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Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I.

Quaestio III. Utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit substantia, an homo praedicetur per modum habitus et accidentis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit substantia, an homo praedicetur per modum habitus et accidentis, sicut dicebat opinio tertia. Et quod Christus dicatur homo per modum habitus, ostenditur.

1. (Ad oppositum.) Ad Philippenses secundo1: Habitu inventus ut homo; super quod verbum dicit Hilarius de Trinitate: « Non fuit ille habitus tantum hominis, sed ut hominis »: ergo videtur tam ex hoc verbo, quod dicit habitu, quam ex hoc, quod dicit ut homo — quod importat similitudinem — quod Christus alio modo dicatur homo quam alii homines: et ita videtur, quod dicatur per modum habitus, non per modum substantiae.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum dicit, et habetur in littera2, quod « quartum genus habitus competit huic comparationi »; et illud quartum genus spectat ad hoc quod dicitur praedicari per modum habitus, ut esse vestitum et calceatum, quod est in quadam adiacentia: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Quod advenit alicui iam in esse completo est illi accidens et praedicatur per modum accidentis3; sed humana natura advenit personae Christi iam in esse completo: ergo videtur, quod ei adveniat ut accidens et praedicetur per modum accidentis, non ergo per modum substantiae.

4. Item, quod praedicatur denominative est accidens et praedicatur per modum accidentis4; sed humana natura praedicatur de Christo denominative — unde Filius Dei dicitur humanatus, quod quidem non potest dici de alio homine — ergo videtur, quod non dicatur de ipso per modum substantiae, sed per modum accidentis.

5. Item, impossibile est, diversa genera praedicari de eodem essentialiter5: ergo multo minus erit possibile, divinam naturam et humanam convenire eidem essentialiter: ergo si Christus, essentialiter loquendo, est Deus; videtur, quod homo dicatur solummodo per modum accidentis sive per modum habitus.

6. Item, quae habent diversas definitiones non possunt praedicari de uno et eodem essentialiter6; sed Deus et homo diversas habent definitiones: ergo cum Deus dicatur de Christo essentialiter, homo non dicetur de eo substantialiter, sed solum accidentaliter.

Sed contra: 1. (Fundamenta.) In decretali Alexandri Papae7: « Cum Christus perfectus sit Deus et perfectus sit homo, qua temeritate audent aliqui dicere, quod Christus non est aliquid, secundum quod homo »: ergo secundum sententiam Alexandri Papae homo praedicatur de Christo per modum substantiae.

2. Item, « substantia nulli est accidens », ut vult Philosophus8; sed humana natura in Christo est substantia: ergo nulli accidit: ergo non accidit personae Verbi.

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3. Item, si humana natura accidit Christo, aut accidit Christo Deo, aut Christo homini; Christo homini non, quia nulli homini est accidentale esse hominem1b; Christo, secundum quod Deus, similiter accidere non potest, quia nullum accidens potest Christo inesse ratione divinae naturae: ergo nullo modo videtur, quod possit praedicari per modum accidentis.

4. Item, nihil est univocum substantiae et accidentis2b: ergo si de Christo dicitur secundum accidens, et de aliis hominibus secundum substantiam, ergo non dicitur univoce, sed aequivoce. Sed si hoc verum est, non videtur, quod sit de nostro genere, nec mors eius nostrae redemptioni proficere.

5. Item, substantia nobilior est accidente3b: ergo si homo de aliis dicitur per modum substantiae, et de Christo per modum habitus, ergo esse hominem minus nobiliter convenit Christo quam aliis. Quodsi hoc est impium dicere, restat igitur idem quod prius, quod homo non dicatur de Christo per modum habitus, sed per modum substantiae.

6. Item, quod praedicatur per modum habitus et accidentis, non praedicatur per modum substantiae — unde quamvis homo dicatur vestitus, nunquam tamen dicitur vestimentum — ergo si Filius Dei diceretur humanatus per modum habitus, nunquam diceretur homo; quodsi hoc falsum est, restat idem quod prius4b.

Conclusio.

Christus, secundum quod homo, est substantia et aliquid, et homo de eo praedicatur substantialiter, non per modum accidentis et habitus nisi per quandam conformitatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod homo dicitur de Christo per modum habitus et accidentis, (Duplex sensus.) dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod praedicatio illa sit pure accidentalis, ita quod non substantialis; aut ita, quod aliquo modo habeat rationem praedicationis accidentalis, et tamen secundum veritatem sit substantialis.

(Conclusio 1.) Si hoc ultimo modo intelligatur, sic veritatem habet, pro eo quod humana natura in Christo quodam modo proprietatem accidentis habet, in hoc videlicet, quod substantificatur in supposito alterius naturae, ita quod non dat illi supposito primum esse, sed advenit iam completo5b. Unde sicut albedo non substantificatur in aliquo, quod sit in genere qualitatis, sed magis in substantia, nec illi dat esse, sed iam completo advenit; sic per quandam conformitatem est reperire circa Christi humanitatem, quae substantificatur in divina persona, habente perfectum esse ex alia natura quam ex ipsa humanitate, videlicet ex divina. (Notandum.) Et propterea nostri doctores dixerunt, quod humana natura in Christo vergit in accidens, secundum quandam conformitatem6b. Et hoc si intelligatur sane, est dictum subtiliter et catholice. — (De habitu.) Maxime autem inter omnem modum accidentis modum habitus habet, pro eo quod habitus nominat adiacentiam unius substantiae respectu alterius, quae quidem potest esse, utriusque servata proprietate. Et ideo Apostolus, prudentissimus fidei praedicator, et Augustinus, subtilissimus fidei defensor, insinuant, aliquo modo Christum dici7b hominem secundum habitum, non excludentes per hoc, quin homo dicatur de Christo secundum substantiam.

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(Sensus alius.) Alio modo est intelligere, quod Christus dicatur homo secundum accidens, ita quod modus ille praedicandi omnino sit accidentalis, et non secundum substantiam8b. (Conclusio 2.) Et hic modus dicendi, licet aliquando visus fuerit habere opinionis probabilitatem, manifeste apparet in se habere erroris temeritatem. Unde et illa tertia opinio, quae posuit hoc, ab Alexandro reprobata est; nec immerito, quia veritati illius unionis repugnat. Hoc enim dicit fides recta, quod divina natura et humana unitae sunt in unam personam: ergo Deus dicitur de Christo tanquam de proprio supposito, et homo similiter. Sed homo cum praedicatur de aliquo sicut de proprio supposito, substantialiter praedicatur et significat ipsum, (Conclusio 3.) de quo dicitur, esse aliquam substantiam; et ideo ex ipso fidei fundamento necessario sequitur, quod sit aliquid, secundum quod homo9b. — Unde rationes concedendae sunt, quae ad hoc inducuntur.

(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur ad oppositum de auctoritate Apostoli et Augustini, iam patet responsio ex his quae iam dicta sunt. Nam etsi homo habeat aliquo modo modum habitus, non tamen habet omnino. Licet enim humanitas adveniat iam completo1c, nihilominus substantificatur in illo tanquam in proprio suo supposito, quia Dei Filius, qui est suppositum divinae naturae per naturam, fecit se suppositum humanae naturae per gratiam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: accidens est quod advenit iam completo etc.; dicendum, quod si assimiletur in hoc, quod advenit iam completo, non tamen omnino; (Notandum.) quia accidens omnino adiacet extrinsecus et dicit modum essendi2c, sed humana natura sic advenit illi personae, quod non adiacet extrinsecus, nec dicit modum essendi tantum, sed ipsius hypostasis substantiam et naturam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedicatur denominative; dicendum, quod praedicatio denominativa potest esse quatuor modis: (Modi 4 praedicationis denominativae.) per modum inhaerentiae, ut cum dicitur: iste est albus; per modum transmutationis, ut cum dicitur: Petrus est dealbatus; per modum possessionis, ut cum dicitur: asinus Socraticus; et per modum unionis, ut cum dicitur: ferrum ignitum, id est igni unitum3c. Cum ergo dicitur, quod praedicatio denominativa est accidentis; dicendum, quod verum est, quando est per modum inhaerentis, non autem est verum, si semper intelligatur de praedicatione denominativa secundum alios modos. — Cum autem dicitur: Christus est humanatus; non est ibi praedicatio per modum inhaerentis, sed per modum unionis et relationis. Et ideo non sequitur, quod humana natura sit accidens; nec sequitur ex hoc, quod persona divina sit mutata, quia, quamvis mutatio absoluta in accidente ponat mutationem in subiecto, introductio tamen ipsius relationis in esse potest esse ex mutatione facta in altero extremo4c.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impossibile est, diversorum5c genera praedicari de eodem substantialiter; (Notandum.) dicendum, quod verum est de illis generibus, quae habent oppositionem et distinctionem, sicut sunt genera creatarum rerum. Non sic autem est de divina natura et humana, quia, cum humana sit omnino possibilis et in omnimoda obedientia, nihil impedit, quod humana natura et divina simul concurrunt in unam personam, ita quod de eadem persona praedicetur Deus essentialiter et per naturam, et de illa eadem praedicetur homo essentialiter propter unionem gratuitam, per quam Deus, sicut potuit et voluit, se fecit suppositum naturae humanae; quod quidem sic fuit sibi facile, sicut facile est homini sibi indumentum sumere, immo multo facilius, si consideretur eius summa potentia et creaturae obedientia6c.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus et homo diversas habent definitiones; dicendum, quod non sunt diversae, ita quod non possunt concurrere in suppositum unum, si Deus facere velit illud, (Notandum.) pro eo quod multo magis pendet et indiget humana natura respectu divinae personae, quam aliquod accidens respectu substantiae. Non est ergo Deo impossibile, immo valde credibile et possibile, immo verum, quod Dei Filius fecit se in natura humana in incarnatione personam et hypostasim et suppositum.

(De 3 opinionum diversitate.) Et qui hoc intelligit7c, manifeste videt, quae istarum trium opinionum magis accedit ad explicandum incarnationis sacramentum. Nam tertia opinio, quae negat, Christum aliquid esse, secundum quod homo, negat etiam8c, personam Filii hypostasim esse humanae naturae, simpliciter recedit a veritate. Prima vero opinio, quae dicit, in Christo duo esse supposita, a veritate deviat. Media vero opinio, quae dicit, unam personam, sive hypostasim duabus naturis esse suppositam, veritatem dicit. Unde omnes doctores communiter tenent hodie opinionem mediam, ut loco eius quod dicebat illa opinio, unam personam ex duabus naturis esse compositam, nunc dicatur una persona duabus naturis esse supposita, non mutando sensum, sed verba, quae multum sunt in tali materia observanda. Ex his igitur, quae dicta sunt, colligi potest, quae sit praedictarum opinionum diversitas, et in qua earum sit maior probabilitas veritatis9c.

Scholion

I. Hac quaestione eliditur gravissimus error tertiae opinionis (quam professus est Abaelardus), scilicet, quod homo de Christo praedicatur accidentaliter, sive, uti ipse dicebat, non in quid, sed in quomodo se habens, ut cum dicitur: homo indutus. Hinc orta est propositio etiam a Petro Lombardo (hic c. 1. 4.) relata, quod Christus non est aliquid, secundum quod homo. Hanc perniciosam propositionem condemnavit Alexander III. (cfr. hic I. fundam.), qui antea fuit celeberrimus magister iuris, vocatus Rolandus Bandinelli, Senensis († 1181), qui etiam quodam modo discipulus fuit Abaelardi. Nuper P. Denifle Ord. Praed. invenit in quodam codice saeculi XII. vel XIII. hucusque incognitum librum Sententiarum magistri « Rodlandi », in quo inter alios errores Abaelardi etiam praedicta propositio refellitur. Gravissimis autem argumentis P. Denifle persuadet, istum Rodlandum non esse alium ab Alexandro III. (cfr. periodicum Archiv für Litt. u. Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters Heft 2. 3. pag. 434–461). — Quomodo sane intelligendum sit, quod humana natura in Christo vergit in accidens, bene explicatur in corp., et cfr. pag. 155, nota 6. Durandus quidem errorem Abaelardi reprobat; nihilominus displicet modus loquendi, quo idem explicat suam propositionem, accidentaliter esse Verbo unitam naturam humanam.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 6; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 37. 49. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 7. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Article I.

Question III. Whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance, or whether "man" is predicated of him after the manner of a habit and accident.

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance, or whether "man" is predicated of him after the manner of a habit and accident, as the third opinion held. And that Christ is called a man after the manner of a habit is shown:

1. (On the contrary.) To the Philippians, chapter two1: Found in habit as a man; upon which word Hilary says, in On the Trinity: "It was not that habit only of a man, but as of a man": therefore it seems, both from this word which says in habit, and from this which says as a man — which imports a likeness — that Christ is called a man in another way than other men are: and so it seems that he is said [to be a man] after the manner of a habit, not after the manner of a substance.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the book of the Eighty-three Questions, says, and it is contained in the text [of Lombard]2, that "the fourth genus of habit befits this comparison"; and that fourth genus pertains to what is said to be predicated after the manner of a habit, as to be clothed and shod, which is in a certain adjacency: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. That which comes to something already in completed being is to it an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident3; but the human nature comes to the person of Christ already in completed being: therefore it seems that it comes to him as an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident, and therefore not after the manner of a substance.

4. Likewise, what is predicated denominatively is an accident and is predicated after the manner of an accident4; but the human nature is predicated of Christ denominatively — whence the Son of God is called "humanated," which indeed cannot be said of any other man — therefore it seems that it is not said of him after the manner of a substance, but after the manner of an accident.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that diverse genera be predicated of the same thing essentially5: therefore much less will it be possible that the divine and human natures belong to the same thing essentially: therefore if Christ, speaking essentially, is God, it seems that "man" is said [of him] only after the manner of an accident or after the manner of a habit.

6. Likewise, things which have diverse definitions cannot be predicated of one and the same thing essentially6; but God and man have diverse definitions: therefore since God is said of Christ essentially, "man" will not be said of him substantially, but only accidentally.

On the contrary: 1. (The grounds.) In the decretal of Pope Alexander7: "Since Christ is perfect God and is perfect man, with what rashness do certain men dare to say that Christ is not anything, insofar as he is man": therefore according to the judgment of Pope Alexander "man" is predicated of Christ after the manner of a substance.

2. Likewise, "a substance is an accident to nothing," as the Philosopher will have it8; but the human nature in Christ is a substance: therefore it is an accident to nothing: therefore it is not an accident to the person of the Word.

3. Likewise, if the human nature is an accident to Christ, either it is an accident to Christ as God, or to Christ as man; not to Christ as man, since to no man is it accidental to be a man1b; nor likewise can it accrue to Christ insofar as he is God, since no accident can be in Christ by reason of the divine nature: therefore in no way does it seem that it can be predicated after the manner of an accident.

4. Likewise, nothing is univocal to substance and accident2b: therefore if of Christ it is said according to accident, and of other men according to substance, then it is not said univocally, but equivocally. But if this is true, it does not seem that he is of our genus, nor that his death avails for our redemption.

5. Likewise, substance is nobler than accident3b: therefore if "man" is said of others after the manner of a substance, and of Christ after the manner of a habit, then to be a man belongs less nobly to Christ than to others. But if it is impious to say this, then there remains the same as before, namely that "man" is not said of Christ after the manner of a habit, but after the manner of a substance.

6. Likewise, what is predicated after the manner of a habit and accident is not predicated after the manner of a substance — whence, although a man is called clothed, he is nevertheless never called a garment — therefore if the Son of God were called "humanated" after the manner of a habit, he would never be called a man; but if this is false, there remains the same as before4b.

Conclusion.

Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a substance and something, and "man" is predicated of him substantially, not after the manner of an accident and habit except by a certain conformity.

I respond: It must be said that when it is said that "man" is said of Christ after the manner of a habit and accident, (A twofold sense.) it can be understood in two ways: either so that that predication is purely accidental, in such a way that it is not substantial; or so that in some way it has the character of an accidental predication, and yet according to the truth is substantial.

(Conclusion 1.) If it be understood in this last way, then it holds the truth, because the human nature in Christ in a certain way has the property of an accident, namely in this, that it is substantified in the supposit of another nature, in such a way that it does not give to that supposit its first being, but comes to it already complete5b. Whence, just as whiteness is not substantified in something which is in the genus of quality, but rather in a substance, nor does it give being to it, but comes to it already complete; so by a certain conformity it is found in the case of Christ's humanity, which is substantified in the divine person, which has perfect being from a nature other than from the humanity itself, namely from the divine. (Note.) And therefore our teachers said that the human nature in Christ inclines toward an accident, according to a certain conformity6b. And this, if it be soundly understood, is said subtly and catholically. — (Concerning the habit.) Most of all, however, among every mode of accident it has the mode of a habit, because a habit names the adjacency of one substance with respect to another, which adjacency can indeed be, the property of each being preserved. And therefore the Apostle, the most prudent preacher of the faith, and Augustine, the most subtle defender of the faith, intimate that in some way Christ is called7b a man according to a habit, not thereby excluding that "man" is said of Christ according to substance.

(Another sense.) In another way it is to be understood that Christ is said to be a man according to accident, in such a way that that mode of predicating is altogether accidental, and not according to substance8b. (Conclusion 2.) And this manner of speaking, although it has at some time seemed to have the probability of an opinion, manifestly appears to have in itself the rashness of error. Whence also that third opinion, which posited this, was reproved by Alexander; and not undeservedly, since it is repugnant to the truth of that union. For this the right faith says: that the divine and human natures are united into one person: therefore God is said of Christ as of his proper supposit, and "man" likewise. But when "man" is predicated of something as of its proper supposit, it is predicated substantially and signifies the very thing (Conclusion 3.) of which it is said, to be some substance; and therefore from the very foundation of the faith it necessarily follows that he is something, insofar as he is a man9b. — Whence the reasons which are adduced to this [conclusion] are to be conceded.

(Solution of the opposing arguments.) 1, 2. To that which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of the Apostle and of Augustine, the response is already clear from those things which have already been said. For although "man" has in some way the mode of a habit, it nevertheless does not have it altogether. For although the humanity comes [to him] already complete1c, nonetheless it is substantified in him as in its own proper supposit, since the Son of God, who is the supposit of the divine nature by nature, made himself the supposit of the human nature by grace.

3. To that which is objected: an accident is that which comes to something already complete, etc.; it must be said that, though it be like it in this, that it comes [to him] already complete, yet not altogether; (Note.) since an accident lies altogether outside and bespeaks a mode of being2c, but the human nature comes to that person in such a way that it does not lie outside, nor bespeak only a mode of being, but the substance and nature of the very hypostasis.

4. To that which is objected, that it is predicated denominatively; it must be said that denominative predication can be in four ways: (The four modes of denominative predication.) by the mode of inherence, as when it is said, this man is white; by the mode of transmutation, as when it is said, Peter has been whitened; by the mode of possession, as when it is said, the ass of Socrates; and by the mode of union, as when it is said, iron set afire, that is, united to fire3c. When therefore it is said that denominative predication is of an accident; it must be said that this is true when it is by the mode of an inhering thing, but it is not true if it always be understood of denominative predication according to the other modes. — But when it is said, Christ is humanated, there is not there a predication by the mode of an inhering thing, but by the mode of union and relation. And therefore it does not follow that the human nature is an accident; nor does it follow from this that the divine person has been changed, since, although an absolute change in an accident posits a change in the subject, the introduction of the relation itself into being can nonetheless come about from a change made in the other extreme4c.

5. To that which is objected, that it is impossible that the genera of diverse things5c be predicated of the same thing substantially; (Note.) it must be said that this is true of those genera which have opposition and distinction, such as are the genera of created things. But it is not so with the divine and human nature, since, the human being altogether possible and in complete obedience, nothing prevents the human and divine natures from concurring together into one person, in such a way that of the same person God is predicated essentially and by nature, and of that same person "man" is predicated essentially on account of the gratuitous union, by which God, as he was able and willed, made himself the supposit of the human nature; which indeed was as easy for him as it is easy for a man to take a garment to himself, nay, much easier, if his supreme power and the creature's obedience be considered6c.

6. To that which is objected, that God and man have diverse definitions; it must be said that they are not diverse in such a way that they cannot concur into one supposit, if God will to do it, (Note.) because the human nature depends and stands in need much more with respect to the divine person than any accident with respect to a substance. It is therefore not impossible for God, nay, very credible and possible, nay, true, that the Son of God made himself in the human nature, in the incarnation, a person and hypostasis and supposit.

(On the diversity of the three opinions.) And he who understands this7c manifestly sees which of these three opinions comes nearer to explaining the mystery of the incarnation. For the third opinion, which denies that Christ is anything insofar as he is a man, denies also8c that the person of the Son is the hypostasis of the human nature, and simply departs from the truth. But the first opinion, which says that in Christ there are two supposits, strays from the truth. But the middle opinion, which says that one person, or hypostasis, is the supposit of two natures, speaks the truth. Whence all the teachers commonly hold today the middle opinion, so that, in place of what that opinion used to say — that one person is composed of two natures — there is now said one person that is the supposit of two natures, not changing the sense, but the words, which in such matter are much to be observed. From these things, therefore, which have been said, it can be gathered what the diversity of the aforesaid opinions is, and in which of them is the greater probability of the truth9c.

Scholion

I. By this question is struck down the most grievous error of the third opinion (which Abelard professed), namely, that "man" is predicated of Christ accidentally, or, as he himself said, not as to what [a thing is], but as to how it is disposed, as when it is said: a clothed man. Hence arose the proposition, related also by Peter Lombard (here c. 1, 4), that Christ is not anything insofar as he is a man. This pernicious proposition Alexander III condemned (cf. here, fundamentum 1), who had earlier been a most celebrated master of law, called Roland Bandinelli of Siena († 1181), who also was in a certain way a disciple of Abelard. Recently Fr. Denifle, of the Order of Preachers, found in a certain codex of the twelfth or thirteenth century a hitherto-unknown book of Sentences of a master "Rodland," in which, among other errors of Abelard, the aforesaid proposition is also refuted. And by very weighty arguments Fr. Denifle makes it convincing that this Rodland is none other than Alexander III (cf. the periodical Archiv für Litt. u. Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, Heft 2, 3, pp. 434–461). — In what sound sense it is to be understood that the human nature in Christ inclines toward an accident is well explained in the body [of the article], and cf. p. 155, note 6. Durandus indeed reproves the error of Abelard; nevertheless the manner of speaking displeases [him], by which the same man explains his proposition, that the human nature is united to the Word accidentally.

II. Alex. of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 6, m. 3. — Scotus, in both his commentaries, q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; Summa III, q. 2, a. 6; Summa contra Gentiles IV, cc. 37, 49. — B. Albert, III Sent., d. 7, a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 4, a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 7. — Verba Hilarii habentur X. de Trin. n. 23. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. in fine.
    [Phil. 2,] verse 7. — The words of Hilary are found in On the Trinity X, n. 23. See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 5, at the end.
  2. Hic c. 5. — In testimonio allato pro comparationi, qua voce Magister usus est ad abbreviandam longiorem Augustini sententiam, codd. B G L M O aa bb et edd. 1, 2 exhibent compositioni. De proposit. seq. cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Habere; V. Metaph. text. 28. (IV. c. 23.); nec non Gilb. Porret., de Sex princip. c. de Habitu, ubi inter alia haec: Habitus est corporum et eorum quae circa corpus sunt adiacentia, secundum quam hoc quidem habere, illa vero dicuntur haberi... ut armatum esse, calceatum esse.
    Here c. 5. — In the testimony adduced, for comparationi — which word the Master used to abbreviate a longer sentence of Augustine — codices B G L M O aa bb and editions 1, 2 give compositioni. On the following proposition cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Having; Metaphysics V, text 28 (IV, c. 23); and also Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles, the chapter on Habit, where among other things he says: A habit is the adjacency of bodies and of the things which are about a body, according to which the one is said to have, the others to be had... as to be armed, to be shod.
  3. Vide de hoc verba Averrois, tom. II. pag. 327, nota 1. allegata. — Vat. addit de illo. Paulo inferius pro in esse completo codd. E F G I (K a prima manu) N T U X et edd. 1, 2 in esse complete.
    On this see the words of Averroes cited in vol. II, p. 327, note 1. — The Vatican edition adds de illo. A little below, for in esse completo ("in completed being"), codices E F G I (K by the first hand) N T U X and editions 1, 2 read in esse complete.
  4. Secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1, cuius verba explicata habentur tom. 1. pag. 473, nota 1. — In conclusione pro dicatur cod. U sincerius praedicatur.
    According to Aristotle, Categories, c. 1, whose words are explained in vol. I, p. 473, note 1. — In the conclusion, for dicatur, codex U more genuinely [reads] praedicatur.
  5. Cfr. secunda regula praedicamentalis, quam exhibet Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 4. (c. 2.), nec non IV. Topic. c. 2, quod cap. Alex. Aphrodisias (circiter an. 200 post Christum) exponens ait: Genera duo eiusdem esse non possunt, nisi sit alterum sub altero. — Paulo inferius pro homo dicatur codd. L aa homo praedicatur.
    Cf. the second predicamental rule, which Aristotle sets forth in the Categories, c. 4 (c. 2), and also Topics IV, c. 2, on which chapter Alexander of Aphrodisias (about the year 200 after Christ), expounding it, says: Two genera cannot belong to the same thing, unless the one be under the other. — A little below, for homo dicatur, codices L aa [read] homo praedicatur.
  6. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Haec [essentiae] autem non eadem sunt, eo quod definitiones diversae.
    Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 4): But these [essences] are not the same, because their definitions are diverse.
  7. Libr. V. Decretal. Gregor. tit. 7. de Haereticis, c. 7, ubi textus origin. pro qua temeritate audent aliqui dicere exhibet mandamus, quatenus sub anathemate interdicas, ne quis audeat dicere, et dein post quod homo addit: quia, sicut Christus verus est Deus, ita verus est homo, ex anima rationali et humano carne subsistens. Cfr. Conc. Lateran. III. celebr. sub Alexandro III., tit. de Haeret. c. 20.
    Book V of the Decretals of Gregory, title 7, On Heretics, c. 7, where the original text, for with what rashness do certain men dare to say, gives we command that under anathema you forbid anyone to dare to say, and then after insofar as he is man adds: because, just as Christ is true God, so he is true man, subsisting from a rational soul and human flesh. Cf. the Third Lateran Council, celebrated under Alexander III, title On Heretics, c. 20.
  8. Libr. I. Phys. text. 27. et 30. (c. 3.): Quod vere est [i. e. substantia] nulli accidit.
    Physics I, texts 27 and 30 (c. 3): That which truly is [i.e. substance] is an accident to nothing.
  9. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. et 46. (VI. c. 1. et 13.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 2 and 46 (VI, cc. 1 and 13).
  10. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 2; VII. text. 1. seqq.; XI. c. 3. (III. c. 2; VI. c. 1; X. c. 3.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 2; VII, text 1 and following; XI, c. 3 (III, c. 2; VI, c. 1; X, c. 3).
  11. Vide Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 1. (VI. c. 1.). — Subinde pro dicitur et paulo inferius (in conclusione) pro dicatur cod. U bis praedicatur. In fine arg. post per modum habitus cod. aa sic prosequitur: et accidentis, sed praedicatur per modum substantiae.
    See Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 1 (VI, c. 1). — Thereupon for dicitur, and a little below (in the conclusion) for dicatur, codex U twice [reads] praedicatur. At the end of the argument, after per modum habitus, codex aa continues thus: and of an accident, but is predicated after the manner of a substance.
  12. Codd. K Z bb restat quod et primum.
    Codices K Z bb [read] restat quod et primum ("there remains both that and the first").
  13. Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 3. et q. 2. ad 1. — Codd. F N T U X iam completo esse. Mox pro in aliquo edd. in albo.
    Cf. above, q. 1, reply to [objection] 3, and q. 2, reply to 1. — Codices F N T U X [read] iam completo esse. Soon, for in aliquo ("in something"), the editions [read] in albo ("in something white").
  14. Adverte, quod B. Albert., hic d. 7. a. 6. ait: Natura humana nullo modo est accidens nec degenerat in accidens; nec antiqui dixerunt, quod degenerat in accidens, sed quod vergit in accidens, et novelli pergit mutaverunt in degenerat, cum illa valde diversa sint. Videtur enim vergere in accidens propter convenientiam cum accidentis proprietate quadam, non propter accidentis naturam, scil. quod potest abesse Filio Dei sine diminutione personae et advenit ei sine augmento... sed absit, quod degeneret, quia potius generosa fit. Cfr. supra pag. 150, nota 4.
    Note that B. Albert, here d. 7, a. 6, says: The human nature is in no way an accident, nor does it degenerate into an accident; nor did the ancients say that it degenerates into an accident, but that it inclines toward an accident, and the moderns changed inclines into degenerates, though these are very diverse. For it seems to incline toward an accident on account of an agreement with a certain property of an accident, not on account of the nature of an accident — namely, that it can be absent from the Son of God without diminution of the person, and comes to him without augmentation... but far be it that it should degenerate, since rather it is made noble. Cf. above, p. 150, note 4.
  15. Codd. K Z adiiciunt esse.
    Codices K Z add esse.
  16. Cod. K et non substantialis. Paulo inferius pro manifeste apparet edd. manifeste tamen patet.
    Codex K [reads] et non substantialis. A little below, for manifeste apparet, the editions [read] manifeste tamen patet.
  17. Cfr. Apologia de Verbo incarnato, auctore, ut videtur, Ioanne Cornubiensi, in qua contra eos agitur, qui Christum aliquid esse negant, secundum quod est homo (inter opera Hug. a S. Vict.). — Paulo superius pro ex ipso fidei codd. I aa ex ipsius fidei.
    Cf. the Apology concerning the Word Incarnate, by the author, as it seems, John of Cornwall, in which it is argued against those who deny that Christ is anything insofar as he is a man (among the works of Hugh of St. Victor). — A little above, for ex ipso fidei, codices I aa [read] ex ipsius fidei.
  18. Scil. personae Verbi.
    That is, [to the being] of the person of the Word.
  19. Cfr. Aristot., 1. Topic. c. 4, et VII. Metaph. text. 1. seqq. (VI. c. 1.). — Codd. O U S U subiiciunt tantum. Pro essendi edd. hic substituunt adhaerendi, et paulo inferius inhaerendi, hoc ultimo loco omissa etiam voce tantum.
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics I, c. 4, and Metaphysics VII, text 1 and following (VI, c. 1). — Codices O U S U add tantum. For essendi ("of being") the editions here substitute adhaerendi ("of adhering"), and a little below inhaerendi ("of inhering"), in this last place omitting also the word tantum.
  20. Edd. addunt et corpus animatum, id est animae unitum. Mox pro accidentis cod. A accidens, codd. F N P bb accidentalis.
    The editions add and a body endowed with soul, that is, united to a soul. Soon, for accidentis, codex A [reads] accidens; codices F N P bb [read] accidentalis.
  21. Cfr. supra pag. 11, nota 1. — Paulo superius post in accidente Vat. subdit absoluto.
    Cf. above, p. 11, note 1. — A little above, after in accidente, the Vatican edition appends absoluto.
  22. Vat. diversa, sicut et in obiectione ipsa habetur. Aliquanto inferius eadem Vat. pro simul concurrunt exhibet sic concurrant et omittit deinde ita.
    The Vatican edition [reads] diversa, as it is also had in the objection itself. Somewhat below, the same Vatican edition, for simul concurrunt, gives thus concurrant, and then omits ita.
  23. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. incorp. et ad 5.
    Cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, in the body and in the reply to 5.
  24. Pro intelligit cod. L intellexit. Subinde pro accedit codd. I L excedit.
    For intelligit, codex L [reads] intellexit. Thereupon, for accedit, codices I L [read] excedit.
  25. Pro etiam cod. A ipsam.
    For etiam, codex A [reads] ipsam.
  26. Cfr. etiam supra Praenotata post divisionem textus et a. 1.
    Cf. also above, the Praenotata after the division of the text, and article 1. ---
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