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Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus
p. 757

Quaestio II. Utrum usus timoris servilis sit bonus, an malus.

Secundo quaeritur de timore servili in comparatione ad eius usum, et est quaestio, utrum usus timoris servilis sit bonus, an malus. Et quod bonus sit, videtur:

1. Quia quales sunt habitus, tales sunt actus1; sed timor servilis, cum sit donum Spiritus sancti, est bonus: ergo per documentum moralis philosophi actus eius est bonus.

2. Item, maxima est Philosophi2, quod «cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum», et «cuius usus malus, ipsum est malum»: ergo si usus timoris servilis est malus, ipse timor servilis esset malus; sed non est malus, cum detur divinitus: ergo actus eius est bonus.

3. Item, omnis habitus, cuius usus praeparat hominem ad susceptionem gratiae, est bonus quantum ad usum; sed timor servilis est huiusmodi, quia per usum eius introducitur caritas, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera3: ergo etc.

4. Item, nullus actus, quo quis vitat peccatum, est peccatum; sed actu timoris servilis recedit homo a peccato4: ergo actus timoris servilis non est peccatum: non est ergo malus. Et est malus, vel bonus: ergo est bonus.

Sed contra: 1. Super illud Psalmi5: Confige timore tuo carnes meas; Glossa: «Timor servilis carnem non crucifigit, quia vivit in eo peccandi voluntas, et sequeretur opus, si speraretur impunitas: mallet enim licere, et dolet non licere, quod lex vetat»; sed omnis talis motus est directe contra iustitiam, quia vellet, iustitiam non esse: omnis vero motus contra iustitiam est malus: ergo actus et usus timoris servilis est malus.

2. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus6: «Cum poena timetur, et Dei facies non amatur, timor ex tumore est, non ex amore»; sed omnis actus, qui procedit ex radice tumoris et superbiae, est actus malus et damnabilis: ergo usus timoris servilis non est bonus, sed culpabilis.

3. Item, nullus actus incompossibilis caritati est bonus: sed timere serviliter est actus incompossibilis caritati: ergo timere serviliter non est bonum. Maior manifesta est, quia caritas bono non repugnat, sed malo. Minor autem manifesta est secundum verba Augustini et Apostoli7, quia spiritus servitutis non stat cum spiritu adoptionis.

4. Item, omnis timor ortum habet ex amore8: ergo timor servilis ex amore habet ortum; sed omnis amor aut est naturalis, aut libidinosus, aut gratuitus: cum ergo timor servilis non possit habere ortum ex amore gratuito, quia est in peccatore; nec ex amore naturali potest — constat, quia iam esset timor naturalis — restat ergo, quod ex amore libidinoso. Sed omnis actus, qui exit ex amore libidinoso, est malus et culpabilis: ergo actus timoris servilis est malus.

5. Item, amare Deum propter temporalia principaliter est peccatum et malum, ergo similiter timere Deum propter poenas principaliter est malum; sed hoc est timere serviliter: videtur ergo, quod actus timoris servilis semper sit culpabilis.

6. Item, timor servilis non dicitur servilis nisi a servitute peccati9: ergo pari ratione nullus dicitur timere serviliter, nisi circa illum actum sit annexa circumstantia peccati; sed circumstantia peccati annexa actui facit totum actum deformem: ergo videtur, quod actus et usus timoris servilis semper sit culpabilis et deformis.

Conclusio.

> Timor servilis, quando servilitas non concomitatur actum, sed solum habitum, potest esse bonus, licet non sit meritorius.

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Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum dico timorem servilem, duo dico, videlicet ipsum habitum, quo anima disponitur ad timendum Deum ut punientem eos qui praevaricantur; et ulterius nomine servilitatis importatur deformitas peccati, quae annexa est illi habitui in eodem homine, ratione cuius ille homo dicitur esse servus peccati10, et timor in eo existens dicitur esse timor servilis. Per hunc etiam modum, cum dico, aliquem timere serviliter, duo dico, videlicet actum ab illo habitu egredientem et voluntatis servilitatem sive deformitatem concomitantem. — Sed attendendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ita quod deformitas illa voluntatis concomitetur quantum ad habitum, aut quantum ad actum. Si concomitatur solum quantum ad habitum; sic potest esse, quod aliquis serviliter timeat, et tamen motu illo non peccabit; quia, si ex recogitatione11 poenarum aliquis abhorret offendere Deum, hoc potest esse praeter omne peccatum. — Si autem concomitatur in actu, quamvis ipsum timere de se non sit malum, tamen ratione deformitatis actualiter annexae depravatur; sicut aliquis, qui timet poenas et timendo dolet, quod tales poenae infliguntur pro culpa, et actu etiam concupiscit peccare, si non esset illa poena; et hoc modo timere serviliter est peccatum et malum. Hoc autem non est semper, cum quis movetur timore servili, alioquin per usum illius doni magis homo se a gratia elongaret quam praepararet; quod plane falsum est.

Et ideo concedendum est, quod usus timoris servilis potest esse bonus, licet non sit bonus bonitate meriti, sed magis bonitate praeparante vel ordinante12 ad meritum, quae simul stat cum peccato. Unde et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt, licet ratio ultima sit sophistica, quia procedit ex suppositione falsa.

Ad argumenta pro parte contraria: 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod in timore servili vivit voluntas peccandi, et quod dolet de eo, quod lex vetat; dicendum, quod illud verbum Augustini non intelligitur, quod semper, quando timet, doleat actu, et similiter quod voluntas peccandi semper sit in actu; sed hoc dicit, quia manet in habitu et radice13. Licet autem voluntas sit per peccatum deformata, et regnet in ea malus amor, potest tamen aliquando moveri ad aliqua bona opera in genere vel ex circumstantia per aliquam gratiam gratis datam, non committendo culpam, sicut patet per multa exempla; et sic potest esse in parte ista.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timere serviliter est ex tumore, sicut dicit Gregorius, non ex amore; dicendum, quod ex non dicit ibi causam, sed concomitantiam; et cum dicit concomitantiam in actu, tunc deformat actum timoris servilis14; cum dicit concomitantiam in habitu, non oportet, quod deformet, sed tamen facit ipsum deficere a meriti perfectione.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus incompossibilis caritati est malus; dicendum, quod aliquis actus potest esse incompossibilis alicui ratione circumstantiae propriae, quam habet ex proprio habitu, vel ratione alicuius annexi. Cum ergo dicitur, quod actus timoris servilis est incompossibilis caritati, hoc non est ratione ipsius actus per se et secundum se, quia habens caritatem potest bene timere Deum ratione poenae; sed hoc intelligitur ratione annexi15, quod facit ipsum deficere a merito caritatis. Et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod actus timoris servilis sit malus, sed vel est malus, vel est in homine secundum statum malum; et conclusio est vera ratione alterius partis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor servilis habet ortum ex amore16; dicendum, quod non habet ortum ex amore libidinoso, sed potest habere ortum ex amore naturali. Amor enim naturalis dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, qui est cum ipsa natura plantatus; alio modo, qui est ex naturali affectu et voluntario exercitio acquisitus sine gratiae dono; et ex tali amore potest homo peccator etiam se ipsum sine peccato amare et mala sua fugere, sive praesentia sive futura17; et ex tali amore timor servilis habet procedere. Si enim homo amat se ipsum ad hoc, ut acquirat salutem, et ex hoc timeat aeterna tormenta incurrere; talis affectio amoris, quamvis non sit ex caritate, potest esse absque libidine. — Aliter potest dici, quod sicut timor mundanus, quo quis timet amittere mundana, est ex amore mundi, et timor humanus ex amore temporalis salutis; sic timor servilis, cum quis timet incurrere aeterna tormenta, est ex amore aeternae salutis et beatitudinis; et iste amor, quantum est de se, non est culpabilis, sed est vel naturalis, vel gratuitus a gratia gratis data, vel gratuitus a gratia gratum faciente; et timor servilis bene potest esse ex amore salutis primo vel medio modo dicto18. Et ideo falsum supponit, cum dicit, quod est ex amore libidinoso19.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amare Deum propter temporalia principaliter est peccatum; dicendum, quod non est simile de amore et timore: quia

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amor est ille qui facit frui, quia eius est quietare, vel ad aliud inclinare; et ideo peccat qui diligit Deum propter temporalia principaliter, quia facit de via finem et de fine viam20; non sic autem est ex parte timoris. — Alia est ratio: quia, cum quis amat Deum propter temporalia, duo sunt ibi amata; sed cum quis timet Deum propter poenas, quas infligit, unus solus est, quem timet — qui enim timet habentem cultellum uno et eodem timore timet cultellum sive plagam cultelli et actionem percutientis — et ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod timere serviliter est timere cum circumstantia peccati; dicendum, quod illa circumstantia sive deformitas peccati potest poni circa actum timendi ratione ipsius actus, vel ratione timentis. Et si ponatur ratione ipsius actus, tunc utique actus deformatur et efficitur malus ratione annexi, sicut prius fuit expositum. Sed si ita sit, quod ponatur ratione ipsius timentis; sic potest esse, quod actus non sit actus deformatus, sed quia deformitas est circa timentem, licet secundum illam deformitatem non actualiter moveatur. Et propterea non est opportunum, quod semper timere serviliter sit peccatum, immo hoc potest esse utile et praeparatorium21 respectu gratiae22.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the use of servile fear is good or evil.

Secondly there is inquiry concerning servile fear in comparison to its use, and the question is whether the use of servile fear is good or evil. And that it is good seems [so]:

1. Because as the habits are, so are the acts1; but servile fear, since it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, is good: therefore by the teaching of moral philosophy its act is good.

2. Likewise, it is a maxim of the Philosopher2, that «that whose use is good is itself good also», and «that whose use is evil is itself evil»: therefore if the use of servile fear is evil, servile fear itself would be evil; but it is not evil, since it is given divinely: therefore its act is good.

3. Likewise, every habit whose use prepares a man for the reception of grace is good with respect to use; but servile fear is of this sort, because through its use charity is introduced, as Augustine says, and it is had in the text3: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no act by which one avoids sin is a sin; but by the act of servile fear a man withdraws from sin4: therefore the act of servile fear is not a sin: therefore it is not evil. And it is either evil or good: therefore it is good.

On the contrary: 1. Upon that [verse] of the Psalm5: Pierce my flesh with thy fear; the Gloss: «Servile fear does not crucify the flesh, because in it the will to sin lives, and the work would follow, if impunity were hoped for: for it would prefer that [sin] were allowed, and it grieves that it is not allowed, what the law forbids»; but every such motion is directly against justice, because it would wish justice not to be: but every motion against justice is evil: therefore the act and use of servile fear is evil.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the Morals6: «When punishment is feared, and the face of God is not loved, fear is from swelling [pride], not from love»; but every act which proceeds from the root of swelling and pride is an evil and damnable act: therefore the use of servile fear is not good, but culpable.

3. Likewise, no act incompatible with charity is good: but to fear servilely is an act incompatible with charity: therefore to fear servilely is not good. The major is manifest, because charity is not repugnant to the good, but to the evil. But the minor is manifest according to the words of Augustine and the Apostle7, because the spirit of servitude does not stand with the spirit of adoption.

4. Likewise, every fear takes its origin from love8: therefore servile fear has its origin from love; but every love is either natural, or lustful, or gratuitous: since therefore servile fear cannot have its origin from gratuitous love, because it is in a sinner; nor can it from natural love — it is established, because then it would be natural fear — it remains therefore that [it is] from lustful love. But every act which issues from lustful love is evil and culpable: therefore the act of servile fear is evil.

5. Likewise, to love God on account of temporal things principally is a sin and evil, therefore likewise to fear God on account of punishments principally is evil; but this is to fear servilely: therefore it seems that the act of servile fear is always culpable.

6. Likewise, servile fear is not called servile except from the servitude of sin9: therefore by parity of reasoning no one is said to fear servilely, unless about that act there is annexed a circumstance of sin; but a circumstance of sin annexed to an act makes the whole act deformed: therefore it seems that the act and use of servile fear is always culpable and deformed.

Conclusion.

> Servile fear, when servility does not accompany the act, but only the habit, can be good, although it is not meritorious.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that when I say "servile fear," I say two things, namely the habit itself, by which the soul is disposed to fear God as punishing those who transgress; and further, by the name of servility is imported the deformity of sin, which is annexed to that habit in the same man, by reason of which that man is said to be a slave of sin10, and the fear existing in him is said to be servile fear. In this same way, when I say that someone "fears servilely," I say two things, namely the act issuing from that habit and the servility or deformity of the will accompanying [it]. — But it is to be attended to, that this can be in two ways: either so that that deformity of the will accompanies with respect to the habit, or with respect to the act. If it accompanies only with respect to the habit; thus it can be that someone fears servilely, and yet by that motion will not sin; for, if from a recollection11 of punishments someone shrinks from offending God, this can be apart from all sin. — But if it accompanies in the act, although the fearing itself is not in itself evil, nevertheless by reason of the deformity actually annexed it is depraved; as someone who fears punishments and in fearing grieves that such punishments are inflicted for fault, and in act even covets to sin, if that punishment were not [there]; and in this way to fear servilely is sin and evil. But this is not always [the case], when one is moved by servile fear, otherwise through the use of that gift a man would estrange himself from grace more than prepare [himself]; which is plainly false.

And therefore it is to be conceded that the use of servile fear can be good, although it is not good with the goodness of merit, but rather with a goodness preparing or ordering12 toward merit, which stands together with sin. Hence also the reasons which show this are to be conceded, although the last reason is sophistical, because it proceeds from a false supposition.

To the arguments for the contrary part: 1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that in servile fear the will to sin lives, and that it grieves over what the law forbids; it must be said that that saying of Augustine is not understood [to mean] that always, when one fears, one grieves in act, and likewise that the will to sin is always in act; but he says this because it remains in the habit and root13. But although the will is deformed by sin, and an evil love reigns in it, it can nevertheless sometimes be moved to some good works in their kind or from a circumstance by some grace freely given, not committing fault, as is evident through many examples; and thus it can be in this case.

2. To that which is objected, that to fear servilely is from swelling, as Gregory says, not from love; it must be said that from does not there state a cause, but an accompaniment; and when it states an accompaniment in the act, then it deforms the act of servile fear14; when it states an accompaniment in the habit, it does not necessarily deform [it], but nevertheless makes it fall short of the perfection of merit.

3. To that which is objected, that an act incompatible with charity is evil; it must be said that an act can be incompatible with something by reason of a proper circumstance, which it has from its proper habit, or by reason of something annexed. When therefore it is said that the act of servile fear is incompatible with charity, this is not by reason of the act itself per se and in itself, because one having charity can well fear God by reason of punishment; but this is understood by reason of something annexed15, which makes it fall short of the merit of charity. And therefore from this it does not follow that the act of servile fear is evil, but it is either evil, or it is in a man according to an evil state; and the conclusion is true by reason of the other part.

4. To that which is objected, that servile fear has its origin from love16; it must be said that it does not have its origin from lustful love, but it can have its origin from natural love. For natural love is spoken of in two ways: in one way, that which is planted with nature itself; in another way, that which is acquired by natural affect and voluntary exercise without the gift of grace; and from such love a sinful man can even love himself without sin and flee his evils, whether present or future17; and from such love servile fear has [its power] to proceed. For if a man loves himself to this [end], that he may acquire salvation, and from this fears to incur eternal torments; such an affection of love, although it is not from charity, can be without lust. — Otherwise it can be said that just as worldly fear, by which one fears to lose worldly things, is from love of the world, and human fear from love of temporal welfare; so servile fear, when one fears to incur eternal torments, is from love of eternal welfare and blessedness; and this love, as far as it is of itself, is not culpable, but is either natural, or gratuitous from grace freely given, or gratuitous from grace making [one] pleasing; and servile fear can well be from love of welfare in the first or middle mode stated18. And therefore he supposes falsely, when he says that it is from lustful love19.

5. To that which is objected, that to love God on account of temporal things principally is a sin; it must be said that it is not alike concerning love and fear: because

love is that which makes [one] enjoy, because it belongs to it to bring to rest, or to incline toward another [thing]; and therefore he sins who loves God on account of temporal things principally, because he makes of the way an end and of the end a way20; but it is not so on the part of fear. — There is another reason: because, when one loves God on account of temporal things, there are two things loved there; but when one fears God on account of the punishments which He inflicts, there is one only, which he fears — for he who fears one holding a knife by one and the same fear fears the knife or the blow of the knife and the action of the one striking — and therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

6. To that which is lastly objected, that to fear servilely is to fear with a circumstance of sin; it must be said that that circumstance or deformity of sin can be placed about the act of fearing by reason of the act itself, or by reason of the one fearing. And if it is placed by reason of the act itself, then indeed the act is deformed and is made evil by reason of the annexed [thing], as was earlier expounded. But if it be so, that it is placed by reason of the one fearing; thus it can be that the act is not a deformed act, but [it is so] because the deformity is about the one fearing, although according to that deformity he is not actually moved. And therefore it is not fitting that to fear servilely should always be a sin, nay rather this can be useful and preparatory21 with respect to grace22.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 700, nota 6, ubi praeter Augustinum allegatur Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. — De minori vide quaest. praeced. — In conclus. pro per documentum moralis philosophi cod. A secundum Philosophum.
    Cf. vol. II, p. 700, note 6, where besides Augustine, Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 1, is cited. — On the minor see the preceding question. — In the conclusion, for per documentum moralis philosophi ("by the teaching of moral philosophy") codex A reads secundum Philosophum ("according to the Philosopher").
  2. Boeth., II. de Differentiis topic. (cfr. tom. I. pag. 31, nota 1. et pag. 34, nota 9.). Cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 9.), ubi idem dicitur de generationibus, non de usibus. — Pro ipsum ut malum codd. G N I Z ac ipsum quoque malum. Subinde pro est malus codd. λ bb esset malus.
    Boethius, On Topical Differences II (cf. vol. I, p. 31, note 1, and p. 34, note 9). Cf. Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 9), where the same is said of generations, not of uses. — For ipsum ut malum codices G N I Z [read] ac ipsum quoque malum. Likewise, for est malus codices λ bb [read] esset malus.
  3. Hic c. 5, ubi et verba Augustini allata sunt.
    Here, c. 5, where the words of Augustine are also cited.
  4. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seq. et quaest. praeced. in corp.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 5 ff., and the preceding question in the body [of the response].
  5. Psalm. 118, 120. — De Glossa (edd. Glossa Augustini) vide supra pag. 755, nota 3.
    Psalm 118[:120] (Vulg.). — On the Gloss (the editions [read] Gloss of Augustine) see above, p. 755, note 3.
  6. Gregor., Moral. libr. IV. c. 27. n. 80: Cum enim a peccato praesens poena metuitur et amissa Dei facies non amatur, ex tumore est, non ex humilitate. — In fine arg. pro culpabilis edd. damnabilis.
    Gregory, Morals book IV, c. 27, n. 80: For when present punishment is feared on account of sin and the lost face of God is not loved, it is from swelling, not from humility. — At the end of the argument, for culpabilis ("culpable") the editions [read] damnabilis ("damnable").
  7. Rom. 8, 15. — Verba Augustini versis hic in III. Magistri c. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3.
    Rom. 8:15. — The words of Augustine [are] turned here into [the text] of the Master, Book III, c. 5. Cf. above, p. 338, note 3.
  8. Inferius post ex amore naturali edd. omittunt potest; cod. U ibi verbo constat praeligit quod.
    Below, after ex amore naturali the editions omit potest; codex U there prefixes quod to the word constat.
  9. August., Epist. 145. (alias 144.), super illud II. Petr. 2, 19: A quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est, inter alia ait (n. 4.): Humiliter autem putat, victorem se esse peccati, qui poenae timore non peccat; quia, etsi non impletur foris negotium malae cupiditatis, ipsa tamen mala cupiditas intus est hostis. Et quis coram Deo innocens invenitur, qui vult, fieri quod vetatur, si subtrahas quod timetur? etc.
    Augustine, Letter 145 (alias 144), upon that [verse] of 2 Peter 2:19: For by whatever one is overcome, to that also he is bound as a slave, among other things says (n. 4): But he humbly thinks himself the victor over sin, who does not sin from fear of punishment; because, even if outwardly the business of evil desire is not fulfilled, the evil desire itself is within an enemy. And who is found innocent before God, who wills that to be done which is forbidden, if you take away that which is feared? etc.
  10. Respicitur illud Ioan. 8, 34: Qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. — Paulo superius pro servilitatis edd. servilitis. Paulo inferius pro videlicet actum cod. U videlicet ipsum actum. Post pauca pro servilitatem cod. A servitutem.
    Reference is made to that [verse] of John 8:34: Whoever commits sin is a slave of sin. — A little above, for servilitatis the editions [read] servilitis. A little below, for videlicet actum codex U [reads] videlicet ipsum actum. After a little, for servilitatem codex A [reads] servitutem.
  11. Codd. A U Z cogitatione.
    Codices A U Z [read] cogitatione ("from a thought").
  12. Codd. V Z praeparante et disponente. In fine corp. pro falsa cod. A falsi.
    Codices V Z [read] praeparante et disponente ("preparing and disposing"). At the end of the body, for falsa codex A [reads] falsi.
  13. Sive quodam modo latenter; cfr. supra pag. 755, nota 3.
    Or in a certain way latently; cf. above, p. 755, note 3.
  14. Codd. G H I L T V aa serviliter. Subinde post cum cod. U subiungit vero.
    Codices G H I L T V aa [read] serviliter ("servilely"). Likewise, after cum codex U adds vero.
  15. Cod. A ratione alicuius annexi, quia facit etc.]
    Codex A [reads] ratione alicuius annexi, quia facit ("by reason of something annexed, because it makes"), etc.]
  16. Edd. cum pluribus codd. adiungunt libidinoso.
    The editions, with several codices, add libidinoso ("from lustful [love]").
  17. Cfr. Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 4. — Inferius pro potest esse edd. potest tamen esse.
    Cf. Aristotle, Ethics IX, c. 4. — Below, for potest esse the editions [read] potest tamen esse ("can nevertheless be").
  18. Confirmatur verbis Domini (Matth. 10, 28.): Sed potius timete eum, qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam.
    It is confirmed by the words of the Lord (Matt. 10:28): But rather fear Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.
  19. Vide infra dub. 2. seq. — Paulo ante pro vel medio modo Vat. vel tertio modo, et aliquanto superius pro cum quis codd. A U quo quis.
    See below, the following Doubt 2. — A little before, for vel medio modo ("or the middle mode") the Vatican edition [reads] vel tertio modo ("or the third mode"), and somewhat above, for cum quis codices A U [read] quo quis.
  20. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 3. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro quia eius edd. et eius. Paulo inferius post Alia est codd. A U Z inserunt etiam.
    Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 3, q. 2. — A little above, for quia eius the editions [read] et eius. A little below, after Alia est codices A U Z insert etiam.
  21. Cod. A quod et in fine solut. praeparatio pro praeparatorium.
    Codex A [reads] quod, and at the end of the solution praeparatio for praeparatorium.
  22. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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