Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 34
Articulus II. De timore gratuito.
Consequenter quaeritur de timore gratuito; et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur de ipso timore quantum ad eius divisionem.
Secundo quaeritur de eodem quantum ad eius diminutionem.
Tertio et ultimo quaeritur quantum ad eius evacuationem.
Quaestio I. Utrum timor initialis et filialis sint diversae timoris species.
Circa primum sic proceditur, et est quaestio de timore gratuito quantum ad divisionem eius, qua dividitur in initialem et filialem, utrum istae sint diversae timoris species. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo per divisionem Magistri1, qua dividit timorem in quatuor differentias; et omnes aliae differentiae sunt formaliter differentes: videtur ergo, quod similiter sit reperire circa timorem initialem et filialem.
2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia timor initialis et filialis aut distinguuntur quantum ad essentialem differentiam, aut solum quantum ad statum. Si primo modo: hinc habeo propositum. Si secundo modo; contra: quia timor habet esse in triplici statu, secundum quod triplex est status hominis iusti, videlicet in statu incipientis, proficientis et perfecti: cum ergo Magister illam differentiam non apponat, videtur, quod aut est insufficiens, aut istas differentias timoris non assignat solummodo quoad statum. Nec tantum divisio Magistri videtur esse insufficiens, immo etiam divisio Augustini2 et aliorum, qui de hac materia loquuntur, qui solummodo in has species dividunt timorem gratuitum.
3. Item, diversitas habituum venit ex diversitate obiectorum; sed sicut Magister3 innuit, et communiter etiam tenetur, quod timor initialis habet oculum ad poenam, timor vero filialis habet oculum ad offensam: ergo videtur, quod hic timor et ille sint diversae species timoris.
4. Item, timor initialis medium tenet inter servilem et filialem et quantum ad rationem deveniendi, quia per servilem devenitur ad filialem mediante initiali, et etiam quantum ad modum timendi4: cum ergo timor initialis sit diversa species a timore servili, videtur ergo, quod etiam sit diversa species a filiali.
Sed contra:
1. « Si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum; et si unum non dicitur multipliciter, nec reliquum »5; sed spes non habet multiplicari per species et differentias: ergo nec timor.
2. Item, magis perfectum et minus perfectum non diversificant rem quantum ad speciem6; sed timor initialis et filialis differunt, sicut magis perfectum et minus perfectum: ergo secundum speciem non distinguuntur.
3. Item, sicut contingit ponere timorem initialem et filialem, qui est perfectorum, sic etiam contingit ponere amorem initialem et consummatum et perfectum7: cum ergo amor per has differentias non habeat secundum species diversificari, videtur similiter, quod nec timor.
4. Item, quae habent ortum ab eodem secundum speciem sunt eiusdem speciei, quia, si causa est univoca, et effectus univocus; sed timor initialis et castus ortum habent ab amore gratuito, secundum quod vult Augustinus8, et iste est unus amor tantum secundum speciem: ergo videtur, quod similiter sit et in timore.
5. Item, si plures sint timores gratuiti diversi secundum speciem; cum quilibet eorum sit donum Spiritus sancti, tunc videtur, quod dona Spiritus sancti sint plura quam septem9.
6. Item, si timor initialis et gratuitus differunt, hoc non est, nisi quia iste habet oculum ad poenam, ille ad offensam, sicut Magister tangit in littera10. Sed contra: una et eadem species timoris est, qua quis timet Deum offendere et a Deo separari: cum ergo ista sint diversa, et tamen timor non diversificetur respectu horum; videtur similiter, quod diversificari non habeat respectu poenae et offensae, maxime cum videamus, quod timor initialis habeat ad utrumque aspicere.
Conclusio. Timor initialis et filialis non differunt specie, sunt tamen diversi timores ratione statuum, modorum timendi et principalium motivorum.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est duplex modus dicendi.
Quidam enim voluerunt dicere [opinio 1], quod timor initialis et filialis non differunt nisi quantum ad statum, sicut et amor, ex quo timor sub his differentiis trahit originem. Unde sicut amor incipiens et perficiens essentialiter est idem, licet status sit diversus hic et ibi; sic voluerunt dicere se habere in timore initiali et filiali. — Sed illud non videtur sufficere [non sufficit], pro eo quod tertius posset timor assignari inter hos duos, videlicet timor proficiens. Et iterum, non videmus, talem modum distinguendi sive dividendi esse in aliis donis gratuitis, cum tamen in eis sit istos duos status invenire.
Et propterea est alius modus dicendi [opinio 2], quod timor initialis et timor filialis sunt diversae species timoris, et diversus est utrobique modus timendi, et ad diversa intuetur homo secundum illos duos timores. Et huiusmodi signum est, quia unus evacuatur, et alter manet in patria, secundum quod Magister dicit in littera11; quod quidem non esset, si essent idem in essentia. — Verumtamen adhuc istud videtur valde difficile bene intelligere [non probatur], quomodo secundum profectum12 hominis in statu gratiae habent esse in eo diversi habitus timoris formaliter differentes. — Et ideo neuter istorum modorum videtur plane ipsi intellectui satisfacere.
Possumus igitur viam mediam eligere [opinio 3 et via media], ut dicamus, quod timor filialis et initialis non adeo differunt, sicut duae13 species formaliter differentes, cum unus quodam modo sit materialis respectu alterius et quodam modo claudatur in altero. Timor enim initialis timet poenam et offensam; timor vero filialis offensam quidem timet et attendit summi Patris reverentiam. Et sic unus quodam modo se habet ex additione ad alterum14. Et ideo non differunt [conclusio 1] sicut duae species e diverso unum genus dividentes. Nec tamen est ibi differentia solum quantum ad statum, pro eo quod timor initialis principaliter aspicit offensam; timor vero filialis, etsi unum oculum habeat ad offensam, principaliorem tamen habet oculum ad Dei reverentiam. Et quia diversa habent principalia motiva; hinc est, quod sunt diversi modi timendi. Quia vero unum15 clauditur in altero et alteri substernitur; hinc est, quod proprie loquendo, non sunt alterius et alterius speciei. Possunt tamen dici diversi timores [conclusio 2], tum ratione status, tum ratione modorum timendi, tum etiam ratione principalium motivorum; sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, et ideo concedi possunt.
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium [solutio oppositorum], quod spes non habet dividi, ergo nec timor; dicendum, quod ratio illa non valet: quia illud intelligitur non de divisione univoci, sed de divisione multiplicis, sicut patet ex intellectu illius considerationis, quam Philosophus16 ponit. — Si autem quaeras [quaestio incidens solvitur]: quare magis timor habet dividi quam spes? dicendum, quod spes semper principaliter intuetur unum solum et summum bonum; timor autem secundum diversos status modo principaliter intuetur poenam, modo principaliter Dei offensam, modo principaliter Dei reverentiam; et ideo non est simile ex ista parte et ex illa.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis perfectum et minus perfectum non diversificant rem; dicendum, quod proprie loquendo, non est ibi differentia secundum speciem, secundum quod dictum est. Verumtamen ratio illa non valet, quia non solum differunt17 [notandum] penes perfectum et imperfectum, sed etiam penes aliud et aliud principale motivum; licet unum quodam modo praesupponat alterum, et quod erat formale respectu unius fiat materiale respectu alterius.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amore, iam patet responsio, quia non est simile: quia amor non habet differentiam penes motivum, sed solummodo penes statum18; et ideo non distinguitur sicut timor.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illa quae habent ortum ab eodem secundum speciem, sunt eiusdem speciei: dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in his quae generantur secundum generationem univocam [notandum]; cum autem timor ex amore generatur, non est generatio univoca: et propterea ex uno amore secundum speciem non tantum possunt generari diversi timores, immo possunt generari quatuor genera affectionum, secundum Augustinum19, quae formaliter distinguuntur.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc erunt diversa dona; dicendum, quod unus istorum timorum quantum ad illud quod habet nobilitatis et completionis, clauditur in alio: et ideo sub uno dono omnes habent comprehendi, videlicet sub spiritu timoris Domini.
6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod si ratione diversorum motivorum diversificantur, tunc timor initialis et filialis distinguerentur in duos; dicendum, quod non est simile: quoniam, etsi timor initialis ad duo habet oculos suos, ad unum20 [notandum] habet principaliter, ad alterum ex consequenti, similiter et timor filialis: et ideo ratione illius motivi, ad quod principaliter intuetur, unusquisque illorum habet simpliciter unitatem. Sic autem non est in proposito, quia initialis timor principaliter aspicit ad unum, videlicet ne offendat iustitiam, filialis autem principaliter aspicit ad aliud, videlicet ad Patris reverentiam; et ideo non est simile ex hac parte et ex illa.
I. Tertiam opinionem, quam S. Bonav. hic approbat, tenet cum aliis communiter etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 19. a. 8), qui in Comment. affert hanc rationem, quod in timore initiali sit tum actus principalis, scilicet refugere malum, in quo non differt a timore casto; tum secundarius et imperatus, scilicet refugere propter poenam. « Actus autem imperati per accidens comparantur ad habitus imperantes; et ideo timor initialis et castus sunt idem in substantia habitus, differunt tamen accidentaliter ». Sed in Summa arguit ex hoc principio, quod duo isti timores se habeant ad invicem, sicut caritas imperfecta ad perfectam. De eadem quaestione: B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 3.
II. Quoad 2. quaestionem communiter docetur, quod crescente caritate, diminuatur actus timoris, quo timetur poena, non autem actus, quo quis veretur Deum offendere et ab eo separari. De eadem quaestione: S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc.; S. loc. cit. a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3. — Durand., hic q. 6.
III. Solutio ultimae (3.) quaestionis communiter approbatur, licet quidam, ut refert Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 4.), opinentur, « quod illa resilitio (cfr. hic in corp.) non potest dici actus timoris nisi aequivoce, cum nihil aliud sit, quam ex consideratione divinae magnitudinis et parvitatis propriae se sub Deo humiliare; humiliatio autem timor dici non potest nisi aequivoce vel similitudinarie ». Tamen Richard. non recedendum esse censet a communi opinione, quod donum timoris remaneat quoad habitum et quoad « aliquem actum, qui erit vel ille qui factus est in opinione prima [scilicet reverentia divinae maiestatis et resilitio in propriam parvitatem], vel ille quem habet respectu finis » [scilicet gaudere de evasione divinae offensae]. De hac 3. quaestione: S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4; S. loc. cit. a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 5. — Durand., hic q. 3.
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Article II. On gratuitous fear.
It is next asked concerning gratuitous fear; and concerning this three things are asked.
First it is asked about that fear itself with respect to its division.
Second it is asked about the same with respect to its diminution.
Third and last it is asked with respect to its evacuation.
Question I. Whether initial fear and filial fear are diverse species of fear.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is a question about gratuitous fear with respect to its division, by which it is divided into initial and filial, whether these are diverse species of fear. And that they are, it seems:
1. First, by the Master's division1, by which he divides fear into four differences; and all the other differences are formally differing: it seems therefore that the like is to be found regarding initial and filial fear.
2. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason: because initial and filial fear are either distinguished with respect to an essential difference, or only with respect to status. If in the first way: hence I have my thesis. If in the second way; on the contrary: because fear has being in a threefold status, according as the status of the just man is threefold, namely in the status of one beginning, of one progressing, and of one perfected: since therefore the Master does not posit that difference, it seems that either it is insufficient, or he does not assign those differences of fear solely with respect to status. Nor only the Master's division seems to be insufficient, but rather also the division of Augustine2 and of others who speak about this matter, who divide gratuitous fear only into these species.
3. Likewise, diversity of habits comes from diversity of objects; but as the Master3 suggests, and as is also commonly held, that initial fear has its eye on punishment, while filial fear has its eye on offense: therefore it seems that this fear and that are diverse species of fear.
4. Likewise, initial fear holds a middle place between servile and filial both with respect to the ground of arriving — because through servile [fear] one arrives at filial by the mediation of initial — and also with respect to the mode of fearing4: since therefore initial fear is a diverse species from servile fear, it seems therefore that it is also a diverse species from filial.
On the contrary:
1. « If one of opposites is said in many ways, so also the other; and if one is not said in many ways, neither is the other »5; but hope cannot be multiplied through species and differences: therefore neither can fear.
2. Likewise, the more perfect and the less perfect do not diversify a thing with respect to species6; but initial and filial fear differ as the more perfect and the less perfect: therefore they are not distinguished according to species.
3. Likewise, just as it happens that one posits initial and filial fear, which is of the perfected, so too it happens that one posits initial and consummated and perfect love7: since therefore love is not to be diversified according to species through these differences, it seems likewise that neither is fear.
4. Likewise, things that have their origin from the same thing according to species are of the same species, because, if the cause is univocal, so is the effect univocal; but initial and chaste fear have their origin from gratuitous love, according as Augustine holds8, and this is one love only according to species: therefore it seems that it is likewise also in fear.
5. Likewise, if there are several gratuitous fears diverse according to species; since each of them is a gift of the Holy Spirit, then it seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are more than seven9.
6. Likewise, if initial and gratuitous fear differ, this is not except because the one has its eye on punishment, the other on offense, as the Master touches on in the letter10. But on the contrary: it is one and the same species of fear by which one fears to offend God and to be separated from God: since therefore these are diverse, and yet fear is not diversified with respect to them; it seems likewise that it need not be diversified with respect to punishment and offense, especially since we see that initial fear has regard to both.
Conclusion. Initial and filial fear do not differ in species, yet they are diverse fears by reason of their statuses, of the modes of fearing, and of the principal motives.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold manner of speaking.
For certain men wished to say [opinion 1] that initial and filial fear differ only with respect to status, just as does love also, from which fear under these differences draws its origin. Hence just as beginning and perfecting love is essentially the same, although the status be diverse here and there; so they wished to hold it to be in initial and filial fear. — But that does not seem to suffice [it does not suffice], for the reason that a third fear could be assigned between these two, namely progressing fear. And again, we do not see such a mode of distinguishing or dividing to exist in the other gratuitous gifts, although in them too these two statuses are to be found.
And therefore there is another manner of speaking [opinion 2], that initial fear and filial fear are diverse species of fear, and the mode of fearing is diverse in each, and a man looks to diverse things according to those two fears. And a sign of this is that the one is evacuated, and the other remains in the fatherland, according as the Master says in the letter11; which indeed would not be, if they were the same in essence. — Yet still this seems very difficult to understand well [it is not proved], namely how according to the progress12 of a man in the status of grace there should be in him diverse habits of fear formally differing. — And therefore neither of these manners seems plainly to satisfy the intellect itself.
We can therefore choose a middle way [opinion 3 and the middle way], so that we say that filial and initial fear do not differ so much as two13 species formally differing, since the one is in a certain way material with respect to the other and in a certain way is enclosed in the other. For initial fear fears punishment and offense; but filial fear indeed fears offense and attends to the reverence of the most high Father. And thus the one in a certain way is related by an addition to the other14. And therefore they do not differ [conclusion 1] as two species dividing one genus from opposite sides. Nor yet is there a difference there only with respect to status, for the reason that initial fear principally regards offense; while filial fear, even if it have one eye on offense, nevertheless has its more principal eye on the reverence of God. And because they have diverse principal motives; hence it is that they are diverse modes of fearing. But because the one15 is enclosed in the other and is laid under the other; hence it is that, properly speaking, they are not of one and another species. Yet they can be called diverse fears [conclusion 2], both by reason of status, by reason of the modes of fearing, and also by reason of the principal motives; as the reasons adduced for the first part show, and therefore they can be conceded.
To the arguments:
1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary [solution of the opposing arguments], that hope cannot be divided, therefore neither can fear; it must be said that that reasoning is not valid: because that is understood not of the division of what is univocal, but of the division of what is manifold, as is plain from the understanding of that consideration which the Philosopher16 sets down. — But if you should ask [an incidental question is solved]: why does fear have being divided more than hope? it must be said that hope always principally looks to one sole and highest good; but fear according to diverse statuses now principally looks to punishment, now principally to the offense of God, now principally to the reverence of God; and therefore it is not alike on this side and on that.
2. To that which is objected, that the more perfect and the less perfect do not diversify a thing; it must be said that, properly speaking, there is not there a difference according to species, according as has been said. Yet that reasoning is not valid, because they differ not only17 [note] in respect of the perfect and the imperfect, but also in respect of one and another principal motive; although the one in a certain way presupposes the other, and what was formal with respect to the one becomes material with respect to the other.
3. To that which is objected concerning love, the response is already plain, because it is not alike: because love does not have its difference in respect of motive, but only in respect of status18; and therefore it is not distinguished as fear is.
4. To that which is objected, that those things which have their origin from the same thing according to species are of the same species: it must be said that that holds true in those things which are generated according to univocal generation [note]; but since fear is generated from love, the generation is not univocal: and therefore from one love according to species not only can diverse fears be generated, but rather four genera of affections can be generated, according to Augustine19, which are formally distinguished.
5. To that which is objected, that then there would be diverse gifts; it must be said that one of those fears, with respect to that which it has of nobility and completion, is enclosed in the other: and therefore under one gift they all have to be comprehended, namely under the spirit of the fear of the Lord.
6. To that which is objected last, that if they are diversified by reason of diverse motives, then initial and filial fear would be distinguished into two; it must be said that it is not alike: because, even though initial fear has its eyes on two things, it has them principally on one20 [note], on the other consequently, and likewise filial fear: and therefore by reason of that motive to which it principally looks, each of them has simply a unity. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because initial fear principally regards one thing, namely lest it offend justice, while filial fear principally regards another, namely the reverence of the Father; and therefore it is not alike on this side and on that.
I. The third opinion, which St. Bonaventure here approves, is commonly held with others also by St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 3, sub-question 2; Summa II–II, q. 19, a. 8), who in the Commentary brings forward this reasoning, that in initial fear there is both a principal act, namely to flee evil, in which it does not differ from chaste fear; and a secondary and commanded act, namely to flee on account of punishment. « But commanded acts are compared per accidens to the commanding habits; and therefore initial and chaste fear are the same in substance of habit, yet differ accidentally ». But in the Summa he argues from this principle, that these two fears are related to one another as imperfect charity to perfect. On the same question: Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 4, sub-question 1. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the two following questions, here q. 3.
II. As to the 2nd question it is commonly taught that, charity increasing, the act of fear by which punishment is feared is diminished, but not the act by which one is in awe of offending God and being separated from him. On the same question: St. Thomas, here at the cited place, the sub-question; the same at the cited place, a. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the cited place, sub-question 3. — Durandus, here q. 6.
III. The solution of the last (3rd) question is commonly approved, although certain men, as Richard of Mediavilla reports (here a. 2, q. 4), are of the opinion « that that recoiling (cf. here in the body) cannot be called an act of fear except equivocally, since it is nothing other than, from the consideration of the divine greatness and of one's own littleness, to humble oneself under God; but humiliation cannot be called fear except equivocally or by way of likeness ». Yet Richard holds that one must not depart from the common opinion, that the gift of fear remains as to the habit and as to « some act, which will be either that which is performed in the first opinion [namely reverence of the divine majesty and recoiling into one's own littleness], or that which it has with respect to the end » [namely to rejoice at the escape from the divine offense]. On this 3rd question: St. Thomas, here at the cited place, sub-question 4; the same at the cited place, a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the cited place, a. 5. — Durandus, here q. 3.
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- Hic c. 4. Vide infra dub. 2. — Superius pro istae cod. X isti. In fine arg. pro reperire multi codd. reperiri.Here ch. 4. See below, dubium 2. — Above, for istae codex X has isti. At the end of the argument, for reperire many codices have reperiri. [p.761 n.5]
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq., ubi et Bedae divisio habetur. — Paulo superius pro non apponat, quod habent codd. A H U Z bb, in aliis non apponit.See here the Master's letter, ch. 4 ff., where Bede's division too is found. — A little above, for non apponat, which codices A H U Z bb have, others read non apponit. [p.761 n.6]
- Hic c. 6. seq. — De maiori vide supra 470, nota 8.Here ch. 6 f. — On the major, see above p. 470, note 8. [p.761 n.7]
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — Pro ad modum multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 ad medium.See here the Master's letter, ch. 6. — For ad modum many codices and editions 1, 2 read ad medium. [p.761 n.8]
- Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 193, nota 1. — De minori cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2.According to Aristotle, on whom see above p. 193, note 1. — On the minor cf. above d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. [p.762 n.1]
- Cfr. tom. II. pag. 659, nota 7.Cf. tom. II, p. 659, note 7. [p.762 n.2]
- Ut Magister insinuat hic in lit. c. 5. — De proposit. seq. cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro perfectorum [cod. A perfectiorum], quod habent codd. I L W Z, in aliis et edd. perfectior; paulo inferius pro secundum species cod. A per species.As the Master suggests here in the letter, ch. 5. — On the following proposition cf. above d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for perfectorum [cod. A perfectiorum], which codices I L W Z have, in others and the editions perfectior; a little below, for secundum species cod. A has per species. [p.762 n.3]
- Cuius verba videsis hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1, et VII. Metaph. text. 22. et 28. (VI. c. 7. seq.).Whose words you may see here in the Master's letter, ch. 4 ff. — On the major cf. Aristotle, Topics VII, ch. 1, and Metaphysics VII, text 22 and 28 (VI, ch. 7 f.). [p.762 n.4]
- Quod reprobatum est supra p. I. a. 2. q. 1.Which was rejected above, part I, a. 2, q. 1. [p.762 n.5]
- Hic c. 6. seq. — In fine arg. pro aspicere cod. K respicere.Here ch. 6 f. — At the end of the argument, for aspicere codex K has respicere. [p.762 n.6]
- Hic c. 3. et 7. seq.Here ch. 3 and 7 f. [p.762 n.8 — n.7: Cod. K potest.]
- Codd. A U perfectionem, non pauci alii codd. perfectum, codd. B C F G I K L N O T V praemittunt propositum. Paulo inferius pro plane Vat. plene.Codices A U read perfectionem, not a few other codices perfectum, codices B C F G I K L N O T V prefix propositum. A little below, for plane the Vatican edition has plene. [p.762 n.9]
- Pro sicut duae species, uti in codd. A B C D H M P Q U Z bb legitur, codd. K X sicut diversae species, alii codd. sicut differentiae species, cod. G sicut differentiae et species, edd. sicut differunt species. Paulo ante pro filialis codd. A G I (K a prima manu) L T V Z servilis.For sicut duae species, as is read in codices A B C D H M P Q U Z bb, codices K X have sicut diversae species, other codices sicut differentiae species, cod. G sicut differentiae et species, the editions sicut differunt species. A little before, for filialis codices A G I (K from the first hand) L T V Z have servilis. [p.762 n.10]
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. in fine et c. 7. — Mox pro e diverso codd. E G I L N T V a diverso, edd. diversae. Non ita multo post pro ad offensam codd. F K ad Dei offensam, et subinde pro principaliorem codd. B D H K U X Z et edd. 1, 2 principalem, codd. A W aa principaliter.Cf. here the Master's letter, ch. 6 at the end and ch. 7. — Soon, for e diverso codices E G I L N T V have a diverso, the editions diversae. Not very long after, for ad offensam codices F K have ad Dei offensam, and thereupon for principaliorem codices B D H K U X Z and editions 1, 2 principalem, codices A W aa principaliter. [p.762 n.11]
- Edd. unus, et paulo inferius pro status cum paucis codd. statuum.The editions read unus, and a little below, for status, with a few codices, statuum. [p.762 n.12]
- Libr. I. Topic. c. 13. — De unitate spei cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. — Pro multiplicis (i. e. aequivoci) codd. G H I K L V aa multiplicitatis, cod. A multitudinis, qui cod. et circa finem solut. ultimum principaliter omittit.Topics I, ch. 13. — On the unity of hope cf. above d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. — For multiplicis (i.e. of the equivocal) codices G H I K L V aa have multiplicitatis, cod. A multitudinis, which codex also omits principaliter near the end of the last solution. [p.763 n.1]
- Codd. differt. In cod. A desiderantur verba mox sequentia licet unum... alterius.The codices read differt. In codex A the words next following, licet unum... alterius, are wanting. [p.763 n.2]
- Codd. A U status.Codices A U read status. [p.763 n.3]
- Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3. et pag. 556, nota 5. — Pro quatuor Vat. trin.City of God XIV, ch. 7, n. 2. Cf. above p. 338, note 3, and p. 556, note 5. — For quatuor the Vatican edition has trin. [p.763 n.4]
- Edd. unum tamen. Paulo inferius pro simpliciter (deest in cod. A) codd. G S aa principaliter. In fine solut. pro ex hac parte et ex illa cod. M hinc et inde.The editions read unum tamen. A little below, for simpliciter (lacking in codex A) codices G S aa have principaliter. At the end of the solution, for ex hac parte et ex illa codex M has hinc et inde. [p.763 n.5]