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Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum maior sit congruitas ad unionem in tota specie quam in uno individuo.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum maior sit congruitas in tota specie1 quam in uno individuo. Et quod maior sit in tota humana specie, videtur:

1. Quia tota indigebat curatione. Et Damascenus2 dicit, « quod erat inassumtibile erat incurabile »: ergo si propter curationem generis humani Deus naturam assumsit, videtur, quod magis congruum fuerit totam speciem assumere quam unam naturam singularem.

2. Item, maioris potestatis debuit esse reparator quam primus praevaricator; sed in primo praevaricatore Deus posuit totam humanam speciem, ita quod nihil erat extra ipsum Adam3, sed omnes in ipso erant: ergo videtur, quod magis congruerit, Dei Filium totam massam, quam Adam corruperat, assumere, quam aliquam eius partem.

3. Item, « bonum est diffusivum sui4 », ergo magis bonum magis diffusivum, ergo in maximo effectu bonitatis maxime se debet Deus diffundere; sed maximus effectus bonitatis divinae fuit redemptio generis humani: ergo congruebat, quod maxime se diffunderet: igitur magis congruum fuit, ut assumeret speciem quam aliquam naturam particularem.

4. Item, Filius missus est in mentem, et missus est in carnem; sed missio Filii Dei in mentem non tantum respicit unam animam singularem, sed omnem animam filiorum Dei per adoptionem: ergo pari ratione missio in carnem non debet esse in unum corpus singulare, sed in omnia corpora humana, vel saltem in aliqua, quae coniuncta sunt animabus, ad quas mittitur divina sapientia5.

Contra: 1. « Natura non facit per plura quae potest facere per pauciora6 » — et hoc facit ad eius commendationem — similiter ergo Deus, qui est institutor naturae: sed genus humanum potuit sufficienter reparari per unum hominem: ergo magis congruebat, quod unum assumeret quam plures.

2. Item, decet humanam naturam assumtam haberi in praecipuo honore; sed si omnes7 assumsisset, non esset magis honorabilis unus quam alter; hoc quidem derogaret honori et dignitati mediatoris, et nihil tale congruit fieri: ergo etc.

3. Item, si omnes assumsisset, ergo assumsisset peccatores; sed si nullo modo convenit, mediatorem esse peccatorem8, ergo non convenit, Filium Dei assumere omnem hominem.

4. Item, si omnes homines aut multos assumsisset, aut esset inter eos aliqua germanitatis affinitas, aut nulla. Si nulla, non videtur, quod hoc conveniret, cum inter personas divinas summa attendatur germanitas, ut dicit Richardus9. Si autem esset affinitas, ita quod unus pater et alter filius, iam esset proprietatum confusio. Et ideo, si hoc non decet nec congruit, videlicet proprietates confundi in Trinitate; videtur, quod multitudo hominum non haberet congruitatem ad unionem, quemadmodum natura singularis.

Conclusio.

Non ita congruit, totam speciem, sive individuorum multitudinem assumi a Filio Dei, sicut congruit, ipsam assumi in natura singulari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio non ita congruit, totam speciem, sive individuorum multitudinem assumi a Filio Dei, sicut competit ipsum assumere in natura singulari10; et hoc tum ratione ipsius unionis in se, tum ratione reparationis nostrae, tum ratione exaltationis naturae assumtae. — Ratione unionis in se magis congruebat, quod assumeret unam naturam quam plures, sicut decens erat, unum uniri uni, et Unigenitum Patris fieri Unigenitum matris, ut sic per unionem naturae nec fieret recessus ab unitate, nec fieret confusio in personali proprietate.

Ratione vero reparationis nostrae magis congruebat, quia unio fiebat propter mediatorem. Mediator autem unus est11, ut reducat ad unitatem et

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concordiam Deum et hominem. Si enim plures essent, aut unus sufficeret, aut non. Si sufficeret, tunc alii superfluerent. Si non sufficeret, iam imperfectus mediator esset. Unde sicut Christus semel pro peccatis mortuus est, quia una oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos12; ita semel et in unica natura debuit incarnari.

Ratione vero exaltationis naturae assumtae magis congruebat, quia decebat illum hominem, qui Deus erat, sic exaltari, ut daretur ei nomen, quod est super omne nomen13. Et quoniam illud « quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit »; sicut Deus est unus, qui non habet aliam naturam aequalem, sed summus est inter omnia, sic natura assumta unica est, cui non aequatur aliqua creatura, sed ipsa excellit inter omnia creata, tanquam cui data est omnis potestas in caelo et in terra14. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod magis decens fuerit assumere unam naturam singularem quam totam speciem.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod tota indigebat curatione; dicendum, quod tota indigebat curatione, et tota curari poterat per unum hominem, sicut totum corpus curari potest per cauterium, quod fit circa unum membrum; ideo non oportuit, assumi totum genus humanum. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit de Damasceno: « Quod erat inassumtibile erat incurabile »; loquitur enim de assumtibili in se, vel in suo simili; sic tota humana natura assumta fuit in Christo, sicut patebit infra15. Et nihil in homine indigebat curatione, quod non sit assumtum a Deo in unitate personae.

2. Ad illud quod opponitur, quod tota humana species fuit in praevaricatore; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia praevaricator corrupit et corruptionem transfudit mediante generatione carnali16; Christus autem sanat per gratiam et mediante regeneratione spirituali; et ideo non oportet, quod illi qui curandi sunt, sint in carne Christi, sicut fuerunt in natura hominis primi. Sufficit enim renasci in Ecclesia per eius Sacramenta, in qua Christus regenerat filios virginitate integra.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum est diffusivum sui in praecipuo effectu bonitatis; dicendum, quod magnitudo diffusionis potest intelligi intensive, vel extensive; sed in effectu bonitatis praecipuo non oportet esse diffusionem bonitatis per extensionem, sed per intensionem. Unde quanto maiora sunt dona, tanto paucioribus communicantur. Et quia gratia unionis est maxima in termino17, ita quod non potest esse maior nec cogitari; hinc est, quod uni singulari naturae debuit communicari.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod missio in mentem non respicit unam personam tantum; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia missio in mentem attenditur secundum effectum gratiae inhabitantem, quae18 communis est omnibus iustis; sed missio Filii in carnem est secundum gratiam unionis, quae facit, hominem esse Deum. Quamvis autem congruum sit, quod multis communicet iustitiae bonitatem, non tamen convenit, quod multis communicet divinitatis nomen et dignitatem. Decet enim Deum habere multos servos et filios adoptivos, sed non decet, multos homines esse naturales Dei filios sive deos, vel, ut proprius loquar, esse Deum vel Dei Filium unigenitum19.

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English Translation
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Question III. Whether the fittingness toward union is greater in the whole species than in one individual.

Thirdly it is asked whether the fittingness is greater in the whole species1 than in one individual. And that it is greater in the whole human species seems to be the case:

1. Because the whole [nature] was in need of healing. And Damascene2 says that "what was unassumable was incurable": therefore, if God assumed the nature for the healing of the human race, it seems that it would have been more fitting to assume the whole species than one singular nature.

2. Likewise, the repairer ought to have been of greater power than the first transgressor; but in the first transgressor God placed the whole human species, in such a way that nothing was outside Adam himself3, but all were in him: therefore it seems that it would have been more fitting for the Son of God to assume the whole mass which Adam had corrupted, than some part of it.

3. Likewise, "the good is diffusive of itself4," therefore the greater good is more diffusive, therefore in the greatest effect of goodness God ought most to diffuse himself; but the greatest effect of divine goodness was the redemption of the human race: therefore it was fitting that he should diffuse himself most; therefore it was more fitting that he should assume the species than some particular nature.

4. Likewise, the Son is sent into the mind, and is sent into the flesh; but the sending of the Son of God into the mind does not regard only one singular soul, but every soul of the sons of God by adoption: therefore by parity of reasoning the sending into the flesh ought not to be into one singular body, but into all human bodies, or at least into some, which are conjoined to souls, to which the divine wisdom is sent5.

On the contrary: 1. "Nature does not do through many things what it can do through fewer6" — and it does this for its own commendation — therefore likewise God, who is the institutor of nature: but the human race could be sufficiently repaired through one man: therefore it was more fitting that he should assume one [nature] than many.

2. Likewise, it is fitting that the assumed human nature be held in the highest honor; but if he had assumed all7, one would not be more honorable than another; this indeed would derogate from the honor and dignity of the mediator, and nothing of the sort is fitting to be done: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if he had assumed all, then he would have assumed sinners; but if it in no way befits the mediator to be a sinner8, then it does not befit the Son of God to assume every man.

4. Likewise, if he had assumed all men or many, either there would be among them some kinship of consanguinity, or none. If none, it does not seem that this would befit, since among the divine persons the highest kinship is regarded, as Richard says9. But if there were kinship, such that one were father and another son, there would now be a confusion of properties. And therefore, if this is not seemly nor fitting, namely that the properties be confounded in the Trinity, it seems that a multitude of men would not have a fittingness toward union, as does a singular nature.

Conclusion.

It is not so fitting that the whole species, or the multitude of individuals, be assumed by the Son of God, as it is fitting that it be assumed in a singular nature.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt it is not so fitting that the whole species, or the multitude of individuals, be assumed by the Son of God, as it befits him to assume it in a singular nature10; and this both by reason of the union in itself, and by reason of our reparation, and by reason of the exaltation of the assumed nature. — By reason of the union in itself it was more fitting that he should assume one nature than many, just as it was seemly that one be united to one, and that the Only-begotten of the Father become the Only-begotten of the mother, so that thus through the union of nature there be neither a withdrawal from unity, nor a confusion in the personal property.

But by reason of our reparation it was more fitting, because the union came about for the sake of the mediator. But the mediator is one11, that he may lead back to unity and

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concord God and man. For if there were many, either one would suffice, or not. If he sufficed, then the others would be superfluous. If he did not suffice, then he would now be an imperfect mediator. Hence, just as Christ died once for sins, because by one offering he has consummated for ever those who are sanctified12; so once and in a single nature he ought to have been incarnate.

But by reason of the exaltation of the assumed nature it was more fitting, because it was seemly that that man, who was God, be so exalted that there be given to him a name which is above every name13. And since that "which is said by way of superabundance befits one alone"; just as God is one, who has no other nature equal to him, but is highest among all things, so the assumed nature is unique, to which no creature is equal, but it itself excels among all created things, as one to whom all power in heaven and on earth has been given14. — Therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that it was more seemly to assume one singular nature than the whole species.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary, that the whole [nature] was in need of healing; it must be said that the whole was in need of healing, and the whole could be healed through one man, just as the whole body can be healed through a cautery which is applied around one member; therefore it was not necessary that the whole human race be assumed. — Nor does that avail which is objected from Damascene: "What was unassumable was incurable"; for he speaks of the assumable in itself, or in its like; thus the whole human nature was assumed in Christ, as will be made clear below15. And nothing in man was in need of healing which has not been assumed by God in unity of person.

2. To that which is opposed, that the whole human species was in the transgressor; it must be said that it is not similar, because the transgressor corrupted and transmitted the corruption by means of carnal generation16; but Christ heals through grace and by means of spiritual regeneration; and therefore it is not necessary that those who are to be healed be in the flesh of Christ, as they were in the nature of the first man. For it suffices to be reborn in the Church through its Sacraments, in which Christ regenerates sons with virginity intact.

3. To that which is objected, that the good is diffusive of itself in the chief effect of goodness; it must be said that the magnitude of diffusion can be understood intensively or extensively; but in the chief effect of goodness there need not be a diffusion of goodness through extension, but through intension. Hence the greater the gifts, the fewer they are communicated to. And because the grace of union is greatest at the terminus17, so that there cannot be a greater nor can a greater be conceived; hence it is that it ought to be communicated to one singular nature.

4. To that which is objected, that the sending into the mind does not regard one person only; it must be said that it is not similar, because the sending into the mind is regarded according to the indwelling effect of grace, which18 is common to all the just; but the sending of the Son into the flesh is according to the grace of union, which makes man to be God. But although it is fitting that he communicate to many the goodness of justice, nevertheless it does not befit that he communicate to many the name and dignity of divinity. For it befits God to have many servants and adoptive sons, but it does not befit that many men be natural sons of God, that is, gods, or, to speak more properly, that they be God or the Only-begotten Son of God19.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. congruitas ad unionem in tota specie humana.
    The Vatican edition reads fittingness toward union in the whole human species.
  2. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. et 18. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. — Paulo inferius post Deus naturam cod. K adiicit humanam.
    Book III of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6 and 18. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, at the end. — A little below, after God ... the nature, codex K adds human.
  3. Anselm., de Conceptu virg. et orig. pecc. c. 2: Tota natura humana in illis [Adam et Eva] erat, et extra illos de illa nihil erat. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. 1. q. 2.
    Anselm, On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, c. 2: "The whole human nature was in them" [Adam and Eve], "and outside of them there was nothing of it." Cf. II Sent. d. 30, a. 1, q. 2.
  4. Secundum Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. § 1, et de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 1. seq.
    According to Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, c. 4, § 1, and On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 1 ff.
  5. Respicitur illud Sap. 9, 10: Mitte illam [sapientiam] de caelis sanctis tuis etc. — Pro in aliqua codd. G H K M O Z bb in illa.
    Reference is made to that text of Wisdom 9:10: "Send her" [wisdom] "from your holy heavens" etc. — For into some, codices G H K M O Z bb read into that.
  6. Axioma hoc fundatur in locis Aristotelis, tom. II. pag. 44, nota 5, pag. 741, nota 4. et pag. 778, nota 2. allatis.
    This axiom is founded on the passages of Aristotle cited in tom. II, p. 44, note 5, p. 741, note 4, and p. 778, note 2.
  7. Codd. G H (K a secunda manu) Y (Z a prima manu) bb omnes Sanctos.
    Codices G H (K by a second hand) Y (Z by a first hand) bb read all the Saints.
  8. August., X. Confess. c. 43. n. 68: Mediator ille Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus, inter mortales peccatores et immortalem iustum apparuit; mortalis cum hominibus, iustus cum Deo: ut, quoniam stipendium iustitiae vita et pax est, per iustitiam coniunctam Deo evacuaret mortem iustificatorum impiorum, quam cum illis voluit habere communem.
    Augustine, Confessions X, c. 43, n. 68: "That mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, appeared between mortal sinners and the immortal just one; mortal with men, just with God: so that, since the wage of justice is life and peace, by justice joined to God he might destroy the death of the justified ungodly, which he willed to have in common with them."
  9. Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 2. et 4. seqq. — De seq. propos. cfr. supra pag. 17, notae 3. 7. 9. — Paulo inferius post videtur codd. N W subiiciunt etiam.
    Book VI of On the Trinity, c. 2 and 4 ff. — On the following proposition cf. above, p. 17, notes 3, 7, 9. — A little below, after it seems, codices N W add also.
  10. Edd. naturam in singulari. Post assumere in cod. K a secunda manu adiectum est hominem.
    The editions read the nature in the singular. After to assume, in codex K a second hand has added man.
  11. Epist. I. Tim. 2, 5: Unus enim Deus, unus et mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. — Codd. K P Q R bb hic adiiciunt ut dicit Apostolus. Paulo superius pro in personali proprietate cod. Q in personarum proprietate. Dein post fiebat cod. F addit haec. Paulo inferius pro Si enim edd. Si ergo.
    First Epistle to Timothy 2:5: "For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus." — Codices K P Q R bb here add as the Apostle says. A little above, for in the personal property codex Q reads in the property of the persons. Then after came about codex F adds these things. A little below, for For if the editions read Therefore if.
  12. Hebr. 10, 14. Ibid. 9, 28: Sic et Christus semel oblatus est ad multorum exhaurienda peccata.
    Hebrews 10:14. Ibid. 9:28: "So also Christ was offered once to take away the sins of many."
  13. Phil. 2, 9. — Seq. testimonium est Aristotelis et habetur V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.), de quo vide ibid. VII. c. 1. et tom. I. pag. 542, nota 2.
    Philippians 2:9. — The following testimony is from Aristotle and is found in Topics V, c. 3 (c. 5), on which see ibid. VII, c. 1, and tom. I, p. 542, note 2.
  14. Matth. 28, 18.
    Matthew 28:18.
  15. Art. seq. per totum et d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. et 3. — Codd. et edd. 1, 2 verba Damasceni gratuito dant ordine inverso: quod erat incurabile erat inassumtibile. Deinde pro in Christo codd. G H K O Z aa bb exhibent a Christo, et mox pro Et nihil codd. M O ita quod nihil. In fine solut. non pauci codd. in unitate mutaverunt in unitatem.
    The following article throughout, and d. 5, a. 2, q. 1 and 3. — Codices and editions 1, 2 gratuitously give the words of Damascene in inverted order: "what was incurable was unassumable." Then for in Christ codices G H K O Z aa bb present by Christ, and presently for And nothing codices M O read so that nothing. At the end of the solution not a few codices changed in unity to into unity.
  16. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Quomodo generatio et regeneratio inter se differant sintque contrariae inter se, exponit August., I. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 31. n. 60. et III. c. 2. n. 2. — In fine solut. Vat. et ed. 1 voci virginitate praefigunt in.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 31, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — How generation and regeneration differ from one another and are mutually contrary, Augustine sets forth in On the Merits and Remission of Sins I, c. 31, n. 60, and III, c. 2, n. 2. — At the end of the solution the Vatican edition and edition 1 prefix in to the word virginity.
  17. De hac dictione, quae est secundum Gilb. Porret., cfr. tom. II. pag. 787, nota 6. De re ipsa vide infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. seqq. et d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Cod. A magis in termino. Aliquantulum ante deest in compluribus codd. tanto.
    On this expression, which is according to Gilbert of Poitiers, cf. tom. II, p. 787, note 6. On the matter itself see below d. 6, a. 1, q. 2 ff., and d. 13, a. 1, q. 2 f. — Codex A reads greater at the terminus. A little before, in several codices so much is lacking.
  18. Vat. qui.
    The Vatican edition reads who [masculine].
  19. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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