Bonaventure

QUAESTIO II. Utrum omnes virtutes cardinales sint una virtus, an diversae.

Secundo quaeritur de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad ipsarum diversitatem, et quaeritur, utrum omnes virtutes cardinales sint una virtus, an diversae. Et quod sint diversae, ostenditur:

1. Primo per potentias, quas dirigunt: quia prudentia dirigit rationalem, temperantia concupiscibilem, fortitudo irascibilem¹: cum ergo potentiae sint propria subiecta habituum, et propriis subiectis diversificatis formaliter, necesse est, ipsarum habitus formaliter diversificari; et praedictae potentiae animae sunt diversae; videtur, quod necesse sit, cardinales virtutes esse distinctas et essentialiter diversas.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per actus, quos eliciunt: quoniam alius est actus ipsius prudentiae, formaliter loquendo, alius temperantiae, sicut patet: cum ergo habitus diversificentur per actus diversificatione formali et essentiali², videtur, quod necessarium sit, habitus cardinalium virtutum essentialiter distingui.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per obiecta: quia temperantia est circa delectationes et fortitudo circa passiones³: cum ergo prima distinctio habituum ortum habeat ab obiectis, videtur ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, hoc ipsum quarto loco ostenditur per vitia, contra quae sunt. Si enim vitia, quibus opponuntur huiusmodi virtutes, simpliciter sunt diversorum generum, et privationes distinguuntur et diversificantur secundum ipsos habitus⁴; videtur ergo, quod necessarium sit, habitus virtutum cardinalium formaliter et essentialiter ab invicem distingui.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per medietates, secundum quas huiusmodi virtutes attenduntur. Si enim huiusmodi virtutes cardinales habent medietates formaliter differentes; cum medietates respiciant virtutes secundum ipsarum rationem formalem⁵, videtur ergo, quod necesse sit, ipsas virtutes cardinales essentialiter et formaliter esse differentes.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus, de Moribus Ecclesiae⁶: « Illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur »; sed hoc non dicit diversitatem secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum relationem: ergo videtur, quod virtutes cardinales solummodo secundum comparationem habeant distingui, non secundum essentiam absolutam.

2. Item, Augustinus, in libro de Quantitate animae⁷: « Virtus est aequalitas vitae undique rationi consentiens »; sed aequalitas vitae undique non potest esse secundum unam solam comparationem, sed secundum comparationem ad omnem actum et ad omne obiectum: ergo si haec est definitio virtutis recte assignata, videtur, quod quaelibet virtus ad

omnem actum et ad omne obiectum habeat animam ordinare. Sed hoc non esset, si virtutes distinguerentur penes actus et obiecta: ergo videtur, quod virtutes cardinales non habeant aliquam essentialem differentiam.

3. Item, nullae formae ad invicem disparatae et diversae se ipsas denominant — quamvis enim vere dicatur, quod musicum sit album, tamen nullo modo conceditur, quod musica sit alba — sed virtutes cardinales, secundum quod vult Bernardus⁸ et Augustinus, se ipsas denominant, quia fortitudo est prudens et prudentia fortis: ergo videtur, quod non habeant essentialem differentiam.

4. Item, « iustitia, secundum quod dicit Anselmus⁹, est rectitudo voluntatis »; sed omnis cardinalis virtus est rectitudo voluntatis: ergo omnis cardinalis virtus est iustitia. Si ergo iustitia nominat unam speciem virtutis, videtur, quod cardinales virtutes non habeant essentialem diversitatem sive formalem.

5. Item, cuilibet virtuti essentiale est inspicere medium, cuilibet etiam essentiale est medium servare, cuilibet etiam essentiale est aggredi difficile, cuiuslibet etiam est ordinare¹⁰. Si ergo medium inspicere est ipsius prudentiae, medium servare temperantiae, aggredi difficile fortitudinis, ordinare ipsius iustitiae; videtur, quod quaelibet istarum virtutum intret essentiam alterius: non ergo formaliter distinguuntur.

CONCLUSIO.

Virtutes cardinales formaliter distinguuntur, quatenus ordinantur ad speciales actus, minus tamen distinguuntur, quatenus sunt gratia informatae et caritate meritoriae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad formam, per quam sunt gratuitae, et quantum ad formam, per quam sunt meritoriae, et quantum ad formam, per quam sunt ad speciales actuum differentias ordinatae.

Si loquamur de forma, per quam sunt gratuitae; sic in illa potius uniuntur, quam distinguuntur, quia illa forma est gratia gratum faciens, quae licet sit una, tamen gratam reddit Deo animam cum universis eius potentiis et habitibus virtuosis, sicut in secundo libro ostensum fuit, distinctione vigesima septima¹¹. — Similiter si loquamur de ipsis virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad formam, per quam sunt meritoriae et habent rationem merendi perfecte; sic magis connectuntur et uniuntur, quam distinguantur; quia illa forma est caritas, per quam virtutes ceterae tanquam pondere unico ad unum finem ultimum inclinantur quasi ad locum proprium; et hoc infra melius ostendetur in tractatu de connexione virtutum¹². — Si vero loquamur de ipsis virtutibus secundum formam, per quam sunt ad speciales actuum differentias ordinatae; sic dico, quod virtutes cardinales essentialiter et formaliter distinguuntur. Et earum diversitas colligitur ex quinque comparationibus, sicut in obiiciendo fuit ostensum, videlicet ex diversitate potentiarum, quas informant et perficiunt, et ex diversitate actuum, quos eliciunt, et ex diversitate obiectorum, ad quae ordinantur, et ex diversitate medietatum, circa quas consistunt, et ex diversitate vitiorum oppositorum, quae excludunt. Et ideo rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod virtus non est aliud quam varius affectus amoris; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de virtutibus cardinalibus, secundum quod reduci habent ad unam radicem caritatis, per quam habent perfecta ordinatione ad ipsum Deum ordinare, et ex hoc sortiuntur quandam connexionem et unitatem; vel hoc patet per litteram sequentem, qua definiens temperantiam dicit¹³: « Temperantiam dicamus esse amorem Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servantem, fortitudinem amorem omnia propter Deum facile perferentem », et sic de aliis. Talis autem relatio temperantiae et fortitudinis in Deum per amorem non est virtutum cardinalium, nisi in quantum a caritate reguntur et informantur et imperantur. Et hoc modo verum est, quod habent quandam unitatem ratione unius motoris; sed propter hoc non sequitur, quod non diversificentur propriis formis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est aequalitas vitae undique rationi consentiens; dicendum, quod per hoc quod est undique dupliciter potest intelligi, quod fiat distributio. Aut ita quod hoc quod est undique distribuat pro duabus extremitatibus consistentibus circa medietatem; et sic convenit cuilibet virtuti cardinali per se, quia nec declinat ad superfluum nec ad diminutum. Alio modo hoc quod est undique potest distribuere pro omnibus partibus

potentialibus animae¹⁴; et sic non competit alicui virtuti cardinali absolute, sed in quantum habet connexionem cum alia. Et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod omnes virtutes sint una virtus essentialiter, sed quod possunt dici una per quandam connexionem et aggregationem; sicut omnes potentiae animae, quamvis sint diversae, dant tamen ipsi animae unum integrum posse, ita quod una sine altera non posset animam facere potentem¹⁵. Sic intelligendum est de aequalitate vitae, quae consistit penes unam virtutem partialiter, penes autem omnes consistit integre et perfecte.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una virtus denominat aliam; dicendum, quod est praedicatio multiplex, videlicet per causam et per essentiam et per concomitantiam¹⁶. Et cum dicitur, quod una virtus denominat alteram, hoc non est propter essentialem convenientiam, sed hoc est propter hoc, quod concomitantur se circa unum animae subiectum et circa potentias, quae se mutuo circumincedunt. Et si tu obiicias, quod concomitantia non sufficit, quia non conceditur, quod musica sit alba; dicendum, quod concomitantia non sufficit simpliciter, sed concomitantia cum simplicitate subiecti, per quam subiectum potest reflectere se super se et super omne illud, quod est in se; sicut patet, quod anima intellectiva simpliciter potest se convertere super se per actum intelligendi et similiter per actum diligendi. Et hinc est, quod virtutes in talibus potentiis existentes possunt se mutuo denominare; et ideo non est simile de omnibus actibus, etiam si circa idem subiectum habeant consistere.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis cardinalis virtus est quaedam voluntatis rectitudo, ita quod omnis virtus cardinalis est iustitia; dicendum, quod iustitia dupliciter accipitur: quia est iustitia generalis, et est iustitia specialis. Et iustitia generalis complectitur omnes virtutes, non solum cardinales, sed etiam theologicas¹⁷. Iustitia vero specialis non est simpliciter rectitudo voluntatis, sed rectitudo voluntatis ordinans ad alterum; et hoc non competit cuilibet virtuti cardinali; et propterea non sequitur, quod cardinales virtutes non habeant ad invicem distingui.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de illis quatuor conditionibus, quae sunt in qualibet virtute; responderi potest, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod virtutes non sint distinctae: quia quod quaelibet illarum conditionum attribuatur alicui virtuti speciali, hoc non est per proprietatem, sed magis per appropriationem. Cuiuslibet enim virtutis est medium tenere; sed hoc appropriatur temperantiae, quia maxime opportunum est circa delectationes medium custodire; sic et de aliis conditionibus intelligendum est. — Si tamen obiiciat, quod inspicere medium hoc est proprium ipsius prudentiae, et ita videtur, quod prudentia sit de essentia aliarum virtutum cardinalium; dicendum, quod inspectio medii est duobus modis, vel per modum considerationis discretae, vel per modum inclinationis determinatae. Primo modo medium inspicere est proprium ipsius prudentiae, quae perficit potentiam rationalem, cuius est considerare et discernere; et hoc modo inspicere medium non convenit virtuti cardinali per sui essentiam, sed per concomitantiam, quia habet prudentiam directivam. Unde sicut oculus videt sibi et aliis membris, sic prudentia inspicit sibi et virtutibus ceteris. — Alio modo inspicere medium est per modum inclinationis determinatae; et sic non tantum est prudentiae, sed etiam cuiuslibet virtutis, quia quaelibet virtus est quoddam pondus recte inclinans et movens ad medium, circa quod habet consistere. Unde sicut gravitas lapidis recte dicitur inspicere locum deorsum sive medium mundi; sic quaelibet virtus rationabiliter potest dici inspicere medium recte vivendi; et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod prudentia ab aliis virtutibus non habeat diversificari¹⁸.

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Question II. Whether all the cardinal virtues are one virtue, or diverse.

Secondly it is asked of the cardinal virtues as to their diversity, and it is asked whether all the cardinal virtues are one virtue, or diverse. And that they are diverse is shown:

1. First, through the powers which they direct: for prudence directs the rational [power], temperance the concupiscible, fortitude the irascible¹: since therefore the powers are the proper subjects of habits, and, the proper subjects being formally diversified, it is necessary that their habits be formally diversified; and the aforesaid powers of the soul are diverse; it seems that it is necessary that the cardinal virtues be distinct and essentially diverse.

2. Likewise, the same is seen through the acts which they elicit: since the act of prudence itself is one, formally speaking, [and] that of temperance another, as is clear: since therefore habits are diversified through acts by a formal and essential diversification², it seems that it is necessary that the habits of the cardinal virtues be essentially distinguished.

3. Likewise, the same is shown through the objects: for temperance is about pleasures and fortitude about passions³: since therefore the first distinction of habits takes its origin from objects, it seems therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, the same is shown in the fourth place through the vices, against which they are. For if the vices to which such virtues are opposed are simply of diverse genera, and the privations are distinguished and diversified according to the habits themselves⁴; it seems therefore that it is necessary that the habits of the cardinal virtues be formally and essentially distinguished from one another.

5. Likewise, the same is shown through the means according to which such virtues are regarded. For if such cardinal virtues have means formally differing; since the means regard the virtues according to their formal character⁵, it seems therefore that it is necessary that the cardinal virtues themselves be essentially and formally differing.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, On the Morals of the Church⁶: «That which is called the fourfold virtue is so called from a certain varied affection of love itself, as far as I understand»; but this does not assert a diversity according to essence, but only according to relation: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues have to be distinguished only according to comparison, not according to absolute essence.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the book On the Quantity of the Soul⁷: «Virtue is the equality of life consenting on every side to reason»; but the equality of life on every side cannot be according to one single comparison, but according to comparison to every act and to every object: therefore if this is the rightly assigned definition of virtue, it seems that any virtue has [the office] of ordering the soul to

every act and to every object. But this would not be, if the virtues were distinguished in respect of acts and objects: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have any essential difference.

3. Likewise, no forms disparate and diverse from one another denominate themselves — for although it be truly said that the musical [thing] is white, yet it is in no way conceded that music is white — but the cardinal virtues, according to what Bernard⁸ and Augustine hold, denominate themselves, because fortitude is prudent and prudence is brave: therefore it seems that they do not have an essential difference.

4. Likewise, «justice, according to what Anselm⁹ says, is the rectitude of the will»; but every cardinal virtue is rectitude of the will: therefore every cardinal virtue is justice. If therefore justice names one species of virtue, it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have an essential or formal diversity.

5. Likewise, to every virtue it is essential to look to the mean, to every one it is also essential to preserve the mean, to every one it is also essential to attempt the difficult, to every one it also belongs to order¹⁰. If therefore to look to the mean belongs to prudence, to preserve the mean to temperance, to attempt the difficult to fortitude, to order to justice; it seems that any of these virtues enters the essence of another: therefore they are not formally distinguished.

CONCLUSION.

The cardinal virtues are formally distinguished, insofar as they are ordered to special acts; yet they are less distinguished, insofar as they are informed by grace and meritorious through charity.

I respond: It must be said that there is a speaking of the cardinal virtues as to the form by which they are gratuitous, and as to the form by which they are meritorious, and as to the form by which they are ordered to special differences of acts.

If we speak of the form by which they are gratuitous; thus in it they are rather united than distinguished, because that form is the grace that makes [one] pleasing, which, although it be one, nonetheless renders the soul pleasing to God together with all its powers and virtuous habits, as was shown in the second book, distinction twenty-seventh¹¹. — Similarly, if we speak of the cardinal virtues themselves as to the form by which they are meritorious and have the formal character of meriting perfectly; thus they are more connected and united than distinguished; because that form is charity, by which the other virtues are inclined, as by a single weight, to one ultimate end as to their proper place; and this will be better shown below in the treatise on the connection of the virtues¹². — But if we speak of the virtues themselves according to the form by which they are ordered to special differences of acts; thus I say that the cardinal virtues are essentially and formally distinguished. And their diversity is gathered from five comparisons, as was shown in the objecting [arguments], namely from the diversity of the powers which they inform and perfect, and from the diversity of the acts which they elicit, and from the diversity of the objects to which they are ordered, and from the diversity of the means about which they consist, and from the diversity of the opposed vices which they exclude. And therefore the reasons which are adduced for this side are to be granted, because they conclude truly.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that virtue is nothing other than a varied affection of love; it must be said that Augustine speaks there of the cardinal virtues insofar as they have to be reduced to the one root of charity, through which they have [the office] of ordering, by a perfect ordering, to God Himself, and from this they obtain a certain connection and unity; or this is clear from the following text, in which, defining temperance, he says¹³: «Let us say that temperance is the love keeping itself whole and uncorrupted for God, fortitude the love bearing all things easily for the sake of God», and so of the others. But such a relation of temperance and fortitude to God through love does not belong to the cardinal virtues, except insofar as they are governed and informed and commanded by charity. And in this way it is true that they have a certain unity by reason of one mover; but on account of this it does not follow that they are not diversified by their proper forms.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue is the equality of life consenting on every side to reason; it must be said that by this [word] on every side the distribution can be understood in two ways. Either so that this [word] on every side distributes for the two extremes consisting about the mean; and thus it belongs to any cardinal virtue per se, because it neither declines to excess nor to defect. In another way this [word] on every side can distribute for all the potential parts

of the soul¹⁴; and thus it does not belong to any cardinal virtue absolutely, but insofar as it has connection with another. And from this it cannot be concluded that all the virtues are one virtue essentially, but that they can be called one through a certain connection and aggregation; just as all the powers of the soul, although they be diverse, nonetheless give to the soul itself one whole capacity, so that one without the other could not make the soul capable¹⁵. Thus it must be understood of the equality of life, which consists partially in respect of one virtue, but in respect of all consists wholly and perfectly.

3. To that which is objected, that one virtue denominates another; it must be said that there is a manifold predication, namely by cause and by essence and by concomitance¹⁶. And when it is said that one virtue denominates another, this is not on account of essential agreement, but it is on account of this, that they accompany one another about one subject of the soul and about powers which mutually interpenetrate one another. And if you object that concomitance does not suffice, because it is not conceded that music is white; it must be said that concomitance does not suffice simply, but concomitance with simplicity of the subject, by which the subject can reflect upon itself and upon all that which is in itself; as is clear, that the intellective soul can simply turn upon itself through the act of understanding and similarly through the act of loving. And hence it is that the virtues existing in such powers can mutually denominate one another; and therefore it is not the same with all acts, even if they have to consist about the same subject.

4. To that which is objected, that every cardinal virtue is a certain rectitude of the will, so that every cardinal virtue is justice; it must be said that justice is taken in two ways: for there is general justice, and there is special justice. And general justice embraces all the virtues, not only the cardinal ones, but also the theological ones¹⁷. But special justice is not simply rectitude of the will, but rectitude of the will ordering to another; and this does not belong to every cardinal virtue; and therefore it does not follow that the cardinal virtues do not have to be distinguished from one another.

5. To that which is objected concerning those four conditions which are in any virtue; it can be answered that it is true; but nonetheless from this it does not follow that the virtues are not distinct: because that any of those conditions be attributed to some special virtue, this is not by property, but rather by appropriation. For it belongs to every virtue to hold the mean; but this is appropriated to temperance, because it is most fitting to guard the mean about pleasures; so also it must be understood of the other conditions. — If, however, one objects that to look to the mean is proper to prudence itself, and thus it seems that prudence is of the essence of the other cardinal virtues; it must be said that the looking to the mean is in two ways, either by way of discerning consideration, or by way of determinate inclination. In the first way to look to the mean is proper to prudence itself, which perfects the rational power, whose [office] it is to consider and discern; and in this way to look to the mean does not belong to a cardinal virtue by its essence, but by concomitance, because it has directive prudence. Hence just as the eye sees for itself and for the other members, so prudence looks for itself and for the other virtues. — In another way to look to the mean is by way of determinate inclination; and thus it belongs not only to prudence, but also to any virtue, because every virtue is a certain weight rightly inclining and moving to the mean about which it has to consist. Hence just as the heaviness of the stone is rightly said to look to the place below or the middle of the world; so any virtue can reasonably be said to look to the mean of living rightly; and from this it cannot be concluded that prudence does not have to be diversified from the other virtues¹⁸.

Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.

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