Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis.

Secundo quaeritur, qualiter beatitudo sit appetibilis; et quaeritur, utrum omnes appetant beatitudinem veram. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Boethius¹: « Inserta est mentibus hominum veri boni cupiditas »; sed verum bonum est quod nos beatos vere efficit: ergo omnes appetunt beatitudinem veram.

2. Item, Philosophus² dicit, quod « omnia bonum exoptant »; aut ergo exoptant bonum quodcumque, aut bonum, quod sufficit. Non quodcumque,

p. 1003 quia, si quodcumque, tunc processus est in infinitum: constat ergo, quod bonum, quod sufficit. Sed nullum bonum est sufficiens implere animam humanam nisi beatitudo vera: ergo omnes homines appetunt beatitudinem veram.

3. Item, quod homo appetat beatitudinem, aut hoc est naturale, aut deliberationis. Si deliberationis: ergo potest appetere contrarium, scilicet miseriam, cuius contrarium dicit Augustinus in tertio de Libero Arbitrio¹: ergo appetit appetitu naturali. Sed naturalis appetitus est communis omnibus et perpetuus: ergo si talis est appetitus beatitudinis, patet etc.

4. Item, unumquodque perfectibile naturaliter appetit suam perfectionem; sed anima humana nata est perfici beatitudine vera²: ergo omnis anima appetit beatitudinem veram.

Contra:

1. « Invisa possumus diligere, incognita nequaquam », ut dicit Augustinus³; sed multi sunt qui ignorant, quid sit et ubi sit beatitudo vera; quod patet, quia ponunt beatitudinem in divitiis et honoribus: ergo et beatitudinem veram non appetunt.

2. Item, « peccatum est, spreto Bono incommutabili, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere⁴ »; sed beatitudo est Bonum incommutabile: ergo omnis peccator beatitudinem veram spernit, ergo nullus appetit. — Si dicas, quod spernit appetitu deliberativo, sed appetit naturali; hoc nihil est: quia « quod naturale est non assuescit in contrarium »: ergo nunquam per assuefactionem spernere poterit.

3. Item, beatitudo aut appetitur propter se, aut propter aliud. Si propter aliud: ergo non appetitur ut beatitudo, quia illud facit beatum, in quo finis constituitur: appetitur ergo ab omni, a quo appetitur, propter se⁵. Sed multi sunt qui fruuntur utendis et utuntur fruendis: ergo multi sunt qui veram beatitudinem non appetunt propter se: ergo nec appetunt.

4. Item, si appetitur, aut in ratione commodi, aut in ratione honesti. Si in ratione commodi; cum appetitus commodi sit in animalibus brutis: ergo et beatitudinis⁶. Si in ratione honesti; cum amor honesti non sit in malis: ergo non appetitur ab ipsis malis.

Conclusio.

Omnes homines beatitudinem veram appetunt naturaliter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duo sunt, quae faciunt appetitum, scilicet convenientia et indigentia. Quoniam igitur anima rationalis creata est ad Dei imaginem et similitudinem⁷ et facta est capax boni sufficientissimi; et ipsa sibi non sufficit, cum sit vana et deficiens: ideo dico, quod veram beatitudinem appetit naturaliter.

Ad 1. 2. 3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod multi ignorant veram beatitudinem; respondent aliqui, quod ante appetitum deliberativum oportet cognitionem praecedere, sed non appetitum naturalem. — Sed hoc nihil est: quia, sicut in nobis est duplex amor, naturalis et deliberativus⁸; sic similiter et duplex cognitio: ergo sicut deliberativa cognitio deliberativum amorem praecedit, sic naturalis naturalem.

Et propterea dicendum, quod sicut duplex est instinctus ad bonum, scilicet in generali et in speciali; sic et duplex appetitus. Et dictamen boni in generali venit a cognitione naturali, et quantum ad hoc non est error; sed dictamen in speciali illius vel illius non est omnino ab habitu naturali, sed per assumtionem factam a ratione deliberante, et circa hoc est error. — Similiter et de appetitu intelligendum⁹. Omnes ergo habent appetitum beatitudinis verae in generali et habent cognitionem in generali. Omnes enim credunt, quod beatitudo sit bonum, quod sufficit, et omnes istud appetunt. In speciali vero, quando assumit: hoc sufficit, scilicet honor, vel pecunia, errat cognitio, et declinat affectio. Et est simile de eo qui vult emere aurum et credit, hoc frustum aurichalci esse aurum, et frustum auri credit esse aurichalcum. Si quaeras ab eo in generali, quid velit emere; respondet: aurum. Si quaeras, quod frustum vult emere; respondebit, quod hoc, demonstrato aurichalco. — Similiter, si ab avaro quaeras, utrum appetat beatitudinem veram et velit habere; respondebit, quod sic. Si quaeras, quid velit, utrum paradisum, vel

p. 1004 denarium; respondebit: denarium. Et huius ratio est, quia hic credit sufficientiam, ibi non.

Si quaeras: quomodo cognovit in generali? dico, quod innata est illa cognitio¹. Si quaeras: per quid? dico, quod sufficientiam cognoscit per indigentiam. — Si opponas, quod privatio non est via cognoscendi habitum²; dicendum, quod est quaedam indigentia omnino privans, quaedam disponens et inclinans; et haec est ratio cognoscendi. Unde si materia necessario haberet potentiam cognoscendi, cognosceret utique formam, ad quam inclinatur et disponitur; sic anima sufficientiam per suam indigentiam³. — Posset tamen dici, quod cognitio beatitudinis et multarum rerum naturalium, ut puta iuris naturalis, nobis innata est. Et si anima dicatur creata esse « ut tabula rasa⁴ »; hoc intelligitur solum quantum ad species et similitudines, quas acquirit per sensus. — Vel dicatur tertio modo, sicut in primo libro⁵ dictum est de caritate, quomodo cognoverit eam, qui non habet, et tamen sine receptione speciei a sensibus. — Quilibet istorum modorum multum est probabilis. — Alia duo patent.

Ad 4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod beatitudo appetitur sub ratione commodi; sed illud commodum est proprium naturae rationalis, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem. Unde etsi animalia appetant commodum, illud appetunt, ad quod sunt⁶.

The numbered footnotes in the Apparatus below follow Quaracchi's own numbering, which restarts on every printed page; the labels are therefore page-qualified: notes 1–2 of page 1002, notes 1–9 of page 1003, notes 1–6 of page 1004. The same markers appear at the same positions in the Latin body above and in the English translation.

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Question II. In what way beatitude is desirable.

Secondly it is asked, in what way beatitude is desirable; and it is asked whether all men desire true beatitude. And that they do, it seems.

1. Boethius¹: "Implanted in the minds of men is a longing for the true good"; but the true good is that which truly makes us blessed: therefore all desire true beatitude.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher² says that "all things long for the good"; therefore they either long for any whatever good, or for the good which suffices. Not for any whatever,

for if for any whatever, then there is a process to infinity: it stands, therefore, that it is the good which suffices. But no good is sufficient to fill the human soul except true beatitude: therefore all men desire true beatitude.

3. Likewise, that a man should desire beatitude is either natural or of deliberation. If of deliberation: then he can desire the contrary, namely misery, the contrary of which Augustine says in the third book of On Free Choice¹: therefore he desires it with a natural desire. But natural desire is common to all and perpetual: therefore if the desire of beatitude is such, the conclusion is plain, etc.

4. Likewise, everything perfectible naturally desires its own perfection; but the human soul is born to be perfected by true beatitude²: therefore every soul desires true beatitude.

On the contrary:

1. "Things unseen we can love, things unknown by no means," as Augustine says³; but there are many who do not know what true beatitude is and where it is; which is plain, because they place beatitude in riches and honours: therefore they do not desire true beatitude either.

2. Likewise, "sin is, having despised the unchangeable Good, to cleave to changeable things⁴"; but beatitude is the unchangeable Good: therefore every sinner despises true beatitude, therefore none desires it. — If you say that he despises it with the deliberative desire, but desires it with the natural one; this is nothing: because "what is natural does not grow accustomed to its contrary": therefore he will never be able by habituation to despise it.

3. Likewise, beatitude is desired either for its own sake or for the sake of something else. If for the sake of something else: then it is not desired as beatitude, because that makes blessed in which the end is constituted: it is therefore desired for its own sake by everyone by whom it is desired⁵. But there are many who enjoy things to be used and use things to be enjoyed: therefore there are many who do not desire true beatitude for its own sake: therefore neither do they desire it at all.

4. Likewise, if it is desired, it is either under the aspect of the advantageous or under the aspect of the honourable. If under the aspect of the advantageous; since the desire of the advantageous is in brute animals: then the desire of beatitude is too⁶. If under the aspect of the honourable; since the love of the honourable is not in the wicked: then it is not desired by the wicked themselves.

Conclusion.

All men naturally desire true beatitude.

I respond: It must be said that there are two things which produce desire, namely suitability and neediness. Since therefore the rational soul has been created to the image and likeness of God⁷ and has been made capable of the most sufficient good; and it does not suffice for itself, since it is empty and deficient: therefore I say that it naturally desires true beatitude.

To 1, 2, 3. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that many are ignorant of true beatitude; some answer that knowledge must precede the deliberative desire, but not the natural desire. — But this is nothing: because, just as in us there is a twofold love, natural and deliberative⁸; so likewise there is also a twofold knowledge: therefore just as deliberative knowledge precedes deliberative love, so natural knowledge precedes natural love.

And therefore it must be said that just as there is a twofold instinct toward the good, namely in general and in particular; so also there is a twofold desire. And the judgment of the good in general comes from natural knowledge, and as regards this there is no error; but the judgment in particular, of this or that, is not wholly from a natural habit, but by an assumption made by deliberating reason, and about this there is error. — And the like is to be understood of desire⁹. All men therefore have the desire of true beatitude in general and have knowledge of it in general. For all believe that beatitude is the good which suffices, and all desire that. But in particular, when one assumes: this suffices, namely honour or money, knowledge errs and affection turns aside. And it is like the case of one who wishes to buy gold and believes this piece of brass to be gold, and believes the piece of gold to be brass. If you ask him in general what he wishes to buy, he answers: gold. If you ask which piece he wishes to buy, he will answer: this one, pointing to the brass. — Likewise, if you ask a miser whether he desires true beatitude and wishes to have it, he will answer that he does. If you ask what he wishes, whether paradise or

a penny; he will answer: the penny. And the reason of this is that here he believes there is sufficiency, there he does not.

If you ask: how did he know it in general? I say that that knowledge is innate¹. If you ask: by what? I say that he knows sufficiency through neediness. — If you object that privation is not a way of knowing a habit²; it must be said that there is a certain neediness wholly privative, and a certain one disposing and inclining; and this latter is the ground of knowing. Hence if matter necessarily had the power of knowing, it would surely know the form to which it is inclined and disposed; so the soul knows sufficiency through its own neediness³. — It could nevertheless be said that the knowledge of beatitude and of many natural things, such as the natural law, is innate in us. And if the soul is said to be created "as a blank tablet⁴"; this is understood only as regards the species and likenesses which it acquires through the senses. — Or let it be said in a third way, as was said in the first book⁵ concerning charity, how one who does not have it has come to know it, and yet without the reception of a species from the senses. — Any one of these ways is highly probable. — The other two are plain.

To 4. To the last it must be said that beatitude is desired under the aspect of the advantageous; but that advantage is proper to rational nature, because it alone is capable of God through knowledge and love. Hence even if animals desire the advantageous, they desire that to which they are ordered⁶.

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