Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 6
Quaestio II. Utrum persona Christi sit una unitate simplici, an composita.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum persona Christi sit una unitate simplici, aut composita, sicut dicebat secunda opinio. Et quod habeat in se unitatem compositam, videtur (Fundamenta):
1. Primo per illud quod dicitur in Symbolo1 (Ad oppositum): « Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus »; sed homo est compositus ex anima et carne: ergo Christi persona est composita ex divinitate et humanitate.
2. Item, Damascenus in tertio libro2: « In Domino Iesu Christo duas naturas cognoscimus, unam hypostasim ex utrisque compositam »: si ergo secundum ipsum idem est hypostasis et persona, ergo etc.
3. Item, intellectus personae praesupponit intellectum naturae3; sed si est compositio in eo quod praesupponitur, necessario est compositio in eo quod supponit: cum ergo natura humana in Christo sit composita, necessario sequi videtur, quod et persona composita dici debeat.
4. Item, si Christus esset solum ex anima rationali et carne, haberet hypostasim compositam: ergo cum habeat in se animam et carnem et divinitatem, per locum a minori4, multo magis videtur habere compositam hypostasim.
5. Item, Christus est homo aut simplex, aut compositus; constat, quod non simplex, quia hoc est contra naturam humanitatis: est ergo homo compositus. Sed homo non praedicatur de Christo nisi ratione suppositi et hypostasis5: ergo videtur, quod persona in Christo debeat dici composita.
Sed contra: 1. Omne compositum compositione temporali est temporale: si ergo persona Christi est composita, et non nisi compositione temporali; ergo persona Christi est temporalis: non ergo aeterna. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.
2. Item, ubicumque est compositio de novo, ibi est mutatio: si ergo in incarnatione persona Christi fuit composita, necessario sequitur, quod fuerit mutata. Sed personam Verbi mutari est impossibile: ergo etc.
3. Item, ubicumque est compositio, ibi est imperfectio in utroque extremorum, quoniam « ex duobus entibus in actu non fit unum6 », et componibilia possibilia sunt respectu compositi; sed nec in natura Verbi nec in persona potest esse aliqua imperfectio: ergo nec compositio.
4. Item, ubi est compositio, compositum non praedicatur de aliquo extremorum, sicut patet, quia homo nec est anima nec est caro: ergo si persona Christi composita est ex divinitate et humanitate, ergo Christus nec est Deus nec est homo, nec Creator nec creatura. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod persona Christi non est composita.
5. Item, ubi est compositio, unum extremorum non praedicatur de altero — unde cum homo componatur7 ex anima et carne, nec anima est caro, nec e converso — ergo si persona Christi esset composita, nec homo esset Deus, nec Deus homo; quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc.
Conclusio
> Persona Christi non est composita, proprie loquendo, sed tantum in sensu largiore.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod compositio dupliciter potest dici. Uno modo proprie dicitur compositio unio aliquorum duorum habentium mutuam inclinationem ad constitutionem tertii (Distinctio). Et hoc modo, sicut rationes ostendunt, persona Christi non potest dici composita1b (Conclusio 1). Multa enim sequerentur inconvenientia, videlicet quod persona illa esset mutata, et quod esset imperfecta, et quod esset temporaliter in esse producta, et quod etiam non communicarentur idiomata. Et ideo hoc modo dicere, personam Christi esse compositam, non tantum esset falsum, verum etiam esset haereticum.
Alio modo dicitur compositio large simul-cum-alio-positio; et sic personalis unio potest dici compositio2b (Secunda opinio). Et per hunc modum dicebat secunda opinio, personam Christi esse compositam, non quia ipsa sit ex pluribus naturis constituta, sed quia persona illa ante incarnationem suppositum erat in una natura simplici; post incarnationem persona suppositum fuit divinae naturae et humanae, et hoc absque ulla mutatione facta in ipsa, sed solum ex parte humanae naturae, sicut ostensum fuit in prima distinctione huius libri3b. Et ideo opinio ista, quae dicebat, personam Christi fuisse compositam, vera fuit et sanum habuit intellectum. — Quia tamen verbum calumniabile est, pro eo quod compositionis vocabulum consuevit accipi primo modo; ideo doctores praesentis temporis sensum huius opinionis retinent, declinantes compositionis vocabulum. In persona enim Christi non est compositio proprie dicta. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae inductae sunt ad istam partem.
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Symboli, dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo inter animam et carnem, et divinitatem et humanitatem. Non enim est similitudo quantum ad extremorum compositionem, sed quantum ad hoc, quod4b anima et caro concurrunt ad unitatem personae; sic etiam divinitas et humanitas in Christo in unitatem personae concurrunt, quamvis hoc fiat alio et alio modo.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, dicendum, quod Damascenus non accipit ibi proprie compositionem, sed large (Notandum). Unde et verbum suum oportet exponere, quia fortasse non ita improprie sonat in lingua Graeca, sicut in Latina. Unde dicitur hypostasis composita ex duabus naturis, non quia ex illis duabus sit constituta, sed quia in sacramento incarnationis factum est, ut hypostasis, quae erat sub una tantum natura, in duabus5b et sub duabus fieret; unde magis proprie dicitur hypostasis esse in duabus naturis quam ex duabus naturis.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus personae praesupponit6b intellectum naturae; dicendum, quod verum est de natura, quae dat primum esse personae, et talis est divina natura respectu personae Christi. Et propterea, quamvis natura humana sit composita, non sequitur, quod propter hoc persona Christi compositionem habeat.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Christus esset solum ex anima et carne, haberet hypostasim compositam; dicendum, quod verum est, quia tunc haberet primum esse hypostasis eius ex humana natura, quae quidem composita est. Nunc autem non est simile, quia persona Christi suum esse primum habet ex divina natura, quae quidem est omnino simplicissima. Et ideo humana natura superadveniens, sicut non dat personae esse personale, sic non facit, eam esse compositam.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus est homo compositus; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quod subiungit, quod homo praedicatur ratione hypostasis; dicendum, quod si ita intelligatur, quod homo in praedicato ratione hypostasis praedicetur, veritatem non habet (Notandum); quia secundum regulam Philosophi7b, quamvis terminus subiiciatur ratione suppositi, praedicatur ratione formae; et ideo hoc adiectivum compositus circa istum terminum homo non nominat compositionem quantum ad suppositum, sed quantum ad formam. Et propterea non potest ex hoc inferri, quod persona Christi sit composita.
I. Haec quaestio solvit dubium illud, utrum et quo sensu approbari possint verba secundi articuli secundae opinionis (cfr. supra Praenotata post divisionem textus), quod persona Verbi post incarnationem facta sit composita. Constat autem, quod compositio in illo ente, quod vocatur Christus, est prorsus singularis, et quod respectu personae divinae hic terminus purificandus est ab illis imperfectionibus, quae propriae et naturali compositioni inhaerent. Hinc antiqui magistri evitabant Christi personam nominare proprie compositam, nec compositionem admittebant nisi « in sensu largo », id est, ut sit compositio ad hoc sive cum hoc, non compositio ex his. Similiter praeferebant dicere, hypostasim Christi esse in duabus naturis, quam dicere, ex duabus naturis. In hoc etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 3.) concordat cum nostro Doctore dicens: « Persona Christi post incarnationem potest dici aliquo modo composita, in quantum ibi salvatur aliqua conditio compositi; non tamen est ibi vera ratio compositionis, quia deficit ibi altera conditio; unde etiam non est in usu modernorum » etc. Idem tamen in Sum. (III. q. 2. a. 4.) et praecipue Aegid. R. penitus approbare videntur sententiam multorum auctorum recentium, qui, innixi dictis Patrum Graecorum et Conciliorum, praesertim can. 8. et 4. Concilii V. oecumenici, determinate docent, terminum ex hac unione resultantem esse personam proprie compositam, sed eminentiore modo, quam res naturales compositae sint. — Sed in re ipsa vix dissentit S. Bonaventura.
II. Praeter laudatum S. Thomam: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. a. 2. m. 5. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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Question II. Whether the person of Christ is one by a simple unity, or a composite one.
Secondly, it is asked whether the person of Christ is one by a simple unity, or a composite one, as the second opinion was saying. And that it has in itself a composite unity seems to be the case (Fundamenta):
1. First, through that which is said in the Symbol1 (On the contrary side): « For just as the rational soul and the flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ »; but a man is composed of soul and flesh: therefore the person of Christ is composed of divinity and humanity.
2. Likewise, Damascene in the third book2: « In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, one hypostasis composed of both »: if therefore according to him hypostasis and person are the same, therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the understanding of the person presupposes the understanding of the nature3; but if there is composition in that which is presupposed, there is necessarily composition in that which presupposes: since therefore the human nature in Christ is composite, it seems necessarily to follow that the person too ought to be called composite.
4. Likewise, if Christ were only of a rational soul and flesh, he would have a composite hypostasis: therefore since he has in himself soul and flesh and divinity, by an argument from the lesser4, it seems all the more that he has a composite hypostasis.
5. Likewise, Christ is a man either simple, or composite; it is established that he is not simple, because this is contrary to the nature of humanity: he is therefore a composite man. But "man" is not predicated of Christ except by reason of the supposit and hypostasis5: therefore it seems that the person in Christ ought to be called composite.
On the contrary: 1. Everything composite by a temporal composition is temporal: if therefore the person of Christ is composite, and only by a temporal composition; therefore the person of Christ is temporal: therefore not eternal. But this is false: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, wherever there is a new composition, there is change: if therefore in the Incarnation the person of Christ was composed, it necessarily follows that it was changed. But for the person of the Word to be changed is impossible: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, wherever there is composition, there is imperfection in each of the extremes, since « out of two beings in act one thing is not made6 », and things capable of being composed are in potency with respect to the composite; but neither in the nature of the Word nor in the person can there be any imperfection: therefore neither composition.
4. Likewise, where there is composition, the composite is not predicated of any of the extremes, as is plain, because a man is neither the soul nor the flesh: therefore if the person of Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then Christ is neither God nor man, neither Creator nor creature. But if this is false, it remains that the person of Christ is not composite.
5. Likewise, where there is composition, one of the extremes is not predicated of the other — whence since a man is composed7 of soul and flesh, neither is the soul the flesh, nor conversely — therefore if the person of Christ were composite, neither would the man be God, nor God man; but if this is false, it remains etc.
Conclusion
> The person of Christ is not composite, properly speaking, but only in a broader sense.
I respond: It must be said that composition can be spoken of in two ways. In one way, composition is properly called the union of some two things having a mutual inclination toward the constitution of a third (Distinction). And in this way, as the arguments show, the person of Christ cannot be called composite1b (First conclusion). For many incongruities would follow, namely that that person would be changed, and that it would be imperfect, and that it would be brought into being temporally, and also that the idioms would not be communicated. And therefore to say in this way that the person of Christ is composite would not only be false, but even heretical.
In another way composition is called broadly a being-placed-together-with-another; and in this sense the personal union can be called composition2b (The second opinion). And in this way the second opinion was saying that the person of Christ is composite, not because it is itself constituted out of several natures, but because that person before the Incarnation was a supposit in one simple nature; after the Incarnation the person was the supposit of the divine and the human nature, and this without any change made in it, but only on the part of the human nature, as was shown in the first distinction of this book3b. And therefore that opinion, which said that the person of Christ had been composite, was true and had a sound meaning. — Yet because the word is liable to calumny, since the term "composition" is wont to be taken in the first way, therefore the doctors of the present time retain the sense of this opinion while declining the term "composition." For in the person of Christ there is no composition properly so called. — Whence the arguments which were brought for that side are to be conceded.
To 1. To that which is objected on the contrary from the authority of the Symbol, it must be said that there is not a complete likeness between soul and flesh, and divinity and humanity. For the likeness is not as to the composition of the extremes, but as to this, that4b soul and flesh concur toward the unity of the person; so too divinity and humanity in Christ concur into the unity of the person, although this comes about in one way and another.
To 2. To that which is objected from the authority of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not there take "composition" properly, but broadly (Note). Whence his word too must be expounded, because perhaps it does not sound so improperly in the Greek tongue as in the Latin. Whence the hypostasis is said to be composed of two natures, not because it is constituted out of those two, but because in the sacrament of the Incarnation it came about that the hypostasis, which was under one nature only, came to be in two5b and under two; whence the hypostasis is more properly said to be in two natures than of two natures.
To 3. To that which is objected, that the understanding of the person presupposes6b the understanding of the nature; it must be said that this is true of the nature which gives the first being to the person, and such is the divine nature with respect to the person of Christ. And therefore, although the human nature is composite, it does not follow that on this account the person of Christ has composition.
To 4. To that which is objected, that if Christ were only of soul and flesh, he would have a composite hypostasis; it must be said that this is true, because then he would have the first being of his hypostasis from the human nature, which indeed is composite. But now it is not similar, because the person of Christ has its first being from the divine nature, which indeed is altogether most simple. And therefore the human nature supervening, just as it does not give the person personal being, so it does not make it composite.
To 5. To that which is objected, that Christ is a composite man; it must be said that this is true; but as to what is added, that "man" is predicated by reason of the hypostasis; it must be said that if it is so understood, that "man" is predicated in the predicate by reason of the hypostasis, it does not hold the truth (Note); because according to the rule of the Philosopher7b, although a term is made the subject by reason of the supposit, it is predicated by reason of the form; and therefore this adjective composite with respect to that term man does not name composition as to the supposit, but as to the form. And therefore it cannot be inferred from this that the person of Christ is composite.
I. This question resolves that doubt, whether and in what sense the words of the second article of the second opinion (cfr. above, the Praenotata after the division of the text) can be approved, namely that the person of the Word after the Incarnation became composite. Now it is established that the composition in that being which is called Christ is altogether singular, and that with respect to the divine person this term must be purified from those imperfections which inhere in proper and natural composition. Hence the ancient masters avoided naming Christ's person properly composite, nor did they admit composition except « in a broad sense », that is, so that it be a composition toward this or with this, not a composition out of these. Likewise they preferred to say that the hypostasis of Christ is in two natures, rather than to say out of two natures. In this too S. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 3.) agrees with our Doctor, saying: « The person of Christ after the Incarnation can be called composite in some way, insofar as some condition of the composite is preserved there; yet there is not there the true account of composition, because the other condition is lacking there; whence it is also not in use among the moderns » etc. Yet the same in the Summa (III. q. 2. a. 4.) and especially Aegidius Romanus seem wholly to approve the opinion of many more recent authors who, relying on the sayings of the Greek Fathers and of the Councils, especially canons 8 and 4 of the Fifth Ecumenical Council, determinately teach that the term resulting from this union is a properly composite person, but in a more eminent mode than natural composite things are. — But in the reality itself S. Bonaventure scarcely dissents.
II. Besides the cited S. Thomas: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 6. a. 2. m. 5. — Scotus, in both Writings here q. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 3. a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 8. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- Athanasii.Of Athanasius [i.e. the Athanasian Creed].
- De Fide orthod. c. 4; fusius de hac re agit ibid. c. 7. et IV. c. 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.On the Orthodox Faith c. 4; he treats this matter more fully ibid. c. 7 and IV c. 5. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
- Vide Boeth., de Una Persona et duab. natur. c. 2. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 37, nota 1. — Inferius pro sequi videtur codd. K Z sequitur.See Boethius, On the One Person and the Two Natures c. 2 ff. Cf. above p. 37, note 1. — Below, for sequi videtur codices K Z read sequitur.
- De quo vide tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. De hoc ipso arg. vide verba Augustini, hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. allata, et Epist. 137. (alias 3.) c. 3. n. 11.On which see vol. I p. 835, note 5. On this very argument see the words of Augustine adduced here in the text of the Master, c. 3, and Letter 137 (alias 3) c. 3 n. 11.
- Ut explanatum est in quaest. praeced. ad 5. et 6.As was explained in the preceding question, in the reply to 5 and 6.
- Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). Cfr. III. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.), ubi parti tribuitur ratio imperfecti et materiae.Aristotle, Metaphysics VII text 49 (VI c. 13). Cf. Physics III text 66 (c. 6), where to the part is attributed the character of the imperfect and of matter.
- Codd. G H K L T U Z aa bb componitur.Codices G H K L T U Z aa bb read componitur.
- Cod. F dici esse composita.Codex F reads dici esse composita ["to be said to be composite"].
- Cfr. Damasc., Dialectica, c. 65. seq. — Pro simul cod. U scilicet.Cf. Damascene, Dialectica c. 65 ff. — For simul codex U reads scilicet.
- Art. I. q. I.Article I, question I.
- Cod. U subiicit sicut. Mox pro ad unitatem cod. A in unitatem.Codex U adds sicut. Shortly after, for ad unitatem codex A reads in unitatem.
- Vat. adiicit esset. Subinde pro et sub cod. U sive sub.The Vatican edition adds esset. Thereupon, for et sub codex U reads sive sub.
- Codd. A F G H I L N T U aa supponit.Codices A F G H I L N T U aa read supponit.
- In libro de Praedicam., c. de Substantia, docet, de primis substantiis sive suppositis praedicatum dici secundum nomen et rationem. In I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.) reprehendit propositionem: omnis homo est omne animal. — Paulo inferius post praedicatur edd. subdunt tamen.In the book On the Categories, in the chapter on Substance, he teaches that of first substances or supposits the predicate is said according to name and account. In On Interpretation I c. 5 (c. 7) he censures the proposition: every man is every animal. — A little below, after praedicatur the editions add tamen. ---