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Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
p. 802

Quaestio V. Utrum ponenda sit aequalitas in habitibus gratuitis.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum sit ponere aequalitatem in habitibus gratuitis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur Apocalypsis vigesimo primo1: Latera civitatis aequalia; Glossa: id est, virtutes gratuitae sunt aequales. — Ad hoc ipsum habetur auctoritas in littera2, et superius habita fuit distinctione vigesima quinta auctoritas valde expressa.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Ubicumque est una ratio bonitatis, necesse est, quod sit bonitatis aequalitas; sed in omnibus habitibus gratuitis una est ratio bonitatis, videlicet gratia gratum faciens et ipsa caritas3: ergo videtur, quod simpliciter sit in eis bonitatis aequalitas.

3. Item, aut virtutes in eodem sunt aequales, aut non. Si sic; habeo propositum. Si non: ergo meliori virtuti debetur maius praemium, et minori minus; sed motui virtutis debetur praemium substantiale4, illud autem est unum: ergo uni et eidem homini in eodem statu gratiae debetur maius et minus praemium; quod est inconveniens.

4. Item, una virtus denominat alteram, secundum quod vult Augustinus et Bernardus5 — est enim prudentia fortis, et fortitudo prudens — aut ergo prudentia et fortitudo sunt aequales, aut non. Si non; esto ergo, quod prudentia sit maior quam fortitudo, tunc arguitur sic: prudentia est maior quam fortitudo: ergo fortitudo est magis prudens, quam sit fortis in eodem, quia secundum quantitatem prudentiae in eodem est fortitudo prudens; sed quanto virtus fortitudinis est prudentior, tanto nobilior est et excellentior: si ergo magis est prudens quam fortis: ergo est nobilior et excellentior se ipsa. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio6: Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas; et in praecedenti capitulo: Adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro: si igitur caritas est maior et excellentior aliis: ergo non est aequalitas in habitibus gratuitis.

2. Item, de quolibet Confessore cantatur7: Non est inventus similis illi, qui conservaret Legem Excelsi; sed si omnia dona gratuita essent aequalia, tunc qui excederet in uno excederet in omnibus: ergo si verbum illud alicui posset vere attribui, nunquam conveniret alteri, quia « quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit ».

3. Item, maiori bono opponitur maius malum, et e converso, quia « privationes cognoscuntur per habitus »8: ergo cum vitia opposita virtutibus non habeant aequalitatem, quia unum vitium est maius altero; pari ratione videtur, quod nec virtutes gratuitae.

4. Item, habitus crescunt et augmentantur in nobis, secundum quod plus et plus disponimus nos per bonos actus9; sed nos videmus, quod aliquis plus se exercet in actu unius virtutis quam in actu alterius: ergo videtur, quod magis crescat virtus illa quam aliae: ergo necesse est, aliquando virtutem illam esse aliis inaequalem.

5. Item, caritas est vinculum personarum et est vinculum virtutum10 — plures enim personae p. 803 ligantur per vinculum gratiae in una virtute, et plures virtutes in uno homine — sicut ergo se habet una virtus respectu diversarum personarum, sic unus homo respectu virtutum plurium; sed una virtus a diversis personis potest participari inaequaliter: ergo et plures virtutes ab eodem homine.

6. Item, habitus virtutis est habilitare ad actum suum, per se loquendo11; ergo maioris virtutis magis habilitare, et aequalis aequaliter habilitare: si ergo omnes virtutes in eodem homine sunt aequales, necessario idem homo aequaliter erit habilis et facilis ad actus omnium virtutum, quod per experientiam deprehenditur esse falsum. Multi enim habiles sunt ad actum abstinentiae, qui tamen cum difficultate habent usum patientiae et obedientiae.

Conclusio. Duplici via monstratur, quod virtutes gratuitae quodam modo sunt aequales, quodam modo inaequales, simpliciter tamen aequales dici possunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de ipsis habitibus gratuitis contingit loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad ipsum habitum, aut quantum ad exercitium12. (Via 1, cum distinctione.) — Si loquamur de ipsis quantum ad habitum, hoc potest esse dupliciter: (Subdistinctio.) aut respectu gratiae informantis et quodam modo causantis, aut respectu liberi arbitrii suscipientis et cooperantis. — (Conclusio 1.) Si respectu gratiae informantis; sic omnes habent aequalitatem, pro eo quod gratia gratum faciens secundum quantitatem suam et excellentiam reddit gratam Deo animam et eius potentias et habitus, et operationes meritorias13. — Si vero loquamur de ipsis respectu liberi arbitrii consentientis et suscipientis; sic, quia liberum arbitrium in actu unius virtutis maiorem invenit complacentiam quam in alio, et maiorem invenit repugnantiam in uno quam in altero, secundum diversas sui inclinationes et dispositiones; (Conclusio 2.) sic non aequaliter est omnimodam reperire aequalitatem in habitibus virtutum, pro eo quod liberum arbitrium magis fervet quantum ad unam virtutem quam ad aliam, magis etiam adhaeret uni virtuti quam alii.

Si vero loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad exercitium; (Conclusio 3.) sic vix vel nunquam aequantur nec in se nec in comparatione ad liberi arbitrii cooperationem. (Rationes.) — In se non, quia exercitium unius virtutis est fructuosius quam exercitium alterius, sicut exercitium pietatis14, quam abstinentiae; exercitium autem unius virtutis in eodem est securius quam exercitium alterius, sicut exercitium humilitatis et timoris, quam alterius virtutis. — Similiter non habent aequalitatem in comparatione ad liberi arbitrii cooperationem, quia nemo est, qui aequaliter se exerceat in actu omnium virtutum. Aliqui enim magis vacant circa activam, aliqui vero magis circa contemplativam.

(Epilogus.) Et sic concedi potest, quod habitus gratuiti quodam modo sunt aequales, et quodam modo inaequales: aequales quidem sunt quantum ad gratiam informantem, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem15; inaequales vero in comparatione ad liberi arbitrii consensum et exterius exercitium. Et secundum hoc dissolvi possunt rationes, quae ad utramque partem inducuntur.

(Via 2, cum quadruplici distinctione et conclusione.) Aliter potest dici, quod de virtutibus est loqui quadrupliciter: aut quantum ad dignitatem respectu obiecti; et sic una est excellentior altera, etiam in eodem, sicut virtutes theologicae, quam cardinales. Aut quantum ad fervorem et facilitatem respectu actus proprii; et sic adhuc non est necesse, quod habitus gratuiti in eodem adaequentur. Aut quantum ad radicationem et stabilitatem respectu subiecti; et sic adhuc non est necesse, aequalitatem esse, quia talis radicatio venit ex frequentia et assuefactione16 circa actum alicuius virtutis. Aut quantum ad ordinem et efficaciam respectu praemii; et quantum ad hoc habent aequalitatem in eodem; propter hoc quod quantitas meriti cuiuslibet virtutis mensuratur secundum quantitatem gratiae, quae facit opus Deo placitum, et secundum quantitatem caritatis, quae dat operi cuiuslibet virtutis valorem et pondus17. (Ratio duplex.) Et quia una est gratia gratum faciens, ceteras virtutes informans in uno homine; una est etiam caritas per modum ponderis ad finem inclinans: hinc est, quod quantum ad ordinem in finem et efficaciam merendi necesse est, omnes virtutes in eodem aequari. — Rursus, quia bonitas principalis et essentialis virtutum in hoc attenditur, quod ordinant et disponunt ad summum praemium; et in hoc virtutes habent aequari: (Conclusio 4.) hinc est, quod Magister18 simpliciter concludit, et Sancti dicunt, in uno et eodem aequales esse omnes habitus gratuitos. — Et ideo simpliciter concedi possunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. Ad obiecta in contrarium satis de facili patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.

(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de caritate, quod est aliis eminentior; dicendum, quod hoc p. 804 intelligitur ratione exercitii in actu suo, in quo plus hauritur de gratia, et minor est occasio periclitandi. (Notandum.) Affectus enim amoris divini, dum abstrahit a terrenis, facit recedere ab occasione peccati; dum vero unit caelestibus, facit inde hauriri humorem gratiae Spiritus sancti19. Et ideo ex hoc non concluditur inaequalitas virtutum quantum ad meritum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cantatur de Confessoribus: Non est inventus similis illi; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur non ratione habitus, sed ratione alicuius exterioris usus; et hoc innuit ipsum vocabulum, cum dicitur: qui conservaret Legem Excelsi; ex quo innuit, excellentiam illam intelligendam fore in opere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maiori bono opponitur maius malum; dicendum, quod illud non est regulariter20 verum, immo aliquando contingit, minori bono opponi maius malum, sicut desperatio, quae opponitur spei, peior est quam odium, quod opponitur caritati. (Notandum.) Praeterea, aliunde habent virtutes aequalitatem, aliunde habent oppositorum diversitatem. Aequalitatem enim habent ex parte gratiae, ratione cuius quod opponitur uni virtuti per consequens opponitur omnibus; oppositorum autem diversitatem habent ratione specialium actuum et obiectorum; et ex illa parte non est necesse, habitus virtutum habere omnimodam aequalitatem, sicut prius tactum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus crescunt et augmentantur in nobis, secundum quod plus disponimus nos per actus; dicendum, quod crementum habitus quantum ad bonitatem essentialem in genere gratuiti attenditur ex augmento ipsius gratiae, qua augmentata, crescunt et ceterae virtutes21. Cum ergo dicitur, quod magis nos exercemus in actu unius virtutis quam in actu alterius, ergo magis in illa crescimus; dicendum, quod non sequitur, pro eo quod debitus usus et exercitatio in actu unius virtutis disponit ad incrementum omnium. Unde sicut in communitate fraternitatis, licet unus magis negotietur in acquirendo quam alter, tamen bona acquisita omnibus distribuuntur aequaliter; sic et suo modo in proposito intelligendum est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una virtus a diversis personis potest diversimode participari, ergo et diversae virtutes ab eodem; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod unius virtutis in diversis diversae sunt radices; diversarum vero virtutum in eodem non sunt diversae radices, sed una22, videlicet una gratia, per quam est acceptatio, et una caritas, per quam est meriti perfectio.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus virtutis est reddere potentiam facilem; dicendum, quod facilitas23 potentiae ad aliquem actum maior et minor non tantum venit ex parte perfectionis et bonitatis ipsius habitus, verum etiam ex parte dispositionis subiecti. (Notandum.) Unde secundum quod ad actus diversarum virtutum liberum arbitrium secundum plus et minus cooperatur, secundum hoc plus et minus facilitatur, licet etiam habitus virtutum, quantum est de se, adaequentur. (Notandum.) Unde nec ista ratio nec aliae probant inaequalitatem in habitibus gratuitis quantum ad bonitatem essentialem et completivam, sed solum quantum ad aliquid accidentale et annexum, sicut ex his quae praedicta sunt, satis est manifestum.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec de virtutibus infusis proprie non intelligitur de aequalitate earum ratione speciei et obiecti, cum constet, quod sic una virtus etiam in eodem homine maior sit altera, « sicut virtutes theologicae, quam cardinales » (hic in corp.); sed quaestio intelligitur secundum participationem subiecti. Magister (hic c. 2.) verius esse putat, ita pares esse virtutes in unoquoque, ut qui in una par exstiterit alteri, hic in omnibus eidem sit aequalis. Quod S. Thom. (hic a. 4; S. 1. II. q. 66. a. 2.) accuratius ita determinat, ut omnes virtutes unius hominis sint « aequales quadam aequalitate proportionis, in quantum aequaliter crescunt in homine, sicut digiti manus sunt inaequales secundum quantitatem, sed sunt aequales secundum proportionem, cum proportionabiliter augeantur » (S. loc. cit.). Idem tamen addit (ibid.): « Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet inclinationem ipsam ad actum virtutis, potest esse unus homo magis promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius vel ex natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono ». Ab hac doctrina non recedunt S. Bonav., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. aliique (excepto Durando), licet hi aliis distinctionibus et verbis utantur; concorditer enim docent, habitus virtutum, quatenus a Deo sunt infusi, aequales esse secundum proportionem (cfr. hic solutiones ad 4. 5. 6.). De eadem quaestione praeter S. Thomam: B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petri a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 17. circa finem. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

II. Quoad ultimam quaestionem communiter docetur, quod caritas est motor et forma et finis omnium virtutum (cfr. hic dub. 3, supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. 3.): motor quidem, quia movet voluntatem, quae est motor universalis omnium animae facultatum et virtutum; forma, non quidem constitutiva singularum virtutum (hic ad 3.), sed forma directiva ad finem, qui, quatenus intenditur, in moralibus quasi loco formae est et recte dicitur esse principium in operabilibus (cfr. hic ad 4.); denique ipsa est etiam finis ratione ordinis ad finem ultimum, cui fines proximi singularum virtutum subordinantur. — Ab auctore tangitur hic etiam alia virtutum informatio, nempe per gratiam, de qua vide supra d. 33. q. 5. scholion. Ad rem et ad mentem S. Bonaventurae dicit Petr. a Tar. (III. Sent. d. 27. q. 5. a. 2, ubi de hac ipsa quaestione agit): « Virtutum quippe singularum quasi triplex forma est: una quoad esse, scilicet propria differentia; altera quoad bene esse, scilicet gratia; altera quoad agere, scilicet caritas (cfr. hic ad 2.); sicut altero informatur color, ut sit color proprius et distinctus; altero, ut sit color vividus et gratiosus sive pulcher; altero, ut sit secundum actum motivus visus ». — In solutione ad 5. notanda est doctrina auctoris nostri, quo sensu formae adhuc possit esse forma. De hac quaestione S. Thom. cum plerisque aliis Petri Lombardi commentatoribus agit III. Sent. d. 27.

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English Translation

Question V. Whether equality is to be posited among the gratuitous habits.

Fifthly it is asked whether equality is to be posited among the gratuitous habits. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, from that which is said in Revelation twenty-one1: The sides of the city are equal; the Gloss: that is, the gratuitous virtues are equal. — For this very point an authority is had in the text2, and above, in the twenty-fifth distinction, a very express authority was had.

2. Likewise, this very thing seems [so] by reason. Wherever there is one account of goodness, it is necessary that there be an equality of goodness; but in all the gratuitous habits there is one account of goodness, namely grace making [one] pleasing and charity itself3: therefore it seems that there is in them simply an equality of goodness.

3. Likewise, either the virtues in the same [man] are equal, or not. If so, I have what was proposed. If not: then to the better virtue is owed a greater reward, and to the lesser a lesser one; but to the motion of a virtue is owed a substantial reward4, and that is one: therefore to one and the same man in the same state of grace is owed a greater and a lesser reward; which is unfitting.

4. Likewise, one virtue denominates another, as Augustine and Bernard hold5 — for prudence is brave, and fortitude prudent — therefore either prudence and fortitude are equal, or not. If not, let it be then that prudence is greater than fortitude; then it is argued thus: prudence is greater than fortitude: therefore fortitude is more prudent than it is brave in the same [man], because according to the quantity of prudence in the same [man] is fortitude prudent; but the more the virtue of fortitude is the more prudent, the more noble and excellent it is: if therefore it is more prudent than brave: therefore it is more noble and excellent than itself. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. First to the Corinthians, thirteen6: Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity; and in the preceding chapter: I yet show you a more excellent way: if therefore charity is greater and more excellent than the others: therefore there is no equality among the gratuitous habits.

2. Likewise, of every Confessor it is sung7: There was not found one like him, who kept the Law of the Most High; but if all the gratuitous gifts were equal, then he who excelled in one would excel in all: therefore if that word could truly be attributed to anyone, it would never fit another, because « that which is said by superabundance belongs to one alone ».

3. Likewise, to a greater good is opposed a greater evil, and conversely, because « privations are known through habits »8: therefore since the vices opposed to the virtues do not have equality, since one vice is greater than another; by like reasoning it seems that neither [do] the gratuitous virtues.

4. Likewise, habits grow and are augmented in us, according as we dispose ourselves more and more by good acts9; but we see that someone exercises himself more in the act of one virtue than in the act of another: therefore it seems that that virtue grows more than the others: therefore it is necessary that sometimes that virtue be unequal to the others.

5. Likewise, charity is the bond of persons and is the bond of virtues10 — for many persons p. 803 are bound by the bond of grace in one virtue, and many virtues in one man — as therefore one virtue stands with respect to diverse persons, so one man with respect to many virtues; but one virtue can be participated unequally by diverse persons: therefore also many virtues by the same man.

6. Likewise, [the function] of the habit of virtue is to enable for its own act, speaking per se11; therefore [the function] of a greater virtue [is] to enable more, and of an equal one to enable equally: if therefore all the virtues in the same man are equal, necessarily the same man will be equally enabled and ready for the acts of all the virtues, which by experience is found to be false. For many are enabled for the act of abstinence, who nevertheless have the use of patience and obedience with difficulty.

Conclusion. By a twofold way it is shown that the gratuitous virtues are in a certain manner equal, in a certain manner unequal, yet can simply be called equal.

I respond: It must be said that of the gratuitous habits themselves it happens to speak in two ways: either with respect to the habit itself, or with respect to its exercise12. (Way 1, with distinction.) — If we speak of them with respect to the habit, this can be in two ways: (Subdistinction.) either with respect to the grace informing and in a certain manner causing [them], or with respect to free choice receiving and cooperating. — (Conclusion 1.) If with respect to the informing grace; thus all have equality, for the reason that grace making [one] pleasing, according to its own quantity and excellence, renders the soul pleasing to God, and its powers and habits, and meritorious operations13. — But if we speak of them with respect to free choice consenting and receiving; thus, because free choice finds a greater complacency in the act of one virtue than in another, and finds a greater repugnance in one than in another, according to its diverse inclinations and dispositions; (Conclusion 2.) thus it is not so as to find in every way equality in the habits of the virtues, for the reason that free choice grows more fervent toward one virtue than toward another, and also adheres more to one virtue than to another.

But if we speak of the virtues with respect to exercise; (Conclusion 3.) thus they are scarcely or never made equal, neither in themselves nor in comparison to the cooperation of free choice. (Reasons.) — In themselves not, because the exercise of one virtue is more fruitful than the exercise of another, as the exercise of piety14 than [that] of abstinence; and the exercise of one virtue in the same [man] is more secure than the exercise of another, as the exercise of humility and of fear than [that] of another virtue. — Likewise they do not have equality in comparison to the cooperation of free choice, because there is no one who exercises himself equally in the act of all the virtues. For some are more free for the active [life], others rather for the contemplative.

(Epilogue.) And thus it can be granted that the gratuitous habits are in a certain manner equal, and in a certain manner unequal: equal indeed with respect to the informing grace, as the reasons for the first part show15; but unequal in comparison to the consent of free choice and the exterior exercise. And according to this the reasons which are brought for either part can be resolved.

(Way 2, with a fourfold distinction and conclusion.) Otherwise it can be said that of the virtues there is to speak in a fourfold manner: either with respect to dignity in regard to the object; and thus one is more excellent than another, even in the same [man], as the theological virtues than the cardinal. Or with respect to fervor and facility in regard to the proper act; and thus it is still not necessary that the gratuitous habits be made equal in the same [man]. Or with respect to rootedness and stability in regard to the subject; and thus it is still not necessary that there be equality, because such rootedness comes from frequency and habituation16 about the act of some virtue. Or with respect to order and efficacy in regard to the reward; and with respect to this they have equality in the same [man]; on account of this, that the quantity of the merit of any virtue is measured according to the quantity of grace, which makes the work pleasing to God, and according to the quantity of charity, which gives to the work of any virtue value and weight17. (Twofold reason.) And because there is one grace making [one] pleasing, informing the other virtues in one man; there is also one charity inclining to the end by way of weight: hence it is that, with respect to the order to the end and the efficacy of meriting, it is necessary that all the virtues in the same [man] be made equal. — Again, because the principal and essential goodness of the virtues is regarded in this, that they order and dispose to the highest reward; and in this the virtues are to be made equal: (Conclusion 4.) hence it is that the Master18 simply concludes, and the Saints say, that in one and the same [man] all the gratuitous habits are equal. — And therefore the reasons which show this can simply be granted. To the objections to the contrary the response is sufficiently easy through the things which have been said.

(Solution of the opposing [arguments].) 1. For to that which is first objected concerning charity, that it is more eminent than the others; it must be said that this p. 804 is understood by reason of [its] exercise in its act, in which more is drawn from grace, and there is less occasion of being endangered. (Note.) For the affection of divine love, while it draws away from earthly things, makes [one] withdraw from the occasion of sin; while indeed it unites [one] to heavenly things, it makes the moisture of the grace of the Holy Spirit be drawn thence19. And therefore from this no inequality of the virtues is concluded with respect to merit.

2. To that which is objected, that it is sung of the Confessors: There was not found one like him; it must be said that that is understood not by reason of habit, but by reason of some exterior use; and the very word suggests this, when it is said: who kept the Law of the Most High; from which it suggests that that excellence is to be understood in the work.

3. To that which is objected, that to a greater good is opposed a greater evil; it must be said that that is not regularly20 true, nay sometimes it happens that a greater evil is opposed to a lesser good, as despair, which is opposed to hope, is worse than hatred, which is opposed to charity. (Note.) Moreover, the virtues have their equality from one source, [and] the diversity of their opposites from another. For they have equality on the side of grace, by reason of which what is opposed to one virtue is consequently opposed to all; but they have the diversity of opposites by reason of special acts and objects; and from that side it is not necessary that the habits of the virtues have equality in every way, as was touched on before.

4. To that which is objected, that habits grow and are augmented in us, according as we dispose ourselves more by acts; it must be said that the increase of a habit with respect to essential goodness in the gratuitous genus is regarded from the augmentation of grace itself, which being augmented, the other virtues also grow21. When therefore it is said that we exercise ourselves more in the act of one virtue than in the act of another, therefore we grow more in that one; it must be said that it does not follow, for the reason that the due use and exercise in the act of one virtue disposes to the increase of all. Whence just as in a community of brotherhood, although one trades more in acquiring than another, nevertheless the goods acquired are distributed equally to all; so also in its own manner is it to be understood in the matter at hand.

5. To that which is objected, that one virtue can be participated in diverse ways by diverse persons, therefore also diverse virtues by the same [man]; it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that of one virtue in diverse [persons] the roots are diverse; but of diverse virtues in the same [man] the roots are not diverse, but one22, namely one grace, through which there is acceptance, and one charity, through which there is the perfection of merit.

6. To that which is objected, that [the function] of the habit of virtue is to render the power ready; it must be said that the greater and lesser facility23 of a power toward some act comes not only from the side of the perfection and goodness of the habit itself, but also from the side of the disposition of the subject. (Note.) Whence, according as free choice cooperates more and less toward the acts of diverse virtues, according to this it is made ready more and less, although the habits of the virtues, as far as is of themselves, are made equal. (Note.) Whence neither this reasoning nor the others prove inequality among the gratuitous habits with respect to essential and completive goodness, but only with respect to something accidental and annexed, as from the things which have been said before is sufficiently manifest.

Scholion

I. This question concerning the infused virtues is properly understood not of their equality by reason of species and object — since it is agreed that in this way one virtue, even in the same man, is greater than another, « as the theological virtues than the cardinal » (here in the body) — but the question is understood according to the participation of the subject. The Master (here, c. 2) thinks it the truer view, that the virtues are so equal in each one, that he who has been equal to another in one [virtue], is in all equal to the same. Which St. Thomas (here a. 4; S. I-II, q. 66, a. 2) determines more accurately thus, that all the virtues of one man are « equal by a certain equality of proportion, inasmuch as they grow equally in the man, just as the fingers of the hand are unequal according to quantity, but are equal according to proportion, since they are increased proportionably » (St. Th. loc. cit.). Yet the same [author] adds (ibid.): « But as to that which is material in the moral virtues, namely the inclination itself to the act of virtue, one man can be more ready for the act of one virtue than for the act of another, whether from nature, or from custom, or even from the gift of grace ». From this doctrine St. Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla and others (except Durandus) do not depart, although these use other distinctions and words; for they teach concordantly that the habits of the virtues, inasmuch as they are infused by God, are equal according to proportion (cf. here the solutions to 4, 5, 6). On the same question, besides St. Thomas: Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 5. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 17, near the end. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

II. As to the last question, it is commonly taught that charity is the mover and the form and the end of all the virtues (cf. here dub. 3; above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, 3): the mover indeed, because it moves the will, which is the universal mover of all the faculties and virtues of the soul; the form, not indeed constitutive of the several virtues (here, to 3), but a directive form toward the end, which, inasmuch as it is intended, in moral matters is as it were in place of a form and is rightly said to be a principle in things-to-be-done (cf. here, to 4); finally it is also the end by reason of the order to the ultimate end, to which the proximate ends of the several virtues are subordinated. — There is also touched here by the author another informing of the virtues, namely through grace, on which see above, d. 33, q. 5, scholion. To the point and to the mind of St. Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise says (III Sent., d. 27, q. 5, a. 2, where he treats of this very question): « For of each of the virtues there is as it were a threefold form: one as to being, namely the proper difference; another as to well-being, namely grace; another as to acting, namely charity (cf. here, to 2); just as by the one color is informed, so that it be a proper and distinct color; by another, so that it be a vivid and gracious or beautiful color; by another, so that it be, according to act, a mover of sight ». — In the solution to 5 is to be noted the doctrine of our author, in what sense a form can still be a form. On this question St. Thomas, with very many others of the commentators on Peter Lombard, treats in III Sent., d. 27.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 16: Et civitas in quadro posita est... et longitudo et altitudo et latitudo eius aequalia sunt. — Glossa est secundum Gregor., II. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 10. n. 17. et 18, ubi s. Doctor per quatuor latera intelligi vult vel fidem, spem, caritatem et operationem (cfr. supra pag. 533, nota 1. et pag. 553, nota 5.), vel quatuor virtutes cardinales, quae ita, ut exponit, in quadro sunt, ut una aliam non excedat. — In pluribus codd. legitur sic: Glossa, id est virtutes; igitur secundum Glossam virtutes gratuitae sunt aequales. Superius pro habitibus gratuitis cod. A virtutibus gratuitis, Vat. omittit gratuitis.
    Verse 16: And the city is set foursquare... and its length and height and breadth are equal. — The Gloss is according to Gregory, Homilies on Ezekiel bk. II, homily 10, nn. 17 and 18, where the holy Doctor wishes the four sides to be understood either of faith, hope, charity and operation (cf. above, p. 533, note 1, and p. 553, note 5), or of the four cardinal virtues, which, as he expounds, are so foursquare that one does not exceed another. — In several codices it reads thus: The Gloss, that is the virtues; therefore according to the Gloss the gratuitous virtues are equal. Above, for gratuitous habits cod. A [reads] gratuitous virtues, the Vatican [edition] omits gratuitous.
  2. Hic c. 2. et supra d. XXV. c. 5, ubi Gregorii verba habentur, de quibus in nota praeced. sermo fuit.
    Here, c. 2, and above, d. XXV, c. 5, where the words of Gregory are had, of which there was discussion in the preceding note.
  3. Cfr. infra q. 6. et supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 5. in corp. nec non d. 27. a. I. q. 3.
    Cf. below, q. 6, and above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 5, in the body, as well as d. 27, a. I, q. 3.
  4. Quia penes ipsum motum virtutis gratuitae proprie consistit meritum; vide supra pag. 381, nota I. — Praemium substantiale est visio et possessio Dei, quae est una. — Pro virtutis cod. P virtutum.
    Because in the very motion of gratuitous virtue the merit properly consists; see above, p. 381, note I. — The substantial reward is the vision and possession of God, which is one. — For virtutis cod. P [reads] virtutum.
  5. Vide supra pag. 714, nota I. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    See above, p. 714, note I. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.
  6. Vers. 13, ubi pro horum plurimi codd. his. Seq. testimonium est ibid. 12, 31.
    Verse 13, where for horum very many codices [read] his. The following testimony is ibid. 12:31.
  7. In offic. scil. Confes. Pontif., Antiph. 2. ad Laudes, et sumta sunt haec verba ex Eccli. 44, 20. — In fine arg. adducitur dictum Aristot. ex eius V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.).
    In the office, namely of a Confessor Pontiff, Antiphon 2 at Lauds, and these words are taken from Ecclesiasticus 44:20. — At the end of the argument is adduced a saying of Aristotle from his Topics bk. V, c. 3 (c. 5).
  8. Averroes in III. de Anima, text. 25. (ubi Aristot. docet, animam cognoscere malum per suum oppositum) ait: Et universaliter omnes privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per contraria, scilicet per cognitionem habitus et per cognitionem defectus habitus. Cfr. supra pag. 720, nota I. — De opposito errore, « omnia peccata esse paria », quem iam Cicero impugnavit IV. de Finibus bonor. et malor. c. 27. seq., August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 4. ait: Hoc autem de paritate peccatorum soli Stoici ausi sunt disputare, contra omnem sensum generis humani; quam eorum vanitatem in Ioviniano illo, qui in hac sententia Stoicus erat, in aucupandis autem et defensandis voluptatibus Epicureus, de Scripturis sanctis dilucidissime convicisti (Hieronyme) etc. Cfr. etiam eiusd. Epist. 104. (alias 254.) c. I. n. 13. seq., nec non infra dub. 2. et supra q. 3.
    Averroes on III On the Soul, text 25 (where Aristotle teaches that the soul knows evil through its opposite) says: And universally all privations are not known except through their contraries, namely through the knowledge of the habit and through the knowledge of the defect of the habit. Cf. above, p. 720, note I. — On the opposite error, « that all sins are equal », which Cicero already attacked in IV On the Ends of goods and evils, c. 27 ff., Augustine, Letter 167 (alias 29), c. 2, n. 4, says: But this concerning the parity of sins only the Stoics have dared to dispute, against all the sense of the human race; whose vanity, [seen] in that Jovinian, who in this opinion was a Stoic, but an Epicurean in catching and defending pleasures, you (Jerome) most lucidly convicted from the sacred Scriptures, etc. Cf. also the same [author's] Letter 104 (alias 254), c. I, n. 13 ff., as well as below, dub. 2, and above, q. 3.
  9. Vide supra pag. 721, nota 6. et 7.
    See above, p. 721, notes 6 and 7.
  10. Col. 3, 14: Super omnia autem haec caritatem habete, quod est vinculum perfectionis. Hieronym., I. Dialog. adversus Pelagianos, n. 19. ostendens, nos, quamdiu simus in via, cunctas virtutes habere non posse, ait: Quis non cunctis cupiat florere virtutibus? Si totum requiris ab omnibus, tollis rerum diversitatem et gratiarum distantiam et Creatoris artificis varietatem, cuius sacro Propheta sonat carmine: Omnia in sapientia fecisti (Ps. 103, 24.). Indignetur lucifer, quare fulgorem lunae non habeat etc. — Mox pro vinculum gratiae Vat. vinculum caritatis.
    Colossians 3:14: But above all these have charity, which is the bond of perfection. Jerome, Dialogue against the Pelagians bk. I, n. 19, showing that we, so long as we are on the way, cannot have all the virtues, says: Who would not desire to flourish in all the virtues? If you require the whole from all, you take away the diversity of things and the distance of graces and the variety of the Creator-artificer, whose sacred song the Prophet sounds: Thou hast made all things in wisdom (Ps. 103:24). Let lucifer be indignant, that he does not have the splendor of the moon, etc. — Presently, for bond of grace the Vatican [edition reads] bond of charity.
  11. Cfr. supra pag. 388, nota I. et pag. 474, nota 3. — Cod. K habilitare secundum usum suum.
    Cf. above, p. 388, note I, and p. 474, note 3. — Cod. K [reads] to enable according to its own use.
  12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine, et supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Superius pro habitibus gratuitis codd. A U virtutibus.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 2, at the end, and above, d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — Above, for gratuitous habits codd. A U [read] virtutibus.
  13. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. I. q. I. seq. — Paulo ante pro quantitatem cod. K qualitatem.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 42, a. I, q. I ff. — A little before, for quantitatem cod. K [reads] qualitatem.
  14. Cod. K humilitatis vel pietatis.
    Cod. K [reads] of humility or of piety.
  15. Cod. A addit inductae.
    Cod. A adds inductae ("brought forward").
  16. In pluribus codd. assuetudine legi posset ex modo factae abbreviationis. Inferius post et quantum ad hoc codd. K V subiungunt quidem.
    In several codices assuetudine could be read from the manner of the abbreviation made. Below, after et quantum ad hoc codd. K V add quidem.
  17. Cfr. quaest. seq.
    Cf. the following question.
  18. Hic c. 2. — Post hinc est cod. U inserit etiam. Paulo superius pro ordinant et disponunt cod. Z ordinat et disponit.
    Here, c. 2. — After hinc est cod. U inserts etiam. A little above, for ordinant et disponunt cod. Z [reads] ordinat et disponit.
  19. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 4. et a. 2. q. I. — Pro unit et dein pro hauriri edd. unitur et haurire, atque superius pro periclitandi cod. K peccandi, et post exercitii addit et.
    Cf. above, d. 27, a. I, q. 4, and a. 2, q. I. — For unit and then for hauriri the editions [read] unitur and haurire, and above, for periclitandi cod. K [reads] peccandi, and after exercitii adds et.
  20. Codd. K Z bene generaliter.
    Codd. K Z [read] bene generaliter ("well, generally").
  21. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, to 2.
  22. Plurimi codd. omittunt sed una; edd. vero omittunt una post videlicet.
    Very many codices omit sed una; but the editions omit una after videlicet.
  23. Ita codd. A K N U X Z aa, in aliis et edd. facilitatio.
    Thus codd. A K N U X Z aa; in others and in the editions [it reads] facilitatio.
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