Bonaventure

Quaestio III. Utrum timor servilis expellatur, gratia adveniente.

Tertio quaeritur de timore servili in comparatione ad gratiae complementum, et est quaestio, utrum timor servilis expellatur, gratia adveniente. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini, quam Magister adducit in littera¹: «Timor locum praeparat caritati, cum autem venerit caritas, pellitur timor, qui ei praeparavit locum»; sed constat, quod hoc intelligitur de timore servili: ergo timor servilis pellitur, superveniente gratia.

2. Item, spiritus libertatis repugnat spiritui servitutis; sed spiritus gratiae et caritatis est spiritus libertatis, spiritus vero timoris servilis est spiritus servitutis: ergo superveniente gratia, pellitur timor servilis.

3. Item, nullus habens gratiam et caritatem principaliter intuetur poenam, quia principalius intuetur divinam complacentiam; sed timor servilis principaliter facit intueri poenam: ergo timor servilis non potest stare cum gratia³.

4. Item, sicut se habet amor, qui est ante gratiam, ad amorem, qui est ex gratia⁴, sic se habet timor servilis ad timorem gratuitum; sed amor gratuitus alius est ab amore acquisito, vel gratis dato: ergo timor initialis alius est a timore servili. Si ergo timor servilis non potest fieri initialis, videtur, quod manere non possit, cum caritas supervenit.

Item, e contrario videtur, quod timor servilis gratificetur, cum gratia infunditur.

2. Item, plus distat gratia gratum faciens a natura, quam distat a dono gratiae gratis datae: sed gratia superveniens naturam non excludit, sed potius perficit: ergo cum timor servilis sit donum gratiae gratis datae⁵, videtur, quod non expellatur, sed potius perficiatur, adveniente caritate⁶.

3. Item, timore servili timetur poena, timore initiali timetur poena et Dei offensa: ergo timor initialis se habet ex quadam additione ad timorem servilem⁷; sed quod se habet ex additione ad alterum continet illud in se et adhuc amplius: ergo in timore initiali continetur timor servilis; et si hoc, timor servilis non expellitur per adventum caritatis.

4. Item, gratia, quantum est de se, non repugnat nisi peccato, vel ei quod ex peccato trahit originem, sicut est vitium et sequela; sed timor servilis non est peccatum nec ex peccato trahitur⁸: ergo ei gratia non repugnat; et si hoc, tunc non videtur expelli per gratiam.

Sed contra: 1. Sicut se habet fides informis ad fidem formatam, sic se habet timor servilis ad timorem gratuitum; sed fides informis formatur, secundum quod habitum est in praecedentibus²: ergo

### Conclusio. Timor servilis non manet cum gratia, nisi quoad id quod in eo erat materiale.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi. Unus namque modus dicendi est, quod cum dico timorem servilem, duo dico, sicut tactum est prius⁹, videlicet ipsum donum et defectum deformitatis ei-

dem dono annexum, non ratione ipsius doni, sed ratione eius, in quo est. Cum ergo gratia supervenit, expellit ipsum quantum ad defectum deformitatis annexum, non autem, in quantum est donum divinitus gratis datum, sicut in praecedentibus dictum fuit de fide informi.

Alius autem dicendi modus est, quod timor servilis omnino expellitur, adveniente gratia, non solum quantum ad id quod habet servilitatis¹⁰, sed quantum ad hoc quod habet habilitatis. — Et ratio huius est, quia huic timori servilitas quodam modo essentialiter est annexa. Habet enim ortum magis ex amore sui quam ex amore Dei. Unde et timor iste facit poenam principaliter intueri. Et ideo, sicut fides propter repugnantiam aenigmatis sibi annexi ad gloriam evacuatur, ipsa superveniente¹¹; sic habitus timoris servilis expellitur, superveniente caritate. Et huic modo dicendi videtur consonare verbum Augustini¹², quo dicit, quod timor servilis respectu caritatis introducendae se habet, sicut seta respectu fili.

Ex his autem duobus modis dicendi potest elici tertius modus, quasi commixtus ex utroque et tenens medium inter utrumque. Valde enim difficile¹³ videtur dicere, quod ille habitus, quo quis habilis erat ad cessandum a culpa, superveniente gratia, statim recedat, cum contrarium huius dictet ipsa experientia. Difficile etiam videtur dicere et sustinere, quod timor servilis simpliciter¹⁴ maneat, adveniente gratia, cum sit alia timoris differentia quam timor initialis, nec videtur ab eodem trahere originem, et verba Augustini satis videntur contradicere. — Et propterea possumus dicere, quod timor servilis tres habet conditiones: unam sicut materialem et substratam, et hoc est timere¹⁵ poenam aeternam; alteram sicut formalem et completivam, et hoc est principaliter intueri illam poenam; tertiam sicut annexam, et hoc est habere voluntatem deformem coniunctam. Cum igitur gratiae donum superinducitur, timor servilis quantum ad hoc quod materiale erat in ipso, hoc est, in quantum habilitabat¹⁶ ad timendum poenam, manet cum gratia, quia gratiae non repugnat. Quantum vero ad alias duas conditiones, videlicet quantum ad completivam et quantum ad annexam, pellitur per ipsam gratiam; quia, cum gratia supervenit, nec principaliter intuetur poenam nec habet annexam voluntatem malam. Et sic haberi potest, quod donum timoris servilis quantum ad aliquid sui, adveniente gratia, pellitur, et quantum ad aliquid manet. — Et hoc viso, patet responsio ad quaestionem¹⁷; patet etiam pro magna parte responsio ad obiectiones ad utramque partem, quia neutrae simpliciter concludunt veritatem; ideo oportet respondere hinc et inde.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, qua dicit, quod timor servilis expellitur, adveniente caritate¹⁸; dicendum, quod hoc non dicit, quod totaliter pellatur, sed quia servilitatis dominium, qua principaliter poenam intuetur, ab ipso timore, adveniente caritate, aufertur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritus servitutis repugnat spiritui libertatis; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad id quod est in eo servitutis; sed timor servilis aliquid habet, in quo communicat cum timore initiali, et ratione illius non oportet, ipsum expelli¹⁹.

3. Ad illud quod tertio obiicitur, quod timoris servilis principaliter est intueri poenam; iam patet responsio: quia quantum ad illam conditionem habet expelli, qua videlicet poenam intuetur principaliter; sed propter hoc non sequitur, quod expellatur totaliter²⁰.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet amor peccatoris respectu amoris gratuiti, sic timor servilis respectu timoris casti; dicendum, quod non est simile: quoniam, sicut in praecedentibus²¹ habitum fuit, caritas non potest fieri informis, sed timor bene fieri potest informis; ut patet, quando aliquis cadit a caritate, et tamen post lapsum remanet sibi timor aeternorum suppliciorum. Et si tu obiicias, quod amor est radix timoris²², ergo debent currere pari passu; dicendum, quod non valet, quia similiter est radix spei, et tamen spes potest esse informis et formata; et ratio huius assignata fuit supra²³. — Et sic patet, quod rationes istae non concludunt, quod timor totaliter expellatur.

5. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod simpliciter manet per simile et in fide informi et formata; dicendum, quod non est simile ex parte ista et ex illa: quoniam fides informis assentit propter se et super omnia eidem et in omnibus, cui consentit fides formata²⁴; non sic autem est de timore servili

et de timore initiali, quia timor servilis principaliter intuetur poenam, timor autem initialis non principaliter intuetur poenam, sed principaliter intuetur divinam offensam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura non pellitur a gratia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quoniam naturalia sunt inseparabilia et quasi²⁵ dantur ad semper; et ideo non auferuntur, superveniente gratia; quaedam autem sunt gratis superaddita, quae dantur solummodo ad tempus et pro statu determinato, et ideo pelluntur et cessant, recedente statu illo. Et sic est reperire in proposito.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor initialis addit supra servilem; dicendum, quod quaedam est additio simpliciter complens, quaedam est additio distrahens²⁶. Timor initialis addit supra servilem, et hoc quidem non solum complendo, verum etiam distrahendo, quia, sicut dictum est, aufert ei defectum concomitantem, qui quidem est voluntas deformis, et conditionem etiam complentem, quae quidem erat secundum statum illum principaliter intueri poenam, sicut tactum est supra. Et ideo sic supra ipsum addit, quod aliquid de ipso diminuit et expellit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia non repugnat nisi peccato, vel ei quod habet originem a peccato; dicendum, quod non solum huic repugnat, sed²⁷ ei quod habet annexum peccatum. Timor autem servilis peccatum habet annexum; et propter hoc quantum ad hoc, quod poenam habet et formidat poenam futuram, introductum est ex culpa; et ideo non est mirum, si aliquo modo pellitur, adveniente gratia. Quia tamen non habet totaliter ex culpa introduci, verum etiam ex dono Dei secundum aliquid sui; hinc est etiam, quod sic pellitur, quod non totaliter destruitur. — Et secundum hoc satis de plano responderi potest auctoritatibus et rationibus, quae hinc et inde introducuntur²⁸.

Question III. Whether servile fear is expelled when grace comes.

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning servile fear in comparison to the completion of grace, and the question is whether servile fear is expelled when grace comes. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, which the Master adduces in the text¹: "Fear prepares a place for charity, but when charity has come, the fear which prepared a place for it is driven out"; but it is established that this is understood of servile fear: therefore servile fear is driven out when grace supervenes.

2. Likewise, the spirit of liberty is repugnant to the spirit of servitude; but the spirit of grace and charity is the spirit of liberty, whereas the spirit of servile fear is the spirit of servitude: therefore when grace supervenes, servile fear is driven out.

3. Likewise, no one having grace and charity principally regards punishment, because he more principally regards the divine good-pleasure; but servile fear principally makes [one] regard punishment: therefore servile fear cannot stand together with grace³.

4. Likewise, as love which is before grace stands to the love which is from grace⁴, so servile fear stands to gratuitous fear; but gratuitous love is other than acquired love, or love freely given: therefore initial fear is other than servile fear. If therefore servile fear cannot become initial, it seems that it cannot remain when charity supervenes.

Likewise, on the contrary it seems that servile fear is made pleasing [to God] when grace is infused.

2. Likewise, grace which makes [one] pleasing stands farther from nature than it stands from a gift of grace freely given: but supervening grace does not exclude nature, but rather perfects [it]: therefore since servile fear is a gift of grace freely given⁵, it seems that it is not expelled, but rather perfected, when charity comes⁶.

3. Likewise, by servile fear punishment is feared, by initial fear punishment and the offense of God are feared: therefore initial fear stands by a certain addition to servile fear⁷; but what stands by an addition to another contains that [other] in itself and yet more besides: therefore in initial fear servile fear is contained; and if this [is so], servile fear is not expelled by the advent of charity.

4. Likewise, grace, of itself, is repugnant only to sin, or to that which draws its origin from sin, as is a vice and its sequel; but servile fear is not a sin, nor is it drawn from sin⁸: therefore grace is not repugnant to it; and if this [is so], then it does not seem to be expelled by grace.

On the contrary: 1. As unformed faith stands to formed faith, so servile fear stands to gratuitous fear; but unformed faith is formed, according to what was held in the preceding [discussions]²: therefore

### Conclusion. Servile fear does not remain together with grace, except as to that which in it was material.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking. For one manner of speaking is that when I say servile fear, I say two things, as was touched on before⁹, namely the gift itself and the defect of deformity annexed to that gift, not by reason of the gift itself, but by reason of that in which it is. When therefore grace supervenes, it expels it as to the annexed defect of deformity, but not insofar as it is a gift divinely and freely given, as was said in the preceding [discussions] about unformed faith.

But another manner of speaking is that servile fear is altogether expelled when grace comes, not only as to that which it has of servility¹⁰, but as to this which it has of aptitude. — And the reason for this is that to this fear servility is in a certain way essentially annexed. For it has its rise more from love of self than from love of God. Hence too this fear makes [one] principally regard punishment. And therefore, just as faith is voided into glory on account of the repugnance of the enigma annexed to it, when [glory itself] supervenes¹¹; so the habit of servile fear is expelled when charity supervenes. And to this manner of speaking the word of Augustine¹² seems to accord, by which he says that servile fear stands with respect to the charity to be introduced as the bristle stands with respect to the thread.

But from these two manners of speaking a third manner can be elicited, as it were mixed of both and holding a middle between the two. For it seems very difficult¹³ to say that that habit, by which someone was apt for ceasing from fault, should at once withdraw when grace supervenes, since experience itself dictates the contrary of this. It also seems difficult to say and to maintain that servile fear simply¹⁴ remains when grace comes, since it is another difference of fear than initial fear, nor does it seem to draw its origin from the same [source], and the words of Augustine seem sufficiently to contradict [it]. — And therefore we can say that servile fear has three conditions: one as material and substrate, and this is to fear¹⁵ eternal punishment; another as formal and completive, and this is principally to regard that punishment; a third as annexed, and this is to have a deformed will conjoined. When therefore the gift of grace is superinduced, servile fear, as to this which was material in it, that is, insofar as it made [one] apt¹⁶ for fearing punishment, remains together with grace, because it is not repugnant to grace. But as to the other two conditions, namely as to the completive and as to the annexed, it is driven out by grace itself; because, when grace supervenes, it neither principally regards punishment nor has an annexed evil will. And thus it can be held that the gift of servile fear, as to something of itself, is driven out when grace comes, and as to something it remains. — And this seen, the reply to the question¹⁷ is plain; the reply to the objections on both sides is also plain for a great part, because neither side simply concludes the truth; therefore it is fitting to reply on the one side and the other.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the authority of Augustine, by which he says that servile fear is expelled when charity comes¹⁸; it must be said that he does not say this, that it is totally driven out, but that the dominion of servility, by which it principally regards punishment, is taken away from that fear when charity comes.

2. To that which is objected, that the spirit of servitude is repugnant to the spirit of liberty; it must be said that it is true as to that which is in it of servitude; but servile fear has something in which it communicates with initial fear, and by reason of that it is not necessary that it be expelled¹⁹.

3. To that which is thirdly objected, that it belongs to servile fear principally to regard punishment; the reply is already plain: because as to that condition it is to be expelled, by which namely it principally regards punishment; but on account of this it does not follow that it should be expelled totally²⁰.

4. To that which is objected, that as the love of the sinner stands with respect to gratuitous love, so servile fear with respect to chaste fear; it must be said that it is not alike: because, as was held in the preceding [discussions]²¹, charity cannot become unformed, but fear can well become unformed; as is plain, when someone falls from charity, and nevertheless after the fall there remains to him a fear of eternal punishments. And if you object that love is the root of fear²², therefore they ought to run at an equal pace; it must be said that it does not hold, because it is likewise the root of hope, and yet hope can be unformed and formed; and the reason for this was assigned above²³. — And thus it is plain that these reasons do not conclude that fear is totally expelled.

5. But to that which is objected, that it simply remains by the likeness in unformed and formed faith too; it must be said that it is not alike on this side and on that: because unformed faith assents for its own sake and above all things to the same [object] and in all things to which formed faith consents²⁴; but it is not so concerning servile fear

and concerning initial fear, because servile fear principally regards punishment, but initial fear does not principally regard punishment, but principally regards the divine offense.

2. To that which is objected, that nature is not driven out by grace; it must be said that it is not alike: because natural things are inseparable and are as it were²⁵ given for always; and therefore they are not taken away when grace supervenes; but certain things are freely superadded, which are given only for a time and for a determined state, and therefore they are driven out and cease when that state withdraws. And so it is to be found in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that initial fear adds beyond servile [fear]; it must be said that one [kind of] addition is simply completing, another is an addition that distracts²⁶. Initial fear adds beyond servile [fear], and this indeed not only by completing, but also by distracting, because, as was said, it takes away from it the concomitant defect, which indeed is a deformed will, and also the completing condition, which indeed was, according to that state, principally to regard punishment, as was touched on above. And therefore it so adds beyond it that it diminishes and expels something of it.

4. To that which is objected, that grace is repugnant only to sin, or to that which has its origin from sin; it must be said that it is repugnant not only to this, but²⁷ to that which has sin annexed. But servile fear has sin annexed; and on account of this, as to this, that it has punishment and dreads future punishment, it was introduced from fault; and therefore it is no wonder if in some manner it is driven out when grace comes. Yet because it does not have to be introduced totally from fault, but also from the gift of God as to something of itself; hence it is also that it is so driven out that it is not totally destroyed. — And according to this the authorities and reasons which are introduced on the one side and the other can be answered plainly enough²⁸.