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Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Lucae decimo quinto1 super illud: Quanti mercenarii in domo patris mei abundant panibus, dicit Ambrosius, quod multi sunt boni mercenarii, qui spe aeternorum Deo serviunt; sed nemo Deo bene servit, nisi qui servit ei ex caritate: ergo possibile est, motum mercenarii ex caritate habere ortum.

2. Item, Augustinus, super illud Psalmi2: Scrutans corda et renes Deus: « Finis curae et cogitationis est delectatio, ad quam quisque nititur pervenire »: ergo habens caritatem finaliter quaerit delectari; sed qui quaerit suam delectationem quaerit proprium commodum, et omnis talis est mercenarius: ergo videtur, quod affectus caritatis mercenarius esse possit.

3. Item, qui vult implere mandata Dei propter retributionem mercenarius est; sed de viro sancto dicitur in Psalmo3: Inclinavi cor meum ad faciendas iustificationes tuas propter retributionem; et ad Hebraeos undecimo dicitur de Moyse: Aspiciebat in remunerationem: si ergo tam iste quam ille iustus erat et ex caritate movebatur, videtur, quod motus caritatis possit esse mercenarius.

4. Item, homo sanctus desiderat dissolvi et esse cum Christo, ut fruatur eo, secundum quod Apostolus desiderabat, ad Philippenses primo4; sed desiderium illud non potest esse nisi caritatis, cum nullus naturali affectu desideret mori: ergo si tale desiderium intuetur proprium commodum et delectationem, videtur, quod possibile sit, affectum caritatis esse mercenarium.

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Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio5: Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt; sed omnis mercenarius quaerit quod suum est: ergo motus caritatis non potest esse mercenarius.

2. Item, Bernardus, de Diligendo Deo6: « Etsi sine praemio non possit serviri, tamen sine intuitu praemii serviendum est »; et paulo post: « Serviamus Deo in caritate, quae timorem expellit, laborem non sentit, praemium non requirit, meritum non intuetur »: si ergo omnis mercenarius requirit praemium, et caritas non requirit praemium: ergo motus caritatis non potest esse mercenarius.

3. Item, amor caritatis est amor gratuitus; sed gratuitum et mercenarium ex opposito dividuntur7, quia quod fit gratis non fit ex mercimonia: si ergo caritati essentiale est esse gratuitum, videtur, quod motus eius et actus nullo modo possit esse mercenarius.

4. Item, timor, qui principaliter oculum habet ad poenam, est timor servilis, qui non est Deo acceptus: ergo et pari ratione amor, qui habet oculum ad praemium, non potest esse meritorius; sed talis est mercenarius; omnis autem affectus caritatis est meritorius: ergo nullus potest esse mercenarius.

Conclusio. Motus aliquis caritatis non improbabiliter dici potest mercenarius, quatenus respicit ad Bonum increatum tanquam ad finale praemium.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod mercenarius dicitur ille qui principaliter habet oculum ad mercedem; nam si eam aspiceret non principaliter, non propter hoc mercenarius esset. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod duplex est merces, videlicet creata et increata, temporalis et aeterna. Et secundum hoc est duplex mercenarius, videlicet bonus et malus; et duplex mercimonia, una laudabilis et alia vituperabilis. Nam qui principaliter respicit ad mercedem creatam et temporalem, malus mercenarius est; et hunc vituperat Ioannis decimo8 Dominus dicens: Mercenarius autem fugit, quia mercenarius est. Ille vero, qui aspicit principaliter ad mercedem aeternam, de qua dicitur Genesis decimo quinto: Merces tua magna nimis, bonus mercenarius est; et hic mercenarius « panibus abundat fidei, spei et caritatis », sicut dicit Ambrosius super illud9: Quanti mercenarii etc.

De prima mercimonia intelligendo, non est dubium, quod motus caritatis non potest esse mercenarius, quia illa nec est a caritate nec cum caritate, cum caritati repugnet.

De secunda mercimonia dubium est, pro eo quod illa potest esse cum caritate; non est tamen omnino certum, utrum sit a caritate. — Nam quidam voluerunt dicere, quod non est a caritate, sed potius ab affectu naturae caritatem concomitante. Amor enim caritatis, ut dicunt, cum sit amor gratuitus, non intuetur praemium; immo liberaliter omnino facit hominem servire Deo, sicut filium patri suo10. — Aliis autem videtur, quod talis affectus mercenarius possit esse a caritate. Desiderium enim habendi aeternam mercedem et fruendi aeterno bono est desiderium gratiae, nec est amoris naturalis nec acquisiti, sed potius amoris gratuiti, praecipue illud desiderium, quo dicebat Apostolus11: Cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo. Ad affectum enim caritatis non tantum spectat amare Deum amore amicitiae, immo etiam amore concupiscentiae. « Frui enim est amore inhaerere12 », et constat, quod frui Deo est per caritatem. Et ideo voluerunt isti dicere, et satis probabiliter, ut videtur, quod motus caritatis secundum aliquod genus mercimoniae possit esse mercenarius, scilicet secundum quod constituit mercedem suam circa Bonum increatum, ad quod tendit sicut ad finale praemium et desiderat tanquam omne bonum13. — Si igitur hanc positionem sustinere velimus tanquam probabilem, satis facili-

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ter dissolvuntur rationes, quae sunt ad oppositam partem14.

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt; dicendum, quod suum ibi vocatur proprium bonum, ita quod excluditur bonum commune15. Quod autem appetit Deum sicut mercedem suam non quaerit hoc modo quod suum est, quia illud bonum est omnibus commune. Quaerere enim et videre et amare Deum sicut suam mercedem et praemium non est quaerere bonum proprium, illo modo dicendi proprium, qui sonat in vitium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deo sine intuitu praemii est serviendum; dicendum, quod duplex est motus in caritate, videlicet motus amicitiae et motus concupiscentiae. Motus amicitiae est ille quo quis desiderat Deo placere et servire; motus concupiscentiae est quo desiderat Deum habere et videre. Cum ergo dicit Bernardus, quod Deo sine intuitu praemii est serviendum, intelligit de amore amicitiae. Si enim per affectum amicitiae homo servit amico et eum diligit sine intuitu praemii, sicut dicit Philosophus16, multo fortius amore caritatis homo vult bonum Deo sine intuitu alicuius retributionis; sed per hoc non excluditur, quin caritas amore concupiscentiae exoptet et desideret illam summam mercedem apprehendere, ad quam finaliter intendit pervenire.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor caritatis est simpliciter gratuitus, ergo non potest esse mercenarius; dicendum, quod illud argumentum bonum est de ea mercimonia, quae repugnat gratiae; sed mercimonia vitae aeternae non repugnat gratiae, immo illi consonat, quia ad eam specialiter ordinat. Unde sicut amor concupiscentiae non repugnat amori amicitiae in caritate, immo quanto magis quis Deum recte desiderat, tanto magis ad honorem17 eius anhelat; sic affectus huiusmodi mercimoniae non repugnat gratiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de timore, quod ille qui principaliter habet oculum ad poenam, non potest esse Deo acceptus etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam cum poena nec sit Deus nec sit aliquid Dei: qui principaliter aspicit18 poenam ad finem ultimum non est recte ordinatus, cum principaliorem intuitum habeat ad aliud quam ad Deum. Sed merces et beatitudo summa est ipse Deus: et ideo ipsam principaliter potest quis aspicere, et tamen in finem recte ordinatus esse. — Et sic patet, quod nullum est inconveniens dicere, quod motus caritatis possit esse mercenarius, si dicatur mercenarius ex intuitu mercedis aeternae et increatae. Et hoc modo currunt rationes ad primam partem. Si autem alio modo mercenarius dicatur, rationes illae non cogunt nos fateri, motum caritatis posse esse mercenarium19.

English Translation
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Question II. Whether it is possible for the motion of charity to be mercenary.

Secondly it is asked whether it is possible for the motion of charity to be mercenary. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. On Luke fifteen1, upon that text: How many hired servants in my father's house abound with bread, Ambrose says that there are many good hired servants, who serve God in the hope of eternal goods; but no one serves God well except one who serves him out of charity: therefore it is possible for the motion of a hired servant to have its origin from charity.

2. Likewise, Augustine, upon that text of the Psalm2: God searching the hearts and reins: « The end of care and of thought is delight, to which each one strives to come »: therefore one having charity finally seeks to be delighted; but he who seeks his own delight seeks his own advantage, and every such one is mercenary: therefore it seems that the affection of charity can be mercenary.

3. Likewise, he who wishes to fulfill the commandments of God for the sake of reward is mercenary; but of the holy man it is said in the Psalm3: I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications for the sake of reward; and to the Hebrews eleven it is said of Moses: He looked unto the reward: if therefore both this one and that one was just and was moved out of charity, it seems that the motion of charity can be mercenary.

4. Likewise, the holy man desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ, that he may enjoy him, according as the Apostle desired, to the Philippians one4; but that desire cannot be except of charity, since no one by natural affection desires to die: therefore if such a desire looks to its own advantage and delight, it seems that it is possible for the affection of charity to be mercenary.

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On the contrary: 1. First to the Corinthians thirteen5: Charity seeketh not the things that are her own; but every mercenary seeks what is his own: therefore the motion of charity cannot be mercenary.

2. Likewise, Bernard, On Loving God6: « Although one cannot be served without reward, nevertheless one must be served without regard to reward »; and a little after: « Let us serve God in charity, which expels fear, does not feel toil, does not require reward, does not look to merit »: if therefore every mercenary requires reward, and charity does not require reward: therefore the motion of charity cannot be mercenary.

3. Likewise, the love of charity is gratuitous love; but the gratuitous and the mercenary are divided by opposition7, because what is done gratis is not done out of hire: if therefore it is essential to charity to be gratuitous, it seems that its motion and act can in no way be mercenary.

4. Likewise, fear, which principally has its eye on punishment, is servile fear, which is not acceptable to God: therefore by parity of reasoning love also, which has its eye on reward, cannot be meritorious; but such love is mercenary; but every affection of charity is meritorious: therefore none can be mercenary.

Conclusion. Some motion of charity can not improbably be called mercenary, insofar as it looks to the uncreated Good as to a final reward.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that he is called mercenary who principally has his eye on the wage; for if he looked to it not principally, he would not on this account be mercenary. According to this it is to be understood that there is a twofold wage, namely created and uncreated, temporal and eternal. And according to this there is a twofold mercenary, namely good and bad; and a twofold hire, one praiseworthy and the other blameworthy. For he who principally looks to the created and temporal wage is a bad mercenary; and the Lord censures him in John ten8, saying: But the hireling flieth, because he is a hireling. But he who looks principally to the eternal wage, of which it is said in Genesis fifteen: Thy reward [is] exceeding great, is a good mercenary; and this mercenary « abounds with the bread of faith, hope, and charity », as Ambrose says upon that text9: How many hired servants etc.

Understanding it of the first hire, there is no doubt that the motion of charity cannot be mercenary, because that hire is neither from charity nor with charity, since it is repugnant to charity.

Concerning the second hire there is doubt, inasmuch as it can be with charity; it is not however altogether certain whether it is from charity. — For some have wished to say that it is not from charity, but rather from an affection of nature accompanying charity. For the love of charity, as they say, since it is gratuitous love, does not look to reward; nay, it makes a man serve God altogether liberally, as a son [serves] his father10. — But to others it seems that such a mercenary affection can be from charity. For the desire of having the eternal wage and of enjoying the eternal good is a desire of grace, and is neither of natural nor of acquired love, but rather of gratuitous love, especially that desire by which the Apostle said11: I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ. For to the affection of charity it belongs not only to love God with the love of friendship, but even with the love of concupiscence. « For to enjoy is to cleave by love12 », and it is established that to enjoy God is through charity. And therefore these wished to say, and quite probably, as it seems, that the motion of charity according to some kind of hire can be mercenary, namely insofar as it constitutes its wage about the uncreated Good, toward which it tends as to a final reward and desires as every good13. — If therefore we wish to maintain this position as probable, the reasons which are to the opposite part are easily

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dissolved14.

1. For to that which is first objected, that charity seeketh not the things that are her own; it must be said that her own is there called one's proper good, in such a way that the common good is excluded15. But he who desires God as his wage does not in this manner seek what is his own, because that good is common to all. For to seek and to see and to love God as one's wage and reward is not to seek one's proper good, in that manner of calling [a thing] proper which sounds toward vice.

2. To that which is objected, that God is to be served without regard to reward; it must be said that there is a twofold motion in charity, namely the motion of friendship and the motion of concupiscence. The motion of friendship is that by which one desires to please and to serve God; the motion of concupiscence is that by which one desires to have and to see God. When therefore Bernard says that God is to be served without regard to reward, he understands it of the love of friendship. For if by the affection of friendship a man serves a friend and loves him without regard to reward, as the Philosopher says16, much more by the love of charity does a man will good to God without regard to any retribution; but by this it is not excluded that charity by the love of concupiscence may long for and desire to attain that highest wage, to which it finally intends to come.

3. To that which is objected, that the love of charity is simply gratuitous, therefore it cannot be mercenary; it must be said that that argument is good concerning that hire which is repugnant to grace; but the hire of eternal life is not repugnant to grace, nay it is consonant with it, because it specially orders [one] to it. Hence just as the love of concupiscence is not repugnant to the love of friendship in charity, nay the more rightly one desires God, the more he pants toward his honor17; so the affection of this kind of hire is not repugnant to grace.

4. To that which is objected concerning fear, that he who principally has his eye on punishment cannot be acceptable to God, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike. For since punishment is neither God nor anything of God: he who principally looks18 to punishment as the ultimate end is not rightly ordered, since he has a more principal regard to something other than to God. But the wage and the highest beatitude is God himself: and therefore one can principally look to it, and yet be rightly ordered to the end. — And so it is plain that there is nothing unfitting in saying that the motion of charity can be mercenary, if one is said mercenary from regard to the eternal and uncreated wage. And in this way the reasons run to the first part. But if mercenary be taken in another way, those reasons do not compel us to confess that the motion of charity can be mercenary19.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 17. Expositionem Ambrosii integram iam retulimus tom. I. pag. 34, nota 6. — Circa finem mg. pro motum mercenarii codd. A K W motum mercenarium. Deinde post ex caritate Vat. sola omittit habere.
    Verse 17. We have already given the whole exposition of Ambrose in vol. I, p. 34, note 6. — Near the end, in the margin, for motum mercenarii codices A K W [read] motum mercenarium. Then after ex caritate the Vatican edition alone omits habere.
  2. Psalm. 7, 10. in quem locum August., n. 9. dicit: « Finis enim curae delectatio est, quia eo quisque curis et cogitationibus nititur, ut ad suam delectationem perveniat ». Quae Augustini sententia a S. Bonaventura hic iisdem verbis affertur, quibus a Strabo affertur in Glossa ordinaria.
    Psalm 7, 10, on which place Augustine, n. 9, says: « For the end of care is delight, because by his cares and thoughts each one strives toward this, that he may come to his own delight ». This saying of Augustine is here cited by St. Bonaventure in the same words in which it is cited by Strabo in the Glossa ordinaria.
  3. Psalm. 118, 112. — Seq. testimonium est Hebr. 11, 26. — Paulo inferius voci iustus Vat. praefigit vir.
    Psalm 118, 112. — The following testimony is Hebrews 11, 26. — A little below, to the word iustus the Vatican edition prefixes vir.
  4. Vers. 23. — De minori, in qua pro caritatis codd. A T substituerunt caritas, cfr. infra dub. 3. in fine.
    Verse 23. — On the lesser [reading], in which for caritatis codices A T have substituted caritas; cf. below, dubium 3, at the end.
  5. Vers. 5.
    Verse 5.
  6. Cap. 7. n. 17. Cfr. supra pag. 556, nota 4. In dicto Bernardi ante serviri cod. A supplet Deo, cod. V ante Etsi. — Seq. Bernardi testimonium invenitur in eius Epist. 143. n. 3: Servite in caritate illa, quae timorem expellit, labores non sentit, meritum non intuetur, praemium non requirit.
    Ch. 7, n. 17. Cf. above, p. 556, note 4. In the saying of Bernard, before serviri codex A supplies Deo, codex V [does so] before Etsi. — The following testimony of Bernard is found in his Epistle 143, n. 3: Serve in that charity which expels fear, does not feel labors, does not look to merit, does not require reward.
  7. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4, et Comment. p. II. a. 4. q. 4. seq. — Proxime post codd. A K U Z, verbis transpositis, ergo pari ratione et amor.
    See below in the text of the Master, dist. XXXIV, ch. 4, and the Commentary, part II, art. 4, q. 4 and following. — Just after, codices A K U Z, with the words transposed, [read] ergo pari ratione et amor.
  8. Vers. 13. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Gen. 13, 1.
    Verse 13. — The following passage of Scripture is Genesis 13, 1. [i.e. Gen. 15, 1.]
  9. Luc. 15, 17. Verba: « panibus abundat fidei, spei et caritatis », in Ambrosii expositione super hunc locum non inveniuntur, neque S. Bonav. in Comment. super hunc locum nomen Ambrosii commemorat. Ait ibi: « Alii sunt mercenarii... et isti sunt qui serviunt pro mercede aeterna; et tales abundant frequenter panibus fidei, spei et caritatis, de quibus supra (c. 11, 5.): Amice, commoda mihi tres panes ». In expositione autem horum verborum: Amice, commoda etc., Ambrosius (lib. VII. n. 87. seqq.) tangit tres virtutes theologales. — Paulo inferius pro cum caritati repugnet cod. N immo caritati repugnat.
    Luke 15, 17. The words « abounds with the bread of faith, hope, and charity » are not found in Ambrose's exposition upon this place, nor does St. Bonaventure in the Commentary upon this place mention the name of Ambrose. He says there: « Some are hired servants... and these are they who serve for the eternal wage; and such frequently abound with the bread of faith, hope, and charity, concerning whom above (ch. 11, 5): Friend, lend me three loaves ». And in the exposition of these words: Friend, lend etc., Ambrose (book VII, n. 87 ff.) touches on the three theological virtues. — A little below, for cum caritati repugnet codex N [reads] immo caritati repugnat.
  10. Hugo a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XIII. c. 8: « Sed forte mercenarius eris, si diligis Deum et servis ei, ut praemium ab illo accipias. Dicunt hoc stulti quidam, et tam stulti, ut se ipsos non intelligant. Diligimus Deum et servimus illi, sed non quaerimus praemium, ne mercenarii simus, etiam ipsum non quaerimus. Dabit, si voluerit, sed nos non quaerimus... Pura enim et gratuita et filiali dilectione diligimus, nihil quaerimus... Diligimus ipsum, sed non quaerimus aliquid, etiam ipsum non quaerimus, quem diligimus... Quomodo, inquiunt, mercenarii non sumus, si Deum propter hoc diligimus, ut praemium ab eo accipiamus? Non est gratis hoc amare, neque amor iste filialis, sed mercenarii et servi, qui pretium quaerit pro servitute sua. » — Paulo ante pro ab affectu naturae codd. A G (H N primitus) L V W aa ab effectu naturae.
    Hugh of St. Victor, II. On the Sacraments, part XIII, ch. 8: « But perhaps you will be mercenary, if you love God and serve him in order to receive a reward from him. Certain fools say this, and so foolish that they do not understand themselves. We love God and serve him, but we do not seek a reward, lest we be mercenaries, nor do we even seek him. He will give, if he wills, but we do not seek... For with a pure and gratuitous and filial love we love, we seek nothing... We love him, but we do not seek anything, nor do we even seek him whom we love... How, they say, are we not mercenaries, if we love God for this, that we may receive a reward from him? This is not to love gratis, nor is that love filial, but of mercenaries and servants, [of one] who seeks a price for his service. » — A little before, for ab affectu naturae codices A G (H N originally) L V W aa [read] ab effectu naturae.
  11. Phil. 1, 23.
    Philippians 1, 23.
  12. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 1. n. 1. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 2. seq., et Comment. a. 2. q. 1.
    Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, ch. 1, n. 1. Cf. Sentences I, text of the Master, dist. I, ch. 2 ff., and the Commentary, art. 2, q. 1.
  13. Non alienum videtur hic afferre quae Hugo a S. Vict. loco paulo superius (in nota 6.) laudato (II. de Sacram. p. XIII. c. 8.) ulterius dicit: « Audite homines sapientes. Diligimus, inquiunt, ipsum, sed non quaerimus ipsum. Hoc est dicere; diligimus ipsum, sed non curamus de ipso. Ego homo sic diligi nollem a vobis. Si me diligeretis, ut de me non curaretis, ego de vestra dilectione non curarem. Vos videritis, si dignum est, ut Deo offeratis quod homo digne respueret ». Et etiam haec: « Qui hoc dicunt [scil. quod amor iste non sit filialis, sed mercenarius], virtutem dilectionis non intelligunt. Quid est enim diligere nisi ipsum velle habere? Non aliud ab ipso, sed ipsum, hoc est gratis; si aliud quaereres ab ipso, gratis non amares... Si te ipso aliquid amas, mercenarius; si tu ipse, amas et ipsum amas, filius es » etc. — Subinde pro Si igitur edd. Si enim.
    It does not seem out of place here to add what Hugh of St. Victor, in the place cited a little above (in note 6) (II. On the Sacraments, part XIII, ch. 8), further says: « Hear, wise men. We love him, they say, but we do not seek him. This is to say: we love him, but we do not care about him. I, a man, would not wish to be so loved by you. If you loved me in such a way that you did not care about me, I would not care for your love. See whether it is worthy that you should offer to God what a man would worthily spurn ». And also this: « Those who say this [namely, that this love is not filial but mercenary] do not understand the power of love. For what is it to love except to wish to have him himself? Not something other than himself, but himself — this is [to love] gratis; if you were to seek something else from him, you would not love gratis... If you love something for your own sake, [you are] mercenary; if [you love] him for his own sake, and you love and love him, you are a son », etc. — Thereupon for Si igitur the editions [read] Si enim.
  14. In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. ad conciliandas opiniones hic additur, « quod duplex est appetitus sive affectio, amicitiae scil. et commodi ». Illa, affectio scil. amicitiae, ut ibi exponitur, nunquam est mercenaria; haec autem, scil. affectio commodi, qua quis sibi bonum desiderat, si est absoluta, est mercenaria; si non absoluta, sed propter aliud mediante alio, v. gr. gratia et meritis, mercenaria quidem non erit, tamen non est a caritate effective, sed a spe, concomitante caritate.
    In the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, to reconcile the opinions, there is added here that « appetite or affection is twofold, namely of friendship and of advantage ». That [affection], namely the affection of friendship, as it is there expounded, is never mercenary; but this one, namely the affection of advantage, by which one desires good for himself, if it is absolute, is mercenary; if not absolute, but on account of another by means of another, e.g. grace and merits, it will indeed not be mercenary, yet it is not from charity effectively, but from hope, charity accompanying.
  15. August., Epist. 211. (alias 109.) n. 12: Caritas enim, de qua scriptum est, quod non quaerit quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur, quia communia propriis, non propria communibus anteponit. Et ideo, quanto amplius rem communem quam propriam curaveritis, tanto amplius vos profecisse noveritis etc. — Pro vocatur, quam lectionem tuentur codd. A P Q S, codd. B C D H L M O bb exhibent vocat, cod. Z vocavit, codd. R X notant, alii codd. vel vocant vel notant, edd. notat. Subinde pro Quod autem codd. Z bb Qui autem.
    Augustine, Epistle 211 (otherwise 109), n. 12: For charity, of which it is written that it seeketh not the things that are her own, is so understood, because it prefers common things to its own, not its own to common things. And therefore, the more you care for the common thing than for your own, the more you will know that you have advanced etc. — For vocatur, which reading codices A P Q S defend, codices B C D H L M O bb give vocat, codex Z vocavit, codices R X notant, other codices either vocant or notant, the editions notat. Thereupon for Quod autem codices Z bb [read] Qui autem.
  16. Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 5. (c. 4.); VIII. Ethic. c. 3. seqq.; II. Magnor. Moral. c. 12. (c. 11.); VII. Eudem. c. 3. seqq. Cfr. supra pag. 574, nota 5.
    Book II of the Rhetoric, ch. 5 (ch. 4); VIII of the Ethics, ch. 3 ff.; II of the Magna Moralia, ch. 12 (ch. 11); VII of the Eudemian [Ethics], ch. 3 ff. Cf. above, p. 574, note 5.
  17. Codd. A H K aa et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. amorem.
    Codices A H K aa and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] amorem [in place of honorem].
  18. Codd. A K respicit. Subinde edd., pro ad finem exhibentes tanquam finem, haec verba coniungunt cum praecedentibus et disiungunt post ultimum. Cod. bb tanquam ad finem.
    Codices A K [read] respicit. Thereupon the editions, giving tanquam finem in place of ad finem, join these words with the preceding and separate [them] after ultimum. Codex bb [reads] tanquam ad finem.
  19. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
← Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3→