Dist. 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 2
Quaestio III. Utrum Christus habuerit cum aliis hominibus communem speciem.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus habuerit cum aliis communem speciem. Et quod sic, videtur.
Fundamenta.
1. Ad Philippenses secundo1: In similitudinem hominum factus: si ergo communitas speciei attenditur secundum assimilationem in forma humanitatis, videtur, quod Christus in forma specifica conveniat cum aliis hominibus.
2. Item, genitus est eiusdem speciei cum generante in generatione univoca2; sed Christus genitus fuit ex beata Virgine: ergo est eiusdem speciei cum ea.
3. Item, anima rationalis, unita carni, constituit hominem eiusdem speciei communis; sed in Christo fuit anima rationalis unita carni3: ergo Christus habuit speciem communem cum aliis.
4. Item, in Christi incarnatione natura humana exaltata est et reparata4; sed hoc non esset, si Christus non haberet cum aliis hominibus speciem communem: ergo etc.
Ad oppositum.
Sed contra: 1. Ioannes Damascenus, et habetur in littera5: « In Domino Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere ».
2. Item, Magister in littera6: « Natura non sic accipitur in Christo, sicut cum dicitur: una est natura omnium hominum »; sed cum dicitur: una est natura omnium hominum, dicitur esse una unitate speciei: ergo non videtur, quod in Christo sit accipere unam naturam, cum qua cum aliis communicat tanquam in specie specifica.
3. Item, « species, ut dicit Boethius7, dicit totum esse individuorum »; sed humanitas non dicit totum esse Christi: ergo Christus non continetur sub homine tanquam individuum sub propria specie.
4. Item, forma specifica accipitur ab eo quod nobilissimum et perfectissimum est in re8; sed nobilissimum et perfectissimum in Christo non est natura creata, sed increata; sed penes naturam increatam non est accipere speciem communem cum aliis hominibus: ergo nullo modo.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Christus ratione humanae naturae habuit communem speciem cum aliis hominibus, non autem ratione utriusque naturae, scilicet divinae et humanae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod species dicit formam, et non quamcumque, sed formam totius, hoc est formam complectentem totum esse. (Quid species.) Iuxta quod dicit Boethius, quod « species est totum esse individuorum »: et Avicenna9 et alii etiam philosophi in hoc concordant. Forma ergo specifica communis dupliciter potest intelligi: aut secundum praedicationem, aut secundum constitutionem. (Duplex sensus.) Secundum praedicationem homo dicit formam communem Petro et Paulo; secundum constitutionem homo dicit formam, quae simul respicit animam et corpus, et quae resultat ex coniunctione animae cum corpore. Anima enim et corpus concurrunt ad unam essentiam constituendam. Et hinc est, quod constitutus ex anima et corpore habet unam10 formam specificam, communem sibi et aliis sic constitutis per praedicationem; communem nihilominus partibus constituentibus per quandam informationem et completionem.
Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum in Domino Iesu Christo sit communem speciem accipere; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ratione naturae assumtae, aut ratione utriusque, humanae scilicet et divinae. (Applicatio et distinctio.) Si ratione humanae naturae, sic est communem speciem accipere Christi ad alios homines: quia, sicut in aliis hominibus ex coniunctione animae ad carnem per modum perficientis et informantis resultat forma humanitatis, sic et in Christo11. (Conclusio 1.) Et ideo isto modo est accipere in eo communem speciem, tam per praedicationem quam etiam per constitutionem. — Si autem loquamur de Christo ratione divinae naturae et humanae, sic in Domino (Conclusio 2.)
Iesu Christo non est accipere communem speciem, quia divina natura non unitur humanae ad unius essentiae constitutionem; ideo ex coniunctione divinitatis ad humanitatem in Christo nulla resultat forma communis vel universalis, in qua possit aliis assimilari. Et ideo Damascenus dicit, subiungens in eadem auctoritate12, quod « in Christo non est communem speciem accipere, quia nec factus est nec aliquando fiet alius »; subaudiendum est: qui communicet cum eo in forma una ex hoc, quod dicitur Christus. Aliter enim sua ratio non valeret, quia, esto quod esset unus solus homo, sicut est unus solus sol, adhuc esset in eo communem speciem accipere13. (Epilogus.) — Uno igitur modo est in Christo speciem communem accipere, et alio modo non; quia, cum sit in eo triplex substantia, ex coniunctione duarum, videlicet animae et carnis, resultat una forma specifica, in qua cum aliis hominibus communicat. — Et sic procedunt rationes, quae inducuntur ad primam partem.
(Solutio oppositorum.)
Ad 1, 2. Ex coniunctione vero divinitatis ad naturam creatam nulla omnino forma14 resultat; et quantum ad hoc intelligitur verbum Damasceni et Magistri, qui dicunt, quod non est una natura Christi, sicut omnium hominum.
Ad 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod species dicit totum esse individuorum; dicendum, quod verum est eatenus, qua est individuum contentum sub illa specie. Christus autem est individuum contentum sub specie humana ratione naturae creatae, non ratione naturae increatae.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod species specifica accipitur penes illud quod nobilissimum est et perfectissimum in re; dicendum, quod verum est, loquendo de illis, secundum quae res habet esse in genere; Christus autem secundum divinam naturam non ponitur in aliquo genere, sed solum ratione naturae creatae15. Sic igitur concedendum est, quod Christus assumsit veram carnem et veram animam, et haec unita, prout concurrunt in unius speciei specialissimae veritatem.
I. Haec quaestio militat contra errorem paucorum, qui sustinebant, Verbum assumsisse quidem animam et corpus, sed non ita, quod ex eorum coniunctione aliquod totum sive species communis (humanitas) resultaret, cum animam assumserit per se et carnem per se, non animam coniunctam carni. Hoc errore et veritati humanae naturae in Christo et dignitati corporis ipsius omnino derogatur. Plura vide hic in lit. Magistri c. I (ubi Damasceni verba afferuntur, quae huic quaestioni occasionem dedisse videntur) et infra d. 5. a. 2. q. 5.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. i. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; S. III. q. 5. a. 3. ad 3, q. 6. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. I. quaest. lat. 2. — Alii auctores rem breviter tangunt locis citt. in praecedenti scholio.
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Question III. Whether Christ had a common species with other men.
Thirdly it is asked whether Christ had a common species with others. And it seems that he did.
Foundations.
1. To the Philippians, chapter two1: Made in the likeness of men: if, therefore, the commonness of species is regarded according to a likeness in the form of humanity, it seems that Christ agrees in specific form with other men.
2. Likewise, the one begotten is of the same species as the one begetting in a univocal generation2; but Christ was begotten of the blessed Virgin: therefore he is of the same species as she.
3. Likewise, a rational soul, united to flesh, constitutes a man of the same common species; but in Christ there was a rational soul united to flesh3: therefore Christ had a common species with others.
4. Likewise, in Christ's incarnation human nature was exalted and repaired4; but this would not be so if Christ did not have a common species with other men: therefore, etc.
To the contrary.
On the contrary: 1. John Damascene, and it is found in the text [of the Master]5: « In the Lord Jesus Christ there is no taking of a common species ».
2. Likewise, the Master in the text6: « Nature is not taken in Christ as when it is said: there is one nature of all men »; but when it is said: there is one nature of all men, it is said to be one by a unity of species: therefore it does not seem that in Christ one is to take a single nature, with which he has in common with others as in a specific species.
3. Likewise, « species, as Boethius says7, states the whole being of individuals »; but humanity does not state the whole being of Christ: therefore Christ is not contained under man as an individual under its proper species.
4. Likewise, specific form is taken from that which is noblest and most perfect in the thing8; but the noblest and most perfect in Christ is not the created nature, but the uncreated; but in respect of the uncreated nature there is no taking of a common species with other men: therefore in no way [does he have it].
Conclusion
Conclusion. Christ, by reason of his human nature, had a common species with other men, but not by reason of both natures, namely the divine and the human.
I respond: It must be said that species states a form, and not just any form, but the form of the whole, that is, a form embracing the whole being. (What species is.) According to which Boethius says that « species is the whole being of individuals »: and Avicenna9 and other philosophers also agree in this. Therefore common specific form can be understood in two ways: either according to predication, or according to constitution. (Twofold sense.) According to predication, "man" states a form common to Peter and Paul; according to constitution, "man" states a form which regards at once soul and body, and which results from the conjunction of soul with body. For soul and body come together to constitute one essence. And hence it is that what is constituted of soul and body has one10 specific form, common to itself and to others so constituted by predication; common nonetheless to the constituting parts by a certain informing and completion.
When, therefore, it is asked whether in the Lord Jesus Christ there is a taking of a common species; this can be understood in two ways: either by reason of the assumed nature, or by reason of both [natures], namely the human and the divine. (Application and distinction.) If by reason of the human nature, then there is a taking of a common species of Christ with respect to other men: because, just as in other men from the conjunction of soul to flesh by way of perfecting and informing there results the form of humanity, so also in Christ11. (Conclusion 1.) And therefore in this way one is to take in him a common species, both by predication and also by constitution. — But if we speak of Christ by reason of the divine nature and the human, then in the Lord (Conclusion 2.)
Jesus Christ there is no taking of a common species, because the divine nature is not united to the human for the constitution of one essence; therefore from the conjunction of divinity to humanity in Christ there results no common or universal form, in which he could be likened to others. And therefore Damascene says, adding in the same authority12, that « in Christ there is no taking of a common species, because he has neither been made nor will ever be made another »; it must be understood: one that would share with him in one form from the fact that he is called Christ. For otherwise his reasoning would not hold, since, granted that there were but one single man, just as there is one single sun, there would still be in him a taking of a common species13. (Epilogue.) — In one way, therefore, there is in Christ a taking of a common species, and in another way not; because, since there is in him a threefold substance, from the conjunction of two, namely soul and flesh, there results one specific form, in which he has [something] in common with other men. — And thus proceed the arguments which are brought to the first part.
(Solution of the contrary arguments.)
To 1 and 2. From the conjunction of divinity to created nature there results no form whatever14; and as regards this the saying of Damascene and the Master is to be understood, who say that there is not one nature of Christ, as [there is one nature] of all men.
To 3. As for that which is objected, that species states the whole being of individuals; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is an individual contained under that species. But Christ is an individual contained under the human species by reason of the created nature, not by reason of the uncreated nature.
To 4. As for that which is objected last, that specific form is taken in respect of that which is noblest and most perfect in the thing; it must be said that this is true, speaking of those things according to which a thing has being in a genus; but Christ, according to his divine nature, is not placed in any genus, but only by reason of the created nature15. Thus, therefore, it must be conceded that Christ assumed true flesh and a true soul, and these united, inasmuch as they come together into the truth of one most special species.
I. This question contends against the error of a few who maintained that the Word indeed assumed a soul and a body, but not in such a way that from their conjunction any whole or common species (humanity) resulted, since he assumed the soul by itself and the flesh by itself, not the soul joined to the flesh. By this error both the truth of the human nature in Christ and the dignity of his body are entirely disparaged. See more here in the text of the Master, chapter I (where the words of Damascene are adduced, which seem to have given occasion to this question) and below, d. 5, a. 2, q. 5.
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. i, m. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 3, little-question 3; Summa III, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3, q. 6, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. I, quaest. lat. 2. — Other authors touch on the matter briefly in the places cited in the preceding scholion.
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- Vers. 7. Supra edd. aliis hominibus contra codd.Verse 7. Above, the editions read to other men, against the codices.
- Cfr. tom. II. pag. 479, nota 1. — Mox post ex beata Virgine codd. M O subiiciunt generatione univoca.Cf. vol. II, p. 479, note 1. — Soon after of the blessed Virgin codices M O add by univocal generation.
- Ut ostensum est quaest. praeced.As was shown in the preceding question.
- Cfr. Eph. 2, 5. seq.; II. Petr. 1, 4.Cf. Eph. 2:5 f.; 2 Pet. 1:4.
- Hic c. I.Here, chapter I.
- Hic c. I. In auctoritate adducta codd. EG (K a prima manu) pro una est natura substituunt una esse natura, quae lectio etiam in textu origin. Magistri habetur. Mox in minori codd. A K L T V aa bb eandem lectionem exhibent pro una est natura.Here, chapter I. In the authority adduced, codices EG (K by a first hand) substitute to be one nature for there is one nature, which reading is also found in the original text of the Master. Soon after, in the minor [premise], codices A K L T V aa bb present the same reading in place of there is one nature.
- Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. c. de Specie et in libro de Divisione. Ipsa Boethii verba vide tom. II. pag. 108, nota 6. et pag. 441, nota 8.Book III of the Commentary on Porphyry, chapter On Species, and in the book On Division. For Boethius's own words see vol. II, p. 108, note 6, and p. 441, note 8.
- Sub hoc respectu differentia specifica etiam ultima vocari potest, quippe cum secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.), sumatur a forma et in sua unitate totam substantiam comprehendat et speciem definiti. Cfr. X. Ethic. c. 6. et 7.Under this respect the specific difference can also be called ultimate, since according to Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 43 (VI, c. 12), it is taken from the form and in its unity comprehends the whole substance and the species of the defined thing. Cf. Ethics X, cc. 6 and 7.
- Libr. I. Logic. c. de Specie, et V. Metaph. c. 3. seqq. Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, ubi Aristotelica de hac re doctrina proponitur exponiturque. — In subnexis respicitur nota divisio universalis in universale logicum (in praedicando) et universale metaphysicum (in essendo). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 441, nota 3.Logic I, chapter On Species, and Metaphysics V, c. 3 ff. Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter On Species, where the Aristotelian doctrine on this matter is set forth and expounded. — In what follows reference is made to the well-known division of the universal into the logical universal (in predicating) and the metaphysical universal (in being). Cf. vol. II, p. 441, note 3.
- Pro unam edd. humanam.For one the editions read human.
- Cfr. infra d. 5. a. 2. q. 1.Cf. below, d. 5, a. 2, q. 1.
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Paulo inferius pro ex hoc, quod codd. L aa cc et hoc est quod, cod. dd et ex hoc est quod, codd. A N T U X et ex hoc quod, cod. F id est in hoc ex hoc quod.See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — A little below, for from this, that codices L aa cc read and this is what, codex dd and from this is what, codices A N T U X and from this what, codex F that is, in this from this what.
- Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 55. (VI. c. 15.): Quaecumque in alio contingunt, velut si alter fiat talis, patet, quod erit sol; communis ergo ratio. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 357, nota 2.Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 55 (VI, c. 15): Whatever things occur in another, as if another should become such, it is plain that there will be [but one] sun; therefore the account is common. Cf. vol. II, p. 357, note 2.
- Cod. K forma communis.Codex K reads common form.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4. — Circa initium solut. Vat. pro species (i. e. forma) specifica substituit species specialissima. Secundum Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, homo respectu generis generalissimi, quod est substantia, species vocatur specialissima; membra intermedia, scil. corpus (substantia corporea) et animal (corpus animatum), respectu habito ad superiora, dicuntur species, respectu habito ad inferiora, genera. — In fine solut. pro veritatem codd. A K L T U aa bb exhibent unitatem; Vat. voci veritatem adiicit et unitatem.Cf. I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 4. — Near the beginning of the solution, for specific species (i.e. form) the Vatican edition substitutes most special species. According to Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter On Species, man, in respect of the most general genus, which is substance, is called the most special species; the intermediate members, namely body (corporeal substance) and animal (animated body), with regard had to the higher [members] are called species, and with regard had to the lower [members], genera. — At the end of the solution, for truth codices A K L T U aa bb present unity; the Vatican edition adds to the word truth the words and unity.