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Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 558

Quaestio II. Utrum spes sit genus virtutis, an species specialissima.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum spes sit genus virtutis, vel species specialissima. Et quod species specialissima, videtur.

1. Una est virtus ab unitate obiecti; sed in uno solo sperandum est, videlicet in Deo, iuxta illud quod saepe dicitur in Scriptura2, quod in Domino sperandum est, non in aliqua creatura: ergo videtur, quod spes sit virtus unica, nullo modo plurificata.

2. Item, merces omnium una est, et omnes unum et summum Bonum exspectant, in quo non cadit diversitas secundum speciem sive secundum formam3: ergo si spes est exspectatio aeternae mercedis, videtur, quod exspectatio illa nullo modo habeat formaliter diversificari: ergo spes non habet sub se alias species differentes: ergo habet in se unitatem speciei specialissimae.

p. 559

3. Item, pauciora sunt speranda, quam sint credenda — credimus enim praemia et supplicia, sed non speramus nisi tantum praemia1 — ergo maior videtur esse unitas in spe quam in fide, vel etiam tanta; sed fides est una unitate speciei specialissimae: ergo et spes.

4. Item, spei succedit perfecta tentio, sicut fidei succedit visio2; sed perfecta tentio summi Boni est una secundum speciem in omnibus Beatis nec habet diversificari per alias dotes specie differentes: ergo nec spes habet subdividi in alias virtutes: igitur spes est virtus specialis et habet in se unitatem speciei specialissimae.

Sed contra: 1. Diversorum actuum diversi sunt habitus; sed confidere et exspectare sunt actus formaliter differentes: si ergo ad spem pertinet confidere, secundum quod dicimur sperare in Domino3; ad spem etiam pertinet exspectare, secundum quod dicimur sperare futuram gloriam: videtur ergo, quod spes habeat diversificari formaliter et ita subdividi in alias species.

2. Item, « spes est exspectatio futurae beatitudinis », secundum quod dicit Magister in littera4, et habetur in Glossa ad Romanos quinto; sed « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus »: ergo spes exspectat omne bonum. Sed exspectatio diversificari habet secundum diversitatem boni exspectati, et spes non tantum exspectat unum bonum, immo congregationem omnium bonorum: ergo videtur, quod ipsa includit in se universitatem omnium virtutum.

3. Item, omnis virtus meritoria facit, hominem tendere ad finem suum assequendum, quem tamen nondum habet5; sed spes est virtus illa, qua quis exspectat praemium omnium meritorum: ergo videtur, quod virtus spei communis sit ad omnes virtutes: ergo non habet unitatem speciei specialissimae.

4. Item, sicut se habet gaudium respectu boni praesentis, sic se habet spes respectu boni futuri6; sed gaudium, quo quis gaudet de actu virtutis praesentis, non habet distingui ab ipsa virtute, immo est omnibus virtutibus generale — castus enim est qui continet et hoc ipso gaudet — ergo pari ratione videtur, quod spes de futuro bono sit communis ad omnes virtutes: ergo virtus spei non habet unitatem speciei specialissimae.

Conclusio.

Spes est una virtus et unitatem habet speciei specialissimae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quemadmodum fides, licet sit circa multa credibilia, una tamen virtus est, quia una est principaliter ratio movendi in omnibus credibilibus7; sic et virtus spei, quotcumque et quantacumque bona exspectet, una virtus est et unitatem habet speciei specialissimae, quia una est ratio, cui innititur in exspectando. — Sicut enim fidei virtus, assentiendo primae Veritati propter se et super omnia, omnia illa credit, quae sibi summa Veritas dictat esse credenda; sic ipsa spes, confidendo et innitendo immensae et indeficientissimae largitati divinae, omnia illa exspectat, quae sibi Deus promittit esse in futuro retribuenda. Et quemadmodum fidei virtus omnia quaecumque credit, principaliter non solum credit Deo, sed etiam de Deo et circa Deum; sic et ipsa spes omnia quae exspectat, non solum exspectat a Deo, sed etiam exspectat illa obtinere in ipso Deo, ut habendo Deum habeat omne bonum8. — Rursus, quemadmodum fides credit Deo tanquam rationi moventi et circa ipsum versatur tanquam circa obiectum et in ipsum tendit tanquam in finem proprium; sic et ipsa spes. Et quoniam unitas virtutis attenditur penes unitatem rationis moventis et obiecti principalis et finis proprii; et haec omnia reperire est in virtute spei sicut et in virtute fidei: concedendum est, ipsam spem esse unam unitate speciei specialissimae. — Et rationes, quae inducuntur ad hanc partem, sunt concedendae.

p. 560

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diversorum actuum diversi sunt habitus; dicendum, quod verum est, quando illi actus sunt principales respectu habituum; sed quando sic est, quod unus principaliter respicit habitum virtutis, et alius habet ad illum ordinem et connexionem et consequentiam naturalem, non oportet, habitum diversificari propter illorum actuum diversitatem. Et sic est in proposito reperire. Ideo enim spes exspectat magna bona promissa, quia confidit de immensa largitate promittentis; unde quia unus istorum actuum est ratio alterius, hinc est, quod non pertinent ad diversos habitus, sed ad unum. Unde unus est habitus, quo speramus in Domino et quo speramus habere Dominum, sicut unus, quo credimus Deo et quo credimus Deum1.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes est respectu omnis boni, cum sit respectu beatitudinis; dicendum, quod sicut fides credit, iustos assecuturos beatitudinem, et caritas illam2 beatitudinem cum bonorum universitate desiderat; et tamen fides una virtus est, quia non fertur super beatitudinem et ea quae ad beatitudinem spectant, nisi sub ratione una; sic etiam et spes in exspectando summam beatitudinem, et quidquid boni in ipsa est, non recedit ab unitate habitus et virtutis, quia una est in ipsa spe ratio exspectandi, in hoc videlicet, quod immensae et indeficienti innititur largitati. — Praeterea, quod dicitur, quod « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione3 perfectus »; hoc non dicitur per bonorum multitudinem et varietatem, sed hoc dicitur per aequivalentiam, quia tantum erit illud unicum bonum, quod exspectatur, quod aequivalebit omni bono; per quem modum dixit Dominus Moysi, Exodi trigesimo tertio4, cum peteret, ut ostenderet ei faciem suam: Ego, inquit, ostendam tibi omne bonum: et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, virtutem spei diversificari, quia exspectat perfectam beatitudinem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus tendit et ordinat ad finem suum assequendum; dicendum, quod tendere in finem potest esse dupliciter: aut promerendo et habilitando, aut exspectando. Primus modus tendendi est communis omnibus virtutibus, sed alius modus proprius est ipsi spei. Nulla enim virtute exspectamus beatitudinem nisi mediante ipsa spe, quamvis omni virtute ipsam beatitudinem mereamur. Potest quidem alia virtus actum exspectandi imperare5, sed nulla virtus nisi spes potest elicere, quia illius virtutis est actus, loquendo formaliter.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod sicut se habet gaudere de bono praesenti ad ipsas virtutes, sic exspectare bonum futurum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia gaudium surgit ex complacentia boni praesentis; omnis autem virtus, in quantum huiusmodi, cum consistat in plena voluntate, quae quidem voluntas complacet sibi in obiecto, vel actu suo, habet quoddam gaudium sibi adiunctum, sicut sibi essentiale. Et hoc est quod vult Philosophus6, quod nullus est vere castus, nisi complaceat sibi illius virtutis actus et usus; et si complacet sibi, hoc ipso gaudet, cum illum actum exercet. Secus autem est de exspectatione boni futuri; possunt enim virtutes in suos actus exire, nihil cogitando de remuneratione. Praeterea, exspectatio futuri boni actus est differens ab actibus ipsarum virtutum; sed complacentia ipsius actus virtutis est ipsius actus virtuosi complementum7. Ideo non sic distinguitur gaudium ab aliis speciebus virtutum, secundum quod ipsa spes; nec spes est omnibus communis et generalis, secundum quod gaudium8.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether hope is a genus of virtue, or a most special species.

Secondly it is asked, whether hope is a genus of virtue, or a most special species. And that it is a most special species seems to be the case.

1. A virtue is one by the unity of its object; but one is to hope in one alone, namely in God, according to what is often said in Scripture2, that one is to hope in the Lord, not in any creature: therefore it seems that hope is a single virtue, in no way multiplied.

2. Likewise, the reward of all is one, and all await the one and highest Good, in which there falls no diversity according to species or according to form3: therefore if hope is the awaiting of the eternal reward, it seems that that awaiting can in no way be formally diversified: therefore hope does not have under itself other differing species: therefore it has in itself the unity of a most special species.

3. Likewise, fewer things are to be hoped for than are to be believed — for we believe both rewards and punishments, but we hope for nothing but the rewards alone1 — therefore the unity in hope seems to be greater than in faith, or at least as great; but faith is one with the unity of a most special species: therefore hope also is.

4. Likewise, perfect holding [tentio] succeeds to hope, just as vision succeeds to faith2; but the perfect holding of the highest Good is one according to species in all the Blessed, nor does it have to be diversified by other endowments differing in species: therefore neither does hope have to be subdivided into other virtues: therefore hope is a special virtue and has in itself the unity of a most special species.

On the contrary: 1. Of diverse acts there are diverse habits; but to be confident and to await are formally differing acts: if therefore to be confident pertains to hope, according as we are said to hope in the Lord3; to await also pertains to hope, according as we are said to hope for future glory: it seems therefore that hope must be formally diversified and thus subdivided into other species.

2. Likewise, « hope is the awaiting of future beatitude », according as the Master says in the text4, and is had in the Gloss on Romans, chapter five; but « beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods »: therefore hope awaits every good. But the awaiting must be diversified according to the diversity of the good awaited, and hope awaits not only one good, but rather the gathering of all goods: therefore it seems that it includes in itself the totality of all the virtues.

3. Likewise, every meritorious virtue makes a man tend toward attaining his end, which nevertheless he does not yet possess5; but hope is that virtue by which one awaits the reward of all merits: therefore it seems that the virtue of hope is common to all the virtues: therefore it does not have the unity of a most special species.

4. Likewise, as joy stands in relation to a present good, so hope stands in relation to a future good6; but the joy by which one rejoices over the act of a present virtue is not to be distinguished from the virtue itself, but rather is general to all the virtues — for he is chaste who restrains himself and by this very fact rejoices — therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that hope concerning a future good is common to all the virtues: therefore the virtue of hope does not have the unity of a most special species.

Conclusion.

Hope is one virtue and has the unity of a most special species.

I respond: It must be said that, just as faith, although it is concerned with many things to be believed, is nevertheless one virtue, because there is principally one ground of moving in all things to be believed7; so also the virtue of hope, however many and however great the goods it awaits, is one virtue and has the unity of a most special species, because there is one ground upon which it relies in awaiting. — For just as the virtue of faith, by assenting to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things, believes all those things which the highest Truth dictates to it are to be believed; so hope itself, by being confident in and relying upon the immense and most unfailing divine bounty, awaits all those things which God promises to it are to be given in return in the future. And just as the virtue of faith believes all whatsoever it believes, principally not only believing God, but also concerning God and about God; so hope itself, all the things which it awaits, not only awaits them from God, but also awaits to obtain them in God himself, so that by having God it may have every good8. — Again, just as faith believes God as the moving ground and is occupied about him as about its object and tends into him as into its proper end; so also is hope itself. And since the unity of a virtue is regarded according to the unity of the moving ground and of the principal object and of the proper end; and all these are to be found in the virtue of hope just as in the virtue of faith: it must be conceded that hope itself is one with the unity of a most special species. — And the reasons which are brought forward for this part are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that of diverse acts there are diverse habits; it must be said that this is true when those acts are principal with respect to the habits; but when it is so, that one principally regards the habit of the virtue, and another has toward it an order and connection and natural consequence, it is not necessary that the habit be diversified on account of the diversity of those acts. And so it is found in the present case. For hope awaits the great goods promised precisely because it is confident of the immense bounty of the one promising; whence, since one of these acts is the ground of the other, hence it is that they do not pertain to diverse habits, but to one. Whence there is one habit by which we hope in the Lord and by which we hope to have the Lord, just as there is one by which we believe God and by which we believe God1.

2. To that which is objected, that hope is with respect to every good, since it is with respect to beatitude; it must be said that just as faith believes that the just will attain beatitude, and charity desires that2 beatitude together with the totality of goods; and yet faith is one virtue, because it is not borne upon beatitude and the things that pertain to beatitude except under one ground; so also hope in awaiting the highest beatitude, and whatever of good is in it, does not depart from the unity of the habit and virtue, because there is one ground of awaiting in hope itself, namely in this, that it relies upon the immense and unfailing bounty. — Moreover, as to what is said, that « beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation3 of all goods »; this is not said by reason of the multitude and variety of goods, but it is said by equivalence, because that one good which is awaited will be so great that it will be equivalent to every good; in which manner the Lord said to Moses, in Exodus, chapter thirty-three4, when he asked that he would show him his face: I, he says, will show thee every good: and therefore from this it does not follow that the virtue of hope is diversified, because it awaits the perfect beatitude.

3. To that which is objected, that every virtue tends and is ordered toward attaining its end; it must be said that to tend into an end can be in two ways: either by meriting and disposing, or by awaiting. The first mode of tending is common to all the virtues, but the other mode is proper to hope itself. For by no virtue do we await beatitude except by the mediation of hope itself, although by every virtue we merit that very beatitude. Indeed another virtue can command5 the act of awaiting, but no virtue except hope can elicit it, because it is the act of that virtue, speaking formally.

4. To that which is objected last, that as to rejoice over a present good stands to the virtues themselves, so to await a future good; it must be said that it is not alike: because joy arises from the complacency of a present good; but every virtue, insofar as it is such, since it consists in the full will, which will indeed takes complacency in its object, or in its own act, has a certain joy adjoined to it, as something essential to it. And this is what the Philosopher means6, that no one is truly chaste unless the act and use of that virtue please him; and if it pleases him, by this very fact he rejoices, when he exercises that act. But it is otherwise with the awaiting of a future good; for the virtues can go forth into their acts, thinking nothing of the remuneration. Moreover, the awaiting of a future good is an act differing from the acts of the virtues themselves; but the complacency of the act of a virtue is the complement of the virtuous act itself7. Therefore joy is not distinguished from the other species of the virtues in the way that hope is; nor is hope common and general to all, in the way that joy is8.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. IV. Reg. 17, 21; Iob 8, 13; Ps. 2, 13; 72, 28; Ier. 17, 5. et 7. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 214, nota 3.
    2 Kings (IV Reg.) 17, 21; Job 8, 13; Ps. 2, 13; 72, 28; Jer. 17, 5 and 7. — On the major premise cf. above, p. 214, note 3.
  2. Gen. 15, 1: Ego protector tuus sum et merces tua magna nimis. — De propos. seq. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, et infra dub. 2. — In fine arg. pro unitatem codd. A K veritatem.
    Gen. 15, 1: I am thy protector and thy reward exceeding great. — On the proposition following cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, and below, dub. 2. — At the end of the argument, for unitatem codd. A K read veritatem.
  3. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Quod fides sit virtus una, ostensum est supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Mox pro vel etiam cod. Z vel saltem.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 3. — That faith is one virtue was shown above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — Presently, for vel etiam cod. Z reads vel saltem.
  4. Cfr. infra q. 3. in corp. et supra pag. 394, nota 2. — Vat. sic prosequitur: sed perfecta visio summi Veri est una etc.
    Cf. below, q. 3, in the body, and above, p. 394, note 2. — The Vatican edition continues thus: but the perfect vision of the highest True is one etc.
  5. Psalm. 4, 6: Sperate in Domino. Ps. 36, 3: Spera in Domino et fac bonitatem. — De maiori vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine.
    Ps. 4, 6: Hope in the Lord. Ps. 36, 3: Hope in the Lord and do good. — On the major premise see above, p. 470, note 8, at the end.
  6. Hic c. 1. Secundum S. Bonav. (infra dub. 2.) haec definitio sumta est ex Haymonis Exposit. in Epist. ad Rom. 5, 4. seq., unde in Glossam ordinariam transiit. Plenius quam alibi habetur apud Petr. Lombard. in Comment. super Rom. 5, 4. — Definitio beatitudinis, quae deinde datur, et in qua cod. bb cum textu originali congregatione pro aggregatione, est Boethii et invenitur in eius III. lib. de Consol. prosa 2. — In fine arg. Vat. omnium bonarum virtutum.
    Here, c. 1. According to St. Bonaventure (below, dub. 2) this definition is taken from Haymo's Exposition on the Epistle to the Romans 5, 4 ff., whence it passed into the Ordinary Gloss. It is had more fully than elsewhere in Peter Lombard's Commentary on Romans 5, 4. — The definition of beatitude which is then given, and in which cod. bb with the original text reads congregatione for aggregatione, is from Boethius and is found in his On Consolation, book III, prose 2. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition reads of all good virtues.
  7. Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 9. — Pro habet edd. videt. Paulo inferius cod. U voci meritorum praemittit virtutum et, cod. aa virtutum tantum.
    Cf. above, p. 488, note 9. — For habet the editions read videt. A little below, cod. U prefixes to the word meritorum the words virtutum et, cod. aa only virtutum.
  8. Vide infra a. 2. q. 4. in corp. — Quae in minori proponuntur, insinuantur ab Aristol., II. Ethic. c. 3: Signum autem habituum sit vel voluptas, vel aegritudo, quae facta subsequitur. Nam qui a corporis voluptatibus abstinet, si eo ipso gaudet, temperans [Averroes hic castus], si dolet, intemperans est existimandus. Et I. Ethic. c. 8: Qui bonis actionibus non delectatur bonus minime est; neque enim vel iustum quempiam dixeris, qui iuste agendo non delectetur etc. — Mox pro praesentis non pauci codd. praesente.
    See below, a. 2, q. 4, in the body. — The things proposed in the minor premise are insinuated by Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 3: But let pleasure, or the pain that follows upon a deed, be the sign of habits. For he who abstains from the pleasures of the body, if by this very fact he rejoices, is to be judged temperate [Averroes here reads chaste], if he is pained, intemperate. And Ethics I, c. 8: He who is not delighted by good actions is by no means good; for you would not call anyone just who is not delighted in acting justly etc. — Presently, for praesentis not a few codices read praesente.
  9. Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro principaliter codd. M O principalis. Post pauca edd. ante bona inserunt et quaecumque.
    See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — For principaliter codd. M O read principalis. A little after, the editions before bona insert et quaecumque.
  10. Bernard., Serm. 9. in Ps. (90.) Qui habitat, n. 8: Ceterum quod dicit: Tu es, Domine, spes mea (v. 9.), forte amplius aliquid sonat et sublimius, quod videlicet non modo in eo speret, sed eam. Convenientius siquidem spes nostra dicitur quod speramus, quam in quo speramus. — Voci Deum cod. aa praefigit ipsum.
    Bernard, Sermon 9 on the Psalm (90) Qui habitat, n. 8: Moreover, as to what he says: Thou art, O Lord, my hope (v. 9), perhaps it sounds something further and more sublime, namely that he should hope not merely in him, but him. For our hope is more fittingly said to be that which we hope for, than that in which we hope. — To the word Deum cod. aa prefixes ipsum.
  11. Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et dub. 3. — Paulo superius pro sed ad unum cod. A sed etiam ad unum.
    See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1, and dub. 3. — A little above, for sed ad unum cod. A reads sed etiam ad unum.
  12. Cod. Z per illam [simul audi fidem]. Aliquanto inferius ante non recedit Vat. interiicit ideo.
    Cod. Z reads per illam [understand also fidem]. Somewhat below, before non recedit, the Vatican edition inserts ideo.
  13. Pro aggregatione plurimi codd. congregatione, quemadmodum etiam in textu origin. legitur. Mox pro per edd. propter. Subinde pro aequivalentiam codd. U Z aequipollentiam, cod. A aequalitatem.
    For aggregatione very many codices read congregatione, just as it is also read in the original text. Presently, for per the editions read propter. Thereupon, for aequivalentiam codd. U Z read aequipollentiam, cod. A aequalitatem.
  14. Vers. 19.
    Verse 19.
  15. Ut fides, vel caritas. Cfr. quaest. seq. ad 5. — In initio solut. pro ordinat edd. ordinatur.
    As faith, or charity. Cf. the following question, ad 5. — At the beginning of the solution, for ordinat the editions read ordinatur.
  16. Vide supra pag. 559, nota 6. — Circa initium solut. post futurum Vat. addit ad ipsas.
    See above, p. 559, note 6. — About the beginning of the solution, after futurum the Vatican edition adds ad ipsas.
  17. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 4.
    Cf. below, a. 2, q. 4.
  18. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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