Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page, so the markers are page-qualified (p891, p892, p893, p894).

Quinto quaeritur, utrum resurrectio sit naturalis, an miraculosa. Et quod non sit naturalis, ostenditur:

1. A parte initii: quia «a privatione in habitum per naturam non fit regressus¹»; sed in morte est summa privatio: ergo resurrectio, cum sit a morte, non est per naturam.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte termini: quia omne quod natura producit, est corruptibile et mortale; sed corpus glorificatum est immortale et incorruptibile²: ergo etc.

3. Item, tertio ostenditur a parte modi operandi: quia natura operatur successive, non subito; sed resurrectio erit subito, in ictu oculi³: ergo non est a natura.

4. Item, ostenditur etiam a parte principii effectivi: quia «natura est vis insita rebus, ex similibus similia procreans⁴»; sed in resurrectione non fit simile ex simili: ergo etc.

5. Ultimo ostenditur a parte omnium horum: quia est articulus fidei, quae non est de his quae fiunt per naturam, sed supra naturam: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Iob comparat resurrectionem hominis germinationi ligni praecisi, Iob decimo quarto¹; Apostolus vivificationi grani mortui, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto; Gregorius, in homilia paschali, generationi circulari corporis arboris ex parvo semine. Et in his ostendere volunt et probare resurrectionem: ergo si ratio et similitudo bona est, quam ponunt; cum omnia haec sint a natura, resurrectio est naturalis.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur, quia dicit Augustinus in libro de Quantitate animae²: «Si cursum naturalium rerum attendamus, certius erit nobis, resurrectionem esse futuram, quam solem oriri cras».

3. Item, Apostolus dicit³: Oportet, corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem; sed quod est supra naturam non oportet evenire: ergo resurrectio est in potentia naturae.

4. Item, ratione probatur hoc ipsum: quia maior est aptitudo pulveris hominis ad generationem⁴ hominis quam alterius animalis; sed natura per putrefactionem potest de tali pulvere aliud animal generare: ergo et corpus hominis reparare.

5. Item, maior est aptitudo materiae corporis hominis ad ipsum, quam virgarum ad serpentes; sed productio serpentum ex virgis magorum, quamvis ministerio fieret diabolico, tamen erat naturalis⁵: ergo etc.

6. Item, quod est in appetitu naturae est naturale, quia natura non fundavit appetitum frustra; sed anima naturaliter appetit reuniri corpori; hoc constat per Augustinum super Genesim ad litteram⁶, ubi dicit, quod «anima propter appetitum ad corpus retardatur, ne tota intentione feratur in summum caelum»: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod appetitus est tantum ex parte animae; ostenditur etiam, quod ex parte pulverum: quia corpus humanum ex coniunctione sui cum anima habet ordinari ad immortalitatem; sed coniunctio cum anima est naturalis: ergo et illa ordinatio. Sed ad illud, ad quod res naturaliter ordinatur, habet naturalem appetitum, ut ignis sursum ferri⁷: ergo etc. Praeterea, pulveres illi aut resolvuntur in elementa prima, aut non. Si sic; cum elementa sint homogenea, non magis habent ordinationem ad corpus humanum quam alia pars elementi, quae nunquam fuit corpus: ergo non est maior ratio, quare de eo iterum fiat corpus humanum quam de alio; quod falsum est. Si non resolvuntur ad elementa; aliqua vis tenet, quae est in ipsis pulveribus, et per ipsam ordinantur ad ulteriorem formam, ergo naturalem⁸: ergo ex parte corporis et animae est resurrectio naturalis.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Resurrectio non est naturalis, sed supra naturam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in resurrectione tria sunt: primum est corporis ex pulveribus reformatio; secundum ipsi corpori reformato animae unio; tertium unitorum inseparabilis colligatio. Primum est contra naturam, id est contra solitum cursum naturae, quae potest perfecta destruere, non destructa reparare. Secundum est secundum naturam, quod anima optime corpori sibi organizato, cui desiderabat uniri, uniatur. Tertium est supra naturam, scilicet quod ex corruptibili fiat incorruptibile non separabile.

Quoniam igitur primum et ultimum est non a natura, sed supra vel contra; ideo non est dicendum, resurrectionem naturalem esse, sed supra naturam⁹.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod probatur et comparatur operationibus naturae; dicendum, quod probatio est bona et per locum a minori¹⁰. Si enim natura creata potest facere vivum de mortuo, de semine parvo facere magnum corpus, quae est potentiae finitae; multo magis Deus potest per se facere de homine; et ad hoc tendunt illae rationes et comparationes. Et propter hoc dicit Augustinus: «Certissima erit nobis resurrectio, si cursum naturalem attendamus», non quia ipsa sit a natura, sed quia a Deo melius hoc potest fieri, quam a natura possint fieri opera sua.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de opportunitate, dicendum, quod est opportunitas materiae et efficientis, sicut et necessitas; et opportunitas a parte efficientis est ratione immutabilitatis, non coactionis¹¹; et ideo opportunum, quia Deus decrevit et disposuit, non quia compellatur, vel materia necessario

ex parte naturae praeparetur. Et ideo talis opportunitas non infert, huiusmodi resurrectionem esse a causa naturali, cum stet cum causa supernaturaliter operante.

Ad 4, 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura potest de his quae generata sunt per putrefactionem, et de serpentibus; dicendum, quod quaedam animalia modicam organizationem habent, utpote vermes et animalia corporis anulosi; et talium est natura productiva per putrefactionem. Quaedam completam, ut animalia sensibilia perfecta et gradientia, ut equus; et talia non potest¹ nisi per vim formativam influxam cum decisione seminis; et tale est corpus humanum, quod non potest naturaliter organizari, nisi adsit semen et debitum vas suscipiens, scilicet matrix; et ideo non est simile de serpentibus.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de appetitu naturae, dupliciter potest responderi: uno modo, quod propositio illa falsa est. Quaedam enim sunt in naturae appetitu, quae tamen non sunt in eius potestate; et talia non sunt naturalia, ut patet de beatitudine². Quae autem sunt in appetitu et potestate, talia sunt naturalia; tale autem non est resurrectio. — Aliter solvi potest, quod ex parte animae est appetitus, ex parte pulverum non est appetitus; nec ex illa parte est naturalis, sed contra naturam.

Unde nota de pulveribus tres opiniones. Quidam enim dicunt, quod habent appetitum et naturalem ordinationem ad incorruptionem propter animam; et ratione illius habent, quod non possunt resolvi usque ad elementa, tamen possunt esse materia quorumlibet corporum. — Sed istud non capio, quod in corpus vermis possit reverti homo, vel in corpus lupi, et non resolvi in elementa; immo Glossa super illud Psalmi³: Posuerunt morticina, videtur dicere, quod resurrectio est «ex occultissimis naturae sinibus». Verbum etiam Augustini in Enchiridio repugnat, quod innuit, quod in ipsa etiam elementa possunt resolvi.

Alia opinio est, quod resolvuntur in elementa, et tamen manet appetitus propter hoc, quod elementa illa, ut fuerunt corporis humani materia, habuerunt multum de natura lucis, quae stat cum omnibus elementis; et ratione illius naturae habent appetitum et ordinationem. — Sed nec hoc intelligo, quomodo lux maneat simul cum terra, et quod terra, quae est materia corporis humani magis sit lucida; et quod vermis, qui generatur de humano corpore, plus habeat de natura lucis quam alius vermis.

Tertia opinio est, quod pulveres resolvuntur vel resolvi possunt in elementa; nec elementa illa habent aliquem appetitum nec ordinationem ad corpus secundum naturam, sed solum secundum divinam providentiam, quae disponit illud idem corpus reformare animae, ut in eo remuneretur; nec est distincta illa pars ab aliis partibus elementi in se, sed in comparatione ad divinam sapientiam, quam nihil latet, nihil subterfugit.

Et haec opinio probabilior est, ut credo. Et tunc patet responsio ad illud: quia nunquam corpus ex unione ad animam aliquam recipit qualitatem creatam vel dispositionem incorruptibilitatis secundum statum praesentem — nisi forte dicas meritum vel demeritum, sed illud manet in anima, non in corpore — aut si quam aliam des⁴ dispositionem, aut post corruptionem et resolutionem non manet, aut in potentia valde remota manet. — Hoc tamen sine calumnia verum est, quod corpus, ex quo unitur animae rationali, ordinationem statim habet ad immortalitatem secundum divinam providentiam.

Et si tu quaeras: quomodo anima habet appetitum ad hanc partem elementi, cum sit omnino homogeneum et unius naturae cum aliis partibus elementi, nec etiam distinctionem habeat; quia potest omnino aliis commisceri, et iterum aeque bene possit ei corpus ex alia parte elementi reparari et eiusdem complexionis et habitudinis et complementi? dicendum, quod quantumcumque fuerit⁵ simile et commisceatur aliis elementis, sive uni sive pluribus, semper tamen manet substantia materiae cum ratione seminali, et pars substantiae illius materiae, etsi non sit actu separata ab aliis partibus, quibus est commixta, est tamen separabilis; et quamvis non sit separabilis nec distinguibilis secundum humanam potentiam, est tamen separabilis et distinguibilis secundum potentiam et sapientiam divinam, quae novit, in quid redierit corpus humanum, quotcumque et quibuscumque mutationibus et conversionibus sit mutatum: et sic per illius sapientiae discretionem et potentiae operationem illud per easdem formas, per quas disponebatur ad formationem⁶ animae, postmodum disponitur.

Et si tu quaeras, quare anima appetat magis illud quam aliud, cum nulla sit praeelectio propter uniformitatem; dicendum, quod magis appetit propter colligantiam et coniunctionem, quam habuit ad illud. — Et hoc patet sic. Anima enim rationalis, quia est anima, differt ab Angelo et convenit cum aliis animabus, et per hoc habet inclinationem ad corpus; quia rationalis, ad corpus humanum; quia nobilis, ad nobilius organizatum¹; sed ad hoc magis quam ad aliud propter coniunctionem, quam habuit ad illud. — Exemplum est si quis velit contrahere: cum duabus virginibus existentibus aeque pulcris et bonis, et paribus conditionibus ceteris; hic erit indifferens respectu utriusque. Sed esto, quod coniungatur alteri, ipsa coniunctio iam alligabit adeo isti, si fuit² ex amore, ut iam non consoletur habere aliam nec daret hanc pro alia pulcriori et meliori. Sic anima tanto affectu unitur substantiae carnis, quam prius vivificavit, quod non complete ei satisfit, nisi illa eadem, ubicumque lateat, reparetur.

Et sic patet, quod anima habet ordinationem et appetitum, per quem ordinatur ad illud corpus, quantumcumque aliis conformetur; sed corpus habet ordinationem ratione divinae providentiae. Quod autem habeat per aliquid, quod sit in se, ex quo plene resolutum est; non audeo asserere propter hoc, quia nec ratio nec auctoritas nec fides compellit. Attamen, quia potest esse, quod Deus dedit, non audeo pertinaciter negare. Ideo certum tenentes, incertum profundioribus relinquamus. Nam esto, quod non sit in pulveribus appetitus, et quod fiat resolutio usque ad ultima; non perit aliquid, quod ad resurrectionem spectet, propter hoc quod, sicut dicit Augustinus³, «non perit Deo terrena materies, de qua mortalium creatur caro. Sed in quemlibet pulverem cineremve solvatur, in quoslibet halitus aurasve diffugiat, inquamcumque aliorum corporum substantiam, vel in ipsa elementa vertatur, in quemcumque cibum etc.; illi animae etiam in puncto temporis redit, quae ipsam primitus animavit⁴».

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Question V. Whether the resurrection is natural or miraculous.

Fifth, it is asked whether the resurrection is natural or miraculous. And that it is not natural is shown:

1. From the standpoint of the beginning: because «by nature there is no return from privation to a possessed state¹»; but in death there is the utmost privation: therefore the resurrection, since it is from death, is not through nature.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the standpoint of the terminus: because everything that nature produces is corruptible and mortal; but the glorified body is immortal and incorruptible²: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, thirdly it is shown from the standpoint of the mode of operating: because nature works successively, not suddenly; but the resurrection will be sudden, in the twinkling of an eye³: therefore it is not from nature.

4. Likewise, it is also shown from the standpoint of the effective principle: because «nature is a force implanted in things, procreating like from like⁴»; but in the resurrection like is not made from like: therefore, etc.

5. Last, it is shown from the standpoint of all these together: because it is an article of faith, which is not concerned with those things that come about through nature, but above nature: therefore, etc.

On the contrary: 1. Job compares the resurrection of man to the sprouting of a felled tree, Job fourteen¹; the Apostle, to the quickening of a dead grain, First Corinthians fifteen; Gregory, in the Paschal homily, to the cyclical generation of the body of a tree from a small seed. And by these they wish to show and prove the resurrection: therefore, if the reasoning and likeness they set forth is good, since all these things are from nature, the resurrection is natural.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown because Augustine says in the book On the Greatness of the Soul²: «If we attend to the course of natural things, it will be more certain to us that the resurrection is to come than that the sun will rise tomorrow».

3. Likewise, the Apostle says³: This corruptible must put on incorruption; but what is above nature need not come to pass: therefore the resurrection is within the power of nature.

4. Likewise, this same thing is proved by reason: because the aptitude of a man's dust for the generation⁴ of a man is greater than for that of another animal; but nature through putrefaction can generate another animal from such dust: therefore it can also restore the body of a man.

5. Likewise, the aptitude of the matter of a man's body for that body is greater than that of the rods for serpents; but the production of serpents from the rods of the magicians, although it came about by diabolical agency, was nevertheless natural⁵: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, what is in the appetite of nature is natural, because nature did not establish appetite in vain; but the soul naturally desires to be reunited to the body; this is established by Augustine On Genesis according to the Letter⁶, where he says that «the soul is held back on account of its appetite for the body, lest it be borne with its whole intention into the highest heaven»: therefore, etc. If you say that the appetite is only on the part of the soul, it is shown also to be on the part of the dust: because the human body, from its conjunction with the soul, is ordered to immortality; but the conjunction with the soul is natural: therefore so also is that ordering. But that to which a thing is naturally ordered, it has a natural appetite for, as fire has to be borne upward⁷: therefore, etc. Moreover, those dusts are either resolved into the first elements, or not. If so, then since the elements are homogeneous, they have no more an ordering to the human body than any other part of the element which was never a body: therefore there is no greater reason why a human body should be made again from it than from another; which is false. If they are not resolved into the elements, then some force holds them, which is in those dusts, and through it they are ordered to a further form, therefore a natural one⁸: therefore, from the standpoint of both body and soul, the resurrection is natural.

Conclusion

Conclusion. The resurrection is not natural, but above nature.

I respond: It must be said that in the resurrection there are three things: the first is the reformation of the body from the dust; the second, the union of the soul to the body thus reformed; the third, the inseparable binding-together of the things united. The first is against nature, that is, against the accustomed course of nature, which can destroy what is complete but cannot restore what is destroyed. The second is according to nature, namely that the soul be united most fittingly to the body organized for it, to which it desired to be united. The third is above nature, namely that from the corruptible there be made the incorruptible, not separable.

Since, therefore, the first and the last are not from nature, but above or against it, therefore it must not be said that the resurrection is natural, but above nature⁹.

To the arguments:

To 1, 2. To that, then, which is objected — that it is proved and compared to the operations of nature — it must be said that the proof is good and proceeds through the topic from the lesser¹⁰. For if created nature can make the living from the dead, and from a small seed make a great body — nature which is of finite power — much more can God by Himself do this with regard to man; and to this those reasonings and comparisons tend. And on account of this Augustine says: «The resurrection will be most certain to us, if we attend to the natural course», not because it is from nature, but because this can be done better by God than nature's own works can be done by nature.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning fittingness (opportunitas), it must be said that there is a fittingness of the matter and of the efficient cause, just as there is a necessity [of each]; and the fittingness on the part of the efficient cause is by reason of immutability, not of compulsion¹¹; and therefore it is fitting because God decreed and disposed it, not because He is compelled, or because the matter is necessarily

prepared on the part of nature. And therefore such a fittingness does not entail that a resurrection of this kind is from a natural cause, since it stands together with a cause operating supernaturally.

To 4, 5. To that which is objected — that nature can act with regard to those things generated by putrefaction, and with regard to serpents — it must be said that certain animals have a slight organization, such as worms and ringed-bodied animals; and of such the nature is productive through putrefaction. Certain others have a complete [organization], such as perfect sentient and walking animals, like the horse; and such nature cannot [produce]¹ except through a formative power infused with the emission of seed; and such is the human body, which cannot be naturally organized unless there be present seed and a fitting receptive vessel, namely the womb; and therefore it is not similar in the case of serpents.

To 6. To that which is objected concerning the appetite of nature, one can respond in two ways: in one way, that that proposition is false. For there are certain things in the appetite of nature which are nevertheless not in its power; and such are not natural, as is clear in the case of beatitude². But those which are in appetite and in power, such are natural; but the resurrection is not such. — Otherwise it can be resolved thus: that on the part of the soul there is appetite, on the part of the dust there is no appetite; nor on that part is it natural, but against nature.

Hence note three opinions concerning the dust. For some say that [the dusts] have an appetite and a natural ordering to incorruption on account of the soul; and by reason of that they hold that they cannot be resolved all the way down to the elements, yet they can be the matter of any bodies whatever. — But this I do not grasp: that a man could revert into the body of a worm, or into the body of a wolf, and not be resolved into the elements; indeed the Gloss on that verse of the Psalm³: They have set out the dead bodies, seems to say that the resurrection is «from the most hidden bosoms of nature». The word of Augustine in the Enchiridion also opposes it, for it implies that they can be resolved even into the elements themselves.

Another opinion is that they are resolved into the elements, and yet the appetite remains on account of this: that those elements, inasmuch as they were the matter of the human body, had much of the nature of light, which stands together with all the elements; and by reason of that nature they have appetite and ordering. — But neither do I understand this: how light should remain together with earth, and that the earth which is the matter of the human body should be more luminous; and that the worm which is generated from a human body should have more of the nature of light than another worm.

The third opinion is that the dusts are resolved, or can be resolved, into the elements; nor do those elements have any appetite or ordering to the body according to nature, but only according to divine providence, which disposes to reform that same body for the soul, that in it [the soul] may be rewarded; nor is that part distinct from the other parts of the element in itself, but [only] in comparison to the divine wisdom, from which nothing lies hidden, nothing escapes.

And this opinion is more probable, as I believe. And then the reply to the objection is clear: because a body never, from its union with the soul, receives any created quality or disposition of incorruptibility according to the present state — unless perhaps you say merit or demerit, but that remains in the soul, not in the body — or if you should posit some other⁴ disposition, either after corruption and resolution it does not remain, or it remains in a very remote potency. — This, nevertheless, is true without cavil: that the body, from the moment it is united to the rational soul, straightway has an ordering to immortality according to divine providence.

And if you ask: how does the soul have an appetite for this part of the element, since it is wholly homogeneous and of one nature with the other parts of the element, and does not even have a distinction — because it can be entirely mingled with others, and again a body could equally well be restored to it from another part of the element, of the same complexion and disposition and completeness? — it must be said that, however much it may have been⁵ like [the rest] and mingled with other elements, whether with one or with many, nevertheless the substance of the matter always remains together with its seminal reason; and the part of the substance of that matter, even if it is not actually separated from the other parts with which it is commingled, is nevertheless separable; and although it is not separable nor distinguishable according to human power, it is nevertheless separable and distinguishable according to the divine power and wisdom, which knows into what the human body will have returned, by however many and whatever changes and conversions it may have been altered: and thus, through the discernment of that wisdom and the operation of [its] power, it is afterward disposed through the same forms by which it was disposed for the forming⁶ of the soul.

And if you ask why the soul desires this one rather than another, since there is no prior choice on the ground of uniformity — it must be said that it desires [it] more on account of the bond and conjunction which it had to it. — And this is clear thus. For the rational soul, because it is a soul, differs from an Angel and agrees with other souls, and through this it has an inclination to a body; because it is rational, to a human body; because it is noble, to a more nobly organized one¹; but to this one more than to another on account of the conjunction which it had to it. — There is an example, if someone should wish to contract marriage: given two maidens equally beautiful and good, and equal in all other conditions, here he will be indifferent with respect to either. But suppose he is joined to one, the conjunction itself will now bind him so much to this one — if it was² from love — that he now takes no comfort in having the other, nor would he give this one for another more beautiful and better. So the soul is united with such affection to the substance of the flesh which it formerly gave life to, that it is not completely satisfied unless that same [flesh], wherever it lies hidden, be restored to it.

And thus it is clear that the soul has an ordering and appetite by which it is ordered to that body, however much it may be conformed to others; but the body has its ordering by reason of divine providence. But that it should have [this ordering] through something that is in itself, from which it has been fully resolved — I do not dare to assert on this account, because neither reason nor authority nor faith compels it. Nevertheless, since it can be that God has given it, I do not dare pertinaciously to deny it. Therefore, holding fast what is certain, let us leave the uncertain to deeper minds. For suppose there is no appetite in the dust, and that the resolution goes all the way to the last [elements]; nothing perishes that pertains to the resurrection, on account of this: that, as Augustine says³, «earthly matter, from which the flesh of mortals is created, does not perish for God. But whether it be dissolved into any dust or ash, or scatter away into any breaths or breezes, or be turned into the substance of whatever other bodies, or into the elements themselves, or into whatever food, and so on; even in a point of time it returns to that soul which first gave it life⁴».

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