Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3
ARTICULUS III.
De naturali Angelorum dilectione.
Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de naturali Angelorum dilectione, et de ipsa duo quaeruntur. Primo de dilectione, qua diligebant Deum. Secundo de dilectione, qua unus Angelus diligebat alterum.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum Angeli naturali dilectione dilexerint Deum propter ipsum et super omnia.
Quaeritur ergo primo de modo naturalis dilectionis ad Deum. Et est quaestio, utrum Angeli naturali dilectione dilexerint Deum propter se et super omnia. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Quia Bernardus1 dicit, quod «natura est curva»: ergo ad se ipsam reflectitur, ergo magis diligit se quam alia, et alia propter se: ergo etc.
2. Item, qui diligit aliquid supra se elevatur supra se. «Amor enim iungit amantem cum amato2». Si ergo magis diligit quod est supra se quam se, ergo supra se elevatur; sed nihil per se elevatur supra se: ergo necesse est, quod talis amor aliud principium habeat quam naturam.
3. Item, actus dilectionis est nobilissimus inter omnes actus animae, et motus iste, scilicet diligere propter se et super omnia, est motus, quo nullus potest cogitari nobilior3: ergo si natura potest in hunc sine gratia, multo fortius et in quemlibet alium, et ita nulla est opportunitas gratiae naturae institutae. Et iterum, si nobilissimus est, Deo est placitus et acceptus: ergo dignus remuneratione: ergo gratia non est necessaria ad merendum.
4. Item, naturalis dilectio diligit quod diligit per modum desiderii sive concupiscentiae: sed omnis concupiscentia naturalis supponit aliquam indigentiam; sed quandocumque aliquis diligit aliquid propter suam indigentiam, magis diligit illud in quo est indigentia, quam illud quod supplet — ut cum appeto vestimentum propter indigentiam corporis et similiter cibum, magis diligo corpus quam vestimentum vel cibum — ergo si Angelus naturaliter diligit Deum propter suam indigentiam, ergo magis diligit se quam Deum.
CONTRA: 1. Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum4: «Tales Deus creavit Angelos, ut ipsum prae se diligerent, cuius opere se tales creatos esse cognovissent».
2. Item, ratione videtur, quia affectus angelicus amabat bonum naturali dilectione; aut ergo quia bonum, aut quia bonum sibi. Si quia bonum, cum Deus esset summe bonus, magis ergo ipsum Deum quam aliquid aliud diligebat. Si quia bonum sibi; sed Deus adhuc melius erat ei quam aliquid aliud, quia bonus, immo optimus est affectui quaerenti illum5: ergo quocumque modo videtur, quod ipsum propter se et super omnia diligebat.
3. Item, gustus sanus, non errans in iudicio, id magis desiderat et magis amat, quod est magis delectabile; sed Deus est maxime delectabilis: ergo cum Angelus a sua conditione hoc nosset et affectum sanum haberet, ergo in eo propter se et super omnia delectabatur. Sed illud magis diligit, in quo magis6 et propter se delectatur: ergo etc.
4. Item, hoc mandatum de diligendo Deum propter se et super omnia erat scriptum in corde Angeli, ergo conscientia dictabat ei, quod ad hoc tenebatur: ergo si non sic diligebat, contra conscientiam faciebat, ergo peccabat: ergo ante peccatum Deum super omnia diligebat. Si tu dicas, quod conscientia non obligabat eum nisi pro tempore gratiae, quia ante non poterat: contra: affectus Angeli ante peccatum non repugnabat intellectui7, alioquin ante peccatum erat bellum; sed intellectus dicit, nihil esse diligendum super omnia nisi Deum: ergo cum oporteret, Angelum aliquid diligere super omnia, necesse erat8, quod aut diligeret Deum propter se et super omnia, aut faceret contra conscientiam, et ita peccaret.
5. Item, Angelus diligebat Deum, aut ergo fruens, aut utens. Si fruens: ergo propter se et super omnia; si utens: ergo cum «summa perversio sit uti fruendis9», erat perversus, et affectus erat in eo inordinatus, cum faceret de via terminum, et e converso; patet ergo etc.
CONCLUSIO.
Tam Angelus quam homo tempore naturae institutae habiles erant ad diligendum Deum propter ipsum et super omnia.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio tempore naturae institutae tam homo quam Angelus habilis erat ad diligendum Deum propter se et super omnia. Et hoc patet: impossibile enim erat, eum aliter esse rectum10. Rectitudo enim mentis consistit radicaliter in amore. Amor autem rectus esse non potest, si aliquid diligat supra Deum vel aeque, vel aliquid diligat propter se, et Deum propter aliud. Si ergo Deus fecit hominem et Angelum rectum11, patet, quod unicuique dedit habilitatem ad amandum se, Deum, super omnia et propter se.
Patet etiam hoc planius, si attendamus, quid est diligere propter se, et super omnia. — Contingit enim, aliquid diligi dilectione concupiscentiae, sicut aliquis amat vinum, vel amicitiae, sicut aliquis amat socium12. — Propter se vero aliquid diligere amore concupiscentiae est non alterius gratia, sed ibi sistere, sicut ebriosus diligit vinum propter se. Propter aliud, est alterius gratia, sicut sobrius diligit potum propter salutem. — Similiter in amore amicitiae propter se diligere est non alterius gratia velle alteri bonum, sicut dicit Philosophus13, quod «diligimus amicos propter se, etsi nihil omnino boni debeat nobis ab ipsis esse». Propter aliud vero est alterius gratia, sicut aliquis diligit hominem propter commodum suum, sicut dicit idem14, quod «inimicos nostros volumus esse iustos, ut nihil nobis noceant». — Diligere vero aliquid super omnia amore amicitiae est nullo commodo vel incommodo velle ipsum offendere nec amicitiam solvere; similiter diligere15 dilectione concupiscentiae est nullo commodo vel incommodo velle illud perdere.
Quoniam igitur affectus Angeli Deum habere cupiebat propter se, quia summe bonum et summe reficiens, non alterius boni gratia, et Deo volebat bonum propter se, multo magis quam amicus amico; similiter nullo commodo vel incommodo volebat Deum offendere vel perdere, ut manifestum est et patet intuenti; dico, quod Deum diligebat propter se et super omnia.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod motus naturae curvus est; dicendum, quod aut Bernardus intelligit de natura, qua communicamus cum brutis; aut si de rationali, intelligit prout lapsa est; aut hoc vocat curvitatem, quod appetit sibi. Sed esto, quod Deum appetat sibi, non tamen aliquid magis diligit sibi quam Deum, et ita nihilominus propter se et super omnia.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod elevatur supra se; dicendum, quod elevari supra se est dupliciter: aut supra suum posse, et hoc est impossibile, nisi adiuvetur natura; aut supra suum esse, et hoc est possibile et naturale. Unde bene concedo, quod homo naturaliter natus est elevari supra se, contemplando et amando.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus iste videtur nobilissimus et difficillimus et Deo gratissimus: dicendum, quod motus iste aliter est gratiae, aliter est naturae institutae. Naturae institutae est ex quadam habilitate et rectitudine respectu boni; gratiae vero est, quia captivatur affectus in obsequium Christi, sicut intellectus per fidem16. Tunc autem captivatur intellectus in obsequium Christi, quando contra illud quod ratio sua dictat, assentit primae veritati; sic et affectus, quando id ad quod diligendum naturaliter inclinatur, amore Christi paratus est odire; vel e converso, quando id ad cuius odium naturaliter inclinatur, paratus est amare. Et talis est affectus, qui contemnit vitam et honores et omne desiderabile, et amat odientes se et laedentes propter Deum; et hic est solus affectus, qui Deo famulatur, et quem Deus acceptat17 et remunerat; et hic non est a natura, sed solum a gratia.
Aliter etiam differt hic motus ab illo, quia ille a cognitione naturali, scilicet qui est dilectionis naturalis, alius est a cognitione fidei. Et differt haec cognitio ab illa, quia cognitio naturalis cognoscit Deum summe bonum propter diffusionem sive communicationem bonitatis in effectibus creatis; sed fides dictat Deum summe bonum per communicationem bonitatis in divinis personis. Et utraque cognitio dicit Deum summe bonum et summe diligendum; sed multo nobilius fides sive cognitio gratuita. Per hunc modum utraque dilectio Deum diligit summe, sed magis et nobilius dilectio gratuita.
Alia differentia consuevit dari, quod dilectione naturali diligit Deum animus sive affectus rectus, quia bonus18 sibi; et ideo summe diligit, quia summe bonum sibi; et omne bonum, quod est et quod habet, pendet ex ipso et nihil esset nisi per ipsum: ideo plus Deum diligit quam etiam se ipsum. Sed dilectione gratuita diligit quis Deum, quia bonus; et quia summe bonus, diligit summe; et quia non est bonus ipse homo, nisi in quantum est ad Deum, non diligit se nisi propter Deum; et hoc dico dilectione gratuita.
Et sic triplex est differentia: prima est a parte modi diligendi; secunda a parte cognitionis disponentis sive principii; tertia est a parte motivi. Omnes autem sunt rationabiles, sed primae magis innitendum.
4. Ad ultimum solvendum est per interemptionem19, quia natura rationalis, de qua nunc loquimur, non tantum amat ratione indigentiae, sed etiam ratione convenientiae et complacentiae; et ideo magis illud quod natum est summe delectare et summe placere.
SCHOLION.
I. Vocabulum naturali in titulo quaestionis intelligitur, quatenus distinguitur a gratuito i. e. supernaturali. In alio sensu naturale distinguitur ab actu deliberativo et libero; sic «amor naturalis respicit ipsam inclinationem naturae, quae est ad unum determinata» (III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; cfr. infra d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3.). De amore naturali in utroque sensu haec quaestio a posterioribus theologis tractata est. — Praeter ea quae in corp. de amore concupiscentiae et benevolentiae (amicitiae), de diligere propter se et propter aliud dicuntur, cfr. de his I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, d. 29. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4.
II. Quaestio solvitur a Seraphico affirmative quoad amorem tum concupiscentiae tum benevolentiae. Consentiunt S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R. et etiam Scotus (cfr. H. de Montefortino, Sum. Scoti, t. III. p. II. q. 26. a. 3, et t. II. p. 1. q. 60. a. 5.), licet (III. Sent. d. 27. q. unica) arguat contra argumentum principale S. Thomae, unde a nonnullis pro opposita sententia citatur. — Alii autem affirmative respondent quoad amorem concupiscentiae, negative quoad amorem benevolentiae. Ita, teste Dionysio Carth., Gulielm. Antissiodorensis, quem sequuntur Alex. Hal., B. Albert. aliique, qui putant, quod amare Deum propter ipsum et super omnia sit caritas supernaturalis. — De differentia autem caritatis sive amoris gratuiti a naturali amore bene loquitur Seraphicus in solut. ad 3; quam doctrinam Petr. a Tar. iisdem fere verbis in compendium redegit.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 30. m. 1. a. 2. § 2.— Scot., loc. cit. et Report. III. Sent. d. 27. n. 11-13. — S. Thom., hic q. 4; S. I. q. 60. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lit. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 11. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 7.
ARTICLE III.
On the natural love of the Angels.
Consequently, in the third place, inquiry is made concerning the natural love of the Angels, and concerning it two things are asked. First, concerning the love by which they loved God. Second, concerning the love by which one Angel loved another.
QUESTION I.
Whether the Angels by natural love loved God for His own sake and above all things.
The first inquiry, then, is about the mode of natural love toward God. And the question is whether the Angels by natural love loved God for His own sake and above all things. And that they did not, it seems:
1. Because Bernard1 says that «nature is curved»: therefore it is bent back upon itself, therefore it loves itself more than other things, and other things for its own sake: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, whoever loves something above himself is raised above himself. «For love joins the lover with the beloved2». If therefore he loves what is above himself more than himself, then he is raised above himself; but nothing of itself is raised above itself: therefore it is necessary that such love have another principle than nature.
3. Likewise, the act of love is the noblest among all the acts of the soul, and that motion, namely to love for His own sake and above all things, is a motion than which none nobler can be conceived3: therefore if nature can attain to this without grace, much more strongly can it attain to any other, and so there is no occasion for the grace of instituted nature. And again, if it is the noblest, it is pleasing and acceptable to God: therefore worthy of remuneration: therefore grace is not necessary for meriting.
4. Likewise, natural love loves what it loves by way of desire or concupiscence: but every natural concupiscence supposes some indigence; but whenever anyone loves something on account of his own indigence, he loves more that in which the indigence is than that which supplies it — as when I seek clothing on account of the body's indigence and likewise food, I love the body more than the clothing or the food — therefore if the Angel naturally loves God on account of his own indigence, then he loves himself more than God.
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Augustine, On the Faith to Peter4: «God created the Angels such that they should love Him before themselves, by whose work they had come to know that they were created such».
2. Likewise, by reason it seems so, because the angelic affection loved the good by natural love; either then because it was good, or because it was good for itself. If because it was good, since God was supremely good, then it loved God Himself more than anything else. If because it was good for itself; but God was still better for it than anything else, since He is good, indeed the best, for an affection seeking Him5: therefore in whatever way it seems that it loved Him for His own sake and above all things.
3. Likewise, a healthy taste, not erring in judgment, desires more and loves more that which is more delightful; but God is most delightful: therefore since the Angel from his condition knew this and had a healthy affection, then he was delighted in Him for His own sake and above all things. But one loves more that in which one is delighted more6 and for its own sake: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, this commandment of loving God for His own sake and above all things was written in the heart of the Angel, therefore conscience dictated to him that he was bound to this: therefore if he did not so love, he acted against conscience, therefore he sinned: therefore before sin he loved God above all things. If you say that conscience did not oblige him except for the time of grace, because before he could not: on the contrary: the affection of the Angel before sin did not conflict with the intellect7, otherwise before sin there was war; but the intellect says that nothing is to be loved above all things except God: therefore since it behoved the Angel to love something above all things, it was necessary8 that either he should love God for His own sake and above all things, or he should act against conscience, and so sin.
5. Likewise, the Angel loved God either as enjoying or as using. If as enjoying: then for His own sake and above all things; if as using: then since «it is the height of perversity to use things to be enjoyed9», he was perverse, and the affection in him was disordered, since he made of the way an end, and conversely; therefore it is plain, etc.
CONCLUSION.
Both the Angel and man, in the time of instituted nature, were capable of loving God for His own sake and above all things.
I respond: It must be said that without doubt, in the time of instituted nature, both man and the Angel was capable of loving God for His own sake and above all things. And this is plain: for it was impossible for him to be upright otherwise10. For the uprightness of the mind consists radically in love. But love cannot be upright if it loves anything above God or equally, or loves anything for its own sake and God for the sake of something else. If therefore God made man and the Angel upright11, it is plain that He gave to each the capability of loving himself, and God, above all things and for His own sake.
This is also plainer if we attend to what it is to love for one's own sake and above all things. — For it happens that something is loved by the love of concupiscence, as someone loves wine, or of friendship, as someone loves a companion12. — But to love something for its own sake by the love of concupiscence is not for the sake of another, but to rest there, as the drunkard loves wine for its own sake. For the sake of something else is for the sake of another, as the sober man loves drink for the sake of health. — Similarly in the love of friendship, to love for its own sake is to will the good to another not for the sake of another, as the Philosopher says13, that «we love friends for their own sake, even if no good at all need come to us from them». But for the sake of something else is for the sake of another, as someone loves a man for his own advantage, as the same one says14, that «we wish our enemies to be just, that they may harm us in nothing». — But to love something above all things by the love of friendship is to will to offend it or dissolve the friendship for no advantage or disadvantage; similarly to love15 by the love of concupiscence is to will to lose it for no advantage or disadvantage.
Since therefore the affection of the Angel desired to have God for His own sake, because supremely good and supremely refreshing, not for the sake of another good, and willed the good to God for His own sake, much more than a friend to a friend; similarly for no advantage or disadvantage it willed to offend or lose God, as is manifest and plain to one considering; I say that he loved God for His own sake and above all things.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that the motion of nature is curved; it must be said that either Bernard understands it of the nature by which we have community with the beasts; or if of the rational nature, he understands it as it is fallen; or he calls this curvature, that it seeks for itself. But granted that it seeks God for itself, nevertheless it does not love anything more for itself than God, and so nonetheless for His own sake and above all things.
2. To that which is objected, that it is raised above itself; it must be said that to be raised above oneself is twofold: either above one's own power, and this is impossible unless nature is helped; or above one's own being, and this is possible and natural. Hence I readily concede that man is naturally born to be raised above himself, by contemplating and loving.
3. To that which is objected, that this motion seems the noblest and most difficult and most pleasing to God: it must be said that this motion is in one way of grace, in another way of instituted nature. Of instituted nature it is from a certain capability and uprightness with respect to the good; but of grace it is, because the affection is taken captive into the obedience of Christ, as the intellect through faith16. Now the intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ when, against that which its reason dictates, it assents to the first truth; so also the affection, when that to which it is naturally inclined to love it is, by the love of Christ, prepared to hate; or conversely, when that to whose hatred it is naturally inclined, it is prepared to love. And such is the affection which despises life and honors and everything desirable, and loves those who hate it and harm it for the sake of God; and this is the only affection which serves God, and which God accepts17 and remunerates; and this is not from nature, but only from grace.
In another way also this motion differs from that, because the one is from natural cognition, namely that which is of natural love, the other is from the cognition of faith. And this cognition differs from that, because natural cognition knows God to be supremely good on account of the diffusion or communication of goodness in created effects; but faith dictates God to be supremely good through the communication of goodness in the divine persons. And both cognitions declare God supremely good and supremely to be loved; but much more nobly faith or gratuitous cognition. In this way both loves love God supremely, but more and more nobly the gratuitous love.
Another difference is wont to be given, that by natural love the upright soul or affection loves God because He is good18 for it; and therefore it loves Him supremely, because He is supremely good for it; and every good which it is and which it has depends on Him and would be nothing except through Him: therefore it loves God more even than itself. But by gratuitous love one loves God because He is good; and because He is supremely good, he loves Him supremely; and because man himself is not good, except insofar as he is ordered to God, he does not love himself except for the sake of God; and this I say by gratuitous love.
And thus the difference is threefold: the first is on the part of the mode of loving; the second on the part of the disposing cognition or principle; the third is on the part of the motive. But all are reasonable, though the first is to be relied on more.
4. To the last, the solution is by destruction19, because the rational nature, of which we now speak, loves not only by reason of indigence, but also by reason of fittingness and complacency; and therefore more that which is born to delight supremely and to please supremely.
SCHOLION.
I. The word natural in the title of the question is understood insofar as it is distinguished from gratuitous, i.e. supernatural. In another sense the natural is distinguished from the deliberative and free act; thus «natural love regards the very inclination of nature, which is determined to one thing» (III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; cfr. below d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3.). On natural love in both senses this question has been treated by later theologians. — Besides the things which are said in the body concerning the love of concupiscence and of benevolence (friendship), and concerning loving for one's own sake and for the sake of another, cfr. on these I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, d. 29. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4.
II. The question is resolved by the Seraphic Doctor affirmatively as to love both of concupiscence and of benevolence. Agreeing are St. Thomas, Petr. a Tar., Richard a Med., Aegid. R. and also Scotus (cfr. H. de Montefortino, Sum. Scoti, t. III. p. II. q. 26. a. 3, and t. II. p. 1. q. 60. a. 5.), although (III. Sent. d. 27. q. unica) he argues against the principal argument of St. Thomas, whence by some he is cited for the opposite opinion. — But others answer affirmatively as to the love of concupiscence, negatively as to the love of benevolence. So, on the testimony of Dionysius Carth., William of Auxerre, whom Alex. of Hales, B. Albert and others follow, who hold that to love God for His own sake and above all things is supernatural charity. — But concerning the difference of charity or gratuitous love from natural love the Seraphic Doctor speaks well in the solution to argument 3; which doctrine Petr. a Tar. reduced to a compendium in nearly the same words.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 30. m. 1. a. 2. § 2.— Scot., loc. cit. and Report. III. Sent. d. 27. n. 11-13. — S. Thom., here q. 4; S. I. q. 60. a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 18; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard a Med., here a. 7. q. 1. — Aegid. R., here p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lit. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 11. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q. here q. 7.