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Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De locutionibus exprimentibus ipsam unionem.

Quaestio I. Utrum vera sit locutio: Deus est homo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de hac locutione: Deus est homo. Et quod sit vera, videtur:

1. (Fundamenta) Per illud quod dicitur in Symbolo1: « Deus et homo unus est Christus»: Christus igitur et est Deus et est homo et est unus; sed quaecumque dicuntur de uno et de eodem secundum numerum, dicuntur de se invicem: ergo Deus est homo, et homo est Deus.

2. Item, Bernardus in quinto ad Eugenium2: « Tantam et tam expressam vim unionis in se praefert ea persona, qua Deus et homo unus est Christus, ut, si duo de se praedices, non erres».

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3. Item, sicut superius3 ostensum fuit, illa unio terminatur ad unitatem personalem sive hypostasis; sed quotiescumque aliqua duo uniuntur in supposito, de se invicem in concretione praedicantur: ergo sicut Deus nominat divinam naturam in concretione, et homo similiter; videtur, quod ibi sit mutua praedicatio, ut dicatur Deus homo, et homo Deus.

4. Item, medium, quod optime iungit extrema, ad utrumque extremorum comparatur secundum habitudinem subiiciendi et praedicandi4: si ergo Christus perfectus mediator est inter Deum et hominem, ergo Deus et homo talem habent habitudinem respectu eiusdem. Sed quae talem habent habitudinem respectu eiusdem dicuntur necessario de se invicem: ergo homo praedicatur de Deo, et Deus de homine.

Sed contra: 1. (Ad oppositum) Maior est unitas personarum in divina natura, quam sit naturarum in Christo in una persona, quia, sicut dicit Bernardus5: «Illa unitas arcem tenet super omnes unitates»; sed ratione unitatis naturae non contingit dicere, quod una persona sit altera: ergo ratione unitatis personae non contingit dicere, quod Deus sit homo, et quod homo sit Deus.

2. Item, magis conveniunt ea quae sunt eiusdem generis et uniuntur in natura et persona, quam quae sunt diversorum generum et uniuntur in persona tantum; sed anima et corpus sunt in genere substantiae et uniuntur in uno homine, qui est eiusdem naturae et unius personae; divinitas autem et humanitas non sunt eiusdem generis nec uniuntur in unitatem6 naturae, sed solum in unitatem personae: ergo cum haec sit falsa: anima est corpus, et e converso; ergo et haec: homo est Deus, et Deus est homo.

3. Item, cum dicitur: Deus est homo7, aut homo praedicatur de Deo et de Petro univoce, aut aequivoce. Si univoce: ergo aliquid est univocum Creatori et creaturae, quod est impossibile; si aequivoce: ergo non videtur Christus homo ad genus hominum pertinere, ex quo homo de ipso et aliis non dicitur uniformiter.

4. Item, cum dicitur: Deus est homo, aut homo praedicatur per se, aut per accidens. Si per se; et quod praedicatur per se dicitur de quolibet supposito: ergo quaelibet persona divina est homo. Si per accidens: ergo videtur, quod aliquid accidat Deo; quod omnino falsum est, sicut probatum est in primo libro8.

5. Item, cum dicitur: Deus est homo, aut homo praedicatur de Deo absolute, aut relative. Si absolute: ergo dicitur de tribus, quia nomina absoluta dicuntur de tribus, sicut vult Augustinus9, et haec dicunt substantiam. Si secundum relationem; sed omne relativum dicitur respectu alicuius: ergo homo dicitur respectu alicuius. Sed hoc est plane falsum: ergo non videtur, quod homo aliquo modo praedicetur de Deo.

6. Item, si homo praedicatur de Deo, aut est in plus, aut in minus, aut in aeque10. Si in minus: ergo quilibet homo est Deus, et non convertitur; si in plus: ergo quilibet, qui Deus est, homo est; si in aeque: ergo redit idem inconveniens.

7. Item, hoc nomen Deus aut supponit pro persona Filii, aut non. Si pro persona Filii supponit, eadem ratione et pro persona Patris: ergo si haec est vera pro persona Filii: Deus est homo, et haec pro persona Patris: Deus non est homo11. Si vero non supponit pro persona Filii: ergo cum in illa persona facta sit unio, praedicta locutio erit simpliciter falsa.

8. Item, plus distat Deus et homo, quam homo et non-homo; sed Deus nunquam facit, quod homo

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sit non-homo: ergo non videtur, quod possit facere nec per naturam nec per miraculum, quod haec sit vera: Deus est homo.

9. (Quaestio implicita) Item, triplex est praedicandi modus: quod enim praedicatur de altero aut praedicatur per essentiam, aut per inhaerentiam, aut per causam12. Cum ergo dicitur: Deus est homo, aut praedicatur per essentiam, et tunc Deus et homo erit eiusdem essentiae, quod est impossibile; aut per inhaerentiam, et tunc accidit Deo esse hominem; aut per causam, et tunc pari ratione poterit dici, quod Deus est lapis, quia ita est causa lapidis, sicut et hominis: nullo igitur modo videtur posse concedi, hominem de Deo posse praedicari.

Conclusio

Necesse est concedere, hominem esse Deum, et Deum hominem; haec tamen praedicatio est per modum singularem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum catholicam veritatem absque dubio necesse est concedere, (Conclusio 1) hominem esse Deum, et Deum hominem, pro eo (Ratio) quod duae naturae ibi unitae sunt in unam personam. Quae autem in uno supposito uniuntur necessario de se invicem praedicantur, si accipiantur concrete, propter illam maximam, qua dicitur: «quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem»; per quam etiam fundari habet virtus syllogismi expositorii, quod probat Philosophus in libro Priorum13, ea quae dicuntur de uno et eodem, praedicari de se invicem. Si igitur unus est Christus, qui est Deus et homo, necessario oportet concedere, Deum esse hominem, et hominem esse Deum. Et hoc quidem attestantur Sanctorum auctoritates, et communiter fatentur doctores theologiae. — (De modo praedicationis) De modo tamen praedicandi diversi diversimode sentiunt.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod haec praedicatio (Opinio 1) non sit in recto, sed in obliquo, ut sit sensus: Deus est homo, id est, Deus habet hominem. (Improbatur) — Et hic modus dicendi relabitur ad tertiam opinionem, quae dixit, hominem praedicari de Deo secundum habitum, quae etiam superius14 improbata est. Manifestum est etiam, quod illud non est sufficienter dictum, quia, si diceretur Deus esse homo, id est habens hominem, eadem ratione diceretur caro, quia habet carnem, et pes, quia habet pedem.

(Opinio 2) Et ideo alii dicere voluerunt, quod talis praedicatio est in recto, verumtamen nec est praedicatio formalis nec causalis nec accidentalis, sed per identitatem; et est sensus: Deus est homo, id est, Deus est ille qui est homo; ille autem, qui est homo, id est Filius Dei, de Deo praedicatur per praedicationem identitatis15. (Non probatur) — Sed nec adhuc illud plene solvit, quia quaelibet implicatio claudit in se praedicationem; et ideo, cum dicitur: Deus est ille qui est homo, adhuc contingit quaerere de illa implicatione, quae est ex parte praedicati, ad quam praedicationem habeat reduci; et tunc vel oportet ire in infinitum implicando, vel oportebit16 recurrere ad alium modum praedicandi.

(Opinio 3 et conclusio 2) Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, ut cum dicitur: Deus est homo, hic est singularis modus praedicandi. Non enim est talis praedicatio per essentiam nec per causam nec per inhaerentiam, sicut ostendebat ratio ultima, sed est praedicatio per unionem; ideo enim homo praedicatur de Deo, quia unitur ei in unitatem personae. Et quoniam haec unio est singularis17, non est mirum, si singularem modum exigit praedicandi.

(Ad quaestionem implicitam) Et per hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaerebatur; quia talis praedicatio non reducitur ad alios modos praedicandi consuetos, habet tamen in se veritatem, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

Ad argumenta pro parte opposita: Ad 1. (Solutio oppositorum) Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod propter unionem in natura una persona non praedicatur de alia, quamvis illa unio sit excellentior: ergo sic et in proposito; dicendum, quod non sequitur. (Notandum) Unitas enim Trinitatis maior est quantum ad rationem similitudinis et conformitatis, non autem quantum ad rationem mutuae praedicationis, pro eo quod illa quae conveniunt in una natura, non praedicantur de se ita mutuo, sicut illa quae concurrunt in unam personam, pro eo quod natura dicit quid commune, hypostasis dicit suppositum proprium; consequentia autem affirmativa tenet ab inferiori ad superius, non e converso. Unde cuicumque subiicitur iste homo, potest subiici homo; cuicumque subiicitur homo, potest subiici animal; sed e converso non sequitur: de quocumque praedicatur animal, praedicatur et homo; immo est ibi consequens18. Ideo, quando una hypostasis subiicitur duobus, necesse est illa sibi invicem subiici, et sic per consequens praedicari. Quando autem una natura dici-

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tur de pluribus, non est necesse, illa de se invicem praedicari.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima et caro concurrunt in unam personam et naturam, non tamen praedicantur de se invicem mutua praedicatione; dicendum, quod non est simile duplici ex causa. (Ratio 1) Primum quidem, quia concurrunt in unitatem personae atque naturae tanquam partes constitutivae, quarum non est praedicari de toto, nec per consequens de se invicem; non sic divina natura et humana, sicut in praecedentibus19 visum est. (Ratio 2) — Alia est etiam ratio, quia anima et caro significant partes constitutivas in abstractione; Deus autem et homo non in abstractione, sed in concretione significant; et hac de causa possunt de se invicem dici, quamvis in abstractione de se invicem non praedicentur. Haec enim est falsa: Deitas est humanitas, sicut haec: caro est anima, quamvis ista sit vera: caro est animata. — (Nota) Intelligatur tamen sane quod dictum est, homo significari in concretione; concretio enim proprie dicta reperitur in terminis accidentalibus20.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si homo praedicatur de Deo, aut praedicatur univoce de Deo, aut aequivoce; (Notandum) dicendum, quod proprie nec univoce nec aequivoce: non aequivoce, quia non est diversa hominis significatio, secundum quod dicitur de Deo et de Martino; univoce non, quia etsi homo retineat eandem significationem, cum dicitur de Deo et de Petro, alio tamen modo comparatur ad Petrum et Paulum, alio modo ad Deum. Ad Petrum comparatur praedicatione formali et essentiali, ad Deum vero in unione personali; ideo ad neutrum praedictorum modorum possunt illae duae praedicationes plenarie reduci, licet aliquid possit ibi reperiri de uno praedictorum modorum, aliquid de alio21.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cum dicitur: Deus est homo, aut praedicatur per se, aut per accidens; dicendum, quod neutro modo, accipiendo proprie per se et22 per accidens: per se, inquam, non praedicatur, cum non sit essentialis habitudo unius ad alterum; per accidens non praedicatur, quia unum non est accidens alterius. Nec illud est inconveniens, quia talis modus praedicandi sub praedicta divisione non habet comprehendi23. (Alia solutio) — Posset tamen dici, quod uniri humanae naturae ex parte Dei non dicit accidens, sed ex parte naturae assumtae. Unde quodam modo talis praedicatio posset dici per se, quodam modo per accidens: per se, comparando divinam naturam ad personam, in qua est unio, de qua per se praedicatur; per accidens posset dici, humanam naturam comparando ad personam, cui habet uniri per gratiam24.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum homo praedicetur absolute, vel relative; (Distinctio notanda) dicendum, quod dici relative est dupliciter: vel relatione implicita, vel explicita. Cum ergo dicitur: Deus est homo, homo praedicatur de Deo quodam modo absolute, quodam modo relative: absolute quantum ad privationem relationis extrinsecae; relative quantum ad positionem relationis intrinsecae25. Est enim sensus: Deus est homo, id est, Deus est unitus humanae naturae unitate personae, ratione cuius homo de Deo, et Deus habet dici de homine.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si praedicatur homo de Deo, aut praedicatur in plus, aut in minus, aut in aeque; (Notandum) dicendum, quod quoddam est genus praedicationis, in quo praedicatum et subiectum se habent ut excedentia et excessa, ut cum dicitur: homo est albus; et sic est in proposito. Nam etsi homo dicatur de aliquo supposito Dei, non tamen dicitur de quolibet, nec e converso; sicut non omnis homo est albus, nec omne album est homo.

Ad 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut haec est vera pro persona Filii: Deus est homo, ita haec pro persona Patris est vera: Deus non est homo; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia, sicut in primo libro26 dictum fuit, (Notandum) iste terminus Deus partim habet naturam termini communis propter suppositorum pluralitatem, partim naturam termini discreti propter formam incommunicabilem. Et ideo, quia naturam habet termini communis, locutionem potest reddere veram pro uno supposito; quia vero naturam

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habet termini discreti, ideo non refert, si praeponatur, vel postponatur ei negatio. Unde in negativa negatur pro omnibus suppositis, quamvis in affirmativa possit reddere locutionem veram pro uno solo. Et ideo haec est falsa: Deus non est homo; quia praedicatum removetur non tantum pro Patre, sed etiam pro Filio; et ex hoc necessario sequitur, quod affirmativa sibi opposita sit vera, haec scilicet: Deus est homo.

(Quaestio incidens 1) Unde si quaeratur: quanta est ista propositio: Deus est homo? respondendum est, quod partem habet naturae indefinitae, partem naturae singularis; et hoc est propter naturam termini subiecti. —

(Quaestio incidens 2) Si vero quaeratur, in qua materia sit, utrum in naturali, vel remota, vel contingenti; dicendum, quod in materia contingenti praedicatum et subiectum se habent ut excedentia et excessa; et sic est in proposito; et praedicta propositio reduci habet ad materiam illam, sapit tamen aliquid de materia naturali propter hoc, quod illae naturae, quantum est de se, sunt ad invicem disparatae, per gratiam unionis sunt coniunctae, et quasi naturales factae.

Scholion

I. Circa tres huius articuli quaestiones, quae agunt de proprio et sincero sensu earum locutionum, quas Magister in principio dist. VI. commemorat, principales Scholastici vix nisi in modo loquendi et in rationibus allatis dissentiunt. — De conclusione principali quaestionis I. haud potest esse dubium, quin omnino concedenda sit duplex ista locutio: Deus est homo, et homo est Deus, « non solum propter veritatem terminorum (quia scilicet Christus est verus Deus et verus homo), sed etiam propter veritatem praedicationis » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 16. a. I. in corp.). Tamen veritas praedicationis sustineri nequit neque secundum primam neque secundum tertiam praedictarum opinionum; de quo in annexa quaestione secundaria agitur. Prima enim illa opinio vult, hic esse praedicationem non formalem, sed secundum identitatem, scilicet per implicationem; tertia vero putat, esse praedicationem secundum inhaerentiam (in obliquo). Utraque haec positio merito communiter reprobatur, ast sustinetur, quod hic sit proprie praedicatio per se, modo tamen singulari, quam Scoto placet nominare substantialem. — Nec facit differentiam in re, quando S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. I. ad 6.) ait: « Quod est praedicatio per essentiam », dum S. Bonav. (hic in corp.) dicit: « Non est talis praedicatio per essentiam... sed est praedicatio per unionem». Nam S. Thom. ibi explicat suum modum loquendi, ita continuans: « Non quod divinitas sit humanitas, sed quia suppositum divinae naturae essentialiter [i. e. per unionem] est suppositum humanae naturae ». Et in solutione ad 5. idem dicit, et rem et praedicationem in hac materia esse prorsus singularem.

II. De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., de hac et seqq. qq. S. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 2. et m. 3, q. 7. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. I. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I; S. III. q. 16. a. I. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

III. Locutio in 2. quaest. discussa ab omnibus conceditur, tamen a patronis trium illarum opinionum diverso modo intelligitur. Quod verbum fieri de Deo intelligatur non simpliciter, sed in sensu explicato (hic solut. ad 2.), manifestum est. De hac quaest. agunt: Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. I; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 6. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. I.

IV. Respectu 3. quaestionis Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 7; Report. hic q. 3.) tenet, locutionem: homo factus est Deus, esse simpliciter et proprie veram. Alii vero cum S. Bonav. eam declarant esse impropriam, nisi factus intelligatur impersonaliter, et quatenus determinet totam compositionem. — Praeter Scotum cfr.: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 11. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. a. 4. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. a. 4. — Durand., loc. cit. q. 2.

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English Translation

Article I. On the locutions that express the union itself.

Question I. Whether the locution "God is man" is true.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and the inquiry is about this locution: God is man. And that it is true seems so:

1. (Arguments) From what is said in the Creed1: « God and man is one Christ»: Christ therefore both is God and is man and is one; but whatever things are said of one and the same thing according to number, are said of each other reciprocally: therefore God is man, and man is God.

2. Likewise, Bernard in the fifth book to Eugenius2: « That person, by which God and man is one Christ, bears within itself so great and so express a force of union, that, if you should predicate the two of each other, you would not err».

3. Likewise, just as was shown above3, that union is terminated at a personal unity, that is, of a hypostasis; but whenever any two things are united in a supposit, they are predicated of each other reciprocally in the concrete: therefore just as "God" names the divine nature in the concrete, and "man" likewise; it seems that there is a mutual predication there, so that God is called man, and man God.

4. Likewise, the middle term, which best joins the extremes, is related to each of the extremes according to the relation of being-subjected and being-predicated4: if therefore Christ the perfect mediator is between God and man, then God and man have such a relation with respect to the same thing. But things that have such a relation with respect to the same thing are necessarily said of each other reciprocally: therefore man is predicated of God, and God of man.

On the contrary: 1. (On the opposite side) Greater is the unity of the persons in the divine nature than is the unity of the natures in Christ in one person, because, as Bernard says5: «That unity holds the citadel above all unities»; but by reason of the unity of nature it does not happen that one says that one person is the other: therefore by reason of the unity of person it does not happen that one says that God is man, and that man is God.

2. Likewise, things that are of the same genus and are united in nature and person are more in agreement than things that are of diverse genera and are united in person only; but soul and body are in the genus of substance and are united in one man, who is of the same nature and of one person; but divinity and humanity are not of the same genus, nor are they united into a unity6 of nature, but only into a unity of person: therefore since this is false: the soul is the body, and conversely; then also this: man is God, and God is man.

3. Likewise, when it is said: God is man7, either "man" is predicated of God and of Peter univocally, or equivocally. If univocally: then something is univocal to the Creator and the creature, which is impossible; if equivocally: then Christ does not seem to belong to the genus of men, since "man" is not said uniformly of him and of others.

4. Likewise, when it is said: God is man, either "man" is predicated essentially (per se), or accidentally. If essentially; and what is predicated essentially is said of every supposit: then every divine person is man. If accidentally: then it seems that something is accidental to God; which is altogether false, as was proved in the first book8.

5. Likewise, when it is said: God is man, either "man" is predicated of God absolutely, or relatively. If absolutely: then it is said of the three, because absolute names are said of the three, as Augustine holds9, and these signify substance. If according to relation; but every relative is said with respect to something: then "man" is said with respect to something. But this is plainly false: therefore it does not seem that "man" is predicated of God in any way.

6. Likewise, if "man" is predicated of God, it is either of wider extent, or of narrower, or of equal extent10. If of narrower: then every man is God, and it does not convert; if of wider: then everyone who is God, is man; if of equal: then the same incongruity returns.

7. Likewise, this name "God" either supposits for the person of the Son, or not. If it supposits for the person of the Son, then by the same reasoning also for the person of the Father: therefore if this is true for the person of the Son: God is man, then this is also for the person of the Father: God is not man11. But if it does not supposit for the person of the Son: then, since in that person the union came about, the aforesaid locution will be simply false.

8. Likewise, God and man are more distant than man and non-man; but God never brings it about that a man

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be a non-man: therefore it does not seem that he can bring it about, neither by nature nor by miracle, that this be true: God is man.

9. (Implicit question) Likewise, the mode of predicating is threefold: for what is predicated of another is predicated either by essence, or by inherence, or by cause12. When therefore it is said: God is man, either it is predicated by essence, and then God and man will be of the same essence, which is impossible; or by inherence, and then it is accidental to God to be man; or by cause, and then by the same reasoning it could be said that God is a stone, because he is the cause of a stone just as also of a man: in no way therefore does it seem that "man" can be predicated of God.

Conclusion

It is necessary to concede that man is God, and God man; this predication, however, is by a singular mode.

I respond: It must be said that according to Catholic truth it is without doubt necessary to concede (Conclusion 1) that man is God, and God man, on the ground (Reason) that the two natures there are united into one person. And things that are united in one supposit are necessarily predicated of each other reciprocally, if they are taken concretely, on account of that maxim by which it is said: «whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are the same as each other»; by which also the force of the expository syllogism comes to be grounded, which the Philosopher proves in the book of the Prior Analytics13, namely that those things which are said of one and the same thing are predicated of each other reciprocally. If therefore Christ, who is God and man, is one, it is necessary to concede that God is man, and man is God. And this indeed the authorities of the Saints attest, and the doctors of theology commonly avow. — (On the mode of predication) About the mode of predicating, however, different men think in different ways.

For some have wished to say that this predication (Opinion 1) is not in the direct (in recto), but in the oblique (in obliquo), so that the sense is: God is man, that is, God has a man. (It is disproved) — And this manner of speaking falls back into the third opinion, which said that man is predicated of God by way of a habit, which also was disproved above14. It is also manifest that this was not sufficiently said, because, if one were to say that God is man, that is, having a man, by the same reasoning he would be called flesh, because he has flesh, and a foot, because he has a foot.

(Opinion 2) And therefore others have wished to say that such a predication is in the direct, yet it is neither a formal nor a causal nor an accidental predication, but one by identity; and the sense is: God is man, that is, God is the one who is man; but that one who is man, that is the Son of God, is predicated of God by a predication of identity15. (It is not proved) — But this still does not fully resolve it, because every implication encloses a predication within itself; and therefore, when it is said: God is the one who is man, it still happens that one inquires about that implication, which is on the side of the predicate, to which predication it is to be reduced; and then either one must go on to infinity implicating, or it will be necessary16 to have recourse to another mode of predicating.

(Opinion 3 and conclusion 2) And for this reason there is a third manner of speaking, namely that when it is said: God is man, this is a singular mode of predicating. For such a predication is not by essence nor by cause nor by inherence, as the last argument showed, but it is a predication by union; for "man" is predicated of God on this account, that it is united to him into a unity of person. And since this union is singular17, it is no wonder if it requires a singular mode of predicating.

(To the implicit question) And by this is made clear what was asked last; because such a predication is not reduced to the other customary modes of predicating, yet it has truth in itself, as the arguments adduced for this side show.

Replies to the arguments on the opposite side: To 1. (Solution of the opposing arguments) As to that which is objected, that on account of a union in nature one person is not predicated of another, although that union is more excellent: therefore so also in the matter at hand; it must be said that it does not follow. (Note) For the unity of the Trinity is greater with respect to the account of likeness and conformity, but not with respect to the account of mutual predication, on the ground that those things which agree in one nature are not predicated of each other so mutually as those things which concur into one person, on the ground that nature signifies something common, the hypostasis signifies a proper supposit; but the affirmative consequence holds from the inferior to the superior, not conversely. Hence to whatever "this man" is subjected, "man" can be subjected; to whatever "man" is subjected, "animal" can be subjected; but conversely it does not follow: of whatever "animal" is predicated, "man" is also predicated; nay, there is a fallacy of the consequent18 there. Therefore, when one hypostasis is subjected to two things, it is necessary that these be subjected to each other, and thus consequently be predicated. But when one nature is said

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of many things, it is not necessary that these be predicated of each other.

To 2. As to that which is objected, that soul and flesh concur into one person and nature, yet are not predicated of each other by a mutual predication; it must be said that the case is not alike, for a twofold reason. (Reason 1) First indeed, because they concur into the unity of person and of nature as constitutive parts, of which there is no being-predicated of the whole, nor consequently of each other; not so the divine and human nature, as was seen in the preceding19. (Reason 2) — There is also another reason, because soul and flesh signify the constitutive parts in the abstract; but God and man signify not in the abstract, but in the concrete; and for this reason they can be said of each other, although in the abstract they are not predicated of each other. For this is false: Deity is humanity, just as this: the flesh is the soul, although this is true: the flesh is ensouled. — (Note) Let it nevertheless be understood soundly, what was said, that "man" is signified in the concrete; for concretion properly so called is found in accidental terms20.

To 3. As to that which is objected, whether, if "man" is predicated of God, it is predicated univocally of God, or equivocally; (Note) it must be said that properly neither univocally nor equivocally: not equivocally, because the signification of "man" is not diverse according as it is said of God and of Martin; not univocally, because, although "man" retains the same signification when it is said of God and of Peter, yet in another way it is related to Peter and Paul, in another way to God. To Peter it is related by a formal and essential predication, but to God in a personal union; therefore to neither of the aforesaid modes can those two predications be fully reduced, although something may be found there of one of the aforesaid modes, something of the other21.

To 4. As to that which is objected, that when it is said: God is man, it is predicated either essentially (per se) or accidentally; it must be said that it is by neither mode, taking per se and accidentally22 properly: essentially, I say, it is not predicated, since there is no essential relation of the one to the other; accidentally it is not predicated, because the one is not an accident of the other. Nor is that incongruous, because such a mode of predicating is not to be comprehended under the aforesaid division23. (Another solution) — It could nevertheless be said that to be united to human nature, on the part of God, does not signify an accident, but on the part of the assumed nature. Hence in one way such a predication could be called per se, in another way accidental: per se, by comparing the divine nature to the person, in which the union is, of which it is predicated per se; accidental it could be called, by comparing the human nature to the person, to which it comes to be united by grace24.

To 5. As to that which is asked, whether "man" is predicated absolutely, or relatively; (Distinction to be noted) it must be said that to be said relatively is in two ways: either by an implicit relation, or by an explicit one. When therefore it is said: God is man, "man" is predicated of God in one way absolutely, in another way relatively: absolutely with respect to the privation of an extrinsic relation; relatively with respect to the positing of an intrinsic relation25. For the sense is: God is man, that is, God is united to the human nature by a unity of person, by reason of which "man" comes to be said of God, and "God" of man.

To 6. As to that which is objected, that if "man" is predicated of God, it is predicated either of wider extent, or of narrower, or of equal extent; (Note) it must be said that there is a certain genus of predication, in which the predicate and the subject are related as exceeding and exceeded, as when it is said: a man is white; and so it is in the matter at hand. For although "man" be said of some supposit of God, yet it is not said of every one, nor conversely; just as not every man is white, nor is every white thing a man.

To 7. As to that which is objected, that just as this is true for the person of the Son: God is man, so this is true for the person of the Father: God is not man; it must be said that the case is not alike; because, as was said in the first book26, (Note) this term "God" partly has the nature of a common term on account of the plurality of supposits, partly the nature of a discrete term on account of the incommunicable form. And therefore, because it has the nature of a common term, it can render the locution true for one supposit; but because it has the nature

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of a discrete term, therefore it makes no difference whether the negation be placed before it or after it. Hence in the negative it is negated for all supposits, although in the affirmative it can render the locution true for one alone. And therefore this is false: God is not man; because the predicate is removed not only for the Father, but also for the Son; and from this it necessarily follows that the affirmative opposed to it is true, namely this: God is man.

(Incidental question 1) Hence if it be asked: how great in quantity is this proposition: God is man? it must be answered that it has part of the nature of an indefinite [proposition], part of the nature of a singular one; and this is on account of the nature of the subject term. —

(Incidental question 2) But if it be asked, in what matter it stands, whether in the natural, or the remote, or the contingent; it must be said that in contingent matter the predicate and the subject are related as exceeding and exceeded; and so it is in the matter at hand; and the aforesaid proposition is to be reduced to that matter, yet it savors somewhat of natural matter on this account, that those natures, so far as concerns themselves, are mutually disparate, [but] by the grace of the union are conjoined, and made as it were natural.

Scholion

I. Concerning the three questions of this article, which treat of the proper and genuine sense of those locutions which the Master recalls at the beginning of dist. VI, the principal Scholastics dissent scarcely except in the manner of speaking and in the reasons adduced. — Concerning the principal conclusion of question I there can be no doubt that this twofold locution is wholly to be conceded: God is man, and man is God, « not only on account of the truth of the terms (because namely Christ is true God and true man), but also on account of the truth of the predication » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 16. a. I. in corp.). Nevertheless the truth of the predication cannot be upheld either according to the first or according to the third of the aforesaid opinions; about which the matter is treated in the annexed secondary question. For that first opinion holds that here there is a predication not formal, but according to identity, namely by implication; the third in turn supposes that there is a predication according to inherence (in the oblique). Both these positions are deservedly commonly disapproved, but it is maintained that here there is properly a predication per se, yet by a singular mode, which it pleases Scotus to name substantial. — Nor does it make a difference in the matter, when S. Thomas (here q. I. a. I. ad 6.) says: « It is a predication by essence », while S. Bonaventure (here in the corpus) says: « It is not such a predication by essence... but it is a predication by union». For S. Thomas there explains his manner of speaking, continuing thus: « Not that divinity is humanity, but because the supposit of the divine nature is essentially [i. e. by union] the supposit of the human nature ». And in the solution to 5 he says the same, that both the reality and the predication in this matter are altogether singular.

II. On this 1st question: Alex. of Hales, on this and the following qq. S. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 2. and m. 3, q. 7. m. 3. a. 2. — Scotus, in each Scriptum here q. I. — S. Thom., here q. I. a. I; S. III. q. 16. a. I. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. I. a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. I. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. I. a. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following qq. here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following qq. here the sole question.

III. The locution discussed in the 2nd question is conceded by all, yet is understood in a different manner by the partisans of those three opinions. That the word "is made" (fieri) is understood of God not simply, but in the explained sense (here solution to 2), is manifest. On this question treat: Scotus, in each Scriptum here q. 2. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. I; S. loc. cit. a. 6. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 6. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. I. a. 3. — Durandus, here q. I.

IV. With respect to the 3rd question, Scotus (here q. 2. n. 7; Reportata here q. 3.) holds that the locution: man is made God, is simply and properly true. But others, with S. Bonaventure, declare it to be improper, unless "is made" be understood impersonally, and insofar as it determines the whole composition. — Besides Scotus cf.: S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 11. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. a. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, loc. cit. a. 4. — Durandus, loc. cit. q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Athanasiano. — De minori cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. I. (p.169, nota 6)
    [From the Creed] of Athanasius. — On the minor premise cf. Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1. (p.169, note 6)
  2. Sive de Consider. c. 9. n. 21, quod testimonium in textu origin. sic exit: ut si duo illa de se invicem praedices, non erraveris, Deum videlicet hominem, et hominem Deum vero catholiceque pronuntians. (p.169, nota 7)
    Or rather On Consideration c. 9, n. 21, which testimony in the original text runs thus: that if you should predicate those two of each other, you would not err, namely pronouncing God to be man, and man to be God, truly and catholically. (p.169, note 7)
  3. Dist. 6. a. 2. q. 1. — Quod ad minorem spectat, respicias, quod Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia docet respectu eorum quae in subiecto sunt, ut e. gr. album, scil. ipsa non praedicari de subiecto secundum rationem sive in abstractione; « dicitur enim corpus album, ratio vero albi nunquam de corpore praedicabitur » [dicendo: corpus est albedo]. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. I. — Pro hypostasis Vat. hypostasim. Paulo inferius pro et homo similiter; videtur cod. F et homo nominat humanam naturam in concretione, sequitur. (p.170, nota 1)
    Dist. 6, a. 2, q. 1. — As regards the minor premise, observe that Aristotle, On the Categories, in the chapter on Substance, teaches with respect to those things which are in a subject, as e.g. "white," namely that they themselves are not predicated of the subject according to the formal account, that is, in the abstract; « for a body is called white, but the account of white will never be predicated of the body » [by saying: a body is whiteness]. Cf. above d. 6, a. 1, q. 1. — For hypostasis the Vatican [ed. reads] hypostasim. A little below, for et homo similiter; videtur, cod. F [reads] et homo nominat humanam naturam in concretione, sequitur. (p.170, note 1)
  4. Secundum Aristot., 1. Prior. c. 4. Et idem ait IV. Polit. c. 9. (c. 7.): In eo [medio] enim utrumque extremorum apparet. (p.170, nota 2)
    According to Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 4. And the same he says in Politics IV, c. 9 (c. 7): For in it [the middle] each of the extremes appears. (p.170, note 2)
  5. Libr. V. de Consider. c. 8. n. 19. — In maiori post personarum Vat. subdit divinarum. (p.170, nota 3)
    On Consideration book V, c. 8, n. 19. — In the major premise, after personarum the Vatican [ed.] adds divinarum. (p.170, note 3)
  6. Cod. A hic et post pauca in unitate. (p.170, nota 4)
    Cod. A here and shortly after [reads] in unitate [into a unity]. (p.170, note 4)
  7. Codd. FUbb ex seqq. supplent et Petrus est homo. Paulo inferius post pertinere cod. O interserit quod damnatum est in decreto Alexandri, sicut patuit supra [d. 6. a. I. q. 3. fundam. I.]. (p.170, nota 5)
    Codd. FUbb supply from what follows et Petrus est homo [and Peter is man]. A little below, after pertinere cod. O inserts quod damnatum est in decreto Alexandri, sicut patuit supra [which was condemned in the decree of Alexander, as appeared above] [d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, fundam. 1]. (p.170, note 5)
  8. Dist. S. p. 1. a. 2. q. I; d. 26. dub. 5; d. 30. q. 2. seq. — De divisione praedicationis vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4, et VII. Metaph. text. II. seq. (VI. c. i.). Boeth., I. in Praedicam. Aristot., primam regulam antepraedicamentalem explicans ait: Duobus enim modis praedicationes fiunt: uno secundum accidens, alio de subiecto [per se]; de homine namque praedicatur album, dicitur enim homo albus; rursus de eodem homine praedicatur animal, dicitur enim homo animal. Sed illa prior praedicatio... secundum accidens est; namque accidens, quod est album, de subiecto homine praedicatur, sed non in eo quod quid sit [essentialiter]... De subiecto [per se] vero praedicare est, quoties altera res de altera in ipsa substantia praedicatur, ut animal de homine; quoniam animal et substantia est et genus hominis; idcirco etc. (p.170, nota 6)
    Dist. 8, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1; d. 26, dub. 5; d. 30, q. 2 f. — On the division of predication see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4, and Metaphysics VII, text 11 f. (VI, c. 1). Boethius, On the Categories of Aristotle I, explaining the first antepredicamental rule, says: For predications come about in two modes: one according to accident, the other of a subject [essentially]; for "white" is predicated of "man," for a man is called white; again "animal" is predicated of the same man, for a man is called an animal. But that former predication... is according to accident; for the accident, which is "white," is predicated of the subject "man," but not in respect of what it is [essentially]... But to predicate of a subject [essentially] is whenever one thing is predicated of another in the very substance, as "animal" of "man"; since "animal" is both a substance and the genus of man; therefore etc. (p.170, note 6)
  9. Libr. V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. seqq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. XXVII. lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq. — Relativa secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de His quae ad aliquid, « dicuntur quaecumque haec ipsa quae sunt, aliorum esse dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad alterum, ut maius hoc ipsum quod est, alterius dicitur ». (p.170, nota 7)
    On the Trinity book V, c. 8, n. 9 f. Cf. I Sent. d. 27, text of the Master, c. 4 f. — Relatives according to Aristotle, On the Categories, in the chapter on Things which are toward something [relatives], « those things are called [relative] which, being the very things that they are, are said to be of other things, or somehow otherwise toward another, as the greater, the very thing that it is, is said [to be greater] than another ». (p.170, note 7)
  10. Damasc., Dialectica, c. 15: Omne praedicatum aut latius patet quam subiectum, aut aeque; minus autem late nunquam... Latius porro patent superiora; minus late inferiora... Praedicatum autem, quod subiecto est aequale, illud est quod cum subiecto convertitur... Quapropter generum de speciebus, et differentiarum de speciebus, ac specierum de individuis praedicatio latior dicitur; propriorum autem aequa. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 348, nota 5. (p.170, nota 8)
    Damascene, Dialectica, c. 15: Every predicate is either of wider extent than the subject, or of equal extent; but of narrower extent never... Now superior things are of wider extent; inferior things less wide... But the predicate which is equal to the subject is that which converts with the subject... Wherefore the predication of genera of species, and of differences of species, and of species of individuals is called wider; but that of propria equal. Cf. tom. I, p. 348, note 5. (p.170, note 8)
  11. Et consequenter Deus simul est homo et non homo, quod est absurdum. — Mox codd. AFGHKUZaa omittunt in ante ablativum illa persona. (p.170, nota 9)
    And consequently God is at once man and not man, which is absurd. — Presently codd. AFGHKUZaa omit in before the ablative illa persona. (p.170, note 9)
  12. Cfr. Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regul. 12. et 18. seqq. (p.171, nota 1)
    Cf. Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rules 12 and 18 ff. (p.171, note 1)
  13. Libr. I. c. 6. Vide tom. I. pag. 576, nota 5, ubi de syllogismo expositorio eiusque principio agitur. — Immediate post Vat. voculae en annectit scilicet. (p.171, nota 2)
    Book I, c. 6. See tom. I, p. 576, note 5, where the expository syllogism and its principle are treated. — Immediately after, the Vatican [ed.] appends to the particle en the word scilicet. (p.171, note 2)
  14. Dist. 6. a. I. q. 3. et dubium 2. (p.171, nota 3)
    Dist. 6, a. 1, q. 3, and doubt 2. (p.171, note 3)
  15. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. a. I. q. I. ad 2. et d. 34. q. 2. — Paulo inferius post praedicationem Vat. adiungit aliquam. — Terminus implicatio, qui in hac ulteriore propositione occurrit, significat propositionem relativam. Sic Petrus Hispan., Summul. tr. de Restrictione, ait, restrictionem fieri posse per implicationem, ut cum dicatur: homo, qui est albus, currit etc. (p.171, nota 4)
    Cf. I Sent. d. 8, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, and d. 34, q. 2. — A little below, after praedicationem the Vatican [ed.] adds aliquam. — The term implicatio, which occurs in this further proposition, signifies a relative proposition. Thus Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract on Restriction, says that restriction can be made by implication, as when one says: the man who is white runs, etc. (p.171, note 4)
  16. Codd. O U K X oportet. (p.171, nota 5)
    Codd. O U K X [read] oportet [it is necessary]. (p.171, note 5)
  17. Ut ostensum est supra d. 6. a. I. et 2. (p.171, nota 6)
    As was shown above d. 6, a. 1 and 2. (p.171, note 6)
  18. De qua fallacia vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). Cfr. supra pag. 18, nota 5. — In edd. haec ultima propositio in fine multum truncata et transformata est: Unde cuicumque subiicitur iste terminus homo, potest subiici et ille terminus animal; scil. et homo, ibi est enim consequens. Paulo inferius pro dicitur cod. B praedicatur, et dein cod. Q sic terminat solutionem: illa sibi invicem subiici et per consequens praedicari. (p.171, nota 7)
    On which fallacy see Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 4 (c. 5). Cf. above p. 18, note 5. — In the editions this last proposition at the end is much truncated and transformed: Hence to whatever this term "man" is subjected, that term "animal" can also be subjected; namely also "man," for there it is a fallacy of the consequent. A little below, for dicitur cod. B [reads] praedicatur, and then cod. Q ends the solution thus: that these be subjected to each other and consequently be predicated. (p.171, note 7)
  19. Dist. 6. a. 2. q. I. — Ibid. a. 1. q. I. vide etiam de alia ratione seq. (p.172, nota 1)
    Dist. 6, a. 2, q. 1. — Ibid. a. 1, q. 1, see also on the other reason following. (p.172, note 1)
  20. Sicut enim duplex distinguitur abstractum, scil. a supposito seu ab individuis, v. gr. humanitas, et a subiecto, v. gr. albedo: sic etiam duplex concretum, scil. ad suppositum, v. gr. homo, et ad subiectum, v. gr. album. Prima species vocatur concretum metaphysicum, secunda physicum; prima spectat ad essentiam, secunda ad accidens. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro homo significari Vat. substituit hominem significari. (p.172, nota 2)
    For just as the abstract is distinguished as twofold, namely from the supposit or from individuals, e.g. humanitas [humanity], and from the subject, e.g. albedo [whiteness]: so also the concrete is twofold, namely toward the supposit, e.g. homo [man], and toward the subject, e.g. album [a white thing]. The first species is called the metaphysical concrete, the second the physical; the first regards essence, the second accident. Cf. above d. 6, a. 1, q. 3. — A little above, for homo significari the Vatican [ed.] substitutes hominem significari. (p.172, note 2)
  21. Vide supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro ad Deum vero codd. H K Z aa bb ad Deum non nisi, codd. B C D G L N (T a prima manu) ad Deum non. Deinde pro plenarie cod. Z plene. (p.172, nota 3)
    See above d. 2, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, for ad Deum vero codd. H K Z aa bb [read] ad Deum non nisi, codd. B C D G L N (T by the first hand) ad Deum non. Then for plenarie cod. Z [reads] plene. (p.172, note 3)
  22. Supplevimus ex codd. K U X bb per se et, exigente hoc etiam contextu. (p.172, nota 4)
    We have supplied from codd. K U X bb the words per se et, the context too requiring this. (p.172, note 4)
  23. Ut ostensum est in corp. quaest. (p.172, nota 5)
    As was shown in the corpus of the question. (p.172, note 5)
  24. Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et in fine, et infra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. (p.172, nota 6)
    Cf. above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, in the corpus and at the end, and below d. 13, a. 2, q. 2. (p.172, note 6)
  25. Vel aliis verbis: De Deo homo praedicatur absolute, scil. ratione significati, quia homo significat quid absolutum; relative vero ratione suppositi, quia homo in Christo propter relationem implicitam ad suppositum divinum stat pro persona Filii et ratione illius relationis implicitae non de qualibet persona divina, sed solum de persona Filii praedicatur. — Codd. B C D hanc propositionem sic subvertunt: absolute quantum ad privationem relationis intrinsecae; relative quantum ad positionem relationis extrinsecae; codd. G H I L N U (K T a prima manu) bis exhibent relationis extrinsecae. Mox cod. U voci unitate praefigit in. (p.172, nota 7)
    Or in other words: Of God "man" is predicated absolutely, namely by reason of the thing signified, because "man" signifies something absolute; but relatively by reason of the supposit, because "man" in Christ, on account of the implicit relation to the divine supposit, stands for the person of the Son, and by reason of that implicit relation is predicated not of every divine person, but only of the person of the Son. — Codd. B C D invert this proposition thus: absolutely with respect to the privation of an intrinsic relation; relatively with respect to the positing of an extrinsic relation; codd. G H I L N U (K T by the first hand) twice exhibit relationis extrinsecae. Presently cod. U prefixes in to the word unitate. (p.172, note 7)
  26. Dist. 4. q. 1. et 4., ubi etiam quae in seq. propositione proponuntur, explicata habes. — Paulo inferius pro incommunicabilem codd. BCDEILMTXaa exhibent communicabilem, Vat. substituit immultiplicabilem, scilicet divinitatem. (p.172, nota 8)
    Dist. 4, q. 1 and 4, where you also have explained the things which are proposed in the following proposition. — A little below, for incommunicabilem codd. BCDEILMTXaa exhibit communicabilem, the Vatican [ed.] substitutes immultiplicabilem, namely the divinity. (p.172, note 8)
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