Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 5
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5
Quaestio V. Utrum concedenda sit haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.
Quinto quaeritur, utrum concedenda sit haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem. Et quod sic, videtur.
(Fundamenta.)
1. Damascenus3c: «Omnia quae in nostra natura plantavit, assumsit Dei Verbum»; sed unicuique nostrum dedit humanitatem: ergo videtur, quod assumsit humanitatem.
2. Item, humanitas non est aliud quam hominis natura, secundum quod dicit Damascenus4c: «Divinitatis et humanitatis nomina naturam sunt repraesentativa»; sed haec simpliciter est concedenda: Filius Dei assumsit humanam naturam: ergo et haec: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.
3. Item, humanitas est forma hominis; sed haec simpliciter conceditur: Filius Dei assumsit formam hominis, sicut dicitur ad Philippenses secundo5c: Humiliavit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens: ergo et ista: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.
4. Item, haec est simpliciter vera: Filius Dei habet humanitatem; et eam non habuit ab aeterno, sed temporaliter6c: ergo videtur, quod eam assumsit.
Sed contra: (Ad oppositum.) 1. Humanitas consequitur unionem animae cum corpore; sed anima et corpus non fuerunt prius unita quam assumta7c: ergo si assumtum secundum ordinem naturalem praecedit ipsam assumtionem, videtur, quod haec sit falsa: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.
2. Item, magis significat in abstractione hoc nomen humanitas quam hoc nomen homo: ergo si «Deus non assumsit humanam naturam in universali, sed in atomo8c», ergo haec est magis impropria: assumsit humanitatem, quam: assumsit hominem: ergo est falsa.
3. Item, si assumsit humanitatem et nunquam deposuit quod assumsit, semper habuit humanitatem; sed quod habet humanitatem semper est homo semper; ergo in triduo fuit homo1d.
(Quaestio incidens.) Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quid nomine humanitatis intelligitur, cum dicitur, Dei Filium assumsisse humanitatem?
Conclusio.
Concedendum est, quod Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem.
Respondeo: (Tripliciter dicitur humanitas.) Dicendum, quod nomen2d humanitatis consuevit tripliciter accipi: uno modo per humanitatem possunt intelligi principia constituentia hominem; alio modo per humanitatem potest intelligi forma consequens totum compositum; tertio modo nomine humanitatis potest intelligi proprietas consequens ipsum hominem, in quantum est homo. Et iste triplex intellectus habetur ex verbis Magistri, distinctione secunda3d, ubi confirmat Magister et ostendit auctoritate Hieronymi, nomine humanitatis corpus et animam intelligi.
(Conclusio cum triplici applicatione.) Omnibus autem his modis concedendum est, Filium Dei assumsisse humanitatem. Si enim nomine humanitatis intelligantur ipsa principia constituentia hominem, videlicet anima et caro, absque dubio verum est, quod Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem, id est animam et carnem4d. — Item, si nomine humanitatis intelligatur forma totius, adhuc veritatem habet: Filius Dei assumsit humanitatem, id est formam humanam, iuxta illud quod dicitur ad Philippenses secundo5d: Humiliavit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens. — Postremo, si nomine humanitatis intelligatur ipsa proprietas consequens, adhuc veritatem habet: Filius Dei assumsit humanam naturam, quia non solum nostram naturam humanam assumsit, sed proprietates consequentes, sicut dicit Damascenus6d. — (Corollarium.) Si quis autem hoc ultimo modo solum intelligat, quod assumserit humanitatem, id est hominis proprietatem, errat circa incarnationis veritatem. Oportet enim ponere, quod hoc triplici modo dicendi Filius Dei assumsit naturam humanam7d. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.
(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod humanitas consequitur unionem; dicendum, quod consequitur unionem animae ad corpus, secundum quod uniuntur in constitutionem naturae, non secundum quod uniuntur in unitatem personae8d. — (Alia solutio cum distinctione.) Posset etiam dici, quod cum quaedam sunt prius assumta, et quaedam coassumta; et quamvis anima et corpus primo assumta sint a Verbo, tamen omnia quae ad ea consequuntur, dici possunt coassumta. Unde, quia anima et corpus habebant proprietatem passibilitatis, Filius Dei assumsit passibilitatem. Et per hunc modum concedendum est, quod assumserit humanitatem, quemadmodum conceditur, quod assumserit passibilitatem, quamvis non concedatur, quod assumserit se passibilem, sed quod assumendo passibilitatem fecerit se passibilem. Sic conceditur, quod assumserit humanitatem, licet non concedatur, quod assumserit se hominem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de abstractione, dicendum, quod potius facit ad oppositum quam ad propositum. (Notandum.) Quia enim significat abstractive, ideo significat in quadam diversitate a supposito; et ideo salvari potest ista conditio assumtionis, quae quidem est distinctio assumentis ad assumtum; non sic autem est in hoc quod dicitur homo9d.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nunquam deposuit quod assumsit; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur quantum ad principia naturae, quae prius fuerunt assumta, scilicet anima et caro; quantum vero ad coassumta veritatem non habet; deposuit enim passibilitatem. (Notandum.) Sed si hoc modo accipiatur humanitas ratione principiorum constituentium hominem, sic nunquam deposuit humanitatem. Sed ex hoc non sequitur: in triduo habuit humanitatem, ergo fuit homo; quia principia hominis non faciunt hominem, nisi in quantum coniunguntur ad invicem, et uniuntur in unitatem personae; et alter istorum modorum deficiebat in triduo. Quodsi nomine humanitatis intelligatur ipsa forma consequens compositum10d, vel ipsa proprietas; non oportet, quod in triduo Christus habuerit humanitatem; quia, sicut dictum est, talia non fuerunt primo assumta, sed magis coassumta.
(Ad quaestionem incidentem.) 4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, patet responsio ex his quae iam dicta sunt.
I. Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis notandum est quod dicit Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 8. ad 3: Differt «dicere humanam naturam et hominem et humanitatem, quia humana natura dicit componentia unita, homo vero nominat quod est ex his; humanitas vero nominat illud quo est». — Sed ipsum vocabulum humanitas iterum diversimode intelligi potest. Praeter tres modos in corp. quaest. relatos est quartus, qui in arg. 2. ad oppos. tangitur, scilicet prout humana natura prorsus abstracte est in intellectu humano. Manifestum autem est, quod incarnatio, si ad hunc sensum restringeretur, non esset nisi fictio (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1, et S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 4.). Item interdum ille terminus sumitur pro tota specie sive pro omnibus eius individuis, de quo sensu supra d. 2. a. 1. q. 3. actum est.
II. Alii antiqui commentatores Petri Lombardi rem principalem quaestionis tractant vel tangunt supra in dist. 2, scilicet S. Thom., ibi q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. (cfr. S. III. q. 6. a. 5.). — B. Albert., ibi a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., ibi q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., ibi a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., ibi q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. — Durand., ibi q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., ibi q. 5.
---
Question V. Whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God assumed humanity.
Fifthly it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God assumed humanity. And that it is so, it seems.
(Fundamentals.)
1. Damascene3c: "All things which He planted in our nature, the Word of God assumed"; but to each of us He gave humanity: therefore it seems that He assumed humanity.
2. Likewise, humanity is nothing other than the nature of man, according to what Damascene says4c: "The names 'divinity' and 'humanity' are representative of a nature"; but this is simply to be conceded: the Son of God assumed human nature: therefore also this: the Son of God assumed humanity.
3. Likewise, humanity is the form of man; but this is simply conceded: the Son of God assumed the form of man, as is said in Philippians, chapter two5c: He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant: therefore also this: the Son of God assumed humanity.
4. Likewise, this is simply true: the Son of God has humanity; and He did not have it from eternity, but temporally6c: therefore it seems that He assumed it.
On the contrary: (To the opposite.) 1. Humanity follows upon the union of soul with body; but the soul and the body were not united prior to being assumed7c: therefore if the thing assumed precedes, according to the natural order, the assumption itself, it seems that this is false: the Son of God assumed humanity.
2. Likewise, the name humanity signifies more in abstraction than does the name man: therefore if "God did not assume human nature in the universal, but in the individual8c," then this is more improper: He assumed humanity, than: He assumed a man: therefore it is false.
3. Likewise, if He assumed humanity and never laid aside what He assumed, He always had humanity; but what has humanity is always a man always; therefore in the three days [in the tomb] He was a man1d.
(Incidental question.) In connection with this it is asked: what is understood by the name humanity when it is said that the Son of God assumed humanity?
Conclusion.
It is to be conceded that the Son of God assumed humanity.
I respond: ("Humanity" is said in three ways.) It must be said that the name2d humanity is customarily taken in three ways: in one way, by humanity can be understood the constituent principles of man; in another way, by humanity can be understood the form following upon the whole composite; in a third way, by the name humanity can be understood the property following upon man himself, insofar as he is a man. And this threefold understanding is had from the words of the Master, in the second distinction3d, where the Master confirms and shows, on the authority of Jerome, that by the name humanity the body and the soul are understood.
(The conclusion with its threefold application.) Now in all these ways it must be conceded that the Son of God assumed humanity. For if by the name humanity are understood the constituent principles of man, namely the soul and the flesh, it is without doubt true that the Son of God assumed humanity, that is, a soul and flesh4d. — Likewise, if by the name humanity is understood the form of the whole, it still holds the truth: the Son of God assumed humanity, that is, a human form, according to that which is said in Philippians, chapter two5d: He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant. — Finally, if by the name humanity is understood the property following upon it, it still holds the truth: the Son of God assumed human nature, because He assumed not only our human nature, but also its consequent properties, as Damascene says6d. — (Corollary.) But if anyone understands only in this last way that He assumed humanity, that is, the property of man, he errs concerning the truth of the Incarnation. For one must hold that in this threefold manner of speaking the Son of God assumed human nature7d. — And the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded.
(Solution of the opposing arguments.) 1. As for what is objected, that humanity follows upon the union; it must be said that it follows upon the union of the soul to the body insofar as they are united into the constitution of a nature, not insofar as they are united into the unity of a person8d. — (Another solution with a distinction.) It could also be said that since some things are first assumed and some co-assumed; and although the soul and the body are first assumed by the Word, nevertheless all the things which follow upon them can be called co-assumed. Hence, because the soul and the body had the property of passibility, the Son of God assumed passibility. And in this manner it must be conceded that He assumed humanity, just as it is conceded that He assumed passibility, although it is not conceded that He assumed Himself as passible, but that by assuming passibility He made Himself passible. Thus it is conceded that He assumed humanity, although it is not conceded that He assumed Himself as a man.
2. As for what is objected concerning abstraction, it must be said that it tells rather for the opposite than for the proposed view. (Note.) For because it signifies abstractly, it therefore signifies in a certain diversity from the supposit; and therefore that condition of the assumption can be safeguarded, which indeed is the distinction of the one assuming from the thing assumed; but it is not so in this, that it is called man9d.
3. As for what is objected, that He never laid aside what He assumed; it must be said that this is understood with respect to the principles of the nature, which were first assumed, namely the soul and the flesh; but with respect to the co-assumed it does not hold the truth; for He laid aside passibility. (Note.) But if humanity is taken in this way, by reason of the principles constituting man, then He never laid aside humanity. But from this it does not follow: in the three days [in the tomb] He had humanity, therefore He was a man; because the principles of man do not make a man, except insofar as they are joined to one another and are united into the unity of a person; and one of these modes was lacking in the three days. But if by the name humanity is understood the form itself following upon the composite10d, or the property itself; it is not necessary that in the three days Christ had humanity; because, as has been said, such things were not first assumed, but rather co-assumed.
(To the incidental question.) 4. As for what was asked last, the response is clear from the things which have already been said.
I. For the understanding of this question it must be noted what Alexander of Hales says, S. p. III. q. 4. m. 8. ad 3: It differs "to say human nature and man and humanity, because human nature names the united components, man, however, names that which is out of these; but humanity names that by which it is." — But the very word humanity can again be understood in diverse ways. Besides the three modes set forth in the body of the question, there is a fourth, which is touched upon in the second argument to the opposite, namely insofar as human nature is altogether abstractly in the human intellect. Now it is manifest that the Incarnation, if it were restricted to this sense, would be nothing but a fiction (cf. above a. 1. q. 1, and St. Thomas, S. III. q. 4. a. 4.). Likewise, that term is sometimes taken for the whole species or for all its individuals, in which sense it was treated above in d. 2. a. 1. q. 3.
II. Other ancient commentators on Peter Lombard treat or touch upon the principal matter of the question above in distinction 2, namely St. Thomas, there q. 1. a. 3. little-question 3 (cf. S. III. q. 6. a. 5.). — Bl. Albert, there a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, there q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, there a. 1. q. 1. — Giles of Rome, there q. 1. a. 1. broad doubt. — Durandus, there q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, there q. 5.
---
- Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6.Book III of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6.
- Loc. cit. c. 4. Cfr. ibid. c. 11. — In testim. allato codd. et edd. 1, 2 (sicut et textus origin.) pro nomina exhibent nomen, praedicati tamen pluralem numerum servantes. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I.The place cited, c. 4. Cf. ibid. c. 11. — In the testimony adduced, the codices and editions 1, 2 (as also the original text) read nomen for nomina, yet retaining the plural number of the predicate. Cf. above, the Master's text, d. II. c. I.
- Vers. 7, ubi Vulgata: Semetipsum exinanivit, formam etc. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri c. I. — Paulo ante pro assumsit cod. K accepit, cod. Z accipit.Verse 7, where the Vulgate has: He emptied Himself, the form etc. Cf. here the Master's text, c. I. — A little before, for assumsit codex K reads accepit, codex Z accipit.
- Pro sed temporaliter, quae verba in cod. T desiderantur, codd. A G H I K L U V Z aa sed sempiternaliter, codd. N X Y sed per incarnationem.For sed temporaliter, which words are lacking in codex T, codices A G H I K L U V Z aa read sed sempiternaliter, codices N X Y sed per incarnationem.
- Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.
- Ut docet Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 11. Vide supra q. 1. in fine, argg. — Mox post quam Vat. cum paucis codd. repetit haec.As Damascene teaches, Book III of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 11. See above, q. 1, at the end, in the arguments. — Soon after quam, the Vatican edition with a few codices repeats haec.
- Cfr. supra pag. 138, nota 8. et infra d. 22. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro Dei Filium codd. K Z bb Dei Filius.Cf. above, p. 138, note 8, and below, d. 22, q. 1. — A little below, for Dei Filium codices K Z bb read Dei Filius.
- Codd. H N U V W voci nomen praefigunt hoc.Codices H N U V W prefix hoc to the word nomen.
- Cap. I. — Paulo post codd., omisso nomine Hieronymi, pro intelligi habent se nomine... intelligere.Chapter I. — A little after, the codices, omitting the name of Jerome, read for intelligi instead se nomine... intelligere.
- Quod et ostensum est supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 1. seq.Which was also shown above, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1 and following.
- Vers. 7. Pro Humiliavit cod. K cum Vulgata Exinanivit.Verse 7. For Humiliavit codex K, with the Vulgate, reads Exinanivit.
- Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I. in fine. — Paulo superius codd. N T U omittunt humanam post nostram naturam, et immediate post plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 assumsit.Book III of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6. See above, the Master's text, d. II. c. I, at the end. — A little above, codices N T U omit humanam after nostram naturam, and immediately after, most codices and editions 1, 2 read assumsit.
- Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I. — Pro naturam humanam, quam lectionem invenimus in cod. bb, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 naturaliter humanitatem, cod. F bene nostram humanitatem, Vat. assumserit veram humanitatem.Cf. above, the Master's text, d. II. c. I. — For naturam humanam, which reading we find in codex bb, the other codices and editions 1, 2 read naturaliter humanitatem, codex F bene nostram humanitatem, the Vatican edition assumserit veram humanitatem.
- Cod. G in unitate personae et paulo ante aequaliter in constitutione naturae. Paulo inferius pro primo assumta codd. K Z prius assumta.Codex G reads in unitate personae and a little before aequaliter in constitutione naturae. A little below, for primo assumta codices K Z read prius assumta.
- Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Pro a supposito cod. Z ad suppositum. Pro et ideo cod. A et ita.Cf. the preceding question. — For a supposito codex Z reads ad suppositum. For et ideo codex A reads et ita.
- Plurimi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 suppositum, sed contra determinata in corp. quaest. Paulo superius pro et alter codd. K Z (bb primitus) et quoquo modo alter, Vat. et alteri.Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read suppositum, but against the matter determined in the body of the question. A little above, for et alter codices K Z (bb originally) read et quoquo modo alter, the Vatican edition et alteri.