Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus

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Articulus Unicus. De his quae mortem Christi consequuntur.

Quaestio I. Utrum Christus in triduo fuerit homo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus^p450-1: «Talis fuit illa susceptio, quae faceret Deum hominem et hominem Deum»; sed susceptio non mutata mansit in triduo, sicut prius ostensum est: ergo Christus in triduo fuit homo.

2. Item, magister Hugo de sancto Victore^p450-2: «Quid stultius, quam quod homo tunc esse desinat, quando vere esse incipit»! Ex hoc arguit ita: cum ergo homo sanctus incipiat esse beatus, quod est esse verissimum, stultissimum est dicere, quod tunc desinat esse: ergo de quolibet homine post mortem verum est dicere, quod sit homo: ergo multo fortius hoc debet concedi et dici de Christo.

3. Item, omne habens humanam naturam est homo; sed Christus in triduo erat habens humanam naturam: ergo Christus in triduo erat homo^p450-3. Maior et minor per se manifestae sunt.

4. Item, quotiescumque anima et corpus uniuntur in unam hypostasim, faciunt hominem; sed in triduo anima et corpus uniebantur in unam hypostasim in Christo: ergo Christus in triduo erat homo.

5. Item, haec est vera: Christus in triduo iacebat in sepulcro; aut ergo secundum quod Deus, aut secundum quod homo; sed non secundum quod Deus: ergo secundum quod homo: ergo Christus in triduo erat homo^p450-4.

6. Item, Christus in triduo non desiit esse sacerdos: ergo Christus in triduo non desiit esse homo. Prima patet per hoc quod dicitur in Psalmo^p450-5: Tu es sacerdos in aeternum; et ad Hebraeos septimo: Christus habet sempiternum sacerdotium. Necessitas illationis in hoc ostenditur, quod sacerdos erat, secundum quod homo.

7. Item, Christus propter assumtionem animae rationalis, rationalis erat rationalitate creata; sed Christus in triduo habuit animam rationalem sibi unitam: ergo Christus in triduo erat rationalis rationalitate creata: ergo erat Angelus, vel anima, vel homo. Sed non erat Angelus, vel anima: ergo erat homo.

Sed contra: 1. «Mortuus diminuit de ratione hominis^p450-6»: ergo quicumque est homo mortuus, est deficiens a completa ratione hominis; sed completum non praedicatur de diminuto: ergo si Christus in triduo erat homo mortuus, haec est falsa: Christus in triduo erat homo.

2. Item, secundum naturalem philosophum homo est compositum ex anima rationali et carne; sed Christus in triduo non erat compositum ex anima rationali et carne^p450-7: ergo Christus in triduo non erat homo vere.

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3. Item, nulla forma praedicatur de toto, quia forma, sed quia est forma consequens totum compositum: si ergo homo praedicatur de Christo, necesse est, quod nominet formam consequentem totum compositum; sed in Christo soluta erat compositio in triduo: ergo in triduo non poterat dici homo. Maior propositio manifesta est per inductionem et per auctoritatem Avicennae^p451-1, qui eam ponit, et per auctoritatem Boethii, qui dicit, quod «species est totum esse individui».

4. Item, corrupto superiori essentiali, necesse est, corrumpi inferius; sed esse vivum superius est ad esse hominem et est ei essentiale, quia «vivere est esse viventis^p451-2»: ergo si Christus in triduo desiit esse vivus, Christus in triduo desiit esse homo: non ergo Christus in triduo erat homo.

5. Item, Christus in triduo nec videre poterat nec audire nec loqui: ergo si erat homo, erat homo caecus, surdus et mutus; sed hoc est absurdum dicere de Christo: ergo falsum est dicere, quod Christus in triduo fuerit homo^p451-3.

6. Item, sicut unio divinae naturae et humanae facit, Deum esse hominem, ita unio animae ad carnem facit, esse animatum: ergo cessante unione animae ad carnem, cessat esse animatum; et si cessat esse animatum, cessat esse animal; et si cessat esse animal, necessario cessat esse homo: ergo a primo, cum in Christo fuerit separatio animae a carne in triduo, Christus desiit esse homo in triduo: non ergo fuit homo in triduo.

7. Item, ad hoc ipsum sunt rationes Magistri in littera^p451-4, quae super hoc fundantur: omnis homo aut est mortalis, aut immortalis, omnis etiam homo est alicubi homo; sed Christus in triduo nec erat mortalis nec erat immortalis nec erat alicubi homo — quia non in sepulcro, cum non esset ibi nisi corpus; non in inferno, cum non esset ibi nisi anima — ergo Christus non fuit homo in triduo.

Conclusio.

Christus in triduo non fuit homo, si loquamur de praedicatione simpliciter actuali.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc fuit triplex modus dicendi. — Primus est, quod non solum vere Christus in triduo possit dici homo, sed etiam hoc potest dici de quolibet homine mortuo. — Secundus vero modus dicendi est, quod hoc non debet concedi de aliis; potest tamen concedi de Christo. — Tertius vero modus dicendi est, quod illud non debet concedi de Christo nec de aliis hominibus. Et primum modum dicendi tenuit magister Hugo de sancto Victore; secundum modum tenuit Magister Sententiarum; tertium vero tenet communis opinio doctorum Parisiensium.

Si quis autem velit diligenter considerare, quilibet modorum praedictorum habet aliquid de veritate. Cum enim dicitur hoc de hoc^p451-5, tripliciter potest dici: aut secundum esse actuale, aut secundum esse aptitudinale, aut partim secundum esse actuale, partim secundum aptitudinale. Praedicatum enim aut dicit essentiam subiecti, aut actum subiecti. Tunc est praedicatio secundum esse actuale, quando subiectum est ens in actu, et forma praedicati actu inhaeret subiecto et est eius actus; sicut, homine existente, dicitur: homo est animal. — Tunc autem est praedicatio secundum esse aptitudinale, quando nec subiectum est actu, nec forma praedicati actu inhaeret subiecto, sed necessaria est ordinatio unius ad alterum, fundata super principia naturae; sicut, nulla rosa existente, conceditur, quod rosa sit flos. — Tunc autem est praedicatio partim secundum esse aptitudinale, partim secundum esse actuale, quando suppositum est in actu, forma vero praedicati non inest ei secundum actum, sed secundum necessariam ordinationem, fundatam super principia naturae.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum Christus sit homo in triduo; si loquamur de praedicatione secundum esse aptitudinale, non tantum est verum de ipso, sed etiam de omni homine mortuo, quia secundum veritatem fidei nostrae et scientiam theologiae, quando homo moritur, remanent principia eius, in quibus salva est ordinatio non solum respectu formae hominis, sed etiam huius hominis; alioquin non esset vera resurrectio^p451-6. — Si autem loquamur de praedicatione partim actuali, partim aptitudinali; sic potest concedi de Christo, quod fuerit homo in triduo, quia erat persona in actu, quamvis forma humanitatis servaretur in aptitudine coniunctionis animae et carnis; sed hoc non potest dici de aliquo alio homine^p451-7. — Si autem loquamur de praedicatione simpliciter actuali, nec de Christo, nec de alio homine est verum dicere, quod sit homo, quamdiu est anima separata a carne. Nihil enim facit, hominem esse actu, nisi actualis coniunctio animae cum carne^p451-8.

Si igitur isti tres modi dicendi intelliguntur secundum tres praedictos modos praedicandi, sic in omnibus reperitur veritas, et nulla est inter eos

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contrarietas; et verum sensit Hugo de sancto Victore, et verum dixit Magister, si intellexerunt^p452-1 iuxta praeassignatos modos, et verum tenet communis opinio. Et per hoc ad omnes rationes ad utramque partem adductas satis potest patere responsio.

Verumtamen, si verba Hugonis velimus amplius considerare, invenimus, eum sensisse, Christum fuisse hominem in triduo, et quemcumque alium hominem mortuum, non solum quantum ad esse aptitudinale, sed etiam quantum ad esse actuale. Posuit enim, quod post mortem salvaretur esse hominis; et quod anima separata esset persona; et quod iterum multo fortius deberet homo dici anima quam corpus, si hoc admitteret usus. Unde arguit in hunc modum^p452-2: cum homo ex anima et corpore constet, tamen propter unam partem, quae est corpus, dicitur homo corpus, multo ergo magis propter partem illam, quae est anima, debet dici anima. — Et in hoc dicto magister Hugo communiter non sustinetur. Nec enim anima separata est persona, sicut ostensum fuit supra^p452-3; nec homo est anima sua; nec verius est homo, cum moritur, quam cum vivit, quantum ad esse naturae, licet fortassis possit augeri in eo esse gratiae; nec corpus, secundum quod est pars integralis hominis, praedicatur de homine: et ideo non sine causa opinionem magistri Hugonis communis opinio non approbat in parte ista.

Magister autem Sententiarum non solum voluit dicere, quod Christus in triduo fuisset homo praedicatione partim actuali, partim aptitudinali, immo^p452-4 vere et actualiter. Et volunt aliqui hoc imponere ei, quod hoc dixit, quia fuit de tertia opinione, quae dixit Christum hominem secundum habitum. Unde volebat dicere, quod actu esset homo, quia actu habebat naturam humanam. — Sed hoc non est imponendum Magistro, quia error est, sicut in praecedentibus^p452-5 ostensum fuit; nec ex verbis Magistri potest expresse haberi, sed alia de causa hoc dixit. Intellexit enim, in Christo duas fuisse uniones et vere, videlicet unionem animae ad carnem, et unionem divinae naturae et humanae. Et unio divinae naturae et humanae faciebat, Christum esse hominem, iuxta illud quod dicit Augustinus: «Talis fuit illa susceptio, ut faceret Deum hominem». Unio vero animae ad carnem faciebat, hominem illum vivere. Quia ergo in triduo mansit unio Divinitatis ad humanitatem, et soluta fuit unio animae ad carnem; hinc est, quod posuit Magister, quod Christus in triduo non desiit esse homo, sed desiit vivere; ideo verum est secundum ipsum dicere de Christo, quod fuit homo in triduo, et quod fuit homo mortuus, quamvis non possit dici de aliquo alio. — Et in hoc etiam Magister defecit, quia ad hoc, quod aliquis sit homo, necessario praeexigitur et coexigitur unio animae ad carnem, cum homo dicat formam totius sive consequentem totum compositum. Unde nequaquam illa susceptio fecisset Deum hominem et hominem Deum, nisi Deus assumsisset corpus et animam, ut coniuncta ad invicem. — Et propter hoc positio Magistri communiter non sustinetur in parte ista, nec positio etiam magistri Hugonis, non quia omni modo^p452-6 sit falsa locutio praedicta: Christus in triduo fuit homo, sed quia falsitatem habet intelligendo de praedicatione secundum esse actuale, secundum quam praedicationem versatur inquisitio circa praedictam locutionem; et isto modo videtur eam tractasse magister Hugo et Magister Sententiarum et communis opinio magistrorum, et secundum istum modum currit praesens inquisitio. — Ideo rationes ostendentes, locutionem praedictam esse falsam, concedendae sunt; procedunt enim secundum hanc viam.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod talis fuit^p452-7 illa susceptio etc.; dicendum, quod hoc non fuit, quia assumsit corpus et animam tantum, sed etiam, quia assumsit corpus et animam unita; et ideo desiit esse homo, non quia sit mutata unio Divinitatis ad carnem, sed quia soluta fuit unio animae et carnis ad invicem.

2. Ad illam auctoritatem Hugonis, qua dicitur, quod nemo desinit esse^p452-8, quando verius esse incipit; dicendum, quod nihil prohibet, quod veritas esse moralis augeatur cum diminutione veritatis esse naturalis; sicut videmus, quod in debilitatione virtutis naturalis frequenter fortificatur virtus moralis. Et ideo non oportet, quodsi homo incipit esse beatus secundum animam, quod propter hoc non desinat esse homo.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habens humanam naturam est homo; dicendum, quod nomine humanae naturae aliquando intelliguntur principia constituentia hominem; aliquando intelligitur forma hominis completiva, quae dat ipsi supposito complementum et operationem debitam illi speciei, secundum illud quod dicit Boethius^p453-1: «Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia». Si ergo accipiatur natura primo modo, locutio est falsa; si secundo modo, locutio est vera; sed isto modo non habuit Christus humanam naturam in triduo: et ideo non sequitur, quod fuerit homo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quando anima et corpus uniuntur in eandem hypostasim, faciunt hominem; dicendum, quod uniri animam et corpus in eandem hypostasim, hoc potest esse dupliciter^p453-2: aut ita, quod illa hypostasis sit ex eis constituta, et sic talis hypostasis, quae sit hic et nunc; et isto modo non possunt uniri in eandem hypostasim, quin uniantur ad invicem, ac per hoc quin faciant hominem. Alio modo possunt uniri in eandem hypostasim, ita tamen, quod illa hypostasis ex eis non constituitur, immo unitur eis etiam localiter separatis; et hoc modo uniri in eandem hypostasim non necessario facit hominem, quia non est ibi unio per constitutionem naturae tertiae, qualis est unio materiae et formae, qualis etiam requiritur ad hominis esse. Et quia isto modo unita erant anima et corpus in Christo in triduo, non modo praemisso; ideo non sequitur, quod Christus in triduo fuerit homo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in triduo iacebat in sepulcro; dicendum, quod talis locutio est vera per synecdochen^p453-3. Dicitur enim Christus iacuisse in sepulcro, quia pars humanitatis eius iacuit in sepulcro. Unde nec iacuit ibi secundum quod homo nec secundum quod Deus, sed secundum aliquid hominis. Sicut ergo non sequitur: Petrus est in tumulo, ergo Petrus est homo; sic etiam intelligendum est in proposito.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in sempiternum fuit sacerdos; dicendum, quod sacerdotium Christi dicitur fuisse sempiternum, non quia semper fuerit sacerdos in actu, sed quia illi sacerdotio nullum aliud successit^p453-4.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in triduo habebat animam rationalem sibi unitam, ergo erat rationalis; dicendum, quod hoc non sequitur, nisi intelligatur per synecdochen, pro eo quod idiomata partium hominis non communicantur hypostasi Verbi nisi mediante toto coniuncto, communicatione propria^p453-5. Et quoniam Christus tunc non erat homo, ideo nec poterat dici albus ratione corporis, nec rationalis ratione animae, nisi per synecdochen, videlicet quod habebat corpus album et animam ratiocinantem. Quod ergo dicit: quod^p453-6 habet animam rationalem sibi unitam est rationale; dicendum, quod hoc habet veritatem, si intelligatur de unione, quae est formae ad materiam; hoc autem modo non uniebatur anima Christi Christo in triduo. Unde non sequitur, quod fuisset homo in triduo.

Scholion

I. Solutio huius quaestionis dependet a duobus principiis, iam supra contra aliter sentientes stabilitis. Primum eorum est, quod Christus assumsit animam et corpus ita unita, ut inde resultaret una natura, nempe humana (vide supra d. 6. praenotata post divisionem textus et ibid. a. 1. q. 1, scholion). Secundum est, quod anima separata non est persona, quod negarunt Hugo a S. Vict. et Magister (cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3.), diversis tamen ducti rationibus. Idem confessi quidem sunt dogma fidei, quod Christus secundum humanam naturam vere in triduo illo fuerit mortuus; nihilominus tenuerunt, eum tunc fuisse hominem «secundum actualem praedicationem». Sed haec doctrina ab omnibus posterioribus dicitur esse falsa in se et orta ex falsis principiis philosophicis. Hugo enim putabat, animam per se esse personam et hominem; Magister vero opinabatur, in Christo propter divinum suppositum coniunctionem animae et corporis non fuisse necessariam, ut esset homo; immo idem, secundum Alexandrum, Henricum Gand. aliosque, putabat, nec ante mortem Christi animam et corpus fuisse ad invicem formaliter unita; a quo tamen errore S. Thomas aliique eum alienum fuisse dicunt. S. Thom. (locc. infra citt.) dicit, Hugonem et etiam Magistrum in hac quaestione verba quidem habuisse erronea, non tamen sensum erroris in fide, sed falsa principia in philosophia. S. Bonav. etiam docet, quo sano sensu (alieno tamen a mente utriusque magistri) dici possit, Christum in triduo fuisse hominem. Idem fere repetunt Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. — Scotus hic multis rationibus philosophicis opinionem praedictam utriusque impugnat; sed de his rationibus non omnes conveniunt.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 19. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. III. q. 50. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. I. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article, Single. On the things that follow upon the death of Christ.

Question I. Whether Christ in the three days was a man.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ was a man in the three days. And that he was, it seems.

1. Augustine^p450-1: «Such was that assumption, which would make God man and man God»; but the assumption remained unchanged in the three days, as was shown before: therefore Christ in the three days was a man.

2. Likewise, master Hugh of St. Victor^p450-2: «What is more foolish than that a man should then cease to be, when he truly begins to be»! From this he argues thus: since therefore a holy man begins to be blessed, which is to be most truly, it is most foolish to say that he then ceases to be: therefore of any man whatever after death it is true to say that he is a man: therefore much more must this be conceded and said of Christ.

3. Likewise, everything having a human nature is a man; but Christ in the three days was having a human nature: therefore Christ in the three days was a man^p450-3. The major and the minor are manifest of themselves.

4. Likewise, whenever soul and body are united into one hypostasis, they make a man; but in the three days soul and body were united into one hypostasis in Christ: therefore Christ in the three days was a man.

5. Likewise, this is true: Christ in the three days lay in the tomb; therefore either insofar as he is God, or insofar as he is man; but not insofar as he is God: therefore insofar as he is man: therefore Christ in the three days was a man^p450-4.

6. Likewise, Christ in the three days did not cease to be a priest: therefore Christ in the three days did not cease to be a man. The first is clear from what is said in the Psalm^p450-5: Thou art a priest forever; and in Hebrews, the seventh chapter: Christ has an everlasting priesthood. The necessity of the inference is shown in this, that he was a priest insofar as he was man.

7. Likewise, Christ, on account of the assumption of a rational soul, was rational by a created rationality; but Christ in the three days had a rational soul united to himself: therefore Christ in the three days was rational by a created rationality: therefore he was an angel, or a soul, or a man. But he was not an angel, or a soul: therefore he was a man.

On the contrary: 1. «The dead man is diminished in respect to the account of man^p450-6»: therefore whoever is a dead man is deficient from the complete account of man; but the complete is not predicated of the diminished: therefore if Christ in the three days was a dead man, this is false: Christ in the three days was a man.

2. Likewise, according to the natural philosopher, man is a composite of rational soul and flesh; but Christ in the three days was not a composite of rational soul and flesh^p450-7: therefore Christ in the three days was not truly a man.

3. Likewise, no form is predicated of the whole because it is a form, but because it is a form following upon the whole composite: if therefore man is predicated of Christ, it is necessary that it name a form following upon the whole composite; but in Christ the composition was dissolved in the three days: therefore in the three days he could not be called a man. The major proposition is manifest by induction and by the authority of Avicenna^p451-1, who posits it, and by the authority of Boethius, who says that «the species is the whole being of the individual».

4. Likewise, the higher essential thing being corrupted, the lower must of necessity be corrupted; but living-being is higher than being-a-man and is essential to it, because «to live is the being of the living thing^p451-2»: therefore if Christ in the three days ceased to be living, Christ in the three days ceased to be a man: therefore Christ in the three days was not a man.

5. Likewise, Christ in the three days could neither see nor hear nor speak: therefore if he was a man, he was a blind, deaf, and mute man; but it is absurd to say this of Christ: therefore it is false to say that Christ in the three days was a man^p451-3.

6. Likewise, just as the union of the divine nature and the human makes God to be man, so the union of soul to flesh makes [a thing] to be animate: therefore, the union of soul to flesh ceasing, the being-animate ceases; and if the being-animate ceases, the being-an-animal ceases; and if the being-an-animal ceases, of necessity the being-a-man ceases: therefore, from the first, since in Christ there was a separation of soul from flesh in the three days, Christ ceased to be a man in the three days: therefore he was not a man in the three days.

7. Likewise, to this same point are the reasons of the Master in the text^p451-4, which are founded upon this: every man is either mortal or immortal, every man also is a man somewhere; but Christ in the three days was neither mortal nor immortal nor a man anywhere — because not in the tomb, since there was nothing there but the body; not in the underworld, since there was nothing there but the soul — therefore Christ was not a man in the three days.

Conclusion.

Christ in the three days was not a man, if we speak of predication simply actual.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there was a threefold manner of speaking. — The first is that not only can Christ truly be called a man in the three days, but this can also be said of any dead man whatever. — The second manner of speaking is that this must not be conceded of others; it can nevertheless be conceded of Christ. — The third manner of speaking is that it must not be conceded of Christ nor of other men. And the first manner of speaking master Hugh of St. Victor held; the second manner the Master of the Sentences held; the third the common opinion of the Parisian doctors holds.

But if anyone should wish to consider diligently, each of the aforesaid manners has something of truth. For when this is predicated of this^p451-5, it can be said in three ways: either according to actual being, or according to aptitudinal being, or partly according to actual being, partly according to aptitudinal. For the predicate either states the essence of the subject, or the act of the subject. Then predication is according to actual being when the subject is a being in act, and the form of the predicate actually inheres in the subject and is its act; as, a man existing, it is said: man is an animal. — But predication is according to aptitudinal being when neither the subject is in act, nor the form of the predicate actually inheres in the subject, but there is a necessary ordering of one to the other, founded upon the principles of nature; as, no rose existing, it is conceded that the rose is a flower. — But predication is partly according to aptitudinal being, partly according to actual being, when the supposit is in act, but the form of the predicate is not in it according to act, but according to a necessary ordering, founded upon the principles of nature.

When therefore it is asked whether Christ is a man in the three days; if we speak of predication according to aptitudinal being, it is true not only of him, but also of every dead man, because according to the truth of our faith and the science of theology, when a man dies, his principles remain, in which the ordering is preserved not only with respect to the form of man, but also of this man; otherwise there would not be a true resurrection^p451-6. — But if we speak of predication partly actual, partly aptitudinal; thus it can be conceded of Christ that he was a man in the three days, because he was a person in act, although the form of humanity was preserved in the aptitude of the conjunction of soul and flesh; but this cannot be said of any other man^p451-7. — But if we speak of predication simply actual, neither of Christ, nor of another man is it true to say that he is a man, so long as the soul is separated from the flesh. For nothing makes a man to be in act except the actual conjunction of soul with flesh^p451-8.

If therefore these three manners of speaking are understood according to the three aforesaid modes of predication, thus in all of them truth is found, and there is no

contrariety among them; and Hugh of St. Victor thought truly, and the Master spoke truly, if they understood^p452-1 according to the modes assigned beforehand, and the common opinion holds truly. And by this the response can sufficiently be clear to all the reasons adduced for either side.

Nevertheless, if we wish to consider further the words of Hugh, we find that he held that Christ was a man in the three days, and any other dead man whatever, not only as to aptitudinal being, but also as to actual being. For he posited that after death the being of man is preserved; and that the separated soul is a person; and that again much more ought the soul to be called man than the body, if usage admitted this. Hence he argues in this manner^p452-2: since man is composed of soul and body, yet on account of the one part, which is body, the man is called body, much more therefore on account of that part, which is soul, ought he to be called soul. — And in this saying master Hugh is not commonly upheld. For neither is the separated soul a person, as was shown above^p452-3; nor is a man his soul; nor is he more truly a man when he dies than when he lives, as to the being of nature, though perhaps the being of grace can be increased in him; nor is the body, insofar as it is an integral part of man, predicated of man: and therefore not without cause does the common opinion not approve the opinion of master Hugh in this part.

But the Master of the Sentences not only wished to say that Christ in the three days was a man by a predication partly actual, partly aptitudinal, but rather^p452-4 truly and actually. And some wish to impute to him that he said this because he was of the third opinion, which said that Christ was man according to habit. Hence he wished to say that he was a man in act, because he actually had a human nature. — But this must not be imputed to the Master, because it is an error, as was shown in what precedes^p452-5; nor can it be expressly gathered from the words of the Master, but for another reason he said this. For he understood that in Christ there were two unions, and truly so, namely the union of soul to flesh, and the union of the divine nature and the human. And the union of the divine nature and the human made Christ to be man, according to that which Augustine says: «Such was that assumption, that it would make God man». But the union of soul to flesh made that man to live. Since therefore in the three days the union of the Divinity to the humanity remained, and the union of soul to flesh was dissolved; hence it is that the Master posited that Christ in the three days did not cease to be a man, but ceased to live; therefore it is true according to him to say of Christ that he was a man in the three days, and that he was a dead man, although it cannot be said of any other. — And in this also the Master failed, because for someone to be a man there is necessarily prerequired and co-required the union of soul to flesh, since man names the form of the whole, or that which follows upon the whole composite. Hence in no way would that assumption have made God man and man God, unless God had assumed body and soul, as joined to one another. — And on account of this the position of the Master is not commonly upheld in this part, nor the position of master Hugh either, not because the aforesaid expression: Christ in the three days was a man, is in every way^p452-6 false, but because it has falsity in being understood of predication according to actual being, according to which predication the inquiry turns concerning the aforesaid expression; and in this way master Hugh and the Master of the Sentences and the common opinion of the masters seem to have treated it, and according to this mode the present inquiry runs. — Therefore the reasons showing the aforesaid expression to be false are to be conceded; for they proceed according to this way.

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that such was^p452-7 that assumption etc.; it must be said that this was so, not because he assumed body and soul only, but also because he assumed body and soul united; and therefore he ceased to be a man, not because the union of the Divinity to the flesh was changed, but because the union of soul and flesh to one another was dissolved.

2. To that authority of Hugh, by which it is said that no one ceases to be^p452-8 when he more truly begins to be; it must be said that nothing prevents the truth of moral being from being increased with the diminution of the truth of natural being; as we see that in the weakening of natural power moral virtue is frequently strengthened. And therefore it does not follow that, if a man begins to be blessed according to the soul, on account of this he does not cease to be a man.

3. To that which is objected, that what has a human nature is a man; it must be said that by the name of human nature are sometimes understood the principles constituting man; sometimes is understood the completive form of man, which gives to the supposit itself the complement and operation due to that species, according to that which Boethius says^p453-1: «Nature is the specific difference informing each single thing». If therefore nature be taken in the first way, the expression is false; if in the second way, the expression is true; but in this way Christ did not have a human nature in the three days: and therefore it does not follow that he was a man.

4. To that which is objected, that when soul and body are united into the same hypostasis, they make a man; it must be said that for soul and body to be united into the same hypostasis can be twofold^p453-2: either thus, that that hypostasis be constituted out of them, and thus such a hypostasis as is here and now; and in this way they cannot be united into the same hypostasis without being united to one another, and thereby without making a man. In another way they can be united into the same hypostasis, yet so that that hypostasis is not constituted out of them, but rather is united to them even when they are locally separated; and in this way to be united into the same hypostasis does not necessarily make a man, because there is not there a union through the constitution of a third nature, such as is the union of matter and form, such as is also required for the being of man. And because in this way soul and body were united in Christ in the three days, not in the manner set forth before; therefore it does not follow that Christ in the three days was a man.

5. To that which is objected, that Christ in the three days lay in the tomb; it must be said that such an expression is true by synecdoche^p453-3. For Christ is said to have lain in the tomb because a part of his humanity lay in the tomb. Hence he lay there neither insofar as he is man nor insofar as he is God, but according to something of man. As therefore it does not follow: Peter is in the grave, therefore Peter is a man; so also it must be understood in the matter at hand.

6. To that which is objected, that Christ was a priest forever; it must be said that the priesthood of Christ is said to have been everlasting, not because he was always a priest in act, but because no other succeeded to that priesthood^p453-4.

7. To that which is objected, that Christ in the three days had a rational soul united to himself, therefore he was rational; it must be said that this does not follow, unless it be understood by synecdoche, inasmuch as the idioms of the parts of man are not communicated to the hypostasis of the Word except through the mediation of the whole conjoined [nature], by a proper communication^p453-5. And since Christ then was not a man, therefore he could not be called white by reason of the body, nor rational by reason of the soul, except by synecdoche, namely that he had a white body and a reasoning soul. As to what it says, then: that^p453-6 he has a rational soul united to himself, [therefore he] is rational; it must be said that this has truth, if it be understood of the union which is of form to matter; but in this way the soul of Christ was not united to Christ in the three days. Hence it does not follow that he was a man in the three days.

Scholion

I. The solution of this question depends upon two principles, already established above against those who hold otherwise. The first of them is that Christ assumed soul and body so united that from them there resulted one nature, namely the human (see above, d. 6, the things noted beforehand after the division of the text, and ibid., a. 1, q. 1, scholion). The second is that the separated soul is not a person, which Hugh of St. Victor and the Master denied (cf. above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3), though led by different reasons. They indeed both confessed the dogma of faith, that Christ according to his human nature truly died in that three days; nevertheless they held that he was then a man «according to actual predication». But this doctrine is said by all later [doctors] to be false in itself and to have arisen from false philosophical principles. For Hugh thought that the soul is of itself a person and a man; the Master, however, was of the opinion that in Christ, on account of the divine supposit, the conjunction of soul and body was not necessary for him to be a man; indeed the same [Master], according to Alexander, Henry of Ghent, and others, thought that not even before the death of Christ were soul and body formally united to one another; from which error, however, St. Thomas and others say he was free. St. Thomas (in the places cited below) says that Hugh and also the Master in this question had words indeed erroneous, yet not the sense of error in the faith, but false principles in philosophy. St. Bonaventure also teaches in what sound sense (alien, however, from the mind of both masters) it can be said that Christ in the three days was a man. Almost the same things Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton repeat. — Scotus here attacks by many philosophical reasons the aforesaid opinion of both; but on these reasons not all agree.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 19, m. 3. — Scotus, in each Writing, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa III, q. 50, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus

Libr. I. de Trin. c. 13. n. 28. — De minori infr. supra d. 21. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
Book I, On the Trinity, c. 13, n. 28. — On the minor, see below, above d. 21, a. 1, q. 1 and following, and here the text of the Master, c. 1.
Libr. II. de Sacram. p. I. c. 11, ubi post verba hic allata Hugo sic prosequitur: Et tanto utique verius est, quanto est verius in quo esse incipit! Non, inquiunt, sed figura est, quando Sancti cum Christo esse dicuntur. Bene. Quando vobiscum sunt, veritas est, et quando cum Christo sunt, figura est. In hoc vobis credite. Nos enim non credimus. Nos scimus, quia Christus veritas est. Qui ad Christum vadunt, non ad figuram vadunt, sed ad veritatem vadunt et figuram evadunt etc. — Proxime post testimon. allatum Vat. cum aliquot codd. pro arguit exhibet arguitur, et deinde sola omittit conclusionem ergo de quolibet... quod sit homo.
Book II, On the Sacraments, p. I, c. 11, where after the words here cited Hugh continues thus: And it is by so much the more truly, by how much it is more truly in that which begins to be! Not so, they say, but it is a figure, when the Saints are said to be with Christ. Good. When they are with you, it is truth, and when they are with Christ, it is a figure. In this believe yourselves. For we do not believe. We know, because Christ is truth. They who go to Christ go not to a figure, but go to the truth and escape the figure, etc. — Immediately after the testimony cited, the Vatican [edition] with some codices, for arguit, gives arguitur, and then it alone omits the conclusion therefore of any... that he is a man.
Recte dicimus, ait Hugo a S. Vict. loc. cit., quod Verbum, ex quo homo factum est, nunquam postea homo esse desiit, quia se nec in morte carnis suae ab assumta humanitate unquam divisit.
Rightly do we say, says Hugh of St. Victor in the place cited, that the Word, from the time it was made man, never afterward ceased to be man, because it never divided itself, even in the death of its flesh, from the assumed humanity.
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.
Psalm. 109, 4. — Seq. Scripturae loc. est Hebr. 7, 24, ubi edd., Vulgatam sequentes, post Christus addunt eo quod maneat in aeternum. — Subinde pro Necessitas illationis edd. Veritas illationis.
Psalm 109:4. — The following scriptural passage is Hebrews 7:24, where the editions, following the Vulgate, after Christus add eo quod maneat in aeternum (because he continues forever). — Thereafter, for Necessitas illationis, the editions read Veritas illationis.
Verba sunt Petri Hisp., de quibus videsis supra pag. 258, nota 2. — Pro diminuit codd. B C D W Y deficit. Subinde pro deficiens edd. diminutus.
The words are Peter of Spain's, on which see above, p. 258, note 2. — For diminuit, codices B C D W Y read deficit. Thereafter, for deficiens, the editions read diminutus.
Cod. U non erat talis, ergo, Vat. non erat huiusmodi, ergo. Pro compositum codd. F N P Q compositus. Edd. 1, 2 omittunt minorem.
Codex U reads non erat talis, ergo; the Vatican [edition] non erat huiusmodi, ergo. For compositum, codices F N P Q read compositus. Editions 1 and 2 omit the minor.
In Metaph., tr. 5. c. 3. 5. 7. Ratio, cui Avicenna innititur, est, quia forma ut forma est pars; «impossibile est autem, ipsam partem praedicari de toto». — De sententia Boethii vide supra pag. 48, nota 7.
In the Metaphysics, tr. 5, cc. 3, 5, 7. The reason on which Avicenna relies is that the form, as form, is a part; «but it is impossible that the part itself be predicated of the whole». — On the opinion of Boethius, see above, p. 48, note 7.
Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 4.). — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 438, nota 3. — Mox pro vivus, Christus in edd. vivens, ergo in.
Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, text 37 (c. 4). — On the major, cf. above, p. 438, note 3. — Soon, for vivus, Christus in, the editions read vivens, ergo in.
Hoc arg. proponitur etiam a Praepositivo, S. p. III.
This argument is proposed also by Praepositinus, Summa, p. III.
Hic c. 1. seq.
Here, c. 1 and following.
Pro dicitur hoc de hoc codd. G I K L T aa dicitur hic de hoc, codd. M O dicitur homo.
For dicitur hoc de hoc, codices G I K L T aa read dicitur hic de hoc; codices M O dicitur homo.
Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 43. a. 1. q. 4.
Cf. Sentences IV, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4.
Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 21. a. 1. q. 3.
See above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 21, a. 1, q. 3.
Codd. A N ad carnem et subinde cum codd. R U intelligantur pro intelliguntur.
Codices A N read ad carnem, and thereafter, with codices R U, intelligantur for intelliguntur.
Vide verba Porphyrii, tom. II. pag. 99, nota 2. allegata.
See the words of Porphyry cited in vol. II, p. 99, note 2.
Ita codd. A I K L M N T, codd. B O intellexerit; edd. intelligunt. Paulo inferius pro potest patere codd. A K posset patere.
Thus codices A I K L M N T; codices B O read intellexerit; the editions intelligunt. A little below, for potest patere, codices A K read posset patere.
Libr. II. de Sacram. p. I. c. 11: Omnis homo est animal, et omne animal est corpus: igitur omnis homo est corpus. Nullam contradictionem hic esse putas. Auctoritas enim hoc dicit... Dic ergo, hoc totum quare magis dicis esse corpus quam animam, cum ex anima simul et corpore constet? Si propter partem unam, quia corpus est, totum ipsum corpus dicitur, nonne multo magis dicendum est anima propter partem alteram, quae anima est? Si enim a parte totum naturam et nomen trahere dicitur, ab illa procul dubio parte, quae melior est et dignior, rectius et naturam et nomen trahere dicetur. Sed non habet usus loquendi, inquis, ut homo anima dicatur. Ecce, concedo secundum usum loquendi... Usus loquendi ab hominibus inventus est etc.
Book II, On the Sacraments, p. I, c. 11: Every man is an animal, and every animal is a body: therefore every man is a body. You think there is no contradiction here. For the authority says this... Say then, why do you call this whole a body rather than a soul, since it is composed of soul and body together? If on account of the one part, because it is body, the whole itself is called body, ought it not much more be called soul on account of the other part, which is soul? For if the whole is said to draw its nature and name from a part, it will more rightly be said to draw both nature and name from that part which is better and worthier. But usage of speech does not have it, you say, that a man be called soul. Behold, I concede according to the usage of speech... The usage of speech was invented by men, etc.
Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro Nec enim codd. A K Nec etiam; paulo inferius pro possit multi codd. posset.
Distinction 5, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, for Nec enim, codices A K read Nec etiam; a little below, for possit, many codices read posset.
Codd. P Q subiiciunt quod. Edd. sibi indulserunt quae sequuntur sic depravare: immo quod hoc dixerit vere et actualiter, volunt aliqui hoc imponere ei, quia fuit etc. Pro hoc dixit codd. E P Q X hoc dixerit.
Codices P Q add quod. The editions allowed themselves to corrupt what follows thus: immo quod hoc dixerit vere et actualiter, volunt aliqui hoc imponere ei, quia fuit etc. For hoc dixit, codices E P Q X read hoc dixerit.
Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 3. et dub. 2. — De seqq. vide lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq. et supra d. V. c. 3. — Paulo inferius edd. omittunt et vere.
Distinction 6, a. 1, q. 3, and dub. 2. — On what follows, see the text of the Master, c. 1 and following, and above d. 5, c. 3. — A little below, the editions omit et vere.
Pro omni modo codd. A U omnino.
For omni modo, codices A U read omnino.
Codd. B C D M O X fuisset. — Paulo inferius pro unita multi codd. unitam.
Codices B C D M O X read fuisset. — A little below, for unita, many codices read unitam.
Codd. M O supplent homo. Mox pro moralis plurimi codd. moris, et subinde pro diminutione veritatis codd. A K U bb diminutione virtutis.
Codices M O supply homo. Soon, for moralis, very many codices read moris, and thereafter, for diminutione veritatis, codices A K U bb read diminutione virtutis.
De Una Persona et duab. natur. c. 1. Cfr. supra d. 3. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 4. ad oppos. — Circa finem solut. codd. B D U omittunt non ante habuit; perperam.
On the One Person and Two Natures, c. 1. Cf. above, d. 3, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 4 to the contrary. — Near the end of the solution, codices B D U omit non before habuit; wrongly.
Vel aliis verbis: et sic talis sit hypostasis, quae sit particularis sive singularis. Dictio etenim hic et nunc opponitur locutioni semper et ubique, qua universale designatur. Vide Aristot., 1. Poster. c. 21. (c. 31.), quem locum iam tom. I. pag. 642, nota 4. allegavimus. — In hac solut. cod. A pro in eandem hypostasim constanter exhibet in eadem hypostasi. Paulo inferius post ex eis edd. subdunt unitis, et subinde cum uno alteroque cod. pro constituitur habent constituatur. Circa finem solut. pro ad hominis esse codd. A T ab hominis esse.
Or in other words: and thus let such a hypostasis be one which is particular or singular. For the expression here and now is opposed to the locution always and everywhere, by which the universal is designated. See Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics], Book 1, c. 21 (c. 31), which passage we already cited in vol. I, p. 642, note 4. — In this solution, codex A for in eandem hypostasim consistently gives in eadem hypostasi. A little below, after ex eis, the editions add unitis, and thereafter, with one or another codex, for constituitur they have constituatur. Near the end of the solution, for ad hominis esse, codices A T read ab hominis esse.
Vide supra pag. 239, nota 8, et tom. II. pag. 319, nota 3.
See above, p. 239, note 8, and vol. II, p. 319, note 3.
Cfr. Hebr. 7, 11. seq.
Cf. Hebrews 7:11 and following.
Vide supra d. 21. a. 1. q. 1, ad 2. — Paulo inferius pro videlicet quod codd. A N videlicet quia.
See above, d. 21, a. 1, q. 1, to the second. — A little below, for videlicet quod, codices A N read videlicet quia.
Post quod cod. bb subiicit omne quod, et subinde pro habet edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. habebat.
After quod, codex bb adds omne quod, and thereafter, for habet, editions 1 and 2 with several codices read habebat.

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