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Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De fide simpliciter dicta sive formata.

Quaestio I. Utrum fides sit virtus.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum fides sit virtus; et loquimur hic de fide, qua quis credit in Deum. Et quod sic, ostenditur.

1. Quod est principium nostrae salutis habet rationem virtutis; sed fides est huiusmodi, secundum quod saepe dicitur in Evangeliop470-3: Fides tua te salvum fecit: ergo fides est virtus.

2. Item, quod est principium purificationis cordis habet rationem virtutis — sicut enim cor non inquinatur nisi per vitium, sic non purificatur nisi per virtutem — sed fides est principium purificationis cordis, secundum quod dicitur Actuum decimo quintop470-4: Fide purificans corda eorum: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis habitus, qui est principium divinae acceptionis, habet rationem virtutis, maxime cum respicit determinatum genus operis; sed fides est huiusmodi, secundum quod dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimop470-5: Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo: ergo fides plenam et perfectam in se continet rationem virtutis.

4. Item, quod directam habet contrarietatem ad vitium et peccatum virtus est; sed fides est huiusmodi, quoniam directe opponitur haeresi et infidelitati, quae sunt vitia et peccata: ergo fides est virtus proprie dicta; et hoc ipsum potest probari expresse per auctoritatem Augustini in litterap470-6.

Sed contra: 1. «In eodem genere sunt extrema et medium», pro eo quod medium participat naturamp470-1 extremorum; sed fides est media inter opinionem et scientiam, sicut dicit magister Hugo in libro de Sacramentisp470-7, ubi dicit, quod «fides est certitudo de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta»: si igitur necp470-2 opinio nec scientia est in genere virtutis, necessario sequi videtur, quod nec fides in genere virtutis contineatur.

2. Item, «habitus distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta»; in hoc autem distinguitur virtus et scientia secundum Philosophump470-8, quod «virtus est in bonum, et scientia est in verum»; sed fides est in verum sub ratione veri: ergo fides non est in genere virtutis, sed magis in genere scientiae. Quod autem fides sit in verum sub ratione veri, patet, quoniam fidei est assentire primae Veritati propter se et super omnia.

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3. Item, vituperabile est homini habenti usum rationis velle aliquid sine ratione, ergo pari ratione vituperabile erit ei credere sine ratione; sed fides, qua credimus in Deum, non inquirit rationemp471-1: ergo talis fides vituperabilis est. Sed nihil, quod est vituperabile, habet rationem virtutis: ergo ubi est fides, non potest esse virtus in nobis.

4. Item, quanto actus aliquis est rationabilior, tanto est virtuti proximiorp471-2, ergo credere per rationem cogentem plus spectat ad virtutem quam credere absque ratione: si igitur credulitas, quam quis habet per violentiam rationis, nec est virtus nec actus virtutis, multo fortius videtur, quod ipsa fides, quae rationem non sequitur nec rationi innititur, careat perfectione virtutis.

Conclusio.

Fides, qua in Deum credimus, non tantum est virtus, verum etiam auriga virtutum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio ipsa fides, qua in Deum credimus, non tantum est virtus, verum etiam auriga virtutum, sicut de prudentia dicit Bernardus ad Eugeniump471-3. — Virtus quidem est, quoniam in ea consistit rectitudo vitae secundum regulam iustitiae. Iustum enim est, ut intellectus noster ita captivetur et subiaceat summae Veritati, sicut affectus noster debet subiacere summae Bonitati; nec potest esse anima recta, nisi intellectus summae Veritati propter se et super omnia assentiat, et affectus summae Bonitati adhaereat. Hanc autem rectitudinem non habet quis nolens, sed volens. Nemo enim plus credit Deo quam sibi, nisi per hoc, quod vult intellectum suum captivare in obsequium Christip471-4. Si ergo captivatio intellectus in obsequium summae Veritatis spectat ad rectitudinem vitae, voluntas, qua quis vult sic se captivare est voluntas recta, et habitus, quo mediante ad hoc expeditur et adiuvatur, facit ad voluntatis rectitudinem. — Si igitur iustitia non est aliud quam «voluntatis rectitudop471-5»; et fides non est aliud nisi habitus, quo intellectus noster voluntarie captivatur in obsequium Christi: restat, quod habitus fidei spectat ad rectitudinem vitae secundum regulam iustitiae; et ideo habet in se rationem virtutis vere et proprie.

Nec solum habet in se rationem virtutis verep471-6, sed etiam aurigae virtutum quarumlibet, tam theologicarum videlicet quam cardinalium. Sine fide enim non est cognitio summi et veri Boni; sine cognitione autem summi et veri Boni non potest esse veri Boni exspectatio et dilectio. Cognitio enim praeambula est et dirigit affectum ad exspectandum et ad desiderandum; et ita necessario fides spem et caritatem praecedit tanquam regula et auriga ipsarump471-7. Rursus, sine cognitione summi Boni non potest esse recta intentio — hoc solum fit recta intentione, quod fit ad gloriam et honorem Dei — sine vero recta intentione nullus actus virtutis recte incedit. Quoniam igitur habitus fidei est, quo mediante summum Bonum a mentibus nostris agnoscitur; hinc est, quod «fides dirigit nostram intentionemp471-8», et per hoc regula est omnis operationis bonae et omnis virtutis meritoriae. Et ideo non tantum debet dici virtus gratuita, sed etiam virtutum gratuitarum regula et auriga. — Et concedendae sunt auctoritates et rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod fides tenet medium inter scientiam et opinionem; dicendum, quod fides assignatur quasi medium inter scientiam et opinionem ab Hugone, non quia conficiatur ex illis duobus, sicut medium conficitur ab extremis, sed quia medium locum tenet quantum ad gradum certitudinis; est enim magis certa quam opinio, et minus quam scientia, sicut videbitur infrap471-9: de hoc autem medio non est

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necesse, quod sit in eodem genere proximo cum extremis. — Posset etiam dici, quod hoc non habet necessitatem in moribus, pro eo quod medium reperitur in genere virtutis, et extrema sunt in genere vitiorump472-1.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod scientia distinguitur in hoc a virtute, quod ipsa est in verum, et virtus in bonum; dici potest, quod Philosophusp472-2 loquitur ibi de virtute consuetudinali, quae consistit circa actiones et passiones, de qua dicit, quod «virtus est in passionibus et operationibus optimorum operativa»; et huiusmodi virtus ordinat in his quae sunt ad finem. De virtute autem intellectuali, cuiusmodi est sapientia et intelligentia, quae ordinant in ipsum finem, non habet veritatem; et hoc modo fides est virtus, non modo praemisso. — Sed hic modus dicendi videtur esse calumniabilis in hoc, quod non tantum de virtute consuetudinali, verum etiam de omni alia virtute sub ratione virtutis videtur posse haec differentia assignari respectu scientiae.

Et propterea dicendum est, quod aliter verum est obiectum fidei, aliter obiectum scientiae: scientiae, inquam, obiectum est, quia est verum visum; fidei autem est obiectum, quia est verump472-3, verum inquam, non visum, sed salutiferum. Quia enim est non visum, requiritur ad ipsum cognoscendum alius habitus, quam sit habitus scientiae; quia salutiferum, ideo habitus ille ad salutem ordinat et ad vitam beatam, et ideo habet rationem virtutis completam. Et sic patet, quod nihil impedit, quin fides possit esse in verum, et tamen nihilominus esse virtus, pro eo quod alio modo est in verum quam scientia, secundum duplicem conditionem praeassignatam. Est enim in veritatem non visam et veritatem salutiferam. Quia enim non visa est, creditur voluntarie; quia autem non solum non visa, sed etiam salutifera, creditur voluntarie et meritorie, quae duo aliena sunt a speculatione scientiae. Unde et veritas, in quam est fides, est veritas secundum pietatemp472-4, quae quidem nota est Catholicis, sed ignota fuit philosophis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credere sine ratione est vituperabile; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi auctoritas non supplet locum rationis. Ubi vero auctoritas locum supplet rationis, non est vituperabile, sed valde commendabile. Sic autem est in fide, quoniam, etsi non adsit intellectui ipsius credentis ratio, propter quam debeat veritati assentire, adest tamen summae Veritatis auctoritas, quae cordi suo suadet; quam etiam summam Veritatem scimus mentiri non posse, et ideo impium est ei non credere. Propterea hoc non tollit, immo potius confert fidei esse virtutem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid magis est rationabile, tanto magis consonat virtuti perfectae; dicendum, quod rationabile dicitur aliquid dupliciter: aut quia consonum est rationi elevatae et illustratae a lumine Veritatis supernae, aut quia consonum est rationi conversae ad cognitionem sensibilemp472-5. Si primo modo dicatur rationabile, non habet instantiam. Si secundo modo dicatur rationabile, falsitatem habet, quoniam frequenter ratio ad sensibilia conversa iudicat esse vera quae sunt falsa, et esse bona quae sunt mala, et e converso. Unde multap472-6 videntur sibi irrationabilia, quae sunt valde rationabilia, sicut patet: quia multa videntur irrationabilia philosophis, quae tamen videntur valde rationabilia Christianis, ut omnino continere et omnino mendicare et similia. Et quantum praecellit iudicium viri iudicium pueri, tantum praecellit iudicium viri christiani iudicium unius philosophi, et iudicium rationis sursum conversae iudicium rationis ad inferiora depressae. Et ideo hoc non impedit, fidem esse virtutem, quia credit aliqua, quae videntur esse irrationabilia homini animali — sunt enim rationabilia homini spiritualip472-7 — immo hoc facit ad rationem virtutis, ut credat sine ratione. Si enim crederet per rationem cogentem, illa credulitas non esset voluntaria, sed necessaria, et sic non esset virtuosa nec meritoria; sicut melius manifestabitur infrap472-8.

Scholion
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I. In hac et duabus seqq. distinctionibus S. Bonav. agit de fide, et quidem omnino ad mentem Concilii Vaticani (c. 3. de Fide), immo hanc catholicam doctrinam optime explicat et illustrat; eadem etiam ac S. Thomas principia scientifica tenet, nec ab ipso nisi in paucis minoris momenti rebus aliquatenus discrepat, praesertim in quadam propositione infra d. 24. a. 2. q. 3. tractata. — De variis sensibus vocabuli fides vide hic dub. 2. — Plures definitiones fidei exhibentur hic dub. 1, et ea quam S. Paulus (Hebr. 11, 1.) dat, praeclare explicatur infra q. 5. Breviter hae notificationes in hac et seq. quaestione sic exprimuntur: Fides est habitus (sive virtus), per quem intellectus voluntarie captivatur in obsequium Christi et innititur primae Veritati propter ipsam et super omnia. Aliis verbis idem dicit definitio Concilii Vatic. (loc. cit.); «Hanc vero fidem, quae humanae salutis initium est, Ecclesia catholica profitetur virtutem esse supernaturalem, qua, Dei aspirante et adiuvante gratia, ab eo revelata vera esse credimus, non propter intrinsecam rerum veritatem naturali rationis lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest. Est enim fides, testante Apostolo (Hebr. 11, 1.), sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium». Eadem Synodus quasi ultimum fundamentum fidei assignat his verbis: «Cum homo a Deo tanquam Creatore et Domino suo totus dependeat, et ratio creata increatae Veritati penitus subiecta sit, plenum revelanti Deo intellectus et voluntatis obsequium fide praestare tenemur». Idem iam hic in corp. dicitur: Iustum enim est, ut intellectus noster ita captivetur et subiaceat summae Veritati, sicut affectus noster debet subiacere summae Bonitati; nec potest esse anima recta, nisi intellectus summae Veritati propter se et super omnia assentiat, et affectus summae Bonitati adhaereat.

II. Ut facilius perspiciatur tota tanti momenti doctrina de fide, iuvat breviter praemittere principaliora principia, quibus innititur theoria auctoris nostri, quae in summa est communis antiquorum doctorum sententia.

1. Duplex est certitudo. «Est enim certitudo speculationis, et est certitudo adhaesionis; et prima quidem respicit intellectum, secunda vero respicit ipsum affectum» (infra q. 4; cfr. q. 5. ad 6, d. 26. a. 1. q. 5.). Consentit cum aliis antiquis S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. et 3, ubi exponit triplicem modum, quo intellectus determinatur ad assensum, scilicet aut ex ipsa praesentia intelligibilis et evidentia obiecti moventis, ut in intellectu primorum principiorum; aut virtute medii moventis, ut in scientia conclusionum; aut imperio voluntatis moventis (cum voluntas moveat omnes vires ad actus suos), ut in fide. Deinde prosequitur (loc. cit. quaestiunc. 1.): «Et haec quidem voluntas determinat intellectum ad aliquid, quod neque per se ipsum videtur, neque ad ea quae per se videntur, resolvi posse determinat, ex hoc quod dignum reputat, illi esse adhaerendum, propter aliquam rationem, qua bonum videtur ei illi rei adhaerere, quamvis illa ratio ad intellectum terminandum non sufficiat propter imbecillitatem intellectus, qui non videt per se hoc cui assentiendum ratio iudicat». Ibidem (quaestiunc. 3.) asseritur: «Certitudo, quae est in scientia et in intellectu, est ex ipsa evidentia eorum quae certa esse dicuntur; certitudo autem fidei est ex firma adhaesione ad id quod creditur» (cfr. de Verit. q. 14. a. 1. ad 7.). — Constat autem, quod haec certitudo adhaesionis per fidem naturalem in vita sociali immensum campum necessario occupat. Cum enim in cognoscendis pluribus rebus, praesertim particularibus, unicuique deficiat proprii intellectus scientia, adhaerendum est mediante fide naturali intellectui alieno rem scienti, ut sic, dum quis alienam scientiam suam facit, quasi per substitutionem suppleat defectum et indigentiam. Ab hac autem fide naturali fides theologica specie differt (supra d. 9. a. 2. q. 4. ad 2.).

2. Obiectum scientiae est verum visum, obiectum fidei est verum non visum, sed salutiferum, ut explicatur hic ad 2; vel aliis verbis: «Fides est de invisibilibus, secundum quod sunt invisibilia» (infra d. 26. dub. 3.); est enim «argumentum non apparentium» (Hebr. 11, 1; cfr. infra q. 5.). «Lumen fidei habet aenigma annexum; et ex hoc oritur, quod intellectus inclinatur ab affectu et dirigit hominem ad cognoscendum non visum» (infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 6; cfr. ibid. corp. in fine).

3. Hinc «auctoritas supplet locum rationis... etsi non adsit intellectui ipsius credentis ratio, propter quam debeat veritati assentire, adest tamen summae Veritatis auctoritas, quae cordi suadet; quam etiam summam Veritatem scimus mentiri non posse; et ideo impium est ei non credere» (hic ad 3.). — Haec auctoritas non est qualiscumque, sed suprema; infallibilis in testificando, quia prima Veritas est summe obstringens ad obedientiam fidei, quia Deus solus Dominus. Hinc Veritas dictat (infra q. 3. et d. 23. a. 2. q. 3), quod «intellectus noster plus credat summae Veritati quam sibi, et quod se redigat in obsequium Christi; ac per hoc, quod non solum credat quae sunt secundum rationem, verum etiam quae sunt supra rationem et contra sensuum experientiam. Quod si recusat, non exhibet summae Veritati debitam reverentiam, dum iudicium industriae propriae praefert dictamini lucis aeternae; quod esse non potest absque tumore superbiae et elationis improbandae» (Brevíloq. p. V. c. 7.). Confirmatur haec doctrina a Concilio Vat. can. 1. de Fide: «Si quis dixerit, rationem humanam ita independentem esse, ut fides ei a Deo imperari non possit, a. s.».

4. Quamquam fides dicit «certitudinem in intellectu» (II. Sent. d. 43. dub. 3.) et «essentialiter respicit actum rationis» (q. 2. in corp.), tamen etiam respicit actum voluntatis ut sibi essentialem; ergo et circa ipsam habet «essentialiter consistere»; «et ipsum velle credere est essentiale ipsi fidei (ibid.), quod magis explicatur infra d. 24. dub. 1. et d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. Consentit S. Thomas (de Verit. q. 14. a. 3. ad 10.): «Fides non est in intellectu, nisi secundum quod imperatur a voluntate... Unde quamvis illud quod est ex parte voluntatis, possit dici accidentale intellectui, est tamen essentiale fidei. Ibid. in corp.: «Credere... non habet assensum nisi ex imperio voluntatis; unde secundum id quod est, a voluntate dependet». Hinc fides potest esse virtus et recte vocatur veritas secundum pietatem (hic ad 2.) et «doctrina secundum pietatem» (infra q. 5. in corp.; cfr. d. 24. dub. 1.), et «non [proprie] probatur, sed probat» (hic dub. 5.). Confirmatur haec doctrina communis reprobatione facta ab Innocentio XI. (an. 1749) sequentis propos. (19.): «Voluntas non potest efficere, ut assensus fidei in se ipso sit magis firmus, quam mereatur pondus rationum ad assensum impellentium».

5. Ultima ratio obiectiva et intrinseca, quae movet ad assensum fidei, est «ipsa summa Veritas [sive auctoritas Dei revelantis], cui ipsa fides innititur propter se et super omnia» (q. 3. in corp.). «Fides autem unicam intuetur rationem, secundum quam omnia credibilia credit» (ibid. ad 2.), et «tam circa creata et increata versatur secundum dictamen Veritatis aeternae» (ibid. ad 3.). — Hoc principium constat inter Catholicos et probatur testimonio Concilii Vat. supra n. 1. allegato. Sed de via ac modo, quo huic formali obiecto fidei ex parte hominis assentitur, subtilissimae in scholis catholicis aetate subsequenti exortae sunt controversiae, de quibus nonnulla dicentur infra q. 5, in scholio.

6. Fide divina sive infusa, qua quis innititur primae Veritati super omnia, credi non potest, nisi «ratio super se elevetur» per illustrationem et inspirationem divinam (infra a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et q. 1. fund. 3.); unde ipsa donum Dei est supernaturale, ut bene explicatur II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3; cfr. infra d. 24. dub. 2. — Hoc fide constat, cum definitum sit a Concilio Vat. (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2, scholion). Ab hac fide divina differt omnino fides naturaliter acquisita, quae interdum nullius virtutis est (a. 2. q. 2. et 3.).

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7. Eadem igitur Veritas prima, ut est ratio obiectiva assensus, irradiat super mentem et in visione beatifica et mediante fide, sed alio modo; videlicet in patria plene et omni ex parte immediate, in fide semiplene et ita, ut maneat speculum et aenigma (infra q. 4. ad 3; cfr. infra d. 35. a. 1. q. 3. et dub. 2.). Unde id quod est materiale in fide, communicatur per verbum exterius revelatum et exterius per auditum, sed «quantum ad suum formale est per infusionem, non per auditum»; «ita unum per auditum cordis, et aliud per auditum corporis» (d. 24. dub. 2.). Adhaeret enim fides alicui testimonio, in quo est prima Veritas, et ita adhaeret ipsi primae Veritati, transcendendo proprii intellectus veritatem. Ad rem S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 14. a. 8. ad 3.): «Prima Veritas est obiectum visionis patriae ut in sua specie apparens, fidei autem ut non apparens; unde etsi idem re sit utriusque actus obiectum, non tamen est idem ratione; et sic formaliter differens obiectum diversam speciem actus facit». — «Fides est perfectio potentiae non qualiscumque, sed secundum statum imperfectionis, in quo intellectus potest aberrare a veritate et in via captivari» (infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1.). «Fides velamen dicit futurae contemplationis et visionis; et tamen hoc velamen potius est illuminans quam obscurans» (IV. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 3.).

8. Nihilominus, ut fides sit rationabile obsequium, multiplex actus rationis praecedit fidem, quibus testimonium Dei cognoscitur credibile et credendum; de quibus motivis credibilitatis multa docet Concilium Vat. c. 2. 3. 4; et vide infra scholion ad 5. quaestionem.

III. In hac I. quaestione agitur de fide ut caritate formata, uti dicunt theologi, quae certe completam rationem virtutis perfectae, supernaturalis et meritoriae habet. Sed infra a. 2. q. 1. 2. eadem quaestio recurrit respectu fidei informis. — Praeter plura alia notanda observatu dignum est quod in solut. ad 4. docetur de duplici rationabili, scilicet secundum rationem vel elevatam superno lumine, vel ad sensibilia conversam et ad inferiora depressam.

IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4; S. II. II. q. 4. a. 5; de Verit. q. 14. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Article I. On faith taken simply, or formed faith.

Question I. Whether faith is a virtue.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether faith is a virtue; and we are speaking here of the faith by which one believes in God. And that it is, is shown.

1. That which is the principle of our salvation has the character of a virtue; but faith is of this kind, according to what is often said in the Gospelp470-3: Thy faith hath made thee whole: therefore faith is a virtue.

2. Likewise, that which is the principle of the purification of the heart has the character of a virtue — for just as the heart is defiled only through vice, so it is purified only through virtue — but faith is the principle of the purification of the heart, according to what is said in the fifteenth of Actsp470-4: Purifying their hearts by faith: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every habit which is the principle of divine acceptance has the character of a virtue, especially when it regards a determinate kind of work; but faith is of this kind, according to what is said to the Hebrews, the eleventhp470-5: Without faith it is impossible to please God: therefore faith contains in itself the full and perfect character of a virtue.

4. Likewise, that which has a direct contrariety to vice and sin is a virtue; but faith is of this kind, since it is directly opposed to heresy and infidelity, which are vices and sins: therefore faith is a virtue properly so called; and this very thing can be proved expressly by the authority of Augustine in the textp470-6.

On the contrary: 1. «In the same genus are the extremes and the mean», inasmuch as the mean participates in the naturep470-1 of the extremes; but faith is a mean between opinion and knowledge, as master Hugh says in the book On the Sacramentsp470-7, where he says that «faith is a certitude concerning absent things, set above opinion and below knowledge»: if therefore neitherp470-2 opinion nor knowledge is in the genus of virtue, it necessarily seems to follow that faith too is not contained in the genus of virtue.

2. Likewise, «habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects»; but in this is virtue distinguished from knowledge according to the Philosopherp470-8, that «virtue is directed to the good, and knowledge to the true»; but faith is directed to the true under the character of the true: therefore faith is not in the genus of virtue, but rather in the genus of knowledge. And that faith is directed to the true under the character of the true is plain, since it belongs to faith to assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things.

3. Likewise, it is blameworthy for a man having the use of reason to will something without reason; therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will be blameworthy for him to believe without reason; but the faith by which we believe in God does not inquire after reasonp471-1: therefore such faith is blameworthy. But nothing that is blameworthy has the character of a virtue: therefore where there is faith, there cannot be virtue in us.

4. Likewise, the more rational an act is, the nearer it is to virtuep471-2; therefore to believe by a compelling reason pertains more to virtue than to believe without reason: if therefore the credulity which one has by the force of reason is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue, much more does it seem that faith itself, which does not follow reason nor rest upon reason, lacks the perfection of virtue.

Conclusion.

Faith, by which we believe in God, is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt faith itself, by which we believe in God, is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues, as Bernard says of prudence to Eugeniusp471-3. — It is indeed a virtue, since in it consists the rectitude of life according to the rule of justice. For it is just that our intellect should be thus held captive and subjected to the highest Truth, just as our affect ought to be subjected to the highest Goodness; nor can the soul be right unless the intellect assents to the highest Truth for its own sake and above all things, and the affect cleaves to the highest Goodness. But one does not have this rectitude unwillingly, but willingly. For no one believes God more than himself, except through this, that he wills to hold his intellect captive in obedience to Christp471-4. If therefore the captivity of the intellect in obedience to the highest Truth pertains to the rectitude of life, the will, by which one wills thus to hold himself captive, is a right will, and the habit by means of which one is made ready and helped to this makes for the rectitude of the will. — If therefore justice is nothing other than «rectitude of willp471-5»; and faith is nothing other than a habit by which our intellect is voluntarily held captive in obedience to Christ: it remains that the habit of faith pertains to the rectitude of life according to the rule of justice; and therefore it has in itself the character of a virtue truly and properly.

Nor does it only have in itself the character of a virtue trulyp471-6, but also of the charioteer of all the virtues whatsoever, both the theological, namely, and the cardinal. For without faith there is no knowledge of the highest and true Good; and without the knowledge of the highest and true Good there can be no expectation and love of the true Good. For knowledge is the forerunner and directs the affect to expecting and desiring; and so faith necessarily precedes hope and charity as their rule and charioteerp471-7. Again, without the knowledge of the highest Good there can be no right intention — this alone is done with a right intention, which is done for the glory and honor of God — and without a right intention no act of virtue proceeds rightly. Since therefore the habit of faith is that by means of which the highest Good is acknowledged by our minds; hence it is that «faith directs our intentionp471-8», and through this it is the rule of every good operation and of every meritorious virtue. And therefore it ought to be called not only a gratuitous virtue, but also the rule and charioteer of the gratuitous virtues. — And the authorities and reasons which are on this side are to be granted.

1. To that, however, which is first objected on the contrary, that faith holds the mean between knowledge and opinion; it must be said that faith is assigned as a kind of mean between knowledge and opinion by Hugh, not because it is composed of those two, as a mean is composed of extremes, but because it holds the middle place as to the degree of certitude; for it is more certain than opinion, and less than knowledge, as will be seen belowp471-9: but concerning this mean it is not

necessary that it be in the same proximate genus with the extremes. — It could also be said that this has no necessity in matters of conduct, inasmuch as the mean is found in the genus of virtue, and the extremes are in the genus of vicesp472-1.

2. To that which is objected, that knowledge is distinguished in this from virtue, that it is directed to the true, and virtue to the good; it can be said that the Philosopherp472-2 is speaking there of habitual virtue, which is concerned with actions and passions, of which he says that «virtue is operative in the passions and operations of the best men»; and virtue of this kind orders us in those things which are for the end. But of intellectual virtue, of which kind are wisdom and understanding, which order us to the end itself, it does not hold true; and in this way faith is a virtue, not in the way set forth before. — But this manner of speaking seems to be open to challenge in this, that not only of habitual virtue, but also of every other virtue under the character of virtue, this difference seems able to be assigned with respect to knowledge.

And therefore it must be said that the object of faith is true in one way, the object of knowledge in another: the object of knowledge, I say, is such because it is the true seen; but the object of faith is such because it is the truep472-3 — the true, I say, not seen, but salvific. For because it is not seen, another habit is required for knowing it than is the habit of knowledge; because it is salvific, therefore that habit orders us to salvation and to the blessed life, and therefore it has the complete character of a virtue. And thus it is plain that nothing prevents faith from being able to be directed to the true, and yet nonetheless to be a virtue, inasmuch as it is directed to the true in another way than knowledge, according to the twofold condition assigned beforehand. For it is directed to the truth not seen and the salvific truth. For because it is not seen, it is believed voluntarily; but because it is not only not seen, but also salvific, it is believed voluntarily and meritoriously, which two things are foreign to the speculation of knowledge. Hence the truth to which faith is directed is a truth according to godlinessp472-4, which indeed is known to Catholics, but was unknown to the philosophers.

3. To that which is objected, that to believe without reason is blameworthy; it must be said that this is true where authority does not supply the place of reason. But where authority supplies the place of reason, it is not blameworthy, but highly commendable. And so it is in faith, since, even if there is not present to the intellect of the believer himself the reason on account of which he ought to assent to the truth, there is nevertheless present the authority of the highest Truth, which persuades his heart; and we know that this highest Truth cannot lie, and therefore it is impious not to believe it. Therefore this does not take away, but rather confers upon faith that it is a virtue.

4. To that which is objected, that the more rational something is, the more it agrees with perfect virtue; it must be said that a thing is called rational in two ways: either because it is consonant with reason elevated and illumined by the light of the supernal Truth, or because it is consonant with reason turned toward sensible knowledgep472-5. If it be called rational in the first way, there is no counter-instance. If it be called rational in the second way, it is false, since frequently reason turned toward sensible things judges to be true things which are false, and to be good things which are evil, and conversely. Hence many thingsp472-6 seem to it irrational which are highly rational, as is plain: for many things seem irrational to philosophers which nonetheless seem highly rational to Christians, such as to be entirely continent and to beg entirely and the like. And as much as the judgment of a man surpasses the judgment of a boy, so much does the judgment of a Christian man surpass the judgment of a single philosopher, and the judgment of reason turned upward the judgment of reason pressed down to lower things. And therefore this does not prevent faith from being a virtue, because it believes certain things which seem to be irrational to the animal man — for they are rational to the spiritual manp472-7 — nay, this makes for the character of virtue, that it believes without reason. For if it believed by a compelling reason, that credulity would not be voluntary, but necessary, and so would not be virtuous nor meritorious; as will be better made clear belowp472-8.

Scholion

I. In this and the two following distinctions St. Bonaventure treats of faith, and indeed altogether according to the mind of the Vatican Council (c. 3, On Faith); nay, he explains and illustrates this catholic doctrine excellently; he holds the same scientific principles as St. Thomas, nor does he differ from him except in a few matters of lesser moment, especially in a certain proposition treated below at d. 24, a. 2, q. 3. — On the various senses of the word faith see here dub. 2. — Several definitions of faith are set forth here in dub. 1, and the one which St. Paul (Heb. 11:1) gives is splendidly explained below at q. 5. Briefly, these descriptions are expressed in this and the following question thus: Faith is a habit (or virtue) by which the intellect is voluntarily held captive in obedience to Christ and rests upon the first Truth for its own sake and above all things. In other words the definition of the Vatican Council says the same (loc. cit.): «This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue, by which, with the inspiring and assisting grace of God, we believe to be true the things revealed by Him, not on account of the intrinsic truth of things perceived by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. For faith, as the Apostle testifies (Heb. 11:1), is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not appearing». The same Synod assigns as it were the ultimate foundation of faith in these words: «Since man depends wholly upon God as his Creator and Lord, and created reason is entirely subject to the uncreated Truth, we are bound to render to God who reveals the full obedience of intellect and will by faith». The same is already said here in the body: For it is just that our intellect should be thus held captive and subjected to the highest Truth, just as our affect ought to be subjected to the highest Goodness; nor can the soul be right unless the intellect assents to the highest Truth for its own sake and above all things, and the affect cleaves to the highest Goodness.

II. That this whole doctrine concerning faith, of such great moment, may be more easily perceived, it helps briefly to set forth beforehand the more principal principles upon which the theory of our author rests, which in sum is the common opinion of the ancient doctors.

1. Certitude is twofold. «For there is a certitude of speculation, and there is a certitude of adhesion; and the first indeed regards the intellect, the second regards the affect itself» (below, q. 4; cfr. q. 5, ad 6, d. 26, a. 1, q. 5). St. Thomas agrees with the other ancients, here q. 2, a. 2, little-questions 1 and 3, where he sets forth the threefold mode by which the intellect is determined to assent, namely either from the very presence of the intelligible and the evidence of the moving object, as in the intellect of first principles; or by the power of a moving means, as in the knowledge of conclusions; or by the command of the moving will (since the will moves all the powers to their acts), as in faith. Then he continues (loc. cit., little-question 1): «And this will determines the intellect to something which is neither seen through itself, nor determined to be able to be resolved into those things which are seen through themselves, from this, that it deems it worthy to be adhered to, on account of some reason by which it seems good to it to adhere to that thing, although that reason does not suffice to terminate the intellect on account of the weakness of the intellect, which does not see through itself this to which reason judges assent must be given». In the same place (little-question 3) it is asserted: «The certitude which is in knowledge and in the intellect is from the very evidence of those things which are said to be certain; but the certitude of faith is from the firm adhesion to that which is believed» (cfr. de Verit. q. 14, a. 1, ad 7). — But it is established that this certitude of adhesion through natural faith necessarily occupies an immense field in social life. For since, in knowing many things, especially particulars, each one is lacking the knowledge of his own intellect, one must adhere, by means of natural faith, to another's intellect which knows the thing, so that thus, while one makes another's knowledge his own, he supplies as it were by substitution his defect and want. But from this natural faith theological faith differs in species (above, d. 9, a. 2, q. 4, ad 2).

2. The object of knowledge is the true seen, the object of faith is the true not seen, but salvific, as is explained here in the reply to 2; or in other words: «Faith is concerned with invisible things, insofar as they are invisible» (below, d. 26, dub. 3); for it is «the evidence of things not appearing» (Heb. 11:1; cfr. below, q. 5). «The light of faith has an enigma annexed; and from this it arises that the intellect is inclined by the affect and directs man to knowing the not-seen» (below, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6; cfr. ibid. in the body at the end).

3. Hence «authority supplies the place of reason... even if there is not present to the intellect of the believer himself the reason on account of which he ought to assent to the truth, there is nevertheless present the authority of the highest Truth, which persuades the heart; and we know that this highest Truth cannot lie; and therefore it is impious not to believe it» (here, ad 3). — This authority is not just any kind, but supreme; infallible in testifying, because the first Truth is most strongly binding to the obedience of faith, because God alone is Lord. Hence the Truth dictates (below, q. 3, and d. 23, a. 2, q. 3) that «our intellect should believe the highest Truth more than itself, and should reduce itself into the obedience of Christ; and through this, that it should believe not only the things which are according to reason, but also the things which are above reason and contrary to the experience of the senses. But if it refuses, it does not render to the highest Truth the due reverence, while it prefers the judgment of its own industry to the dictate of the eternal light; which cannot be without the swelling of pride and reprehensible exaltation» (Breviloquium, p. V, c. 7). This doctrine is confirmed by the Vatican Council, can. 1, On Faith: «If anyone shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be commanded of it by God, let him be anathema».

4. Although faith says «a certitude in the intellect» (II. Sent. d. 43, dub. 3) and «essentially regards an act of reason» (q. 2, in the body), nevertheless it also regards an act of the will as essential to itself; therefore concerning it also it holds «essentially to consist»; «and the very willing to believe is essential to faith itself (ibid.), which is more fully explained below at d. 24, dub. 1, and d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body. St. Thomas agrees (de Verit. q. 14, a. 3, ad 10): «Faith is not in the intellect except insofar as it is commanded by the will... Hence although that which is on the part of the will may be called accidental to the intellect, it is nevertheless essential to faith. Ibid. in the body: «To believe... has no assent except from the command of the will; whence according to that which it is, it depends on the will». Hence faith can be a virtue and is rightly called the truth according to godliness (here, ad 2) and «the doctrine according to godliness» (below, q. 5, in the body; cfr. d. 24, dub. 1), and «is not [properly] proved, but proves» (here, dub. 5). This common doctrine is confirmed by the reprobation made by Innocent XI (in the year 1749) of the following proposition (19): «The will cannot bring it about that the assent of faith be in itself more firm than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent warrants».

5. The ultimate objective and intrinsic reason which moves to the assent of faith is «the highest Truth itself [or the authority of the revealing God], upon which faith itself rests for its own sake and above all things» (q. 3, in the body). «But faith looks to the one ground, according to which it believes all credible things» (ibid. ad 2), and «is concerned both with created and uncreated things according to the dictate of the eternal Truth» (ibid. ad 3). — This principle is established among Catholics and is proved by the testimony of the Vatican Council adduced above at n. 1. But concerning the way and manner in which this formal object of faith is assented to on the part of man, most subtle controversies arose in the catholic schools in the following age, concerning which some things will be said below at q. 5, in the scholion.

6. By divine or infused faith, by which one rests upon the first Truth above all things, one cannot believe unless «reason is elevated above itself» through divine illumination and inspiration (below, a. 2, q. 2, in the body, and q. 1, fund. 3); whence it itself is a supernatural gift of God, as is well explained at II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3; cfr. below, d. 24, dub. 2. — This is established by faith, since it was defined by the Vatican Council (cfr. below, a. 2, q. 2, scholion). From this divine faith differs entirely the faith naturally acquired, which is sometimes of no virtue (a. 2, q. 2 and 3).

7. The same first Truth, therefore, as it is the objective reason of assent, irradiates the mind both in the beatific vision and by means of faith, but in another way; namely, in the fatherland fully and from every part immediately, in faith half-fully and so that there remains a mirror and enigma (below, q. 4, ad 3; cfr. below, d. 35, a. 1, q. 3, and dub. 2). Hence that which is material in faith is communicated through the externally revealed word and outwardly through hearing, but «as to its formal aspect it is by infusion, not by hearing»; «thus one through the hearing of the heart, and the other through the hearing of the body» (d. 24, dub. 2). For faith adheres to a certain testimony, in which is the first Truth, and so it adheres to the first Truth itself, transcending the truth of its own intellect. To the point St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 14, a. 8, ad 3): «The first Truth is the object of the vision of the fatherland as appearing in its own species, but of faith as not appearing; whence although the object of each act be the same in reality, it is nevertheless not the same in ratio; and thus a formally differing object makes a different species of act». — «Faith is a perfection of the power, not of just any kind, but according to a state of imperfection, in which the intellect can err from the truth and be held captive on the way» (below, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1). «Faith says a veil of future contemplation and vision; and yet this veil is illuminating rather than obscuring» (IV. Sent. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3).

8. Nevertheless, that faith may be a rational obedience, a manifold act of reason precedes faith, by which the testimony of God is known to be credible and to be believed; concerning which motives of credibility the Vatican Council teaches many things, c. 2, 3, 4; and see below the scholion to the 5th question.

III. In this first question faith is treated of as formed by charity, as the theologians say, which certainly has the complete character of a perfect, supernatural, and meritorious virtue. But below at a. 2, q. 1 and 2, the same question recurs with respect to unformed faith. — Besides many other things to be noted, it is worthy of observation that in the solution to 4 there is taught the twofold rational, namely according to reason either elevated by supernal light, or turned toward sensible things and pressed down to lower things.

IV. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 4; Summa II–II, q. 4, a. 5; de Verit. q. 14, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 4, little-question 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. L aa quae. Paulo inferius pro de illa cod. A de prima, et subinde pro convenienter cod. Z congruenter.
    Codices L, aa read quae ["which"]. A little further on, for de illa ["of that"], codex A reads de prima; and then for convenienter ["fittingly"], codex Z reads congruenter.
  2. Pro vel codd. A K Z an in.
    For vel ["or"], codices A, K, Z read an in.
  3. Marc. 10, 52; Luc. 17, 19; 18, 42. Cfr. Matth. 9, 22; Marc. 5, 34; Luc. 7, 30; 8, 48. — De maiori huius nec non seqq. argg. vide infra corp. quaest.
    Mark 10:52; Luke 17:19; 18:42. Cfr. Matt. 9:22; Mark 5:34; Luke 7:30; 8:48. — On the major of this and the following arguments, see below in the body of the question.
  4. Vers. 9. — In maiori codd. I L V aa voci cordis adiungunt nostri.
    Verse 9. — In the major, codices I, L, V, aa join nostri ["our"] to the word cordis ["of the heart"].
  5. Vers. 6. — In maiori pro acceptionis cod. bb acceptationis.
    Verse 6. — In the major, for acceptionis ["of acceptance"], codex bb reads acceptationis.
  6. Hic c. 2. seq. — Cod. X Magistri in littera.
    Here c. 2 and following. — Codex X reads Magistri in littera ["of the Master in the text"].
  7. Libr. I. p. X. c. 2. — De maiori, cuius sententia sumta est ex Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 22. seq. (IX. c. 7.), cfr. supra pag. 170, nota 2. In dicta proposit. pro naturam codd. G I L V aa exhibent rationem. Paulo inferius pro sequi videtur codd. A K sequitur.
    Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. X, c. 2. — On the major, whose sentence is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 22 f. (IX, c. 7), cfr. above p. 170, note 2. In the said proposition, for naturam ["nature"], codices G, I, L, V, aa exhibit rationem ["ground"]. A little further on, for sequi videtur ["it seems to follow"], codices A, K read sequitur ["it follows"].
  8. Qui II. Ethic. c. 6. docet, virtutem esse habitum, «ex quo et bonus homo ipse efficietur et bene opus suum reddet». Ibid. VI. c. 2: Contemplativae autem cogitationis, et non activae neque effectivae, bene et male esse est verum et falsum. Et II. Metaph. text. 3. (I. brevior, c. 1.): Speculativae etenim finis veritas, practicae autem opus. — In maiori post et actus codd. A F H K N T U Z bb repetunt distinguuntur; propositio ipsa insinuatur ab Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. et II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3. et pag. 633, nota 6.
    Aristotle, who in Ethics II, c. 6, teaches that virtue is a habit «from which both the good man himself will be made and will render his work well». Ibid. VI, c. 2: But the being good and bad of contemplative thought, and not of practical or productive, is the true and the false. And Metaphysics II, text 3 (the shorter Bk. I, c. 1): For the end of speculative knowledge is truth, but of practical, the work. — In the major, after et actus, codices A, F, H, K, N, T, U, Z, bb repeat distinguuntur; the proposition itself is intimated by Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 1, and On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4). Cfr. tom. II, p. 561, note 3, and p. 633, note 6.
  9. Bernard., Epist. 338. (alios 369.) n. 1: Fides piorum credit, non discutit. Sed iste [Abaelardus], Deum habens suspectum, credere non vult, nisi quod prius ratione discusserit. — Edd. substituunt requirit pro inquirit et paulo superius, pro homini posito omni, omittunt ergo pari ratione... sine ratione.
    Bernard, Letter 338 (in others 369), n. 1: The faith of the godly believes, it does not dispute. But that man [Abelard], holding God under suspicion, is unwilling to believe except what he has first examined by reason. — The editions substitute requirit ["requires"] for inquirit ["inquires"]; and a little above, for homini placing omni, they omit ergo pari ratione... sine ratione.
  10. Vide supra pag. 386, nota 2.
    See above p. 386, note 2.
  11. Sive 1. de Consider. c. 8. n. 9. et 11, sententialiter. In Serm. 49. in Cantic. n. 5. ait: Est ergo discretio non tam virtus, quam quaedam moderatrix et auriga virtutum, ordinatrixque affectuum et morum doctrix. Tolle hanc, et virtus vitium erit, ipsaque affectio naturalis in perturbationem magis convertetur exterminiumque naturae. — Definitionem virtutis habes II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3.
    Or rather, On Consideration I, c. 8, n. 9, and II, in substance. In Sermon 49 on the Canticle, n. 5, he says: Discretion, then, is not so much a virtue, as a certain moderatrix and charioteer of the virtues, and the orderer of the affections and teacher of morals. Take this away, and virtue will be vice, and natural affection itself will be turned rather into disturbance and the ruin of nature. — You have the definition of virtue at II. Sent. d. 27, dub. 3.
  12. Epist. II. Cor. 10, 5: In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. Cfr. supra pag. 217, nota 3. et 5.
    Letter, II Cor. 10:5: Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ. Cfr. above p. 217, notes 3 and 5.
  13. Anselm., de Concept. virg. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12: Iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.
    Anselm, On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, c. 3, and Dialogue on Truth, c. 12: Justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake.
  14. Cod. 0 addit et proprie. Subinde pro sed etiam edd. substituunt sed magis, et paulo inferius ante veri Boni exspectatio repetunt summi et.
    Codex 0 adds et proprie ["and properly"]. Then for sed etiam ["but also"] the editions substitute sed magis ["but rather"], and a little further on, before veri Boni exspectatio, they repeat summi et.
  15. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. seq. Cicero, V. de Finib. bonor. et malor. c. 6. ait: Summum autem bonum si ignoretur, vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est. — De altera ratione, petita ex necessitate agendi cum recta intentione, ad quod Apostolus exhortatur illis verbis I. Cor. 10, 31: Omnia in gloriam Dei facite, cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII, d. XL. et d. XLI. nec non Comment. ibid. — Paulo inferius post hoc edd. subiiciunt enim.
    Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 8 f. Cicero, On the Ends of Goods and Evils V, c. 6, says: But if the highest good is unknown, the rule of living must necessarily be unknown. — On the other reason, drawn from the necessity of acting with a right intention, to which the Apostle exhorts in those words I Cor. 10:31: Do all to the glory of God, cfr. II. Sent. text of the Master, d. XXXVIII, d. XL, and d. XLI, as well as the Commentary there. — A little further on, after hoc, the editions subjoin enim.
  16. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 31. enarrat. 2. n. 4: Bonum enim opus intentio facit, intentionem fides dirigit. — Subinde ante regula est cod. A inserit recta. Paulo superius idem cod. A pro habitus fidei substituit actus fidei, et pro agnoscitur cum cod. K cognoscitur.
    Augustine, Exposition on Psalm 31, exposition 2, n. 4: For intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention. — Then before regula est, codex A inserts recta. A little above, the same codex A substitutes actus fidei for habitus fidei, and for agnoscitur reads, with codex K, cognoscitur.
  17. Quaest. 4. Cfr. etiam d. 24. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Paulo ante pro ex illis duobus codd. A K Z ab illis duobus, Vat. illis duobus tantum; et pro conficitur ab extremis cod. X componitur ex extremis. Deinde post et minus codd. U I L V aa cc repetunt certa.
    Question 4. Cfr. also d. 24, a. 2, q. 2 f. — A little before, for ex illis duobus, codices A, K, Z read ab illis duobus, the Vatican edition illis duobus tantum; and for conficitur ab extremis, codex X reads componitur ex extremis. Then after et minus, codices U, I, L, V, aa, cc repeat certa.
  18. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — Pro necessitatem codd. G I L V aa bb veritatem.
    Cfr. Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6 ff. — For necessitatem ["necessity"], codices G, I, L, V, aa, bb read veritatem ["truth"].
  19. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. duplicem distinguit virtutem, intellectivam et moralem: «Intellectiva ut plurimum ex doctrina habet et generationem et incrementum... moralis vero ex more, id est, assuetudine acquiritur, unde etiam nomen habuit» etc. Ibid. c. 6. ait: De morali [virtute] loquor; haec enim circa affectus [πάθη] et actiones versatur, in quibus excessus et defectus et medium est, ut et timeat et confidat aliquis... ac demum laetetur et doleat magis et minus, atque utraque haec non bene; nam quando oportet, et ob quae, et erga quos, et cuius causa, et ut oportet haec facere, medium est atque optimum; id quod est ipsius virtutis. Simili modo circa actiones est excessus et defectus et medium etc. — De virtutibus intellectualibus agitur ibid. VI. c. 2. seq. — Paulo inferius pro optimorum Vat. suppositorum.
    Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 1, distinguishes a twofold virtue, intellectual and moral: «The intellectual for the most part has both its generation and its increase from teaching... but the moral is acquired from custom, that is, from habituation, whence also it took its name» etc. Ibid. c. 6 he says: I speak of moral [virtue]; for this is concerned with the affections [πάθη] and actions, in which there is excess and defect and a mean, so that one both fears and is confident... and finally rejoices and grieves more and less, and both of these not well; for to do these things when one ought, and on account of what, and toward whom, and for whose cause, and as one ought, is the mean and the best; which is what belongs to virtue itself. In like manner there is excess and defect and a mean concerning actions etc. — Intellectual virtues are treated of ibid. VI, c. 2 f. — A little further on, for optimorum ["of the best"], the Vatican edition reads suppositorum.
  20. Cod. 0 adiicit creditum. Non ita multo ante pro dicendum est codd. E F G I L N T V aa bb addendum est, cod. H attendendum est. Paulo inferius pro et ad vitam codd. A K id est ad vitam.
    Codex 0 adds creditum ["believed"]. Not much before, for dicendum est, codices E, F, G, I, L, N, T, V, aa, bb read addendum est, codex H attendendum est. A little further on, for et ad vitam, codices A, K read id est ad vitam.
  21. Epist. ad Tit. 1, 1: Et [secundum] agnitionem veritatis, quae secundum pietatem est. Cfr. quaest. seq. — Aliquanto superius pro et veritatem edd. male sed veritatem, et post pauca pro in quam est fides cod. 0 in quantum est fidei, edd. in qua est fides.
    Letter to Titus 1:1: And [according to] the acknowledging of the truth, which is according to godliness. Cfr. the following question. — Somewhat above, for et veritatem, the editions wrongly read sed veritatem; and a little after, for in quam est fides, codex 0 reads in quantum est fidei, the editions in qua est fides.
  22. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.
  23. Pro multa edd. hic et paulo inferius nonnulla.
    For multa ["many"], the editions read here and a little further on nonnulla ["some"].
  24. Epist. I. Cor. 2, 14: Animalis autem homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei etc. — Pro sunt enim codd. M 0 sunt tamen, Vat. sunt autem; edd. 1, 2, omisso proxime ante animali, sic prosequuntur: aliquando enim sunt rationabilia etc. Mox pro immo hoc facit edd. et hoc facit.
    Letter, I Cor. 2:14: But the natural man perceiveth not those things which are of the Spirit of God etc. — For sunt enim, codices M, 0 read sunt tamen, the Vatican edition sunt autem; editions 1, 2, omitting the immediately preceding animali, continue thus: for sometimes they are rational etc. Soon, for immo hoc facit, the editions read et hoc facit.
  25. Quaest. 2. et 4. nec non d. 24. dub. 1. Cfr. ibid. a. 2. q. 3.
    Questions 2 and 4, as well as d. 24, dub. 1. Cfr. ibid. a. 2, q. 3.
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