I, c. 8: For without doubt we assert the divine nature to be impassible, and in no way able to be humbled from its loftiness, etc. — For could not (non potuit) the editions [read] cannot (non potest).
  21. Codd. F G H I N U sic est.
    Codices F G H I N U [read] it is so (sic est).
  22. Marc. 16, 19: Et Dominus quidem Iesus... assumtus est in caelum et sedet a dextris Dei. — Glossa ordinaria (apud Strabum et Lyranum) in Ps. 109, 1: Sede a dextris meis i. e. in potioribus meis bonis et occultis». Haymo in hunc locum: Sede a dextris meis i. e. expleta militia tua et peracta obedientia, quiesce in potioribus bonis meis». August., Enarrat. in Ps. 137. n. 14; de Fide et Symbolo, c. 7. n. 14; de Agone christian. c. 26. n. 28; contra Serm. Arian. c. 12. n. 9. illud sedere ad dextram Patris idem esse interpretatur ac summa felicitate frui et beatitudine nec non iudiciaria potestate. Cfr. Athanas. de Incarnat. Verbi, n. 3. seqq., et Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 9.
    Mark 16, 19: And the Lord Jesus indeed... was taken up into heaven and sits at the right hand of God. — The ordinary Gloss (in Strabo and Lyra) on Ps. 109, 1: Sit at my right hand, i.e. in my higher and hidden goods». Haymo on this place: Sit at my right hand, i.e. your warfare being fulfilled and your obedience accomplished, rest in my higher goods». Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 137, n. 14; On Faith and the Creed, c. 7, n. 14; On the Christian Combat, c. 26, n. 28; Against an Arian Sermon, c. 12, n. 9, interprets that sitting at the right hand of the Father to be the same as enjoying the highest felicity and beatitude as well as judicial power. Cf. Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word, n. 3 ff., and Anselm, Why God [Became] Man I, c. 9.
  23. De hac secunda exaltatione cfr. August., Serm. 380. (alias 6. ex Vignerian.) n. 6, et in Ioan. Evang. tr. 14. n. 5.
    On this second exaltation cf. Augustine, Sermon 380 (otherwise 6, from Vigner), n. 6, and On John's Gospel, tractate 14, n. 5.
  24. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo inferius pro reali cod. Z secundum rem.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little below, for real (reali) codex Z [reads] according to the thing (secundum rem).
  25. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 24; B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 24; Blessed Albert, here a. 10; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton, here near the text.
  26. Libr. II. c. 11. — Secunda ratio insinuatur ibid. l. c. 20; tertia ibid. l. c. 8. in fine.
    Book II, c. 11. — The second reason is suggested in the same place, [book II,] c. 20; the third in the same place, c. 8, at the end.
  27. Edd. debebat mori.
    The editions [read] was bound to die (debebat mori).
  28. Edd. mortis.
    The editions [read] of death (mortis).
  29. Cfr. infra d. 20. q. 3. seq. et Anselm. locc. citt.
    Cf. below d. 20, q. 3 and following, and Anselm at the places cited.
  30. Cod. M addit: quoniam est debitum bonitatis sive caritatis, et debitum necessitatis. Primum non est obnoxium, sed mera liberalitas; tale fuit in Christo. Secundum debitum fuit in nobis, non in ipso. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
    Codex M adds: since there is a debt of goodness or charity, and a debt of necessity. The first is not liable [to constraint], but [is] mere liberality; such was [the debt] in Christ. The second debt was in us, not in him. — This doubt is also resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 13; St. Thomas, here near the text.
  31. Cod. F praemittit sic.
    Codex F prefixes thus (sic).
  32. Cfr. August., XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2.
    Cf. Augustine, On the City of God XIII, c. 2.
  33. Dubio praeced. — De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 6. a. 4; B. Albert., hic a. 14; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    In the preceding doubt. — On this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 18, m. 6, a. 4; Blessed Albert, here a. 14; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here near the text. ---
← Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 3