Bonaventure

I. Doctrinam de rationibus seminalibus Scholastici acceperunt a S. Augustino eamque adhibuerunt ad solvendas aliquo modo quaestiones de naturali generatione et corruptione rerum corporalium, praesertim viventium. Haec autem problemata iam in se sunt obscurissima et maioribus difficultatibus obscurabantur in suppositione generationis aequivocae (sive per putrefactionem, ut dicebant), quae illa aetate communiter admittebatur. Nodus autem, qui est solvendus, hic est: si formae substantiali producendae non praecedit in materia aliquid, ex quo producatur, videtur, quod producatur ex nihilo; ad hoc, tunc vel tribuenda esset agentibus naturalibus potentia creativa, vel dicendum, quod in generationibus naturalibus omnes novae formae sint a Creatore (cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.). — Utrumque autem sententia communis Scholasticorum, saltem posteriorum, negabat et asserebat, tum formas illas educi de potentia materiae, tum ad hanc eductionem concurrere rationes seminales. Quid autem proprie et in sententia S. Augustini sint rationes seminales, et quo sensu ipsae concurrant ad productionem formarum, difficile est determinare. Unde dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.): « Haec est una praecipuarum difficultatum in philosophia, in qua etiam magni theologi diversimode sentiunt ». Opinamur autem, respectu harum diversarum opinionum locum habere ea quae de similibus opinionum dissidiis dicit S. Bonav. supra d. 15. dub. 3. Aliter autem iudicandum est de multis recentioribus theoriis circa « descendentiam » viventium, quae, ut Creatorem excludant, vano conatu leges fingunt, ut imperfectissima quaeque propria virtute paulatim ascendere possint ad perfectionem supremarum formarum.

II. Breviter referre iuvat principales sententias antiquorum quid proprie sint rationes seminales. 1. Quidam voluerunt, quod non sint nisi potentia passiva sive receptiva materiae; quae sententia communiter reprobatur. — 2. Scotus primae sententiae in eo appropinquat, quod negat, rationem seminalem in viventibus esse principium aptum, ut active concurrat ad ultimum terminum generationis producendum: unde in productione viventium recurrendum esse vult « ad virtutem divinam, sicut et Averroes facit » (hic q. unica, n. 10; cfr. supra d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. in schol.; sed de Rerum princ. q. 10. a. 3. dubie loquitur). — 3. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 115. a. 2.) ait: « Convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas, quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat ». — 4. Fere idem dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2.): « Ratio seminalis proprie dicta est quaedam vis activa, causata in semine a generante vel a causante, alia a forma substantiali ipsius seminis, quae iuvat ad conservandum formam illam, ad quam determinavit materiam et transmutavit ». — 5. Aegid. R. (hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. et dub. lat. 1-6.) latissime disputat contra praedictas aliasque opiniones, et etiam contra sententiam S. Thomae, scil. tum contra modum, quo hic terminum rationes interpretatur tum contra determinationem earundem. Tamen de hac sententia dicit, quod magis veritati appropinquet, sed non sufficiat. Ipse autem vult, quod, formaliter loquendo, istae sint « quaedam aptitudines vel habitudines, insitae rebus naturalibus a Deo, ex quibus educuntur naturales effectus et formae rerum naturalium per virtutes activas et passivas ».

III. His sexto loco adiungimus sententiam S. Bonaventurae, quae breviter hic in principio corp., et supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et in scholio diffusius exposita est (cfr. etiam supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; d. 12. a. 1. q. 3; d. 15. a. 1. q. 1.). Infra autem d. 30. a. 3. q. 1. fundam. 3, in corp. et ad 5. 6. aliqua adduntur, quibus explicatur, quomodo istae rationes se habeant ad materiam; et inter alia dicitur (in corp.), quod ratio seminalis sit « potentia convertendi ad se aliam naturam, ita ut sufficeret [cum aliquanta materia] ad omnium procreationem, addito sibi illo, in quo posset se multiplicare ». Et ibi ad 5. legitur: « Quantitas virtutis se tenet ex parte formae et potest dici ratio seminalis; et haec, cum sit forma, multiplicabilis est, hoc est, potest sibi similem inducere in materiam sibi appositam ». Praecipue autem S. Bonav. mentem suam explicat in tractatu de resurrectione IV. Sent. in locis supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. citatis (cfr. etiam supra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2, schol.).

Hanc doctrinam, quam, teste Dionysio Carth., etiam Gulielmus Paris. profitetur, accepit S. Bonav. ab Alex. Hal., qui S. p. II. q. 87. in tractatu insigni de vita, m. 2. a. 1. § 2. ad 6, praeter plurima alia dicit: « Elementis mundi indita est quaedam natura simplex et incorporea, alia a natura elementari, quae cooperans virtuti operativae in plantis et animalibus, concurrente virtute corporum caelestium modo conp. 444venienti prodeunt [sic!] in esse animae vegetabilium et animalium. Hae autem virtutes sive naturae possunt dici corporales, quia radicantur in corporibus sive naturis corporum, et spirituales, quia mole carent corporali... Dico ergo opinando, non asserendo, quod illa natura, quae est simplex et incorporea, indita partibus mundi, qua dicit Philosophus inferiora ista plena esse, est principium et origo, ut ex quo est quod est animarum huiusmodi; a virtute vero decisa a generante est quo est; a virtute demum primi orbis et aliorum corporum supercaelestium sunt ipsae animae huiusmodi ut a disponente et corroborante alia operativa ad hoc, quod prodeant in actum ». — Eandem viam sequuntur B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 31. m. 1.) eiusque discipulus Uldaricus, et favent Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 3 et q. 2. a. 1.) aliique, qui simul cum propugnantibus contrarias sententias supra in scholio ad d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. citati sunt.

IV. Respectu specialis quaestionis, utrum ratio seminalis sit ratio universalis, vel singularis, S. Bonav. primam opinionem, quam posteriores Scholastici omnino reprobant, satis benigne iudicat, licet alteram sententiam praeferat. Hanc autem secundam sententiam Petr. a Tar. (qui solus explicite de hac speciali quaestione agit) approbat et sic explicat (hic q. 1. a. 3.): « Ratio seminalis est forma particularis, non universalis, et forma partis, non totius; est tamen forma incompleta. Est enim quasi initium quoddam seu seminarium formae completae in materia, adeo quod per actionem agentis naturalis de potentia ad actum educitur. Fluit autem seu transit de uno esse ad aliud, usquequo perveniat ad esse formae ultimae complentis; sicut ratio seminalis, quae est in semine animalis alicuius, primo habet esse quasi lactis, deinde quasi sanguinis, deinde carnis, deinde embryonis, deinde perfecti animalis, et a principio indistincta, per diversa postmodum distinguibilis. Ideo similitudinem habet quandam formae universalis ratione suae indistinctionis et potentialitatis; non tamen est vere universalis, sed particularis ». Et ad 1. idem dicit, quod istae formae non erant « prius in esse actuali et completo, sed potentiali et incompleto et confuso, sicut forma pulli in ovo ».

V. Posteriores Scholastici cum S. Thoma, Scoto, Aegidio, Henrico Gand. sententiam S. Bonav. de rationibus seminalibus non approbant, et plura obiiciunt, quae non facile possunt clare solvi. Opinamur autem, etiam sententias aliorum non posse eliminare omnes difficultates. Constat quidem, formas naturales, praesertim viventium, praeditas esse mirabili virtute se propagandi tum secundum esse reale in materia, tum secundum esse intentionale per speciem in medio (cfr. supra d. 13. a. 3. q. 2.); sed si de modo utriusque propagationis intimius quaeratur, post tot sapientum virorum studia plura remanent sub velamine abscondita et admiranda, quam certa ratione explicata. Verbum enim Apostoli (1. Cor. 13. 9): Ex parte cognoscimus, saepissime locum habet etiam in iis, quae quotidiana experientia oculis nostris obversantur.

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I. The Scholastics received the doctrine concerning the seminal reasons from St. Augustine and used it in some way to solve questions on the natural generation and corruption of bodily things, especially of living things. These problems, however, are in themselves most obscure and were obscured by greater difficulties in the supposition of equivocal generation (or through putrefaction, as they used to say), which was commonly admitted in that age. The knot, however, which is to be untied, is this: if to the substantial form to be produced there does not pre-exist in matter something out of which it is produced, it seems that it is produced from nothing; in that case, either creative power would have to be attributed to natural agents, or it must be said that in natural generations all new forms come from the Creator (cf. above d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1). — Both of these the common opinion of the Scholastics, at least the later ones, denied, asserting both that those forms are educed from the potency of matter and that the seminal reasons concur in this eduction. But what the seminal reasons are properly and in the opinion of St. Augustine, and in what sense they concur in the production of forms, is difficult to determine. Hence Dionys. Carth. (here q. 2) says: "This is one of the chief difficulties in philosophy, in which even great theologians are of various opinions". We are of the view that, with respect to these diverse opinions, what St. Bonav. says above d. 15. dub. 3. about similar dissents of opinions has its place. But quite a different judgment is to be made of the many recent theories about the "descent" of living things, which, in order to exclude the Creator, by vain effort feign laws so that the most imperfect things can by their own power gradually ascend to the perfection of the highest forms.

II. It is useful to refer briefly to the chief opinions of the ancients about what seminal reasons properly are. 1. Some have held that they are nothing but the passive or receptive potency of matter; which opinion is commonly rejected. — 2. Scotus approaches the first opinion in this, that he denies that the seminal reason in living things is a principle apt to concur actively in the ultimate term of generation to be produced: hence in the production of living things one must have recourse "to the divine power, just as Averroes also does" (here q. unica, n. 10; cf. above d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. in schol.; but in de Rerum princ. q. 10. a. 3. he speaks doubtfully). — 3. St. Thom. (S. I. q. 115. a. 2) says: "Conveniently Augustine calls all active and passive powers, which are principles of generations and natural motions, seminal reasons". — 4. Almost the same is said by Richard. a Med. (here a. 1. q. 2): "The seminal reason properly so called is a certain active force, caused in the seed by the begetter or by the cause, distinct from the substantial form of the seed itself, which helps to conserve that form to which it has determined and transmuted the matter". — 5. Aegid. R. (here q. 2. a. 1. 2. and dub. lat. 1–6) most fully disputes against the aforesaid and other opinions, and also against the opinion of St. Thomas, namely both against the mode in which he here interprets the term rationes and against their determination. Yet of this opinion he says that it more nearly approaches the truth but does not suffice. He himself holds that, formally speaking, these are "certain aptitudes or habits, implanted in natural things by God, from which natural effects and forms of natural things are educed through active and passive powers".

III. In the sixth place we add the opinion of St. Bonaventure, which is briefly set forth here in the beginning of the body, and above d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. and in the scholion is more amply expounded (cf. also above d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; d. 12. a. 1. q. 3; d. 15. a. 1. q. 1). Below however at d. 30. a. 3. q. 1. fundam. 3, in corp. and ad 5. 6. some things are added, in which it is explained how these reasons stand toward matter; and among other things it is said (in corp.), that the seminal reason is "a potency for converting another nature to itself, so that it would suffice [with some quantity of matter] for the procreation of all things, were there added to it that in which it could multiply itself". And there at 5. it is read: "The quantity of the power belongs on the side of form and can be called a seminal reason; and this, since it is a form, is multipliable, that is, it can induce its like into matter set near it". But chiefly St. Bonav. explains his mind in the treatise on the resurrection in IV. Sent. in the places cited above d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. (cf. also above d. 13. a. 2. q. 2, schol.).

This doctrine, which, as Dionysius Carth. testifies, Gulielmus Paris. also professes, St. Bonav. received from Alex. Hal., who in S. p. II. q. 87 in the celebrated treatise on life, m. 2. a. 1. § 2. ad 6, among very many other things says: "To the elements of the world has been given a certain simple and incorporeal nature, distinct from the elemental nature, which co-operating with the operative power in plants and animals, with the concurring power of celestial bodies, in a fitting mode come forth [sic!] into being as the souls of plants and animals. Now these powers or natures may be called corporeal, because they are rooted in bodies or in the natures of bodies, and spiritual, because they lack bodily mass... I say therefore, opining and not asserting, that that nature, which is simple and incorporeal, implanted in the parts of the world, by which the Philosopher says these lower things are full, is the principle and origin, as that from which is the that-which-is (quod est) of such souls; from a power separated from the begetter is the that-by-which-it-is (quo est); from the power finally of the first orb and of the other supercelestial bodies are these souls themselves as from a disposing and corroborating and other operative power for this, that they come forth into act". — The same way is followed by B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 31. m. 1) and his disciple Uldaricus, and Petr. a Tar. favors it (here q. 1. a. 3. and q. 2. a. 1), and others, who together with the propounders of contrary opinions have been cited above in the scholion to d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

IV. With respect to the special question, whether the seminal reason is a universal or singular reason, S. Bonav. judges rather kindly of the first opinion, which the later Scholastics altogether reject, although he prefers the other position. This second position Petr. a Tar. (who alone treats this special question explicitly) approves and so explains (here q. 1. a. 3): "The seminal reason is a particular form, not universal, and the form of a part, not of the whole; yet it is an incomplete form. For it is, as it were, a certain beginning or seedbed of the complete form in matter, so that through the action of the natural agent it is educed from potency to act. It flows or passes from one being to another, until it comes to the being of the ultimate completing form; just as the seminal reason which is in the seed of some animal first has being as if of milk, then as of blood, then of flesh, then of an embryo, then of a perfect animal, and at the beginning is indistinct, but afterward distinguishable through diverse [stages]. Therefore it has a certain likeness to a universal form by reason of its indistinction and potentiality; yet it is not truly universal, but particular". And ad 1. he says the same, that these forms were not "first in actual and complete being, but in potential and incomplete and confused being, just as the form of the chick in the egg".

V. Later Scholastics, with St. Thomas, Scotus, Aegidius, and Henry of Ghent, do not approve the opinion of S. Bonav. on the seminal reasons, and bring forward many objections, which cannot easily be clearly solved. We are of the view, however, that the opinions of the others also cannot eliminate all difficulties. It is certain indeed that natural forms, especially of living things, are endowed with a wonderful power of propagating themselves both according to real being in matter, and according to intentional being through the species in the medium (cf. above d. 13. a. 3. q. 2); but if it be more deeply inquired about the mode of either propagation, after so much study of wise men many things remain hidden under a veil and to be wondered at, rather than explained by certain reason. For the word of the Apostle (1 Cor. 13. 9): We know in part, very often has place even in those things which our daily experience exhibits to our eyes.

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