Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12
Quaestio III. Utrum materia corporalium creata sit sub aliqua diversitate formarum.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum materia illa corporalium creata sit sub aliqua formarum diversitate. Et quod sic, videtur:
Ad oppositum.
1. Per textum1: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram: ergo videtur, quod in principio suae conditionis habuit formam caelestem et formam elementarem. Si tu dicas, quod caelum stat ibi pro caelo empyreo, et terra pro materia corporalium; obiicitur per textum sequentem2: Congregentur aquae in locum unum, et appareat arida: ergo videtur, quod tertio die terra solummodo manifestata fuerit, non producta: ergo in ipso chaos videbantur iam esse elementa.
2. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore3: «Nomine terrae hic terrae elementum significatum puto»: si ergo erat ibi elementum terrae, pari ratione et alia elementa. Si tu dicas, quod ibi vocat elementum terrae, non quia iam erat, sed quia futurum erat; obiicitur per illud quod subditur: «Eratque terrenum hoc elementum medio et uno loco subsidens, ceteris in confusione permixtis». Si ergo permixtio non est eiusdem, sed diversorum, videtur, quod ibi iam erant diversae formae elementares.
3. Item, ratione hoc videtur. Primae formae, quae insunt materiae, sunt formae elementares, sicut patet, quia ultra illas non est resolutio nisi ad materiam primam: ergo si materia illa aliquam formam habuit corporalem, videtur, quod habuerit formam elementarem. Sed formae elementares sunt aeque primae4: ergo videtur, quod simul habuit omnes.
4. Item, constans est secundum positionem Sanctorum, quod lux illa faciebat noctem et diem5; sed diem non poterat facere, nisi esset corpus transparens et illuminabile, noctem non poterat facere, nisi esset corpus opacum, quod umbram proiiceret: videtur ergo, quod in primaria conditione materia in quadam sui parte fuerit transparens et in quadam opaca, et ita quod in se habuerit formas diversas.
5. Item, «nihil est in genere, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie6»: ergo si materia illa erat quid corporeum, erat igitur aliquod corpus: ergo vel simplex, vel mixtum; sed non erat corpus simplex, quia nec caeleste nec elementare; ergo permixtum, ergo habebat in se diversitatem formarum.
6. Item, materia illa, cum esset imperfecta, habebat aliquem appetitum7; aut ergo ad unam formam, aut ad plures. Si ad unam: ergo videtur, cum Deus compleverit appetitum eius, quod debuit dare unam solam formam corporalem; si ad plures: ergo cum multiformitas appetituum veniat ex multiformitate dispositionum, et multiformitas dispositionum ex multiformitate formarum, ergo videtur, quod illa materia condita fuerit sub formarum diversitate.
Fundamenta.
Sed contra: 1. Genesis primo8: Terra autem erat inanis et vacua; sed si esset in materia formarum diversitas, non esset inanis et vacua: ergo etc.
2. Item, alia translatio9: Terra erat invisibilis et incomposita; sed si esset ibi forma caelestis et elementaris, esset iam materia aliquo modo et visibilis et composita.
3. Item, si erant ibi formae plures, aut ergo erant permixtae, aut distinctae. Si distinctae: ergo non erat materia illa informis; si permixtae: ergo videtur, quod haberet formam mixtionis, et ita non erat informis, immo magis formata, quam si haberet solam formam elementarem10.
4. Item, miscibilia praecedunt mixtum11: ergo si ibi erant formae permixtae, per naturam prius sunt elementa quam illa materia, quae primo est condita: ergo videtur ordo praeposterus, quando Deus ex materia illa fecit elementa in sequentibus diebus.
5. Item, si permixtae erant ibi formae, ergo materia illa magis approximabat mixto perfecta mixtione, quam approximet12 elementum: ergo magis approximabat ad opus quintae diei et sextae quam elementorum distinctio: ergo videtur, quod non debuit productio illius materiae determinari in rerum primordio.
6. Item, si erat ibi formarum diversitas, ergo videtur, quod esset ibi actio et passio, et ita generatio et corruptio et alteratio: et ita non erat dicenda materia informis, cum in tali statu essent operationes, quae competunt formis distinctis13.
Conclusio
Materia corporalium non fuit creata sub completa formarum diversitate, sed forma, quam habebat materia informis vocata, non dabat esse completum, sed erat potius dispositio ad formas ulteriores.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod informitatem illius materiae corporalis diversimode intellexerunt diversi.
Opinio 1. Quidam namque voluerunt dicere, quod materia illa diceretur chaos propter formarum multitudinem et contrarietatem, quae erat in partibus materiae, ita quod illae partes non distinguebantur ad invicem secundum loca determinata, nec ita proportionaliter invicem iungebantur, ut ex eis resultaret aliquod mixtum completum. Et ideo erat ibi quaedam permixtio non proportionis, sed confusionis; et sicut non erat ibi proportionalis mixtio, ita nec erat ibi regularis actio, immo cuiusdam pugnae confusio, ita ut calida pugnarent frigidis, et humida siccis14; et sic recte posset materia illa chaos appellari. — Sed iste modus ponendi potius est poeticus quam philosophicus, quia magis sequitur imaginationis fictionem quam rationem, cum secundum istam positionem ponantur elementa illam materiam sic productam naturaliter praecedere; quod nec rationi consonat nec sacrae Scripturae.
Opinio 2. Et ideo est alius modus dicendi rationabilior, quod materia illa producta est sub aliqua forma, sed illa non erat forma completa nec dans materiae esse completum; et ideo non sic formabat, quin adhuc materia diceretur informis, nec appetitum materiae adeo finiebat, quin materia adhuc alias formas appeteret; Conclusio 1. et ideo dispositio erat ad formas ulteriores, non completa perfectio. Et quoniam ad multas formas materia informis appetitum et inclinationem habebat, ideo, quamvis illa forma non haberet in se naturas diversas, Conclusio 2. tamen materia in diversis suis partibus quandam diversitatem imperfectam habebat, non ex diversis actibus completis, sed magis ex appetitibus ad diversa; et ideo permixta dicitur et confusa. — Exemplum. Sicut exemplum ponitur in embryone, quod actu habet unam formam et figuram quandam massae carnis, illa tamen est dispositio ad diversas membrorum figurationes. Deficit exemplum. Istud tamen non est omnino simile, quia forma illa non erat tantae actualitatis, sicut est forma embryonis, nec in tanta propinquitate ad eductionem formarum sequentium, sicut forma embryonis ad eductionem membrorum. Forma enim embryonis est visibilis et per vim naturae ad perfectam completionem est perducibilis15; illa vero materia sub tali forma incomposita erat et invisibilis, et ad formas subsequentes sola divina virtute et operatione poterat perduci. Et ideo propter imperfectionem formae illius materia illa dicitur informis; et propter indeterminatum appetitum multarum formarum confusa dicitur et permixta.
Iudicium hac opinione. Et haec positio satis videtur esse intelligibilis et probabilis. Et iuxta hanc positionem concedendum est, quod materia non fuit creata sub formarum diversitate, sicut rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de textu, dicendum, quod caelum stat ibi pro empyreo. Et si obiicitur, quod Scriptura consequenter dicit, terram apparuisse, non formatam esse; dicendum, quod sicut artifex facit apparere effectum producendo, non ostendendo solum; sic intelligendum est, quod Deus fecit terram apparere, non solum separando elementa ab invicem, sed etiam producendo, ita quod productio fuit cum distinctione, et distinctio cum productione.
2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Hugo dicit, per terram intelligi elementum terrae; dicendum, quod hoc dicit non propter formam terrae, quae iam inesset illi materiae, sed propter quandam aptitudinem incompletam, quae inerat illi parti materiae, ut perficeretur postmodum forma terrae, per eum modum, secundum quem consuevit aliquid appellari eius nomine, ad quod ordinatur. Notandum. Materia enim illa non poterat nisi quodam modo balbutiendo describi, quia necdum erat quod sermo perfecte explicet16, sed etiam intellectus in imaginatione deficit. Unde et illud quod ipse subiungit de permixtione, non est hoc dictum, quia ibi fuerit vera oppositarum formarum coniunctio, sed quia non erat ibi perfecte formarum distinctio.
3. Notandum. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod formae elementares sunt primae in materia corporali; dicendum, quod verum est de formis, quae dant materiae esse completum; forma vero illa, quam habebat informis materia, non dabat sibi esse completum, et ideo tam formas simplices quam compositas, quae esse completum tribuunt, praecedebat vel praecedere poterat.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod erat ibi corpus
opacum et transparens; dicendum, quod nec erat ibi perfecta opacitas nec perfecta transparentia; erat tamen in diversis partibus materiae, secundum quod Conditor ordinaverat ex eis diversas formas producere, aliquis diversus dispositionis modus, qui non ponebat diversitatem formarum. Sicut si intelligatur, quod aliquod corpus in una parte sit rarius et in alia magis compactum, salva formae unitate; sic intelligi debet in illa materia, quae formam habebat maxime17 ad multa possibilem.
5. Notandum. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est in genere, quod non sit in aliqua eius specie; dicendum, quod illud verum est de eo quod est in genere tanquam ens completum; sed materia illa non sic erat corporea, quod esset completa in genere corporum, sed sic habebat extensionem et corporeitatem, quod non habebat perfectam formae actualitatem, sicut praedictum est prius18.
6. Notandum. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de diversitate appetituum, dicendum, quod appetitus non semper sequitur formam completam, sed etiam attenditur secundum appetentis indigentiam et aliquam dispositionem semiplenam; nisi fortassis sit talis appetitus, qui consequatur dispositionem, quae est necessitas19; sed talis non erat in illa informi materia, sed secundum quandam maiorem subtilitatem et raritatem in partibus materiae erat dispositio longinqua ad formas alias et alias.
I. Omissis duabus extremis opinionibus, de quibus in 1. et 2. quaest. actum est, remanent duae aliae opiniones hic expositae. Primam earum, sed sobrie determinatam, tenet S. Thom., qui (de Potent. q. 4. a. 1. ad 13.) dicit, quod illa materia in principio suae creationis «habebat in diversis partibus formas elementares diversas. Dicebatur tamen materia informis, quia nondum formae mixtorum corporum supervenerant materiae, ad quas formae elementares sunt in potentia; nec etiam erat situs elementorum adhuc conveniens eorum generationi» (cfr. S. 1. q. 66. a. 1.). Idem autem in Commentar. (hic a. 4.) alio loquendi modo eandem sententiam explicat: «Sed dico, quod virtutes activae et passivae nondum in principio partibus mundi collatae fuerant, secundum quas postmodum distingui et ordinari dicuntur. Et hoc esse possibile, patet, si sustinere volumus opinionem Avicennae, qui ponit, elementa in mixto remanere secundum formas substantiales quantum ad primum esse, transmutari autem quantum ad secundum, scil. quantum ad qualitates activas et passivas... Unde possibile est, materiam esse sub forma substantiali sine hoc, quod habeat qualitates activas et passivas in suo complemento; et sic, cum esse primum naturaliter praecedat esse secundum, expressus est ordo naturae in successione temporis, dum res prius fiunt in esse primo, quam perficiantur in esse secundo». Observandum autem est, S. Doctorem in posterioribus suis scriptis dictam opinionem Avicennae, cui favet B. Albertus, non approbare. — Haec igitur prima opinio, quam praeferunt etiam B. Albert. et Aegid. R., asserit, primas formas huius materiae fuisse ipsas formas elementares, quod a S. Bonaventura non probatur. — Notum autem est, antiquam et illa aetate communem de quatuor elementis doctrinam, cui innititur ex parte ista opinio, nostra aetate novis scientiae chimicae repertis eliminatam esse, praesertim quatenus docebatur, quod aer, aqua, terra sint corpora simplicia.
II. Secundam autem opinionem, quae est Bedae et Walafridi Strabi, sequitur S. Bonav., quia «satis videtur esse intelligibilis et probabilis». Eandem ut probabilem admittit Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 4.), qui de ista una forma communi et incompleta dicit, quod «communis erat non per praedicationem, sed per indistinctionem, sicut humor arboris sub forma una speciali est communis per indistinctionem ramis ibi producendis et foliis et floribus et fructibus; et sicut forma seminis se habet respectu diversorum membrorum. Illa autem materia secundum diversas sui partes maiorem habebat aptitudinem, ratione raritatis aut densitatis, respectu formae terrae, aut aquae, aut ignis, sicut una pars humoris respectu rami, alia respectu folii, aut floris, aut fructus». — Ad obiectionem autem principalem, quam primae sententiae patroni ex metaphysica opponunt, scil. quod nihil potest esse in genere, quin sit in aliqua eius specie, idem Petrus (ibid. ad 7.) sic respondet: «Forma generalis dupliciter potest dici; vel per communem praedicationem, vel per indistinctionem; hoc secundo modo generalis erat forma illa, non primo modo, immo specialis. Nec oportet, quidquid est in aliquo genere per reductionem ut ens incompletum, esse in aliqua specie generis, sed quod est in aliquo genere ut ens completum. Non enim humor, de quo generabitur ramus aut folium, aut flos, aut fructus, est in aliqua illarum specierum, nec semen in specie animalis, quod inde generatur». Eandem obiectionem solvit S. Bonav., hic ad 3, ubi notanda sunt verba: «Materia illa non sic erat corporea, quod esset completa in genere corporum, sed sic habebat extensionem et corporeitatem, quod non habebat perfectam formae actualitatem». In corp. autem dicitur de hac forma incompleta, quod «dispositio erat ad formas ulteriores, non completa perfectio», et infra de eadem dicitur quod «incomposita erat et invisibilis, et ad formas subsequentes sola divina virtute et operatione poterat reduci».
Sententiae S. Bonaventurae favet Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 44. m. 2, et etiam Richard. a Med. (hic q. 6; licet Dionys. Carth. dicat, eum esse S. Bonaventurae contrarium) his verbis: «Ego autem aestimo, quod quamvis materia caeli empyrei creata fuerit sub forma completa, quod materia aliorum corporum non fuit creata sub forma completa; sed partes illius molis, contentae infra caelum empyreum, creatae fuerunt sub formis incompletis illorum corporum, quae postea de illis partibus facta sunt per intervalla sex dierum». Et praemittit haec: «Et videtur mihi, quod illi qui dicunt, in nullo composito uno esse nisi unam formam substantialem, et nullam formam substantialem recipere magis et minus, necesse habent sequi opinionem immediate praedictam», nempe opinionem S. Augustini, quod in primo instanti temporis omnia simul et sub perfectis formis creata sint. — Etiam Scotus, licet hic totus sit in arguendo, quod materia sit entitas positiva, a forma distincta et per virtutem divinam ab ea separabilis, eandem sententiam ut probabilem refert II. Report. d. 14. q. 1. n. 9, sicut et Biel, hic q. 1. in fine. Lyranus autem primum Genesis capitulum
duplici expositione secundum utramque opinionem interpretatus est.
Etiam S. Thom. admittit suo modo formas intermedias et incompletas, quae in generatione sibi succedunt, ita «quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima et adhuc amplius: et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus» (S. I. q. 118. a. 2. ad 2.). In Sum. c. Gent. (II. c. 89. in fine corp.) istas formas vocat «intermedias, quibus gradatim ad formam ultimam veniatur»; et dicit, quod «ista intermedia non habent speciem completam, sed sunt ut via ad speciem; et ideo non generantur, ut permaneant, sed ut per ea ad ultimum generatum perveniatur». — Hoc autem dictum est secundum sententiam, quae in eodem composito unitatem formae substantialis in toto rigore sustinet; quae positio aliquatenus temperatur a S. Bonaventura, ut patet per ea quae dicit de luce infra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2, ad 5. et de rationibus seminalibus d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, et iam insinuatum est supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, scholion. Cfr. etiam infra d. 15. q. 2. fund. 3. — Notandum autem est, hanc primam et incompletam materiae formam non esse confundendam cum rationibus seminalibus; ut patet infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 3.
III. Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 11. q. 44. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
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Question III. Whether the matter of bodily things was created under some diversity of forms.
Third, it is asked whether that matter of bodily things was created under some diversity of forms. And that it was, seems thus:
To the opposite.
1. By the text1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth: therefore it seems that in the beginning of its founding it had both a heavenly form and an elemental form. If you say that heaven here stands for the empyrean heaven, and earth for the matter of bodily things; the objection is raised by the following text2: Let the waters be gathered into one place, and let the dry land appear: therefore it seems that on the third day the earth was only made manifest, not produced: therefore in the chaos itself the elements seemed already to be present.
2. Likewise, Hugh of Saint Victor3: «By the name earth here I judge the element of earth to be signified»: if therefore the element of earth was there, by parity of reasoning the other elements as well. If you say that he there calls it the element of earth not because it then was, but because it was to be; the objection is raised by what is added: «And this earthen element was settled in the middle and in one place, the rest being mixed in confusion together». If therefore the mixture is not of the same but of diverse things, it seems that diverse elemental forms were already there.
3. Likewise, this is seen by reason. The first forms which are present in matter are the elemental forms, as is clear, because beyond them there is no resolution except into first matter: therefore if that matter had any bodily form, it seems that it had an elemental form. But the elemental forms are equally primary4: therefore it seems that it had them all at once.
4. Likewise, it is constant according to the position of the Saints that that light made night and day5; but it could not make day unless there were a transparent and illuminable body, nor could it make night unless there were an opaque body which would cast a shadow: therefore it seems that in its primary founding the matter was in some part of itself transparent and in some part opaque, and thus that it had diverse forms in itself.
5. Likewise, «nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it6»: therefore if that matter was something bodily, it was therefore some body: therefore either simple or mixed; but it was not a simple body, since neither heavenly nor elemental; therefore mixed, therefore it had in itself a diversity of forms.
6. Likewise, that matter, since it was imperfect, had some appetite7; either therefore for one form or for many. If for one: then it seems, since God fulfilled its appetite, that he ought to have given one sole bodily form; if for many: then since the multiformity of appetites comes from the multiformity of dispositions, and the multiformity of dispositions from the multiformity of forms, it seems that that matter was founded under a diversity of forms.
Foundations.
On the contrary: 1. In Genesis 18: And the earth was empty and void; but if there were a diversity of forms in matter, it would not be empty and void: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, another translation9: The earth was invisible and incomposite; but if there were a heavenly and elemental form there, the matter would already be in some way both visible and composed.
3. Likewise, if there were many forms there, then either they were mixed or distinct. If distinct: then that matter was not unformed; if mixed: then it seems that it would have the form of mixture, and so it was not unformed, but rather more formed than if it had only elemental form10.
4. Likewise, things-to-be-mixed precede the mixture11: therefore if mixed forms were there, by nature the elements are prior to that matter which was first founded: therefore the order seems preposterous, when God afterwards on the following days made the elements from that matter.
5. Likewise, if mixed forms were there, then that matter approximated more closely to a perfectly-mixed mixture than the element approximates12: therefore it approximated more closely to the work of the fifth and sixth days than to the distinction of the elements: therefore it seems that the production of that matter ought not to have been settled in the primordial of things.
6. Likewise, if there was a diversity of forms there, then it seems that there was action and passion there, and so generation and corruption and alteration: and so the matter ought not to have been called unformed, since in such a state there were operations which belong to distinct forms13.
Conclusio
The matter of bodily things was not created under a complete diversity of forms, but the form which the so-called unformed matter had did not give complete being but was rather a disposition toward further forms.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that diverse [authors] have understood the unformedness of that bodily matter in diverse ways.
Opinion 1. For some have wished to say that that matter was called chaos on account of the multitude and contrariety of forms which was in the parts of matter, in such a way that those parts were not distinguished from one another in determinate places, nor were they joined together in such proportion that any complete mixture should result from them. And therefore there was there a kind of mixture, not of proportion but of confusion; and just as there was no proportional mixture there, so neither was there regular action there, but rather the confusion of a kind of strife, such that hot things fought with cold, and moist with dry14; and so that matter could rightly be called chaos. — But this manner of positing is poetic rather than philosophical, because it follows the fiction of imagination rather than reason, since on this position the elements would naturally precede that matter so produced; which is consonant neither with reason nor with Sacred Scripture.
Opinion 2. And therefore there is another, more reasonable, manner of speaking: that that matter was produced under some form, but that form was not a complete form nor one giving matter complete being; and therefore it did not so form it that matter would not still be called unformed, nor did it so terminate matter's appetite that matter would not still desire other forms; Conclusio 1. and therefore there was a disposition toward further forms, not complete perfection. And since unformed matter had appetite and inclination toward many forms, therefore, although that form did not have in itself diverse natures, Conclusio 2. nevertheless matter in its diverse parts had a certain imperfect diversity, not from diverse complete acts, but rather from appetites toward diverse things; and therefore it is called mixed and confused. — An example. Just as the example is given of an embryo, which has in act one form and a certain shape of a mass of flesh, yet this is a disposition toward the diverse shapings of members. The example falls short. This however is not wholly similar, because that form was not of such great actuality as is the form of an embryo, nor in such proximity to the eduction of subsequent forms as is the form of the embryo to the eduction of the members. For the form of the embryo is visible and by the power of nature is able to be brought through to perfect completion15; but that matter under such a form was incomposite and invisible, and to subsequent forms could be brought through only by divine virtue and operation. And therefore on account of the imperfection of the form, that matter is called unformed; and on account of the indeterminate appetite for many forms, it is called confused and mixed.
A verdict on this opinion. And this position seems sufficiently intelligible and probable. And according to this position it must be granted that matter was not created under a diversity of forms, as the reasons adduced to this effect show.
Solution of the opposites. 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary from the text, it must be said that heaven there stands for the empyrean. And if it is objected that Scripture consequently says that the earth appeared, not that it was formed; it must be said that just as a craftsman makes an effect to appear by producing it, not only by showing it; so it must be understood that God made the earth appear not only by separating the elements from one another, but also by producing them, so that the production was with distinction, and the distinction with production.
2. To that, however, which is objected that Hugh says that by earth the element of earth is understood; it must be said that he says this not on account of the form of earth which would already be in that matter, but on account of a certain incomplete aptitude which was in that part of matter, that it might afterwards be perfected by the form of earth, in the manner according to which something is wont to be called by the name of that to which it is ordered. Note. For that matter could only be described in a kind of stammering way, because there was not yet that which speech could perfectly explain16, and even the intellect fails in imagination. Hence what he subjoins about mixture is not said because there was there a true conjunction of opposite forms, but because there was not there a perfect distinction of forms.
3. Note. To that which is objected that the elemental forms are first in bodily matter; it must be said that this is true of the forms which give matter complete being; but that form which unformed matter had did not give it complete being, and therefore it preceded, or could precede, both simple and composite forms which confer complete being.
4. To that which is objected that there was there an opaque and transparent body;
it must be said that there was neither perfect opacity nor perfect transparency there; yet there was in diverse parts of matter, according as the Creator had ordered to produce diverse forms from them, some diverse mode of disposition, which did not posit a diversity of forms. Just as if it were understood that some body in one part be rarer and in another more compact, the unity of form being preserved; so it must be understood in that matter, which had a form maximally17 open to many possibilities.
5. Note. To that which is objected that nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it; it must be said that this is true of what is in a genus as a complete being; but that matter was not so bodily that it was complete in the genus of bodies, but it so had extension and bodiliness that it did not have perfect actuality of form, as was said before18.
6. Note. To that, however, which is objected concerning the diversity of appetites, it must be said that appetite does not always follow complete form, but is also attended according to the indigence of the one desiring and some half-full disposition; unless perhaps it be such an appetite as follows a disposition which is necessity19; but such was not in that unformed matter, but, according to a certain greater subtlety and rarity in the parts of matter, there was a remote disposition toward various other forms.
I. Omitting the two extreme opinions, which were treated in questions 1 and 2, there remain the two other opinions here set forth. The first of them — but soberly determined — is held by St. Thomas, who (de Potent. q. 4. a. 1. ad 13.) says that that matter at the beginning of its creation «had in diverse parts diverse elemental forms. Yet the matter was called unformed, because the forms of mixed bodies had not yet supervened upon the matter — those forms to which the elemental forms are in potency; nor was the position of the elements yet suitable to their generation» (cf. S. I. q. 66. a. 1.). The same author in his Commentary (here a. 4.) explains the same opinion in another mode of speaking: «But I say that the active and passive virtues had not yet at the beginning been conferred on the parts of the world, according to which afterwards they are said to be distinguished and ordered. And that this is possible is clear if we wish to maintain the opinion of Avicenna, who posits that the elements remain in the mixture according to their substantial forms as to the first being, but are transmuted as to the second, namely as to the active and passive qualities... Hence it is possible that matter be under a substantial form without having active and passive qualities in their completion; and so, since first being naturally precedes second being, the order of nature is expressed in succession of time, while things first come to be in first being, before they are perfected in second being». It must however be observed that in his later writings the Saint Doctor does not approve the said opinion of Avicenna, which Blessed Albert favors. — This first opinion, then, which Blessed Albert and Aegidius Romanus also prefer, asserts that the first forms of this matter were the elemental forms themselves, which is not proved by St. Bonaventure. — It is well known, however, that the ancient and at that time common doctrine concerning the four elements, on which this opinion in part rests, has in our age been eliminated by new discoveries of chemical science, especially insofar as it was taught that air, water, and earth are simple bodies.
II. The second opinion, however, which is that of Bede and Walafrid Strabo, is followed by St. Bonaventure, because «it seems sufficiently intelligible and probable». The same is admitted as probable by Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 4.), who concerning this single common and incomplete form says that «it was common not by predication but by indistinction, just as the sap of a tree under one specific form is common by indistinction to the branches there to be produced and to leaves and flowers and fruits; and just as the form of the seed is related to the diverse members. But that matter according to its diverse parts had greater aptitude — by reason of rarity or density — for the form of earth, or water, or fire, just as one part of the sap is for the branch, another for the leaf, or flower, or fruit». — To the principal objection, however, which the patrons of the first opinion bring from metaphysics — namely that nothing can be in a genus without being in some species of it — the same Peter (ibid. ad 7.) thus responds: «General form can be spoken of in two ways: either by common predication or by indistinction; in this second mode that form was general, not in the first mode, but rather specific. Nor is it required that whatever is in any genus by reduction as an incomplete being should be in some species of the genus, but [only] what is in any genus as a complete being. For the sap from which a branch or leaf, or flower, or fruit, will be generated is not in any of those species, nor is the seed in the species of the animal which is generated from it». The same objection is solved by St. Bonaventure here at reply 3, where the words must be noted: «That matter was not so bodily that it was complete in the genus of bodies, but it so had extension and bodiliness that it did not have perfect actuality of form». In the body [of the question], however, it is said of this incomplete form that «disposition was toward further forms, not complete perfection», and below it is said of the same that «it was incomposite and invisible, and to subsequent forms could be brought back only by divine virtue and operation».
The opinion of St. Bonaventure is favored by Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 44. m. 2, and also by Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 6; though Denis the Carthusian says he is contrary to St. Bonaventure), in these words: «But I judge that, although the matter of the empyrean heaven was created under a complete form, the matter of other bodies was not created under a complete form; but the parts of that mass, contained beneath the empyrean heaven, were created under incomplete forms of those bodies which were afterwards made out of those parts during the intervals of the six days». And he premises this: «And it seems to me that those who say that in no composite there is more than one substantial form, and that no substantial form can receive more and less, must necessarily follow the opinion immediately mentioned above» — namely, the opinion of St. Augustine, that in the first instant of time all things were created together and under perfect forms. — Even Scotus, although here he is wholly engaged in arguing that matter is a positive entity, distinct from form and separable from it by divine power, refers to the same opinion as probable in II. Report. d. 14. q. 1. n. 9, as does Biel, here q. 1. at the end. Lyranus, moreover, has interpreted the first chapter of Genesis
by a double exposition, according to each opinion.
St. Thomas too admits in his own way intermediate and incomplete forms, which succeed one another in generation, such that «both in man and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes, there is corruption of the prior, yet so that the subsequent form has whatever the first had and still more: and thus through many generations and corruptions one arrives at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and in other animals» (S. I. q. 118. a. 2. ad 2.). In the Sum. contra Gent. (II. c. 89. at the end of the body) he calls these forms «intermediate, by which one comes step by step to the ultimate form»; and he says that «these intermediates do not have a complete species, but are as a way to the species; and therefore they are not generated to remain, but in order that through them one may arrive at the ultimately generated thing». — This, however, is said according to the opinion which in the same composite maintains in full rigor the unity of substantial form; which position is to some extent tempered by St. Bonaventure, as is clear from what he says about light below d. 13. a. 2. q. 2, ad 5. and concerning seminal reasons d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, and as has already been intimated above at d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, scholion. Cf. also below d. 15. q. 2. fund. 3. — It must, moreover, be noted that this first and incomplete form of matter is not to be confused with the seminal reasons; as is clear below at d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. in the body and at reply 3.
III. Besides those already cited: Blessed Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 11. q. 44. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. a. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1.
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- Gen. 1, 1.Gen. 1:1.
- Gen. 1, 9.Gen. 1:9.
- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. 1. c. 6, ubi etiam seq. textus habetur.Book I, On the Sacraments, pt. 1, c. 6, where the following text is also found.
- Averroes, XII. Metaph. text. 11. ait: Opinatur [Aristoteles], quod prima materia est unum secundum subiectum et multa secundum habilitatem. Primo enim habet habilitates ad recipiendum primas contrarietates, scilicet formas omnium quatuor elementorum. Secundo vero habet potentias consimilium partium, mediantibus formis quatuor elementorum; et istae potentiae diversantur secundum diversitatem mixtionis quatuor elementorum, ita quod ex hoc diversantur formae generabilium.Averroes, Metaphysics XII, text 11, says: He [Aristotle] holds that first matter is one in subject and many in fitness. For first it has fitnesses to receive the first contrarieties, namely the forms of all four elements. Second, it has the potencies of similar parts, mediated by the forms of the four elements; and these potencies are diversified according to the diversity of mixture of the four elements, such that from this the forms of generable things are diversified.
- Cfr. infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2.Cf. below d. 13, a. 1, q. 2.
- Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 4.), ubi ait, quod necessarium sit, de quibus genus praedicatur, et specierum aliquam praedicari, et quaecumque habent genus vel denominative dicuntur a genere, et specierum aliquam habere vel denominative ab aliqua specierum dici, ut si de aliquo disciplina praedicatur, et grammatica vel musica vel aliqua disciplinarum aliarum praedicabitur.Aristotle, Topics II, c. 2 (c. 4), where he says that it is necessary that, of whatever a genus is predicated, some species also be predicated, and that whatever things have a genus, or are called denominatively from a genus, must also have, or be called denominatively from, some species — as if "discipline" is predicated of something, then "grammar" or "music" or some one of the other disciplines will also be predicated [of it].
- Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), ubi dicit, materiam appetere formam, sicut turpe pulcrum.Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, text 81 (c. 9), where he says that matter desires form as the ugly desires the beautiful.
- Vers. 2.Verse 2.
- Septuaginta interpretum.[The translation] of the Septuagint translators.
- Cfr. hic nota 4.Cf. note 4 here.
- Nam, ut ait Aristot., I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 90. (c. 10.), «mixtio est miscibilium alteratorum unio».For, as Aristotle says in On Generation and Corruption I, text 90 (c. 10), «mixture is the union of altered miscibles».
- Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 approximaret.Some codices, with edition 1, [read] approximaret [for approximet].
- Averroes, III. de Anima, text. 18: Nihil agit nisi per suam formam. Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 5. et tom. I. pag. 84, nota 7.Averroes, On the Soul III, text 18: Nothing acts except through its own form. Cf. above p. 89, note 5, and tome I, p. 84, note 7.
- Ovid., I. Metamorph. 19: Quia corpore in uno — Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis. — Hinc ad Ovidium respicitur, cum continuo dicitur, hunc modum ponendi esse potius poeticum quam philosophicum.Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 19: Because in one body — cold things fought with hot, moist with dry. — Hence reference is made to Ovid when it is said next that this manner of positing is rather poetic than philosophical.
- Cod. T ad perfectionem est perducibilis. Paulo inferius post incomposita erat plures codd. omittunt et.Codex T [reads] can be brought through to perfection. A little below, after was incomposite, several codices omit and.
- Vat. quia nedum sermo perfecte non explicat. Paulo post multi codd. minus bene fuerat, codd. W cc fuit pro fuerit. — Cfr. de hac solutione Magist. hic c. 3. 5.The Vatican [edition reads] because not yet does speech perfectly explain. A little later many codices, less well, [read] fuerat, codices W and cc [read] fuit for fuerit. — Cf. on this solution the Master here, c. 3, 5.
- In cod. cc et ed. 1 deest maxime.In codex cc and edition 1, maxime is missing.
- In corp. quaest. et ad 3. — Cod. M omittit prius.[Cf.] the body of the question and the reply to 3. — Codex M omits prius.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1, ubi inter alias necessitatis species affertur illa, quae «est ex principio sufficiente in disponendo», et haec est necessitas materiae dispositae, quae potest dici necessitas exigentiae.Cf. I Sent., d. 6, q. 1, where among other species of necessity that one is brought forward which «is from a principle sufficient in disposing», and this is the necessity of disposed matter, which can be called the necessity of requirement.