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Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
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Articulus (sole article). De spe secundum considerationem absolutam.

Quaestio I. Utrum spes sit virtus gratuita.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum spes sit virtus gratuita. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Romanos octavo1: Spe salvi facti sumus; quod autem nos facit pervenire ad salutem, illud praecipue tenet rationem virtutis gratuitae: si ergo spes est huiusmodi, ergo est virtus gratuita.

2. Item, in Psalmo2: Beneplacitum est Domino super timentes eum, et in eis qui sperant super misericordia eius; sed quod reddit acceptum Deo vel est virtus gratuita, vel habitus excellentior ipsa, sicut habitus doni, vel beatitudinis: si ergo spes non computatur inter habitus donorum et beatitudinum, necesse est, eam computari inter habitus virtutum gratuitarum.

3. Item, habitus directe repugnans culpae habet in se rationem virtutis gratuitae; sed spes undique repugnat culpae, quia repugnat praesumtioni et desperationi3: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut difficile est credere quod est supra rationem, sic difficile est exspectare quod est supra omnem aestimationem; sed per spem exspectatur illud bonum, quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit4: ergo sicut fides est virtus, qua creduntur invisibilia; sic videtur, quod spes est virtus, qua exspectantur inaestimabilia, hoc est bona spiritualia et aeterna.

5. Item, quod maxime firmat animam et rectificat et delectat, illud potissime habet rationem virtutis gratuitae — virtus enim est habitus potentiae regulativus et confirmativus, qui facit ipsam animam gaudere circa ea quae recta sunt, secundum quod vult Philosophus5 — sed spes est huiusmodi — ipsa enim confirmat et delectat, secundum quod dicitur ad Hebraeos sexto: Fortissimum habemus solatium, per quod confugimus ad propositam nobis spem, quam sicut ancoram etc.; et ad Romanos duodecimo: Spe gaudentes — videtur igitur manifeste, quod spes sit in genere virtutis gratuitae.

Sed contra: 1. Nulla passio est virtus: spes est una de quatuor passionibus, secundum quod dicit Boethius de Consolatione6: ergo spes non est virtus. Prima probatur per illud quod dicit Philo-

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sophus, quod « cum tria sint in anima: potentiae, passiones et habitus, virtus non est in genere passionis, sed in genere habitus ». Si ergo spes non est virtus, constat, quod nec virtus gratuita.

2. Item, sicut contingit exspectare futura, sic contingit rememorari praeterita7; sed rememoratio de praeteritis non est virtus, nec circa eam consistit aliqua virtus specialis: ergo nec circa exspectationem futurorum aliqua virtus consistit. Sed exspectatio futurorum vel est ipsa spes, vel procedit ab ipsa: ergo videtur, quod ipsa spes non habeat esse virtus.

3. Item, sicut contingit sperare recte et non recte, sic contingit etiam timere recte et non recte; sed habitus, qui dirigit animam in timendo, non reponitur in genere virtutis, utpote timor8: ergo nec habitus, qui dirigit in sperando: ergo spes, etiam secundum quod nominat habitum, non est in genere virtutis.

4. Item, « omnis virtus moralis consistit circa bonum et difficile », ut vult Philosophus9, ergo multo fortius gratuita; sed in exspectatione bonorum promissorum nulla est difficultas: ergo cum spes non consistat circa difficile, non videtur esse in genere virtutis gratuitae.

5. Item, nulla virtus gratuita in suo actu repugnat perfectioni meriti; sed spes in suo actu perfectioni meriti repugnat — ex imperfectione enim procedit, quod quis servit Deo propter retributionem futuram, quia, secundum quod dicit Bernardus10, « caritas praemium non intuetur » — si ergo spes facit exspectare retributionem futuram, videtur perfectioni meriti repugnare: ergo non est in genere virtutis gratuitae.

Conclusio.

Spes est virtus gratuita, immo gratuitarum virtutum ancora et sustentamentum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomine spei potest intelligi affectio animae, iuxta illud quod philosophi et Sancti11 dicunt, quatuor esse animi affectiones, videlicet gaudium et dolorem, spem et timorem. Potest etiam nomine spei intelligi ipsa res exspectata, iuxta illud ad Titum secundo12: Exspectantes beatam spem. Potest nihilominus sumi pro habitu, qui dirigit animae motum et affectum in illud quod exspectandum est. Et isto tertio modo dicendi spes non tantum est virtus gratuita, immo etiam virtutum gratuitarum sustentamentum et ancora. — Virtus quidem gratuita est, quoniam in hoc, quod facit, animam exspectare ea quae sunt supra omnem13 aestimationem humanam et ea quae promisit largitas divina, facit omnino confidere et inniti summae et immensae largitati, sicut fides facit assentire primae Veritati, et caritas facit adhaerere summae Bonitati; et dum anima ipsi immensae largitati innititur propter se et super omnia, rectificatur et super se elevatur et Deo accepta efficitur. Necesse est ergo, quod habitus, quo mediante fit illud, rationem habeat virtutis gratuitae. — Et quia, cum anima innititur ei qui non potest deficere, quamvis ipsa in se sit deficiens et vacillans, fundatur tamen per spem quasi super firmam petram14; et propterea dixi, quod spes non tantummodo est in genere virtutum gratuitarum, sed etiam est earum ancora et sustentamentum. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

Ad obiecta in contrarium:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod spes est passio; iam patet responsio: quia nomen spei aequivoce accipitur, videlicet pro ipsa affectione et pro habitu regulante illius affectionis motum. Unde spes, secundum quod est virtus, est habitus, qui est principium motus, qui est ab anima15; passio autem magis est ad animam; et secundum quod motus exspectationis sive spei ab anima est, sic potest fieri recte et non recte, secundum imperium liberi arbitrii. Et quantum ad hoc habet circa ipsum attendi perfectio virtutis, vel deformatio vitii.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet exspectatio ad futura, sic16 rememoratio ad praeterita; dicendum, quod non est usquequaque simile de rememoratione praeteritorum et de exspectatione futurorum. Non enim sic consistit rectificatio et obliquatio animae principaliter circa ea quae sunt praeterita, sicut circa ea quae sunt futura, nisi ex consequenti. Virtus enim proprie magis ordinat ad id quod agendum est, quam ad id quod actum est. — Praeterea, alia dissimilitudo est, quia rememoratio respicit actum cognitivae, exspectatio autem motum affectivae17; rectitudo autem virtutis non sic attenditur penes ea quae sunt cognitionis, sicut penes ea quae sunt affectionis. Unde etiam rememorationi, secundum quod iungitur affectioni, annectitur actus virtutis, utpote prudentiae, vel poenitentiae, vel caritatis sive benevolentiae: secundum quod recordatur praeteritorum factorum, ut futura melius agat, vel praeteritorum malorum, ut doleat, vel18 praeteritorum beneficiorum, ut gratias agat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor non est in genere virtutis etiam in quantum habitus, ergo nec spes; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia affectio ipsius timoris consistit in quadam resilitione, sed affectio spei consistit in quadam protensione; et ideo affectio timoris plus habet de passione, affectio vero spei plus habet de actione. Et quoniam habitus virtutum dirigunt animam in actibus, in quibus consistit rectitudo vitae, iuxta illud quod dicitur, quod « virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur19 »; hinc est, quod spes magis est in genere virtutis quam timor.

Et ex hac eadem causa patet, quare magis circa affectionem spei consistit habitus virtutis, quam circa aliquam aliarum trium affectionum. Gaudium enim et dolor, quia habent obiecta sibi coniuncta, magis sunt in suscipiendo; affectio vero spei inter ceteras est, quae plus habet de ratione agendi et quae magis dicit motum ab anima; quamvis et ipsa secundum aliquid sui dicat passionem circa animam; et secundum illud non habet circa ipsam consistere habitus virtutis, sed magis secundum quod dicit rationem motus et protensionis ipsius animae in ipsam rem speratam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod exspectare bonum non est difficile; dicendum, quod sicut credere quod videtur non habet difficultatem, credere tamen firmissime quod non videtur habet magnam difficultatem; sic intelligendum est, quod quamvis sperare bona praesentia, quae aliquo modo videntur in se, vel in suo simili, non est multum difficile; bona tamen invisibilia et aeterna, quae oculus non vidit20, exspectare certa fiducia et pro illis temporalia bona contemnere et his omnibus, quae videntur, superferri, hoc magnam habet difficultatem et magnam dignitatem. Et ideo indubitanter verum est, spem esse in genere virtutis gratuitae.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod spes in suo actu impedit meriti perfectionem; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo, sicut ostendit Apostolus21, consurgit ex perfectione meriti; quanto enim aliquis maiora et meliora habet merita, tanto firmius et certius sperat. — Et si obiiciatur, quod « caritas praemium non intuetur »; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de praemio creato; de praemio autem increato non habet veritatem, quia maxima caritas maxime desiderat uniri Deo et habere Deum. Spes autem perfecta magis aspicit mercedem increatam, de qua dixit Dominus Abrahae, Genesis decimo quinto22: Ego merces tua, quam creatam. Eum enim exspectat quis per spei habitum tenere in patria, cui per caritatem in via uniri desiderabat. — Alius est etiam modus respondendi distinguendo in mercimonia, qua quis servit Deo propter praemium, quod exspectat: quia quaedam est mercimonia, quae constituit finem in proprio commodo; et ista est mercimonia mala et non procedit a spe recta et formata. Quaedam etiam est, quae non constituit finem in proprio bono, sed totum confert et ordinat ad Bonum summum; et hanc mercimoniam facit spes, quae est virtus gratuita; et haec merito non repugnat. — Primus tamen modus dicendi videtur esse rationabilior, quia spes stare potest, exclusa omni intentione dile-

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ctionis mercenariae. Quantumcumque enim amor sit perfectus23 in via, est sibi virtus spei coniuncta. Unde simpliciter dicendum est, quod exspectatio boni aeterni non est mercenaria nec minuit meritum nec facit ad imperfectionem caritatis vel meriti, nisi in quantum mens hominis multum affectuose et intense aspicit ad commodum proprii boni. Multi autem sunt qui beatitudinem exspectant, et tamen parum de se et multum de Deo curant.

Scholion

I. Spes in genere, ut est quaedam affectio animi, « de ratione sua dicit extensionem appetitus in aliquod arduum, quod non omnino excedit facultatem sperantis » (S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2.). De spe, ut est virtus, dicit S. Bonav. (infra q. 3. ad 4.): « Exspectatio spei consistit in quadam protensione ad bona aeterna, quae quidem consurgit ex confidentia, qua anima innititur ipsi Deo ex tota virtute sua ». — Tres spei definitiones vide infra dub. 2. — De obiecto materiali et formali spei cfr. infra dub. 14. et a. 2. q. 1. — Quoad obiectum materiale, quod ab aliis etiam vocatur formale quod sive terminativum, communiter dicitur, quod est sive ipse Deus, sive beatitudo aeterna, scilicet futura. Sed observandum est, quod beatitudo distinguitur in formalem et obiectivam; prima est quid creatum et consistit in actu visionis et fruitionis; altera est ipse Deus, sive ut possessus, sive ut possidendus. Durand. (hic q. 2.), a communissima aliorum sententia recedens, tenet, quod « immediatum obiectum spei non sit ipse Deus, sed beatitudo formalis », ita quod Deus sit quidem obiectum spei principale, sed mediatum. Hoc autem intelligit « de obiecto, quod est res sperata, quia, si obiectum spei dicatur id, a quo speramus beatitudinem, tunc ipse Deus est obiectum immediatum ». Ceteri doctores concorditer docent, ipsum Deum esse immediatum et primarium obiectum spei; bona vero creata, quae ad beatitudinem conducunt, vel ipsi annexa sunt, esse ipsius obiectum secundarium (cfr. infra q. 3. ad 3. et dub. 4.). Tamen circa relationem beatitudinis formalis ad obiectivam est duplex modus dicendi. Schola Scoti vult, obiectum materiale primarium non esse nec solum Deum nec solam eiusdem fruitionem, sed duo simul, scil. Deum possidendum; econtra multi ex schola S. Thomae dicunt, illud esse tantum Deum, at cum connotatione possessionis, ita ut possessio sive consecutio Dei non sit obiectum nec pars obiecti, sed solummodo conditio obiecti. Quidquid sit de his, manifesta est doctrina S. Thomae (S. 1. II. q. 11. a. 3. ad 3.), quod, cum finis dicatur dupliciter: uno modo ipsa res, alio modo adeptio rei, haec « non sunt duo fines, sed unus finis in se consideratus et alteri applicatus... Sicut igitur non est alius finis Deus et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis est, qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione. Et eadem ratio est de beatitudine creata, quae in fruitione consistit ». — In assignando obiecto formali quo plures sunt opiniones, de quibus nonnulla referuntur infra in scholio ad a. 2. q. 4.

II. Quod spes est virtus vere et proprie, praeclare hic probatur; a qua conclusione solus Durand. (hic q. 1.) recedit contendens, quod spes, sicut et fides, sit quidem virtus, sed non nisi « largo modo accipiendo virtutem ». — Notanda est solutio ad 5, qua S. Bonav. contra illos Protestantes, qui operari ex spe praemii volebant esse rem vilis mercenarii, iam anticipavit doctrinam Concilii Trid. (Sess. VI. can. 31.): « Si quis dixerit, iustificatum peccare, dum intuitu aeternae mercedis bene operatur, a. s. »; et can. 27: « Si quis dixerit, iustos non debere pro bonis operibus, quae in Deo fuerint facta, exspectare et sperare aeternam retributionem a Deo per eius misericordiam et Iesu Christi meritum, si bene agendo et divina mandata custodiendo usque in finem perseveraverint, a. s. » (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2. et praecipue d. 27. a. 2. q. 2.). — Verba (ibid.): « Maxima caritas maxime desiderat uniri Deo et habere Deum » etc., elidunt etiam celeberrimi Fenelon errorem, reprobatum ab Innocentio XII. an. 1699, quo, sub praetextu amoris purissimi, actus sperandi mercedem aeternae fruitionis a statu perfectionis videbatur excludi.

III. De hac quaestione praeter Durandum: Scot. (de hac et seqq. qq.), in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 17. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

IV. Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem constat, spem esse virtutem specialem a fide et caritate aliisque virtutibus distinctam. Hoc disertis verbis docet Scotus (hic q. unica n. 10.), licet (n. 2.) referat aliam opinionem quorundam, quod scilicet duae virtutes theologicae sufficiant, de qua dicit: « Tamen si auctoritas contemneretur, innitendo rationi naturali tantum... negaretur, spem esse virtutem distinctam a fide et caritate »; pro qua falsa opinione affert plura argumenta, at concludit: « Via illa non placet, quia videtur obviare auctoritatibus Sanctorum innitentibus dicto Pauli. » De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Article (sole article). On hope according to the absolute consideration.

Question I. Whether hope is a gratuitous virtue.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether hope is a gratuitous virtue. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. To the Romans, chapter eight1: By hope we have been made safe; but that which makes us attain to salvation, that especially holds the formal character of a gratuitous virtue: if then hope is of this kind, then it is a gratuitous virtue.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm2: The Lord is well pleased with them that fear him, and in them that hope upon his mercy; but that which renders one acceptable to God either is a gratuitous virtue, or a habit more excellent than it, such as the habit of a gift, or of a beatitude: if then hope is not counted among the habits of the gifts and beatitudes, it must necessarily be counted among the habits of the gratuitous virtues.

3. Likewise, a habit directly opposed to fault has in itself the formal character of a gratuitous virtue; but hope is on every side opposed to fault, since it is opposed to presumption and to despair3: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as it is difficult to believe what is above reason, so it is difficult to await what is above all estimation; but through hope is awaited that good which neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man4: therefore just as faith is the virtue by which things invisible are believed, so it seems that hope is the virtue by which things inestimable are awaited, that is, spiritual and eternal goods.

5. Likewise, that which most of all strengthens the soul and rectifies and delights it, that most of all has the formal character of a gratuitous virtue — for a virtue is a regulative and confirmative habit of a power, which makes the very soul rejoice concerning the things that are right, as the Philosopher holds5 — but hope is of this kind — for it confirms and delights, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter six: We have a most strong comfort, by which we flee to the hope set before us, which we hold as an anchor etc.; and to the Romans, chapter twelve: Rejoicing in hope — it seems therefore manifestly that hope is in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

On the contrary: 1. No passion is a virtue: hope is one of the four passions, as Boethius says in On Consolation6: therefore hope is not a virtue. The first [premise] is proved by what the Philosopher says,

that « since there are three things in the soul: powers, passions and habits, virtue is not in the genus of passion, but in the genus of habit ». If then hope is not a virtue, it is established that neither is it a gratuitous virtue.

2. Likewise, just as it happens that one awaits things future, so it happens that one remembers things past7; but the remembering of things past is not a virtue, nor does any special virtue consist about it: therefore neither does any virtue consist about the awaiting of things future. But the awaiting of things future either is hope itself, or proceeds from it: therefore it seems that hope itself has not [the property] to be a virtue.

3. Likewise, just as it happens to hope rightly and not rightly, so it also happens to fear rightly and not rightly; but the habit which directs the soul in fearing is not placed in the genus of virtue, as for instance fear8: therefore neither [is] the habit which directs in hoping: therefore hope, even insofar as it names a habit, is not in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, « every moral virtue consists about the good and the difficult », as the Philosopher holds9, therefore much more strongly the gratuitous [virtue]; but in the awaiting of promised goods there is no difficulty: therefore since hope does not consist about the difficult, it does not seem to be in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

5. Likewise, no gratuitous virtue in its act is opposed to the perfection of merit; but hope in its act is opposed to the perfection of merit — for it proceeds from imperfection that one serves God for the sake of future recompense, since, as Bernard says10, « charity does not look to reward » — if then hope makes one await future recompense, it seems to be opposed to the perfection of merit: therefore it is not in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

Conclusion.

Hope is a gratuitous virtue, indeed the anchor and support of the gratuitous virtues.

I respond: It must be said that by the name of hope can be understood an affection of the soul, according to that which the philosophers and the Saints11 say, that there are four affections of the mind, namely joy and grief, hope and fear. By the name of hope can also be understood the very thing awaited, according to that [text] to Titus, chapter two12: Awaiting the blessed hope. It can nonetheless be taken for the habit which directs the motion and affection of the soul toward that which is to be awaited. And in this third manner of speaking hope is not only a gratuitous virtue, but indeed also the support and anchor of the gratuitous virtues. — It is indeed a gratuitous virtue, because in this, that it makes the soul await the things that are above all13 human estimation and the things that divine bounty has promised, it makes [the soul] wholly trust and lean upon the supreme and immense bounty, just as faith makes [it] assent to the first Truth, and charity makes [it] cleave to the supreme Goodness; and while the soul leans upon that immense bounty for its own sake and above all things, it is rectified and raised above itself and made acceptable to God. It is necessary therefore that the habit by whose mediation that is brought about should have the formal character of a gratuitous virtue. — And because, when the soul leans upon him who cannot fail, although it itself is in itself failing and wavering, it is nonetheless founded through hope as upon a firm rock14; and on that account I said that hope is not only in the genus of gratuitous virtues, but is also their anchor and support. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

To the objections on the contrary:

1. As to that which is first objected on the contrary, that hope is a passion; the response is already plain: for the name of hope is taken equivocally, namely for the very affection and for the habit regulating the motion of that affection. Hence hope, insofar as it is a virtue, is a habit which is the principle of motion, which is from the soul15; but passion is rather toward the soul; and insofar as the motion of awaiting or of hope is from the soul, it can thus be done rightly and not rightly, according to the command of free choice. And as to this, the perfection of virtue, or the deformity of vice, is to be regarded about it.

2. As to that which is objected, that as awaiting stands to things future, so16 remembering [stands] to things past; it must be said that the case is not in every respect alike concerning the remembering of things past and the awaiting of things future. For the rectification and the bending-aside of the soul does not consist principally about the things that are past in the way it does about the things that are future, except consequently. For virtue properly orders rather to that which is to be done than to that which has been done. — Moreover, there is another dissimilarity, because remembering regards the act of the cognitive [power], but awaiting [regards] the motion of the affective [power]17; but the rectitude of virtue is not so regarded in respect of the things that belong to cognition as in respect of the things that belong to affection. Hence even to remembering, insofar as it is joined to affection, is annexed an act of virtue, as for instance of prudence, or of penance, or of charity or benevolence: insofar as one recalls past deeds, that one may act better in future, or past evils, that one may grieve, or18 past benefits, that one may give thanks.

3. As to that which is objected, that fear is not in the genus of virtue even insofar as it is a habit, therefore neither is hope; it must be said that the case is not alike, because the affection of fear itself consists in a certain recoiling, but the affection of hope consists in a certain stretching-forth; and therefore the affection of fear has more of passion, but the affection of hope has more of action. And since the habits of the virtues direct the soul in acts, in which the rectitude of life consists, according to that which is said, that « virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly19 »; hence it is that hope is more in the genus of virtue than fear.

And from this same cause it is plain why the habit of virtue consists rather about the affection of hope than about any of the other three affections. For joy and grief, because they have their objects conjoined to them, are more in the receiving; but the affection of hope is, among the rest, that which has more of the character of acting and which more states a motion from the soul; although it too according to something of itself states a passion about the soul; and according to that it does not belong to it that the habit of virtue should consist about it, but rather insofar as it states the character of motion and of the stretching-forth of the soul itself into the very thing hoped for.

4. As to that which is objected, that to await a good is not difficult; it must be said that just as to believe what is seen has no difficulty, yet to believe most firmly what is not seen has great difficulty; so it is to be understood that although to hope for present goods, which are in some manner seen in themselves, or in their like, is not very difficult; yet to await with sure confidence invisible and eternal goods, which the eye has not seen20, and for their sake to despise temporal goods and to be borne above all those things that are seen — this has great difficulty and great dignity. And therefore it is undoubtedly true that hope is in the genus of a gratuitous virtue.

5. As to that which is objected last, that hope in its act hinders the perfection of merit; it must be said that this is false, indeed, as the Apostle shows21, it arises from the perfection of merit; for the greater and better merits one has, the more firmly and surely one hopes. — And if it be objected that « charity does not look to reward »; it must be said that this is understood of created reward; but concerning uncreated reward it has no truth, because the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God and to possess God. But perfect hope looks rather to the uncreated reward, of which the Lord said to Abraham, Genesis chapter fifteen22: I am thy reward, than to the created. For one awaits through the habit of hope to hold in the fatherland him to whom by charity in the way one desired to be united. — There is also another manner of responding, by distinguishing in the bargaining by which one serves God for the sake of the reward which one awaits: for there is a certain bargaining which sets its end in one's own advantage; and this is an evil bargaining and does not proceed from right and formed hope. There is also a certain [bargaining] which does not set its end in one's own good, but refers and orders the whole to the supreme Good; and this bargaining hope makes, which is a gratuitous virtue; and this is rightly not opposed [to merit]. — Yet the first manner of speaking seems to be more reasonable, because hope can stand, with every intention of mercenary love

excluded. For however perfect love may be23 in the way, the virtue of hope is conjoined to it. Hence it must simply be said that the awaiting of the eternal good is not mercenary, nor does it diminish merit, nor does it conduce to the imperfection of charity or of merit, except insofar as the mind of man looks very affectionately and intensely to the advantage of his own good. But there are many who await beatitude, and yet care little about themselves and much about God.

Scholion

I. Hope in general, as it is a certain affection of the mind, « by its very character states an extension of the appetite into something arduous, which does not wholly exceed the faculty of the one hoping » (St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2.). Of hope as it is a virtue, St. Bonaventure says (below q. 3. ad 4.): « The awaiting of hope consists in a certain stretching-forth toward eternal goods, which indeed arises from the confidence by which the soul leans upon God himself with its whole strength ». — See the three definitions of hope below, dub. 2. — On the material and formal object of hope cf. below dub. 14. and a. 2. q. 1. — As to the material object, which by others is also called the formal which or the terminative, it is commonly said that it is either God himself, or eternal beatitude, namely future. But it must be observed that beatitude is distinguished into formal and objective; the first is something created and consists in the act of vision and fruition; the other is God himself, whether as possessed, or as to be possessed. Durand (here q. 2.), departing from the most common opinion of others, holds that « the immediate object of hope is not God himself, but formal beatitude », so that God is indeed the principal object of hope, but the mediate one. But he understands this « of the object which is the thing hoped for, since, if the object of hope be called that from which we hope for beatitude, then God himself is the immediate object ». The other doctors agree in teaching that God himself is the immediate and primary object of hope; but the created goods, which conduce to beatitude, or are annexed to it, are its secondary object (cf. below q. 3. ad 3. and dub. 4.). Yet concerning the relation of formal beatitude to objective there is a twofold manner of speaking. The school of Scotus holds that the primary material object is neither God alone nor the fruition of him alone, but the two together, namely God to be possessed; on the contrary many of the school of St. Thomas say that it is God alone, but with the connotation of possession, so that possession or the attaining of God is not the object nor part of the object, but only a condition of the object. Whatever be of these, the doctrine of St. Thomas is manifest (S. 1. II. q. 11. a. 3. ad 3.), that, since the end is said in two ways: in one way the thing itself, in another way the attainment of the thing, these « are not two ends, but one end considered in itself and applied to another... As therefore God and the fruition of God are not another end; so the account of fruition is the same by which we enjoy God and by which we enjoy the divine fruition. And the account is the same concerning created beatitude, which consists in fruition ». — In assigning the formal object by which there are several opinions, of which some are reported below in the scholion on a. 2. q. 4.

II. That hope is a virtue truly and properly is here excellently proved; from which conclusion Durand alone (here q. 1.) departs, contending that hope, like faith also, is indeed a virtue, but only « taking virtue in a broad sense ». — Notable is the solution to [objection] 5, by which St. Bonaventure, against those Protestants who held that to act from the hope of reward was the act of a base mercenary, already anticipated the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI. can. 31.): « If anyone shall say that the justified man sins when he does good with a view to the eternal reward, let him be anathema »; and can. 27: « If anyone shall say that the just ought not, for the good works which have been done in God, to await and hope for an eternal recompense from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by acting well and keeping the divine commandments they persevere unto the end, let him be anathema » (cf. below a. 2. q. 2. and especially d. 27. a. 2. q. 2.). — The words (ibid.): « The greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God and to possess God » etc., also refute the error of the most celebrated Fénelon, reprobated by Innocent XII in the year 1699, by which, under the pretext of purest love, the act of hoping for the reward of eternal fruition seemed to be excluded from the state of perfection.

III. On this question, besides Durand: Scotus (on this and the following questions), in both Writings here a single question. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 17. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. little-question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here a single question. — Biel, on this and the following questions here a single question.

IV. As to the following (2nd) question, it is established that hope is a special virtue distinct from faith and charity and the other virtues. This Scotus teaches in express words (here q. unica n. 10.), although (n. 2.) he reports another opinion of certain men, namely that two theological virtues suffice, of which he says: « Yet if authority were despised, leaning on natural reason alone... it would be denied that hope is a virtue distinct from faith and charity »; for which false opinion he brings forward several arguments, but concludes: « That way is not pleasing, because it seems to oppose the authorities of the Saints leaning on the saying of Paul. » On this question: St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3. little-question 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 3. — Durand, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 24. [Rom. 8, 24.]
    Verse 24. [Rom. 8, 24.]
  2. Psalm. 146, 11. — De minori cfr. infra d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.
    Ps. 146, 11. — On the minor [premise] cf. below d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. and following.
  3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Cf. here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1.
  4. Epist. I. Cor. 2, 9. — De fide vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.
    First Epistle to the Corinthians 2, 9. — On faith see above d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.
  5. Vide I. Rhetor. c. 20. (c. 9.); I. Ethic. c. 8; II. c. 3-6. et IV. c. 1. ac de Virtutibus, in fine. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Hebr. 6, 18; alter Rom. 12, 12. — In maiori pro animam codd. A F H K N U bb animum, codd. G I L V aa animus.
    See Rhetoric I, c. 20 (c. 9); Ethics I, c. 8; II, c. 3–6, and IV, c. 1, and On the Virtues, at the end. — The following Scripture text is Heb. 6, 18; the other is Rom. 12, 12. — In the major [premise], for animam codd. A F H K N U bb [read] animum, codd. G I L V aa animus.
  6. Libr. I. metr. 7: / Gaudia pelle, / Pelle timorem, / Spemque fugato, / Nec dolor adsit. / Aristot. sententia invenitur II. Ethic. c. 3.
    Book I, metre 7: / "Drive off joys, / Drive off fear, / And put hope to flight, / Nor let grief be present." / The maxim of Aristotle is found in Ethics II, c. 3.
  7. Aristot., de Memoria et reminisc. c. 1: Est enim praesentis quidem sensus, futuri vero spes, facti autem memoria.
    Aristotle, On Memory and Reminiscence, c. 1: "For of the present there is indeed sensation, but of the future hope, and of what has been done, memory."
  8. Secundum philosophos timor est affectus sive passio, quae regitur a fortitudine (cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. et III. c. 6.); secundum theologos autem est donum Spiritus S. (cfr. infra d. 34. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. et p. II. per totam).
    According to the philosophers, fear is an affect or passion, which is governed by fortitude (cf. Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 5, and III, c. 6); but according to the theologians it is a gift of the Holy Spirit (cf. below d. 34. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. and p. II. throughout).
  9. Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 1. Paulo inferius pro non consistat cod. C non consistit nisi.
    Ethics II, c. 3. Cf. above p. 488, note 1. A little below, for non consistat cod. C [reads] non consistit nisi.
  10. De Diligendo Deo, c. 7. n. 17: Non enim sine praemio diligitur Deus, etsi absque praemii intuitu diligendus sit. Vacua namque vera caritas esse non potest, nec tamen mercenaria est, quippe non quaerit quae sua sunt (I. Cor. 13, 5.)... Verus amor praemium non requirit, sed meretur etc. Cfr. Serm. 83. in Cantica, n. 4. seq. — Paulo ante pro servit cod. A serviat.
    On Loving God, c. 7, n. 17: "For God is not loved without reward, although he is to be loved without a view to reward. For true charity cannot be empty, nor yet is it mercenary, since it does not seek the things that are its own (1 Cor. 13, 5)... True love does not require a reward, but earns it" etc. Cf. Sermon 83 on the Canticle, n. 4 and following. — A little before, for servit cod. A [reads] serviat.
  11. Sic, ut unum sanctum auctorem afferamus, dicit Hieronymus, I. in Ezech. 1, 7: Audisse me memini quatuor perturbationes, de quibus plenissime Cicero in Tusculanis [libr. III. et IV.] disputat: gaudii, aegritudinis, cupidinis et timoris, quorum duo praesentia, duo futura sunt... de quibus et Virgilius breviter [Aen. VI. 733.]: Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 8, ubi Stoicorum de hac re sententia exponitur. Horat., I. Epist. epist. 6. canit: Gaudeat, an doleat, cupiat metuatve, quid ad rem? — Pro animae edd. animi.
    Thus, to cite one holy author, Jerome says, On Ezekiel I, 1, 7: "I remember to have heard of four perturbations, which Cicero discusses most fully in the Tusculans [books III and IV]: of joy, of distress, of desire, and of fear, of which two are present, two are future... concerning which Virgil also briefly [Aen. VI, 733]: 'Hence they fear and desire, grieve and rejoice.'" Cf. Augustine, City of God XIV, c. 8, where the opinion of the Stoics on this matter is set forth. Horace, Epistles I, epistle 6, sings: "Whether one rejoices, or grieves, desires or fears, what does it matter?" — For animae the editions [read] animi.
  12. Vers. 13. — Paulo inferius pro affectum codd. A K affectionem.
    Verse 13. [Titus 2, 13.] — A little below, for affectum codd. A K [read] affectionem.
  13. Pro omnem codd. A U V communem. Aliquanto inferius pro et Deo accepta codd. A G U et ideo accepta, et mox pro fit illud cod. F anima innititur.
    For omnem codd. A U V [read] communem. Somewhat below, for et Deo accepta codd. A G U [read] et ideo accepta, and presently for fit illud cod. F [reads] anima innititur.
  14. Respicitur illud Matth. 7, 24: Omnis ergo, qui audit verba mea haec et facit ea, assimilabitur viro sapienti, qui aedificavit domum suam supra petram etc. — August., Enarrat. in Ps. 64. n. 3: Iam desiderio ibi [in caelis] sumus, iam spem in illam terram quasi ancoram praemisimus, ne in isto mari turbati naufragemus etc. — Pro et propterea dixi, quod habent codd. et edd., in Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal., congruentius legitur ideo dicitur.
    There is regarded that [text of] Matt. 7, 24: "Everyone therefore who hears these my words and does them shall be likened to a wise man, who built his house upon a rock" etc. — Augustine, Expositions on the Psalms, on Ps. 64, n. 3: "Already by desire we are there [in heaven], already we have sent hope ahead into that land as an anchor, lest, tossed about in this sea, we suffer shipwreck" etc. — For et propterea dixi, quod, which the codd. and edd. have, in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales it is more fittingly read ideo dicitur.
  15. Cfr. supra pag. 388, nota 2. — Paulo ante edd. voci habitus adiungunt gratuitus. In fine solut. pro vel deformatio codd. A K et deformatio.
    Cf. above p. 388, note 2. — A little before, the editions add to the word habitus the word gratuitus. At the end of the solution, for vel deformatio codd. A K [read] et deformatio.
  16. Hic codd. A K N repetunt se habet.
    Here codd. A K N repeat se habet.
  17. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 5.
    Cf. below a. 2. q. 5.
  18. Pro vel, quod in codd. I L desideratur, plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 ita.
    For vel, which is wanting in codd. I L, very many codd. and edd. 1, 2 [read] ita.
  19. Secundum August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 50. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 5, et Comment. dub. 3. — De discrimine, quod inter timorem interest et spem, vide infra a. 2. q. 1. et d. 34. p. II. dub. 1. — Quomodo gaudium, dolor et spes inter se differant, vide infra a. 2. q. 4. — Inferius pro suscipiendo edd. sustinendo.
    According to Augustine, On Free Choice II, c. 19, n. 50. Cf. II Sentences, text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5, and the Commentary, dub. 3. — On the difference that lies between fear and hope, see below a. 2. q. 1. and d. 34. p. II. dub. 1. — How joy, grief, and hope differ among themselves, see below a. 2. q. 4. — Below, for suscipiendo the editions [read] sustinendo.
  20. Epist. I. Cor. 2, 9. Quae S. Bonav. hic profert, non aliena sunt ab illa sententia, quae habetur in Comment. Epist. ad Rom. 3, 3, olim Ambrosio tributo: Contemnere enim praesentia et quae oblectamento sunt, et in pressura non cedere spe futurorum magni meriti est apud Deum. — Paulo ante pro tamen codd. A K N T aa et edd. 1, 2 autem. Mox pro et his omnibus cod. A et ex his omnibus, et deinde pro hoc [Vat. hic] magnam habet cod. C haec magnam habent.
    First Epistle to the Corinthians 2, 9. What St. Bonaventure here brings forward is not foreign to that opinion which is found in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 3, 3, formerly attributed to Ambrose: "For to despise things present and those that are for delight, and in pressure not to yield, by hope of things to come, is of great merit before God." — A little before, for tamen codd. A K N T aa and edd. 1, 2 [read] autem. Presently, for et his omnibus cod. A [reads] et ex his omnibus, and then for hoc [Vat. hic] magnam habet cod. C [reads] haec magnam habent.
  21. Praeter locc. supra in fundam. 1. et 3. citt. vide Rom. 5, 1. seqq.: Patientia autem probationem [operatur], probatio vero spem, spes autem non confundit etc. Ibid. 15, 4: Ut per patientiam... spem habeamus; et v. 13: Deus autem spei repleat vos... ut abundetis in spe etc. Vide infra a. 2. q. 2. — Pro ostendit edd. dicit.
    Besides the passages cited above in fundamenta 1 and 3, see Rom. 5, 1 and following: "But patience [works] probation, and probation hope, and hope does not confound" etc. Ibid. 15, 4: "That through patience... we may have hope"; and v. 13: "Now may the God of hope fill you... that you may abound in hope" etc. See below a. 2. q. 2. — For ostendit the editions [read] dicit.
  22. Vers. 1. — Mox edd. omittunt quam creatam.
    Verse 1. [Gen. 15, 1.] — Presently the editions omit quam creatam.
  23. Codd. A K perfectionis. Circa finem solut. pro Multi autem cod. A Multi enim.
    Codd. A K [read] perfectionis. Near the end of the solution, for Multi autem cod. A [reads] Multi enim.
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