Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers placed in both the Latin body above and the English translation. They are anchored page by page (page-qualified, in the form p-page-number followed by the note number), because the Quaracchi edition restarts its footer numbering on each printed page; in this question they run across pp. 887–891.

Articulus I.

Quaestio IV. Utrum resurrectio sit eorundem corporum secundum numerum.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum resurrectio sit eorundem secundum numerum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Iob decimo nono¹⁰: In carne mea videbo Deum, Salvatorem meum, quem visurus sum ego ipse, et non alius; constat, quod non dicit alius secundum speciem, sed secundum numerum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Philosophus¹¹: «Si ex mortali fiat immortale, non dicimus, eum aliam vitam sumere»; ergo si non est alia vita, nec aliud vivens, ergo idem: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia identitas rei venit ab identitate principiorum substantialium; sed idem est principium materiale et idem formale: ergo idem homo qui prius.

4. Item, «propria forma non est nata fieri nisi in propria materia¹»: ergo cum anima sit propria forma corporis, quod perficit, non est nata uniri nisi illi: ergo si unitur in resurrectione, unitur eidem. Et si hoc; cum ipsa sit eadem, totum erit idem.

Contra:

1. «Omnis forma corrupta et iterum generata non est eadem numero, sed specie», sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo de Generatione²: cum ergo humanitas corrumpatur in isto in morte et iterum generetur in resurrectione, ergo alia numero. Si tu dicas, quod istud tenet in corruptione, quae est in contrarium, non in morte; contra: maior est corruptio in privationem quam in contrarium, quia ad hoc, quod fiat reparatio, necesse est fieri resolutionem usque ad ultima, et omnia rursus de novo generari³: ergo etc.

2. Item, quamvis artifex de eadem materia iterum faciat statuam, tamen alia est statua post quam ante: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod quamvis homo sit ex eisdem pulveribus, tamen est alius. Si dicas, quod Deus potest facere plus quam natura vel artifex; verum est, quod plus potest, tamen non facit, nisi quod congruit et congruum est; nec est intelligibile, quomodo aliquid corrumpatur et cedat in non-ens, et iterum fiat, quod sit idem⁴; aut si est congruum, quare non dat istam potentiam naturae?

3. Item, differentiae essentiales rem diversificant non tantum numero, sed etiam essentia⁵; sed mortale et immortale sunt essentiales differentiae: ergo cum resurgens sit immortalis et ante mortalis, patet etc.

4. Item, prima generatio et reformatio sunt operationes diversae: ergo si diversarum operationum diversi sunt termini secundum substantiam, aliud est corpus, quod primo generatur, aliud corpus, quod postmodum reformatur.

Conclusio. Resurrectio est eiusdem secundum numerum corporis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa senserunt.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod triplex est diversitas secundum numerum: una, quae venit ex diversitate partis materiae et formae specificatae⁶, sicut differt numero haec aqua et hic ignis; quaedam, quae venit ex diversitate partis materiae, sicut iste ignis ab illo differt; tertia, quae venit ex discontinuatione in duratione; et haec diversitas secundum numerum ortum habet, ut dicunt, ex tempore⁷; tempus enim durationem numerat, sicut et actionem. Prima diversitas secundum numerum est magna, secunda minor, tertia minima. Prima et secunda diversitate carebit corpus resurgens, sed tertia non carebit nec potest carere, quia propositio de praeterito non potest non esse vera⁸. Unde sicut virgo corrupta non potest fieri virgo — quia non potest non fuisse corrupta — nec a Deo nec a natura, nec hoc est intelligibile; sic corpus corruptum non potest omnimoda identitate reparari idem, quia non potest non fuisse corruptum. Tamen haec est ita modica diversitas, ut non mereatur aliquid propter hoc dici diversum, quoniam idem est secundum alium duplicem modum identitatis, scilicet propter identitatem materiae et formae, quia identitas materiae et principalis formae erit in resurgentibus. Hinc est, quod resurrectio est in eisdem⁹. Quod ergo dicit Philosophus, quod «forma corrupta et iterum generata est alia numero»; intelligit de ista diversitate.

Sed istud non videtur multum rationabile: primum quidem, quia stultum videtur dicere, quod Deus non possit omnino idem corpus reformare identitate secundum numerum. — Amplius, identitas secundum numerum in substantia non venit ex accidentibus, licet per illa innotescat¹⁰, nec etiam diversitas. — Et iterum, quod discontinuatio in esse non inducat diversitatem in numero, videtur expresse in artificiatis, ut si arca dissolvatur et iterum ex eisdem tabulis et secundum eundem ordinem reparetur; non dicetur alia arca numero, sed eadem; et tamen desiit esse arca.

Et propter hoc dicunt alii aliter, quod duplex est corruptio: quaedam per dissolutionem sive separationem principiorum componentium sive partium; quaedam per corruptionem formae. In prima

possibile est, idem numero reparari ei qui scit ad eundem modum et ad eadem loca reducere. In secunda — quia quod corruptum est non potest esse idem, quoniam nova est essentia formae, sicut¹ de novo generatur — dicunt quod necessario oportet esse aliud; et de hac intelligit Philosophus. Separatio et dissolutio corporis humani est quantum ad primum modum; ideo reparatur idem, sicut artificiatum, quia, salva anima et corpore, fit separatio unius ab alio, et post, salvis partibus materiae, fit incineratio; et Deus sicut bonus artifex cineres colligit et unit et reformat idem corpus: et quoniam illud corpus habet eandem perfectionem, ideo totum consummatum est idem.

Sed istud non solvit sufficienter. Certum est enim, quod forma carnis humanae corrumpitur, dum generatur inde vermis et serpens; et sicut potest corrumpi in carnem serpentis vel alterius animalis, sic resolvi potest, sicut et illud animal, etiam in quatuor elementa, et unumquodque elementorum corrumpi in aliud, et ita corrumpuntur formae mixti et elementi: ergo necesse est, elementa alia esse numero et aliam carnem. Et ita non potest stare ista responsio.

Et propterea notandum, quod est resurrectio eiusdem numero, quia aliter non esset resurrectio. — Si quaeras a me, quomodo hoc esse possit; dico, quod hoc potest esse per virtutem divinam, quamvis non possit esse per naturam; et istud intelligere possumus sic.

Supponamus nunc, quod natura aliquid agit, et illud non agit ex nihilo; et cum agat in materiam, oportet, quod producat formam; et cum materia non sit pars formae, nec forma fiat pars materiae, necesse est, aliquo modo formas naturales esse in materia, antequam producantur; et substantia materiae praegnans est omnibus: ergo rationes seminales omnium formarum sunt in ipsa. Sed ad illud stat resolutio, a quo incipit generatio: ergo nulla forma omnino corrumpitur, sed manet in materia, sicut antequam produceretur. Et sic dicit Augustinus²; unde formas in materia ante productionem dicit esse quantum ad rationes seminales. Dicit etiam, resolvi ad materiam, sicut ad occultissimos sinus naturae, idem utroque nomine secundum alteram et alteram rationem intelligi volens. Quid autem haec sint, alibi melius patet, scilicet in secundo³. Nunc autem hoc dixisse sufficiat, quod omnes formae, cum corrumpuntur, non omnino corrumpuntur, sed manent aliquo modo. Et huic concordat ratio et auctoritas philosophica et auctoritas beati Augustini⁴, et quod maius est, auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae est auctoritas Spiritus sancti.

Hoc praesupposito, dicendum, quod quamvis forma ibi sit aliquo modo post corruptionem, tamen natura non potest producere ad idem esse, quod habuit prius. — Et ratio huius est: quia agens naturale agit influendo et impertiendo aliquid sui, quo mediante perficit illud quod erat in materia; et illud quod influitur a parte agentis, fit aliquid de completo esse ipsius producti: et ideo necesse est, quod natura det aliquid novi quantum ad modum essendi substantialem, qui est esse⁵ in actu. Quamvis enim natura non det novam essentiam, dat tamen novum modum essendi, non tantum accidentalem, immo etiam substantialem, sicut esse in actu, secundum quem potest res substantialiter numerari et diversificari. Et propterea natura, cum reparat, non idem, sed novum producit; sed Deus, qui potest ipsas rationes seminales sine immissione alicuius novi ad perfectum esse deducere, potest facere, quod sit idem. Et sic facit in proposito, quia ex illis solis et per eundem ordinem in reformatione rem constituit, ex quibus erat ante. Unde si omnia elementa convertantur in ignem, Deus ex illo igne reformat eadem elementa, quae ibi erant in rationibus seminalibus, et ex illis formam carnis per eundem ordinem. Et sic patet, quod Deus potest reformare idem corpus secundum numerum; et sic potest dici ad praesens.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1 et 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo et secundo, iam patet responsio: quia, quamvis istud sit impossibile agenti inferiori, est tamen possibile agenti superiori, scilicet ipsi Deo. — Et quare istam potentiam non communicat Deus creaturae, patet: quia nulla creatura agit se ipsa⁶, sed per aliquid sui, immittendo virtutem, sicut et color ad hoc, quod immutet visum, facit speciem sui in medio: unde agit aliquid extrinsecum in intrinseco; non sic Deus. Hoc autem dico de operatione naturali.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de mortali et immortali, dicendum, quod quidquid sit de mortali, utrum sit differentia, an non — quia non est praesentis considerationis, cum rationes ad utramque partem sint, quia videtur dicere defectum et imperfectionem et non habet differentiam in eodem genere condividentem, et alia plura⁷ — tamen hoc absque calumnia verum est, quod mortale tripliciter accipitur: uno modo dicit naturalem aptitudinem ad

moriendum; alio modo, possibilitatem ad moriendum; tertio modo, necessitatem. Et primo quidem modo mortale inest homini ea ratione, qua compositum ex partibus heterogeneis. Unde Hilarius¹: «Non ex compositis est Deus, quia vita est»: si ergo homo est ex compositis heterogeneis et diversis naturis et dispositionibus; impossibile est, quod vitam habeat nisi cum aptitudine ad moriendum; et sicut talis compositio est homini naturalis, ita et mortale. Et hoc modo accipiendo mortale contra immortale, nunquam concurrunt in idem; sic² nec spirituale aut simplex et compositum. Et si aliquo modo est differentia, isto modo est non dividens animal, sed substantiam viventem, cuius una differentia est immortale, et per oppositum mortale. — Secundo modo mortale inest eo modo, quo est quid compositum ex partibus heterogeneis, habentibus defectibilitatem, sicut in primo homine, qui habebat statum animalem; et hoc modo dicit statum medium inter miseriam et gloriam³. — Tertio modo mortale inest ea ratione, qua vivens est compositum ex contrariis, habentibus defectibilitatem et pugnam ad invicem; et sic inest homini lapso, et hoc modo dicit statum miseriae; et immortale huic⁴ oppositum dicit alium statum. Et quoniam status mutari potest, unitate secundum numerum remanente; hinc est, quod ex mortali secundum hunc duplicem modum fit immortale sine diversitate substantiae. Et hoc modo fit in homine glorificato, qui est mortalis primo modo, scilicet secundum naturalem aptitudinem, sed immortalis, prout dicit privationem potentiae et necessitatis.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod diversae sunt operationes; dicendum, quod diversae operationes diversos effectus inducunt, quando dividuntur ex aequo; sed quando sic est, quod una ad alteram ordinatur, et una est reparativa effectus alterius; si secunda egrediatur ab agente omnino potente, potest omnino idem reparari. Et sic est in proposito.

Sed obiicitur: quomodo potest hoc intelligi? Cum istae operationes sint discontinuae, et esse rei sit discontinuum⁵, et unius continui duo sint ultima tantum: si ergo esse discontinuatur, ergo est aliud et aliud. Cum ergo unum numero consequatur idem actuale; necessario videtur sequi, quod sit aliud et aliud. Et iterum, quomodo potest bis incipere aliquid et esse idem? Impossibile enim est esse et intelligere, quod aliquis currat bis eodem cursu. — Et potest ad hoc responderi, quod de esse rei est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad defluxum et durationem, aut secundum se. Si quantum ad durationem et defluxum; sic necessario oportet, quod duratio sit alia et alia, sicut mensura durationis. Si quantum ad ipsum esse secundum se; sic numeratur et plurificatur a principiis permanentibus; et quoniam principia permanentia sunt eadem, quamvis defluxus durationis et inceptio sit alia et alia: hinc est, quod res est una, et esse rei est unum. — Nec est simile de actionibus successivis, quia illae necessario⁶ numerantur, et praeteritum et futurum respiciunt partes diversas actionis sive mutationis sive durationis successivae. Non sic oportet iudicare de forma absoluta, quae corrupta potest a Deo numerari eadem, quia aliquo modo manet in ratione seminali.

Article I.

Question IV. Whether the resurrection will be of the same bodies according to number.

Fourthly it is asked, whether the resurrection will be of the same [bodies] according to number. And that it will, seems [to be shown].

1. Job, chapter nineteen¹⁰: In my flesh I shall see God, my Saviour, whom I myself shall see, and not another; it is clear that he does not say another according to species, but according to number: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher¹¹: "If from a mortal thing an immortal one should come to be, we do not say that it takes on another life"; therefore if there is not another life, neither is there another living thing, therefore [it is] the same: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason: because the identity of a thing comes from the identity of its substantial principles; but the material principle is the same and the formal principle is the same: therefore [it is] the same man as before.

4. Likewise, "a proper form is not naturally apt to come to be except in its proper matter¹": therefore, since the soul is the proper form of the body which it perfects, it is not naturally apt to be united except to that [body]: therefore if it is united in the resurrection, it is united to the same [body]. And if this is so; since it [the soul] is the same, the whole will be the same.

On the contrary:

1. "Every form that is corrupted and again generated is not the same according to number, but according to species," as the Philosopher says in the second book On Generation²: since therefore humanity is corrupted in this [man] in death and again generated in the resurrection, therefore [it is] another according to number. If you should say that this holds in the corruption which is into a contrary, not in death; on the contrary: corruption into privation is greater than into a contrary, because in order that reparation be made, it is necessary that a resolution be made down to the ultimate [elements], and that all things be again generated anew³: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, although a craftsman may make a statue again from the same matter, still the statue is other after than before: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that, although a man be [made] from the same dust, still he is another. If you should say that God can do more than nature or a craftsman; it is true that He can do more, yet He does not do so, except what is fitting and is congruous; nor is it intelligible how something should be corrupted and pass into non-being, and again come to be, such that it is the same⁴; or if it is congruous, why does He not give this power to nature?

3. Likewise, essential differences diversify a thing not only according to number, but also according to essence⁵; but mortal and immortal are essential differences: therefore, since the one who rises is immortal and before was mortal, it is evident etc.

4. Likewise, the first generation and the reformation are diverse operations: therefore if the termini of diverse operations are diverse according to substance, the body which is first generated is one thing, and the body which is afterward reformed is another.

Conclusion. The resurrection is of the same body according to number.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this diverse men have held diverse [views].

For some have said that there is a threefold diversity according to number: one, which comes from the diversity of a part of the matter and of the specified form⁶, as this water and this fire differ in number; another, which comes from the diversity of a part of the matter, as this fire differs from that; a third, which comes from discontinuity in duration; and this diversity according to number has its origin, as they say, from time⁷; for time numbers duration, just as it does action. The first diversity according to number is great, the second less, the third least. Of the first and second diversity the rising body will be free, but of the third it will not be free nor can it be free, because a proposition about the past cannot fail to be true⁸. Hence, just as a corrupted virgin cannot become a virgin — because she cannot not have been corrupted — neither by God nor by nature, nor is this intelligible; so a corrupted body cannot be repaired as the same by an identity in every respect, because it cannot not have been corrupted. Yet this is so slight a diversity that it does not merit being called diverse on this account, since it is the same according to another twofold mode of identity, namely on account of the identity of matter and form, because the identity of the matter and of the principal form will be in those who rise. Hence it is that the resurrection is of the same [bodies]⁹. What therefore the Philosopher says, that "a form corrupted and again generated is another according to number," he understands of this [third] diversity.

But this does not seem very reasonable: first indeed, because it seems foolish to say that God could not reform the entirely same body by an identity according to number. — Further, identity according to number in substance does not come from accidents, although it is made known through them¹⁰, nor does diversity [either]. — And again, that discontinuity in being does not induce diversity in number is seen expressly in artificial things, as if a chest be dissolved and again be repaired from the same boards and according to the same order; it will not be called another chest according to number, but the same; and yet it ceased to be a chest.

And on account of this others say otherwise, that corruption is twofold: one by dissolution or separation of the component principles or parts; another by the corruption of the form. In the first

it is possible that the same [thing] be repaired according to number by one who knows how to reduce [it] to the same mode and to the same places. In the second — because what is corrupted cannot be the same, since the essence of the form is new, as¹ it is generated anew — they say that of necessity it must be another; and of this the Philosopher understands. The separation and dissolution of the human body is according to the first mode; therefore it is repaired as the same, like an artifact, because, the soul and the body being preserved, there occurs a separation of the one from the other, and afterward, the parts of the matter being preserved, incineration occurs; and God, like a good craftsman, gathers and unites the ashes and reforms the same body: and since that body has the same perfection, therefore the whole consummated [body] is the same.

But this does not resolve [it] sufficiently. For it is certain that the form of human flesh is corrupted while a worm and a serpent are generated from it; and just as it can be corrupted into the flesh of a serpent or of another animal, so it can be resolved, like that animal too, even into the four elements, and each of the elements be corrupted into another, and thus the forms of the mixture and of the element are corrupted: therefore it is necessary that the elements be other according to number and [that there be] another flesh. And thus this response cannot stand.

And therefore it must be noted that the resurrection is of the same [body] according to number, because otherwise it would not be a resurrection. — If you should ask me how this can be; I say that this can be by divine power, although it cannot be by nature; and this we can understand thus.

Let us now suppose that nature does something, and does it not from nothing; and since it acts upon matter, it is necessary that it produce a form; and since matter is not a part of the form, nor does form become a part of matter, it is necessary that in some way natural forms be in the matter before they are produced; and the substance of matter is pregnant with all [forms]: therefore the seminal reasons of all forms are in it. But at that [point] resolution stops, from which generation begins: therefore no form is entirely corrupted, but remains in the matter, just as before it was produced. And thus says Augustine²; whence he says that the forms are in the matter before their production as regards their seminal reasons. He says also that they are resolved into the matter, as into the most hidden recesses of nature, meaning the same [thing] to be understood by each name according to one and another respect. But what these [seminal reasons] are is better shown elsewhere, namely in the second book³. Now let it suffice to have said this, that all forms, when they are corrupted, are not entirely corrupted, but remain in some way. And with this agrees reason and philosophical authority and the authority of blessed Augustine⁴, and what is greater, the authority of sacred Scripture, which is the authority of the Holy Spirit.

This being presupposed, it must be said that although the form be there in some way after corruption, still nature cannot produce [it] to the same being which it had before. — And the reason for this is: because a natural agent acts by influencing and imparting something of itself, by the mediation of which it perfects that which was in the matter; and that which is influenced from the side of the agent becomes something belonging to the complete being of the product itself: and therefore it is necessary that nature give something new as regards the substantial mode of being, which is being⁵ in act. For although nature does not give a new essence, it does give a new mode of being, not only accidental, but even substantial, like being in act, according to which a thing can be substantially numbered and diversified. And therefore nature, when it repairs, produces not the same, but a new [thing]; but God, who can bring the very seminal reasons to perfect being without the introduction of anything new, can make [it] to be the same. And so He does in the case at hand, because from those [elements] alone and by the same order He constitutes the thing in the reformation, from which it was before. Hence if all the elements be converted into fire, God from that fire reforms the same elements, which were there in the seminal reasons, and from them the form of flesh by the same order. And thus it is evident that God can reform the same body according to number; and so it can be said for the present.

To the arguments:

To 1 and 2. To that then which is objected first and second, the response is now evident: because, although this be impossible for a lower agent, still it is possible for a higher agent, namely God Himself. — And why God does not communicate this power to the creature is evident: because no creature acts by itself⁶, but through something of itself, sending forth a power, as color too, in order to alter the sight, makes a likeness of itself in the medium: whence it acts as something extrinsic within something intrinsic; not so God. And this I say of natural operation.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning the mortal and the immortal, it must be said that whatever be [the case] concerning "mortal," whether it be a difference or not — because it is not of the present consideration, since there are reasons for either side, because it seems to signify a defect and imperfection and does not have a difference in the same genus co-dividing [it], and many other things⁷ — nevertheless this is true without calumny, that mortal is taken in three ways: in one way it signifies a natural aptitude toward

dying; in another way, the possibility of dying; in a third way, necessity. And in the first way indeed mortal is present in man by that reason by which [he is] composed of heterogeneous parts. Whence Hilary¹: "God is not from composite things, since He is life": if therefore man is [composed] of heterogeneous composites and diverse natures and dispositions; it is impossible that he have life except with an aptitude toward dying; and just as such composition is natural to man, so also is mortal[ity]. And taking mortal in this way against immortal, they never coincide in the same [subject]; so² neither the spiritual nor the simple and the composite. And if in some way it is a difference, in this way it is not one dividing animal, but the living substance, of which one difference is immortal, and by opposite mortal. — In the second way mortal is present in the manner in which something is composite of heterogeneous parts having defectibility, as in the first man, who had the animal state; and in this way it signifies the state midway between misery and glory³. — In the third way mortal is present by that reason by which a living thing is composite of contraries having defectibility and a struggle against one another; and thus it is present in fallen man, and in this way it signifies the state of misery; and immortal, opposed to this⁴, signifies another state. And since the state can be changed, the unity according to number remaining; hence it is that from mortal, according to this twofold mode, comes to be immortal without a diversity of substance. And in this way it comes about in the glorified man, who is mortal in the first way, namely according to natural aptitude, but immortal, inasmuch as it signifies the privation of the potency and the necessity [of dying].

To 4. To that which is objected lastly, that the operations are diverse; it must be said that diverse operations induce diverse effects when they are divided on an equal footing; but when it is so, that one is ordered to the other, and one is reparative of the effect of the other; if the second proceed from an agent entirely powerful, the entirely same [thing] can be repaired. And so it is in the case at hand.

But it is objected: how can this be understood? Since these operations are discontinuous, and the being of the thing is discontinuous⁵, and of one continuum there are only two ultimate [points]: if therefore being is discontinuous, then it is one and another. Since therefore what is one in number follows the same actual [being]; it seems necessarily to follow that it is one and another. And again, how can something begin twice and be the same? For it is impossible to be and to understand that someone should run twice the same course. — And it can be responded to this that concerning the being of a thing one may speak in two ways: either as regards its flowing-forth and duration, or in itself. If as regards duration and flowing-forth; thus it necessarily follows that the duration be one and another, like the measure of duration. If as regards the being in itself; thus it is numbered and multiplied by the permanent principles; and since the permanent principles are the same, although the flowing-forth of duration and the beginning be one and another: hence it is that the thing is one, and the being of the thing is one. — Nor is it similar concerning successive actions, because those are necessarily⁶ numbered, and the past and the future regard diverse parts of the action or change or successive duration. It is not so that one ought to judge concerning an absolute form, which, once corrupted, can be numbered as the same by God, because in some way it remains in the seminal reason.