Bonaventure

I. Primam sententiam in corp. relatam S. Thom., B. Albert., Richard., Scot. et fere omnes posteriores Scholastici tenent, pro qua praeter alia argumenta etiam hoc communiter affertur: Lux est per se sensibilis; sed nulla forma substantialis est per se sensibilis; ergo etc. Nec iidem approbant fundamentum secundae opinionis, quod in omnibus corporibus sit lux secundum maiorem vel minorem formae participationem, quam sententiam Seraphicus ex S. Augustino accepit (cfr. hic ad 4; infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. art. princ. 2. a. 2. q. 1.). Nostra autem aetate non pauci physici docent, naturam vel qualitatem lucidi esse in omni corpore. — Quodsi autem admittitur recentiorum doctrina de aethere subtilissimo tanquam primo subiecto luminis aliorumque phaenomenorum, tunc argumenta et sententiae antiquorum in nonnullis reformanda sunt. — S. Bonav. pro more suo viam mediam inter utramque opinionem ingreditur, distinguendo inter lucem in se spectatam, prout est forma corporis lucidi et a sensibus non perceptibilis, et effectum eius consequentem et sensibilem, quem vocat fulgorem, qui non differt a lumine, nisi quatenus lumen est in medio, fulgor autem in ipso luminis fonte, sive in luce (cfr. infra a. 3. q. 2. in corp.). Haec sententia S. Doctoris ab aliis Scholasticis non videtur esse recepta.

II. Modus loquendi, quo S. Doctor in solut. ad 5. utitur, conciliari non posse videtur cum sententia, quae tenet, in eodem composito semper non esse nisi unam formam substantialem. Cum enim iam dixerit, lucem in se esse formam substantialem, omnibus corporibus aliquo modo communem, addit, eam poni in eodem corpore cum alia forma, non quidem sicut dispositio imperfecta, quae nata sit perfici per ultimam formam, sed «tanquam forma et natura omnis alterius corporalis formae conservativa et dans ei agendi efficaciam». Deinde loquitur de duabus formis, scil. communi et ultima (cfr. etiam infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.). — Hinc iuvat pauca de celebri controversia circa unitatem formae substantialis hoc loco adnotare et iis adiungere, quae supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in scholio dicta sunt.

1. Principales Scholastici consentiunt in his. a) Si sermo est de forma substantiali in sensu proprio, sive de forma ultima et completa, quae dat esse perfectum et specificum (sive «esse distinctum et limitatum», ut dicit S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 8. p. II. q. 3. fundam. 2.); tunc unam solam in unoquoque composito esse formam substantialem, omnino constat. Nam «unius perfectibilis una sola est perfectio» (supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 3. 4.); et in hoc distinguitur forma substantialis, quae spectat ad primum esse, a forma accidentali, quae spectat ad esse secundum, quod ex accidentalibus formis et earum subiectis «non fit unum per essentiam, sicut fit unum per essentiam ex corpore vivificato et anima vivificante» (infra d. 26. q. 3. ad 4.). — b) In viventibus unum est principium vitae, i. e. una sola anima. — c) In homine autem unica anima intellectiva per se et immediate est forma substantialis corporis, quae «non tantum dat esse, verum etiam vivere et sentire et intelligere» (Breviloq. p. II. c. 9. et infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.).

2. S. Thomas generale principium, quod unius rei una tantum sit forma substantialis, in omnibus omnino entibus obtinere docet, ita ut forma, quae praeter materiam et primam formam substantialem sit in ente corporali, formis accidentalibus adnumeranda sit. Hinc legitime sequitur, in generatione substantiali solam materiam primam esse subiectum eiusdem, et similiter in corruptione fieri resolutionem usque ad materiam primam.

3. Non omnes autem antiqui magistri haec quoad omnia concedebant, sed distinctionem adhibentes inter formas completas et incompletas (sive, ut aliis placet, subordinatas vel diminutas) duplicem exceptionem ab illa regula generali esse volebant.

Primo quidem non pauci illud principium non admittunt respectu formarum imperfectarum, quae sunt in corporibus anorganicis, quae ex mixtione corporum simplicium sive ex combinationibus chimicis resultant. Hi cum Avicenna (cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3. scholion n. I.) docent, formas corporum simplicium quoad ipsum primum esse, licet modo imperfecto, remanere. Hoc autem intelligi potest vel ita, ut istae formae ibi sint ut verae formae, vel ut dispositiones ad formam, vel generatim ut aliquae realitates, quae non proprie rationem formae retinent. Sententiae Avicennae B. Albert. (I. de Generat. et corrupt. tr. 6. c. 5. seqq.) valde favet.

Secundo, respectu omnium viventium praeter animam, quae est forma completa et ultima, formam esse corporeitatis, docet cum suis Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 11. q. 3. n. 25. seqq.), qui tamen quoad formas elementares in mixtis S. Thomae consentit. Haec forma corporeitatis secundum eundem non est specifica, sed generica, et non dat nisi aliquod esse corporeum indeterminatum, non autem in linea accidentali, sed substantiali. Terminus forma corporeitatis adhibetur etiam a S. Bonav. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3. ad 5. (cfr. ibid. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 2. pro parte affirm.) et ab Avicenna I. Sufficientiae c. 2. 3. — Sententiam hanc Scoti ad solos homines restringit Henr. Gand., Quodl. 2. q. 2. 3, Quodl. 4. q. 13. 14.

Manifestum autem est, utramque hanc doctrinae S. Thomae modificationem supponere praedictam distinctionem inter formas completas et incompletas; vel si nomen formae incompletae displicet, inter formam substantialem et aliquam realitatem positivam, quae non sit nec materia nec forma accidentalis. Hanc distinctionem inter formas completas et incompletas saepius adhibet Seraphicus v. g. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3, ubi in solut. ad 5. etiam eandem, ac Scotus, responsionem ad gravissimam obiectionem dat, quod scil. nihil est in genere, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie.

4. S. Bonav. quaestionem illam de unitate formae substan-

tialis explicite non tractat; nihilominus etiam in aliis locis modos loquendi adhibet, qui a sententia S. Thomae alieni esse videntur. Ita infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 2. fund. 3, ubi dicitur, quod corpus humanum, «non est aptum ad diversas operationes nisi per diversas virtutes, nec ad diversas virtutes nisi per diversas naturas, nec habet diversas naturas, nisi quia ex diversis est compositum» (observandum autem est quoad significationem termini natura, quod «dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo ratione partium constituentium, alio modo ratione formae communis consequentis totum», III. Sent. d. 8. a. 1. q. 2; cfr. ibid. d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.). Idem docet hic in divisione textus et infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. circa finem, et ad 1. Similia non pauca occurrunt d. 15. q. 1. 2. 3; d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 6, a. 2. q. 2. ad 6; infra d. 30. a. 3. q. 1, in improbatione 3. opinionis; IV. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2, d. 49. p. II. art. princ. 2. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi dicitur, quod «elementa manent in corpore illo (glorioso) secundum substantiam et qualitates et operationes. Sed attendendum, quod quadruplex est operatio elementorum» etc. Item, Hexaëm. Serm. 4. ante med. a verbis: «Tertia divisio est potentiae et actus». Sed maioris momenti est tota S. Bonaventurae doctrina de rationibus seminalibus, quae infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. 3 diffuse exponitur et iam supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. quoad principia generalia tractata est.

5. Etiam Alex. Hal. plura habet in favorem sententiae S. Bonaventurae, ut S. p. II. q. 63. m. 4. solut. obiect., ubi dicit, quod anima «non est ibi proprie actus materiae, sed actus naturalis corporis completi in forma naturali, quae forma dicitur forma corporalis». Explicite et diffuse de hac quaestione disputat Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 5, qui propriam opinionem ita exponit: Videtur ergo mihi dicendum ad quaestionem, quod in Adam fuit aliqua substantialis forma incompleta cum anima intellectiva; et ita est in quolibet alio homine, quae educitur de potentia ipsius materiae, ex qua et materia constituitur unum compositum incompletum, quod cum aliquibus suis accidentalibus dispositionibus incompletis est materia proxima et propria ad recipiendum animam intellectivam, per quam formam sine intellectiva materia non potest constitui in esse stabili et quieto et plene terminato etc. — Alii etiam doctores Ord. Min. ante Scotum eandem opinionem defendunt, ut ex multis adhuc ineditis manuscriptis constat. Hinc Scotus opinionem suam iam tactam non ipse excogitavit, sed suo modo exposuit et sententiam antecessorum potius restrinxit.

6. Licet memorata sententia S. Thomae de unitate formarum in Ecclesia nunc et a saeculis magna gaudeat auctoritate, tamen et vivente S. Doctore et praecipue post ipsius mortem usque ad canonizationem eadem acriter est impugnata, praecipue ob rationes theologicas, immo censuris immerito condemnata est, ut videri potest in egregio opere Card. Zigliara de Mente Concil. Vienn. p. 196–214, et apud D'Argentré, Collectio iudicior. t. I. p. 216 seqq. Prima huius sententiae censura facta est an. 1276 a Fr. Roberto de Kilwardby, archiep. Cantuariensi (Ord. Praed., ut vult Echardus), et habetur in Collect. iudic. (p. 183 et p. 201); secunda et tertia facta a Ioanne Pechamo Ord. Min., successore Roberti, an. 1284 (ibid. p. 234. seq.). Iam monuimus supra pag. 30 in scholio, has censuras omni carere auctoritate. — Ceterum lugendum est, dissensionem circa hunc articulum dedisse primam occasionem controversiarum acrium et diuturnarum inter duos Ordines Praedicatorum et Minorum. — Nostra autem aetate, post sex saecula, adhuc diversae de compositione corporum sententiae philosophicae a doctoribus catholicis, sciente ac permittente Apostolica Sede, ut probabiles defenduntur, sicut constat ex litteris de mandato Summi Pontificis Pii IX. a D. Wladimiro Czacki 5. Iunii 1877 datis.

Auctores vide in scholio ad praecedentem quaestionem.

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I. The first opinion related in the body S. Thomas, B. Albert, Richard [of Mediavilla], Scotus, and almost all later Scholastics hold; for which, besides other arguments, this is also commonly adduced: Light is per se sensible; but no substantial form is per se sensible; therefore etc. Nor do these approve the foundation of the second opinion — that in all bodies there is light according to a greater or lesser participation of form — which opinion the Seraphic [Doctor] received from St. Augustine (cf. here ad 4; below d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4; IV Sent. d. 49, p. II, art. princ. 2, a. 2, q. 1.). In our age, not a few physicists teach that the nature or quality of the luminous is in every body. — But if the more recent doctrine concerning the most subtle aether as the primary subject of light and other phenomena be admitted, then the arguments and opinions of the ancients in some respects need to be reformed. — St. Bonaventure, as is his manner, enters upon a middle way between both opinions, by distinguishing between light considered in itself — as it is the form of a shining body and not perceptible to the senses — and its consequent and sensible effect, which he calls fulgor, which does not differ from lumen except inasmuch as lumen is in the medium, but fulgor in the very source of light, that is, in lux (cf. below a. 3, q. 2, in the body). This opinion of the holy Doctor does not seem to have been received by the other Scholastics.

II. The mode of speaking which the holy Doctor uses in the solution to argument 5 does not seem able to be reconciled with the opinion which holds that in the same composite there is always only one substantial form. For when he has already said that light in itself is a substantial form, common to all bodies in some manner, he adds that it is posited in the same body with another form — not indeed as an imperfect disposition born to be perfected by the ultimate form, but «as the form and nature conservative of every other corporeal form and giving it efficacy of acting». Then he speaks of two forms, namely the common and the ultimate (cf. also below d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1.). — Hence it is useful to note here a few [things] about the celebrated controversy concerning the unity of substantial form, and to join them to what was said above at d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in the scholion.

1. The principal Scholastics agree in these [points]. a) If the discourse is about substantial form in the proper sense, or about the ultimate and complete form which gives perfect and specific being (or «distinct and limited being», as St. Bonav. says, I Sent. d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 8, p. II, q. 3, fundamentum 2.); then that there is in each composite one only substantial form, is altogether established. For «of one perfectible there is only one perfection» (above d. 8, p. II, q. 1, ad 3, 4); and in this is the substantial form, which regards first being, distinguished from the accidental form, which regards second being, which from accidental forms and their subjects «does not become one per essentiam, just as one per essentiam is made out of a body vivified and a soul vivifying» (below d. 26, q. 3, ad 4.). — b) In living things there is one principle of life, i. e. one only soul. — c) In man, however, the one intellective soul through itself and immediately is the substantial form of the body, which «not only gives being, but also living and sensing and understanding» (Breviloquium p. II, c. 9, and below d. 15, a. 1, q. 3, in the body).

2. S. Thomas teaches that the general principle, that of one thing there is only one substantial form, holds in absolutely all beings — so that the form which, besides matter and the first substantial form, is in a corporeal being, is to be numbered among accidental forms. Hence it follows legitimately that in substantial generation only prime matter is the subject of the same, and similarly in corruption the resolution goes back to prime matter.

3. Not all the ancient masters, however, conceded these things in every respect; but, employing a distinction between complete and incomplete forms (or, as is pleasing to others, subordinate or diminished [forms]), they wished there to be a twofold exception from that general rule.

First, indeed, not a few do not admit that principle with respect to the imperfect forms which are in inorganic bodies, which result from the mixture of simple bodies or from chemical combinations. These, with Avicenna (cf. above d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, scholion n. I.), teach that the forms of simple bodies, as regards first being itself, although in an imperfect manner, remain. This can be understood either in such a way that those forms are there as true forms, or as dispositions to form, or generally as certain realities which do not properly retain the character of form. The opinion of Avicenna B. Albert (On Generation and Corruption I, tr. 6, c. 5 and following) strongly favors.

Secondly, with respect to all living things besides the soul, which is the complete and ultimate form, Scotus and his [followers] teach that there is a form of corporeity (IV Sent. d. 11, q. 3, n. 25 and following) — although as to elementary forms in mixtures he agrees with St. Thomas. This form of corporeity, according to him, is not specific but generic, and gives only some indeterminate corporeal being — not, however, in the accidental line, but in the substantial. The term form of corporeity is also employed by St. Bonav. above d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, ad 5 (cf. ibid. a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2, for the affirmative side), and by Avicenna Sufficientia I, c. 2, 3. — This opinion of Scotus Henr. Gand. restricts to men only, Quodlibet 2, q. 2, 3; Quodlibet 4, q. 13, 14.

It is, however, manifest that each of these modifications of St. Thomas's doctrine supposes the aforesaid distinction between complete and incomplete forms; or, if the name incomplete form displeases, between substantial form and some positive reality which is neither matter nor accidental form. This distinction between complete and incomplete forms the Seraphic [Doctor] more often employs — e. g. above d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, where in the solution to 5 he also gives the same response as Scotus to the gravest objection, namely that nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it.

4. S. Bonav. does not explicitly treat that question of the unity of substantial form;

nevertheless, even in other places he employs modes of speaking which seem to be foreign from St. Thomas's opinion. So below d. 15, a. 1, q. 2, fundamentum 3, where it is said that the human body «is not apt for diverse operations except through diverse powers, nor for diverse powers except through diverse natures, nor does it have diverse natures except because it is composed out of diverse [things]» (it must be observed, however, regarding the signification of the term nature, that it «can be taken in two ways: in one way by reason of the constituent parts, in the other way by reason of the common form following the whole», III Sent. d. 8, a. 1, q. 2; cf. ibid. d. 22, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3.). The same he teaches here in the division of the text and below at d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in the body near the end, and ad 1. Not a few similar [things] occur d. 15, q. 1, 2, 3; d. 17, p. I, q. 2, ad 6; a. 2, q. 2, ad 6; below d. 30, a. 3, q. 1, in the refutation of the third opinion; IV Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, 2; d. 49, p. II, art. princ. 2, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, where it is said that «the elements remain in that (glorified) body according to substance and qualities and operations. But it must be attended to, that there is a fourfold operation of the elements», etc. Likewise, Hexaëmeron Sermon 4 before the middle, from the words: «The third division is of potency and act». But of greater moment is the whole teaching of St. Bonaventure on the seminal reasons, which is set forth diffusely below d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, 3, and was already treated above at d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, as regards the general principles.

5. Also Alex. Hal. has many [things] in favor of S. Bonaventure's opinion — as Summa p. II, q. 63, m. 4, solut. obiect., where he says that the soul «is not there properly the act of matter, but the natural act of a complete body in a natural form, which form is called corporeal form». Explicitly and diffusely on this question Richard of Mediavilla disputes, II Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 5, who sets forth his own opinion thus: It seems to me, therefore, that it must be said to the question that in Adam there was some incomplete substantial form together with the intellective soul; and so it is in any other man, which is drawn forth from the potency of the matter itself, out of which and matter is constituted one incomplete composite, which with some of its incomplete accidental dispositions is the proximate and proper matter for receiving the intellective soul — through which form, without the intellective [soul,] the matter cannot be constituted in a stable and quiet and fully terminated being, etc. — Other doctors of the Order of Friars Minor also, before Scotus, defend the same opinion, as is clear from many still-unedited manuscripts. Hence Scotus did not himself invent the opinion already touched on, but in his own way expounded it and rather restricted the opinion of his predecessors.

6. Although the said opinion of St. Thomas on the unity of forms now and for centuries enjoys great authority in the Church, nevertheless, both while the holy Doctor was alive and especially after his death up to canonization, the same was vigorously impugned — especially on account of theological reasons — and indeed undeservedly was condemned by censures, as can be seen in Cardinal Zigliara's excellent work de Mente Concilii Viennensis p. 196–214, and in D'Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum t. I, p. 216 and following. The first censure of this opinion was made in the year 1276 by Fr. Robert of Kilwardby, archbishop of Canterbury (of the Order of Preachers, as Echardus holds), and is found in Collectio iudiciorum (p. 183 and p. 201); the second and third [were] made by John Pecham of the Order of Friars Minor, successor to Robert, in the year 1284 (ibid. p. 234 and following). We have already noted above on p. 30 in the scholion that these censures lack all authority. — Moreover it is to be lamented that the dissension over this article gave the first occasion to bitter and long-lasting controversies between the two Orders of Preachers and Minors. — In our age, however, after six centuries, still diverse philosophical opinions about the composition of bodies are defended as probable by Catholic doctors — with the knowledge and permission of the Apostolic See — as is clear from the letters by mandate of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, given to Dom Wladimir Czacki on June 5, 1877.

See the authors in the scholion to the preceding question.

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