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Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus
p. 444

Articulus II. De productione animae Evae aliorumque hominum.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de productione animae ipsius Evae et per consequens omnis alterius animae ab anima Adae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Prima quaestio est, utrum animae omnium hominum sint una substantia, vel diversae.

Secundo, dato quod diversae, quaeritur, utrum simul, vel successive sint in esse productae.

Tertio, dato quod successive, quaeritur, utrum anima sit ex traduce.

Quaestio I. Utrum animae omnium hominum sint una substantia, an diversae.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod animae omnium hominum sint una anima numero, non diversae.

Ad oppositum.

1. Omne quod individuatur et multiplicatur ad alterius multiplicationem et individuationem, substantialiter dependet ab illo1; sed anima intellectiva non dependet substantialiter a corpore, cum possit esse substantialiter sine illo: ergo non individuatur nec multiplicatur secundum individuationem corporis vel multiplicationem.

2. Item, plus assimilantur in complexione et natura duorum hominum corpora quam eiusdem corporis membra diversa, ut caro mea carni tuae, quam os meum carni meae: ergo si una anima potest esse vivificativa diversorum membrorum unius corporis, ita quod in illa membra diversas habet influentias secundum eorum dispositiones varias; videtur multo fortius, quod una anima possit esse perfectio duorum corporum sibi similium.

3. Item, multiplicatio in individuis eiusdem speciei attenditur propter conservationem, ut perpetuetur esse in pluribus quod non poterat perpetuari in uno; sed anima rationalis est incorruptibilis, sicut infra2 patebit: ergo videtur, quod in ea non sit multiplicatio secundum numerum: ergo in diversis hominibus non numeratur, sed est eadem numero.

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4. Item, si anima intellectiva individuaretur secundum corpus, per consequens quod reciperetur in illa, individuaretur secundum exigentiam corporis; sed anima intellectiva suscipit formam universalem, ut est universalis: ergo si forma existens in anima non individuatur, pari ratione nec anima, prout est in hoc corpore, individuari potest3.

5. Item, ad hoc quod anima rationalis aliquid intelligat, necesse est, quod ex se intelligente et intellecto fiat unum; sed contingit animas diversorum hominum omnino idem intelligere: ergo contingit unum et idem eis uniri. Sed quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem4: ergo animae plurium hominum sunt una et eadem substantia numero.

6. Item, actus et officium substantiae spiritualis est regere et movere substantiam corporalem: ergo si nihil est otiosum in natura5, nunquam est ponere substantiam spiritualem, quae non moveat corporalem; sed si diversae essent substantiae in diversis hominibus, cum contingat, eas separari a corporibus propriis, contingeret, eas aliquando ab actu cessare, et ita otiosas esse: quod si hoc est inconveniens, inconveniens est, plures homines diversas animas rationales habere.

Contra:

Fundamenta.

1. Sicut dicit Philosophus6, « prius actus habet fieri in propria materia »; sed anima rationalis est actus et entelechia corporis humani: ergo cum diversa sint corpora humana, diversae erunt animae rationales illorum corporum perfectivae.

2. Item, perfectionem et perfectibile necesse est ad invicem esse proportionabilia: ergo nec perfectibile excedit perfectionem, nec perfectio ipsum perfectibile. Si ergo anima rationalis est perfectio corporis humani, illa anima rationalis, quae est perfectio istius corporis, non est perfectio alterius corporis; et ita impossibile est, quod perficiat aliud corpus.

3. Item, ab eodem est esse, et esse unum sive esse distinctum7; sed unumquodque habet esse a sua perfectione: ergo et distinctionem. Si igitur homo ab homine distinguitur, ergo et perfectio unius hominis a perfectione alterius; sed perfectio hominis, secundum quod est homo, est ipsa anima rationalis, non tantum sensibilis: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per deductionem ad impossibile multiplex. Quorum primum est, quia, si eadem anima est in multis hominibus, cum unus sit sciens, alter ignorans, unus bonus, alter malus, unus etiam odiat alterum; sequitur tunc, quod duo contraria erunt in eodem subiecto secundum numerum, et idem ipsum contrariabitur sibi ipsi. Quodsi hoc est impossibile8, restat, quod et illud ex quo sequitur, scilicet unam et eandem animam esse in pluribus hominibus.

5. Item, si una et eadem anima est in pluribus, post mortem nihil plus habet iustus quam impius: ergo bonum remanet irremuneratum et malum impunitum9: ergo mundus est inordinatus, et Deus est iniustus, et stultus est qui facit aliquod bonum. Ergo si hoc est adeo impossibile, ut non tantum sit contra fidem, sed etiam contra rationem rectam, impossibile est, plures homines eandem animam rationalem habere.

6. Item, si una anima rationalis est in diversis hominibus, ergo post mortem non est magis beatus unus quam alter. Si igitur ad beatitudinem non pervenitur nisi per virtutem, et multi sunt, qui in hac vita non habent virtutes: ergo multi sunt, qui non perveniunt ad beatitudinem. Si igitur eadem est p. 446omnium anima, nulli beatificantur: ergo frustra factus est homo, frustra factus est etiam totus mundus. Et si hoc est omnino falsum et impium, falsum et impium est, unam animam esse in pluribus.

Conclusio.

Secundum fidem, rationem et experientiam constat, quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in hac quaestione multi philosophantes multa dixerunt falsa et vana.

Error 1. Quidam enim philosophi crediderunt, non solum eandem esse animam in omnibus hominibus, sed etiam in omnibus animalibus. Crediderunt enim, animam non esse aliud quam Deum; et huius positionis fuit Pythagoras et Varro, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei de Varrone10. Maxime autem hoc putaverunt de anima humana propter sui dignitatem et spiritualitatem quantum ad intellectum agentem; quantum vero ad intellectum possibilem crediderunt esse idem quod hyle11, quia anima potest recipere omnia, et ita denudata est a formis omnibus. — Reprobatur. Hoc autem ponere non est philosophia, sed manifesta insipientia. Cum enim anima sit variabilis et transmutabilis et bonitatis et malitiae susceptibilis, omnino Deus esse non potest12. Cum iterum sit forma nobilissima inter naturales formas, dans actum et complementum corpori et distincta ab aliis formis naturalibus, hyle esse non potest.

Error 2. Alii autem aliter opinati sunt, quod anima humana sive intellectualis, secundum quod intellectualis est, una est in omnibus hominibus, non solum quantum ad intellectum agentem, sed etiam quantum ad intellectum possibilem. — Rationes 2. Et ratio, quae movit ad hoc ponendum, fuit ipsius animae immaterialitas et incorruptibilitas. Quia enim immaterialis est et a corpore non dependens, per corpus non potest individuari, cum nec sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, ut dicit Philosophus13. Cum sit incorruptibilis, non indiget multiplicari, cum una numero conservari possit. — Et haec fuit positio Commentatoris super librum de Anima14, quam etiam vult imponere Aristoteli et trahere ex verbis suis, tum quia ponit mundum aeternum, et ita homines innumerabiles praecesserunt; tum etiam, quia ponit, quod nulla sit substantia spiritualis, quae non habeat corpus movere; quodsi diversae animae essent in diversis hominibus, aliquando cessarent ab actu movendi, cum separantur; essent etiam infinitae actu, cum motus caeli non habuerit principium, secundum Philosophum.

Explicatur erro[r]. Ad vitandas autem obiectiones in contrarium adductas distinguit Commentator tres partes in humana anima. Cuius verba sunt haec super tertium de Anima15: « Opinandum est, quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus, quarum una est intellectus recipiens, secunda autem efficiens, tertia autem factum; et duae istarum sunt aeternae, scilicet agens et recipiens, tertia autem est generabilis et corruptibilis ». Animam autem tertiam, quam dicit generabilem et corruptibilem, vocat intellectum passivum; et illud dicit quod nihil aliud est quam imaginatio. Unde postmodum subiungit16: « Intellectus passivus est corruptibilis, et absque hoc nihil intelligitur. Per intellectum autem passivum intelligo virtutem imaginariam ». Unde vult dicere, quod sicut in visu est color, et est lux, et est oculus videns; sic in intellectu se habet, quod species imaginariae sunt sicut color, intellectus agens est sicut lux, intellectus possibilis est sicut oculus. Et sicut ex concursu illorum trium efficitur visus, ita ex concursu illorum trium efficitur intellectus; et sicut ex diversitate vel defectu coloris causatur diversitas vel defectus actus videndi, sic ex diversitate existente in similitudinibus imaginariis vel imaginatione causatur diversitas in intellectu plurium et defectus etiam actus intelligendi in eodem homine, quia nihil intelligimus nisi in phantasmate. Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus17 corrumpi intellectum, quodam interius corrupto; intellectum, inquam, non quemlibet, sed adeptum. Et per haec quae dicta sunt, nititur declinare inconvenientia, quae ad hanc opinionem sequuntur.

Reprobatur triplici ratione. Quantumcumque autem hanc opinionem coloret, pessima est et haeretica. Est enim contra chri-p. 447stianam religionem, dum aufert meritorum retributionem, quae non esset, si omnium anima una esset. — Est etiam contra rectam rationem. Planum est Notandum. enim, quod anima intellectiva, ut intellectiva est, est perfectio hominis, secundum quod homo. Si ergo homines non sunt diversi solum, secundum quod animalia, sed secundum quod homines, non solum habent diversas imaginationes et animas sensibiles, immo etiam diversos intellectus et animas rationales. — Est etiam contra sensibilem experientiam, quoniam diversi homines diversas habent et contrarias cogitationes et affectiones. Quodsi tu dicas, quod hoc venit ex diversitate specierum existentium in imaginatione; hoc nihil est, quia non solummodo diversificantur in his intelligibilibus, quae extrahuntur a sensu, immo etiam in his quae sunt supra omnem imaginationem, sicut sunt virtutes, quae intelliguntur per suam essentiam, non per speciem imaginariam, sicut etiam est ipse Deus18, quem quidam diligunt, quidam contemnunt.

Conclusio. Hanc igitur positionem repudiando tanquam haereticam et falsam, dicendum est secundum fidem et veritatem, quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales, et concedendae sunt rationes hoc probantes.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod intellectus non dependet a corpore, ergo ab eo non potest individuari: dicendum, quod intellectus individuatur secundum corporis indigentiam; non tamen eius individuatio est a corpore, sed a propriis principiis, materia scilicet et forma sua, quas de se habet, sicut in se subsistit, sicut determinatum est supra19.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una anima potest perficere diversa membra; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod omnia membra continuantur et reducuntur ad unum principale membrum in corpore, mediante quo est defluxus, motus et sensus ad alia membra, ut patet in corde20; diversorum autem hominum corpora non continuantur nec reducuntur ad unum membrum: et ideo non possunt habere unam perfectionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicatio numeralis fit propter conservationem speciei; dicendum, quod sicut in praecedentibus21 dictum est, haec non est tota causa nec praecipua, immo principalis ratio est ad manifestationem bonitatis divinae; Notandum. et haec praecipue est in animabus, quae multae sunt, ut eis distribuatur gratiarum Dei multiformitas, et compleatur illius supernae civitatis integritas et numerositas.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima recipit formam universalem, ut est universalis; dicendum, Notandum. quod etsi illa forma, quam anima recipit, sit universalis per indifferentiam ad multa singularia cognoscenda, tamen revera illa species, quae est in anima, est quoddam accidens singulare, quae qualificat et disponit ipsam animam et in diversis animabus diversificatur; sicut et scientia, quae in diversis cognoscentibus est alia et alia, quamvis sit de re unica22.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens. Notandum. Quando enim dicitur, quod ad actum intelligendi requiritur, quod ex intellecto et intelligente fiat unum: hoc intelligitur quantum ad speciem, quae unitur intellectui, non quantum ad ipsum obiectum extrinsecum. Illa autem species, quae intellectui unitur, habet comparationem ad intellectum, in quo est, et ad obiectum, ad quod est et quod repraesentat; et quamvis in comparatione ad obiectum habeat unitatem quodam modo in diversis cognoscentibus, quia ad idem, in quantum est ratio et similitudo eiusdem; tamen in comparatione ad animam, in qua est, habet diversitatem. Et potest poni exemplum de speciebus receptis in duobus speculis, vel in duobus oculis.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantiae spiritualis officium est movere corpus; dicendum, Dupliciter deficit. quod illud argumentum dupliciter deficit. Primum quidem, quia propter hoc non est substantia spiritualis principaliter facta. Cessabit enim omnis motus, quod ignoravit Philosophus; unde vana est ratio sua, quando assumsit numerum motorum secundum numerum mobilium et motuum23; multo enim plures sunt Angeli, quam sint orbes, qui moventur; non enim facti sunt ad hoc, sed ad fruendum Deo. p. 448— Notandum. Deficit etiam in hoc, quod etsi anima separetur a corpore, resumet tamen aliquando corpus suum per resurrectionem; quod etiam Philosophus ignoravit; et ideo non est mirum, si in huiusmodi deficit. Necesse est enim, philosophantem in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adiuvetur per radium fidei.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio militat contra pessimum errorem philosophorum Arabum, qui unitatem numericam animarum, vel saltem intellectus agentis docebant et in hoc sensu Aristotelem interpretabantur. Erroneae hae opiniones etiam scholas catholicas inficere minitabantur, ut satis apparet ex censura plurium thesium huc spectantium, facta ab Universitate Parisiensi (vide D'Argentré, Collectio iudicior. t. I. pag. 192, c. 8. Errores de anima et intellectu, praesertim thes. 20. 22. 27.). Et merito dicit Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. n. 26.), quod hic error, « qui proprius est et solius Averrois, pessimus est, non tantum contra veritatem theologiae, sed etiam contra veritatem philosophiae. Destruit enim scientiam... et ita omnes virtutes » (cfr. ibid. n. 5.). Unde principales Scholastici tota vi contra hanc doctrinam insurrexerunt, praesertim B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 77. m. 3.), qui 30 argg. Arabum, praesertim Averrois, recenset et refutat, et aliis pluribus argg. contrarium probat; et S. Thom. multis locis, ut in suo opusculo (15.): De Unitate intellectus contra Averroistas; II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 76. a. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 73-75; de Spiritual. Creat. a. 9. 10; de Anima a. 3. — Ipsum Aristotelem Scholastici communiter a dicto errore vindicabant, sed Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 9. q. 14.) dicit: « Mihi videtur, non esse mirum, quod homines dubitant, quid sensit Aristoteles super his duobus, scil. an intellectus sit forma et actus corporis, et an sit idem numero in diversis, an singuli in singulis. Immo ut arbitror, ipse semper super illis in dubio fuit » etc.

II. Scot., loc. cit.; de Rerum princ. q. 9. a. 2. n. 12; apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 76. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. et II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

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English Translation

Article II. On the production of the soul of Eve and of all other human beings.

Next, inquiry is made concerning the second article, namely concerning the production of the soul of Eve herself and, consequently, of every other soul beyond the soul of Adam. And concerning this, three things are asked.

The first question is whether the souls of all human beings are one substance, or diverse.

Second, granted that they are diverse, it is asked whether they were brought into being simultaneously, or successively.

Third, granted that they were brought forth successively, it is asked whether the soul is by traduction.

Question I. Whether the souls of all human beings are one substance, or diverse.

Concerning the first, the procedure is thus, and it is shown that the souls of all human beings are one soul in number, not diverse.

On the contrary side.

1. Everything that is individuated and multiplied to the multiplication and individuation of another, depends substantially upon that other1; but the intellective soul does not depend substantially upon the body, since it can be substantially without it: therefore it is not individuated nor multiplied according to the individuation or multiplication of the body.

2. Likewise, the bodies of two human beings are more assimilated in complexion and nature than the diverse members of the same body — as my flesh to your flesh, more than my bone to my flesh: therefore if one soul can be vivifying of diverse members of one body, in such a way that in those members it has diverse influences according to their various dispositions, it seems much more strongly that one soul could be the perfection of two bodies similar to each other.

3. Likewise, multiplication in individuals of the same species is attended to for the sake of conservation, that being may be perpetuated in many what could not be perpetuated in one; but the rational soul is incorruptible, as will be shown below2: therefore it seems that in it there is no multiplication according to number: therefore in diverse human beings it is not numbered, but is the same in number.

4. Likewise, if the intellective soul were individuated according to the body, consequently what was received in it would be individuated according to the exigency of the body; but the intellective soul receives the universal form, as it is universal: therefore if the form existing in the soul is not individuated, by equal reasoning neither can the soul, insofar as it is in this body, be individuated3.

5. Likewise, in order that the rational soul understand something, it is necessary that from itself as understanding and from the understood thing there should come to be one; but it happens that the souls of diverse human beings understand altogether the same thing: therefore it happens that one and the same thing is united to them. But whatever things are the same as one and the same thing, are the same as each other4: therefore the souls of many human beings are one and the same substance in number.

6. Likewise, the act and office of spiritual substance is to rule and to move corporeal substance: therefore, if nothing is idle in nature5, one is never to posit a spiritual substance that does not move a corporeal one; but if there were diverse substances in diverse human beings, since it happens that they are separated from their proper bodies, it would happen that at some time they ceased from act, and so were idle: but if this is incongruous, it is incongruous that many human beings have diverse rational souls.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta.

1. As the Philosopher says6, « act has to come to be first in its proper matter »; but the rational soul is the act and entelechy of the human body: therefore, since human bodies are diverse, diverse will be the rational souls perfective of those bodies.

2. Likewise, it is necessary that the perfection and the perfectible be proportionable to one another: therefore neither does the perfectible exceed the perfection, nor the perfection the perfectible itself. If, therefore, the rational soul is the perfection of the human body, that rational soul which is the perfection of this body is not the perfection of another body; and so it is impossible that it should perfect another body.

3. Likewise, from the same source comes being and being-one or being-distinct7; but each thing has being from its perfection: therefore also distinction. If, therefore, one human being is distinguished from another, then also the perfection of one human being from the perfection of another; but the perfection of a human being, insofar as he is a human being, is the rational soul itself, not merely the sensitive: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this very thing is seen by a manifold reduction to the impossible. The first of these is, because if the same soul is in many human beings, since one is knowing, another ignorant, one good, another evil, one even hates another; it would then follow that two contraries would be in the same subject according to number, and the same thing would be contrary to itself. But if this is impossible8, it remains that also that from which it follows — namely, that one and the same soul is in many human beings — is impossible.

5. Likewise, if one and the same soul is in many, after death the just has nothing more than the impious: therefore good remains unrewarded and evil unpunished9: therefore the world is disordered, and God is unjust, and foolish is he who does any good. Therefore, if this is so impossible that it is not only against faith but also against right reason, it is impossible that many human beings have the same rational soul.

6. Likewise, if one rational soul is in diverse human beings, then after death one is no more blessed than another. If therefore one does not come to beatitude except through virtue, and many there are who in this life do not have virtues: therefore many there are who do not come to beatitude. If therefore the soul of all is the same, none are beatified: therefore in vain was the human being made, in vain was the whole world made. And if this is altogether false and impious, it is false and impious that one soul be in many.

Conclusio.

According to faith, reason, and experience it stands firm that diverse human beings have diverse rational souls.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that in this question many philosophizing men said many false and vain things.

Error 1. For certain philosophers believed that not only is the soul the same in all human beings, but also in all animals. For they believed that the soul is nothing other than God; and of this position were Pythagoras and Varro, as Augustine says in the book On the City of God concerning Varro10. But they especially supposed this of the human soul on account of its dignity and spirituality with respect to the agent intellect; with respect to the possible intellect, however, they believed it to be the same as hyle11, because the soul can receive all things, and so is denuded of all forms. — It is reproved. But to posit this is not philosophy, but manifest folly. For since the soul is variable and changeable and susceptible of goodness and malice, it altogether cannot be God12. Since, again, it is the noblest form among natural forms, giving act and completion to the body and distinct from other natural forms, it cannot be hyle.

Error 2. Others, however, have opined otherwise, namely that the human or intellectual soul, insofar as it is intellectual, is one in all human beings — not only with respect to the agent intellect, but also with respect to the possible intellect. — Two reasons. And the reason that moved them to posit this was the immateriality and incorruptibility of the soul itself. For since it is immaterial and not depending on the body, it cannot be individuated through the body, since it is neither a body nor a power in a body, as the Philosopher says13. Since it is incorruptible, it does not need to be multiplied, since it can be conserved as one in number. — And this was the position of the Commentator on the book On the Soul14, which he also wishes to impose on Aristotle and to draw from his words, both because he posits the world to be eternal, and so innumerable human beings have preceded; and also because he posits that no spiritual substance is such as not to have a body to move; but if diverse souls were in diverse human beings, when separated they would at some time cease from the act of moving; they would also be infinite in act, since the motion of the heavens has had no beginning, according to the Philosopher.

The error is set out. In order, however, to avoid the objections adduced to the contrary, the Commentator distinguishes three parts in the human soul. His words on the third book of On the Soul are these15: « It is to be supposed that in the soul there are three parts of intellect, of which one is the receiving intellect, the second the effecting, the third the made; and two of these are eternal, namely the agent and the receiving, but the third is generable and corruptible ». Now the third soul, which he calls generable and corruptible, he names the passive intellect; and that he says is nothing other than imagination. Whence afterwards he adds16: « The passive intellect is corruptible, and without it nothing is understood. By the passive intellect I mean the imaginative power ». Whence he wishes to say that, just as in vision there is color, and there is light, and there is the seeing eye, so it stands in the intellect that the imaginative species are like the color, the agent intellect is like the light, and the possible intellect is like the eye. And just as vision is effected from the concurrence of those three, so intellect is effected from the concurrence of those three; and just as from the diversity or defect of color is caused diversity or defect of the act of seeing, so from the diversity existing in imaginative likenesses or in imagination is caused diversity in the intellect of many and even defect of the act of understanding in the same human being, since we understand nothing except in a phantasm. And to this extent the Philosopher says17 that intellect is corrupted when something interior is corrupted — intellect, I say, not any whatsoever, but the acquired. And by these things which have been said, he strives to deflect the inconveniences which follow upon this opinion.

It is reproved by a threefold reasoning. But however much he may color this opinion, it is most wicked and heretical. For it is against the Christian p. 447religion, since it takes away the recompense of merits, which would not be if the soul of all were one. — It is also against right reason. To be noted. For it is plain that the intellective soul, insofar as it is intellective, is the perfection of the human being insofar as he is human. If, therefore, human beings are not diverse only insofar as they are animals, but insofar as they are human beings, they have not only diverse imaginations and sensitive souls, but also diverse intellects and rational souls. — It is also against sensible experience, since diverse human beings have diverse and contrary thoughts and affections. But if you should say that this comes from the diversity of species existing in the imagination, this amounts to nothing, because they are not only diversified in those intelligibles which are drawn out from sense, but also in those which are above all imagination — such as the virtues, which are understood through their essence, not through an imaginary species, just as is God himself18, whom some love, some despise.

Conclusion. Repudiating, therefore, this position as heretical and false, it must be said according to faith and truth that diverse human beings have diverse rational souls, and the reasons proving this are to be conceded.

Solution of the contrary arguments.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary — that the intellect does not depend on the body, therefore cannot be individuated by it — it must be said that the intellect is individuated according to the indigence of the body; nevertheless its individuation is not from the body, but from its own principles, namely matter and its form, which it has of itself, as it subsists in itself, as has been determined above19.

2. To that which is objected — that one soul can perfect diverse members — it must be said that the cases are not alike, for the reason that all members are continuous and reduced to one principal member in the body, by the mediation of which there is influx, motion, and sense to the other members, as is evident in the heart20; the bodies of diverse human beings, however, are not continuous nor reduced to one member: and therefore they cannot have one perfection.

3. To that which is objected — that numerical multiplication takes place for the conservation of the species — it must be said that, as in the preceding21 has been said, this is not the whole nor the chief cause; rather the principal reason is for the manifestation of divine goodness; To be noted. and this is chiefly in souls, which are many, that to them may be distributed the multiform graces of God, and that the integrity and number of that supernal city may be completed.

4. To that which is objected — that the soul receives a universal form, as it is universal — it must be said, To be noted, that although that form which the soul receives is universal by indifference to many singulars to be known, nevertheless in reality that species which is in the soul is a certain singular accident, which qualifies and disposes the soul itself and is diversified in diverse souls; just as science also, which in diverse knowers is one and another, although it be of one single thing22.

5. And by this is evident the response to the next. To be noted. For when it is said that for the act of understanding it is required that from the understood thing and the understanding there be made one: this is to be understood as regards the species, which is united to the intellect, not as regards the extrinsic object itself. But that species which is united to the intellect has a relation to the intellect in which it is and to the object to which it is and which it represents; and although in relation to the object it has a unity in a certain manner in diverse knowers, because it is directed to the same thing, inasmuch as it is the account and likeness of the same — nevertheless, in relation to the soul in which it is, it has diversity. And an example may be taken from species received in two mirrors, or in two eyes.

6. To that which is objected — that the office of spiritual substance is to move a body — it must be said, It is deficient in two ways. that that argument is deficient in two ways. First, because spiritual substance is not principally made for this. For all motion will cease, which the Philosopher was ignorant of; whence his reasoning is vain when he assumed the number of movers according to the number of moveables and motions23; for there are many more Angels than there are orbs that are moved; nor are they made for this, but for enjoying God. p. 448— To be noted. It is also deficient in this, that although the soul be separated from the body, nevertheless it will resume its body at some time through the resurrection — which also the Philosopher was ignorant of; and therefore it is no wonder if in things of this kind he is deficient. For it is necessary that one philosophizing slip into some error, unless he be helped by the ray of faith.

Scholion

I. This question militates against the worst error of the Arab philosophers, who taught the numerical unity of souls, or at least of the agent intellect, and in this sense interpreted Aristotle. These erroneous opinions threatened even to infect Catholic schools, as appears sufficiently from the censure of many theses pertaining to this matter, made by the University of Paris (see D'Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum t. I. p. 192, c. 8. Errors concerning the soul and intellect, especially theses 20, 22, 27). And rightly does Scotus say (IV. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. n. 26) that this error, « which is proper to and unique to Averroes alone, is most wicked, not only against the truth of theology but also against the truth of philosophy. For it destroys science... and so all the virtues » (cf. ibid. n. 5). Whence the principal Scholastics rose with all their force against this doctrine, especially Bl. Albert (S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 77. m. 3), who recounts and refutes 30 arguments of the Arabs, especially of Averroes, and proves the contrary by many other arguments; and St. Thomas in many places, as in his opusculum (15): On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists; II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 76. a. 2; S. c. Gent. II. cc. 73–75; de Spiritualibus Creaturis a. 9, 10; de Anima a. 3. — Aristotle himself the Scholastics commonly vindicated from the said error, but Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 9. q. 14) says: « It seems to me not strange that people doubt what Aristotle thought concerning these two things, namely whether the intellect is the form and act of the body, and whether it is the same in number in diverse men, or single in single ones. Rather, as I judge, he was always in doubt over them » etc.

II. Scotus, loc. cit.; de Rerum principio q. 9. a. 2. n. 12; apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 76. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard a Med., here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 3. and II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 2.) et VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.). — Rationes pro hac opinione praecipue inveniuntur in Averrois Comment. super III. de Anima, text. 4-8; text. 18-20; Destruct. destruct. Disput. physica secunda, in qua, relatis 10 rationibus huius opinionis et Algazelis dubitationibus de ipsis, Averroes illas explicat et has solvit; Tract. de Animae beatitudine; Libell. seu epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine. — Plures codd. cum ed. 2 in hoc arg. bis substituunt dividuationem pro individuationem.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 20 (c. 2) and Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI, c. 8). — The reasons for this opinion are found especially in Averroes's Commentary on On the Soul III, texts 4–8; texts 18–20; Destructio destructionum, second physical disputation, in which, having reported 10 reasons for this opinion and Algazel's doubts about them, Averroes explains them and resolves these; Treatise on the Beatitude of the Soul; Libellus seu epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine. — Several codices with edition 2 in this argument twice substitute dividuationem for individuationem.
  2. Dist. 19. a. 1. q. 1. — Maior est secundum Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.) et II. de Anima, text. 35. (c. 4.).
    Dist. 19, a. 1, q. 1. — The major is according to Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 59 (c. 10), and On the Soul II, text 35 (c. 4).
  3. Averroes, in III. de Anima, text. 5. causam diversitatis inter intellectum et materiam ita assignat: Causa propter quam ista natura [intellectus] est distinguens et cognoscens, prima autem materia neque cognoscens neque distinguens, est, quia prima materia recipit formas diversas, scilicet individuales et istas [singulares]; ista autem recipit formas universales. Et ex hoc apparet, quod ista natura non est aliquod hoc [hoc aliquid sive singulare] neque corpus neque virtus in corpore, quoniam si ita esset, tunc reciperet formas, secundum quod sunt diversa et ista [i. e. individuales et singulares], et si ita esset, tunc formae existentes in ipsa essent intellectae in potentia, et sic non distingueret naturam formarum, secundum quod sunt formae etc. — In maiori, quae fundatur in illo axiomate: Omne quod recipitur, recipitur per modum recipientis, non recepti, cod. cc et ed. 1 recipitur pro reciperetur.
    Averroes, on III. de Anima, text 5, assigns the cause of diversity between intellect and matter thus: The reason why this nature [the intellect] is distinguishing and knowing, while prime matter is neither knowing nor distinguishing, is that prime matter receives diverse forms, namely individual and these [singular] forms; whereas this [the intellect] receives universal forms. And from this it appears that this nature is not any this [individual or singular], nor a body, nor a power in a body — since if it were, it would then receive forms insofar as they are diverse and these [individual and singular], and if so, then the forms existing in it would be understood in potency, and so it would not distinguish the nature of forms insofar as they are forms, etc. — In the major, which is founded on this axiom Whatever is received is received according to the manner of the receiver, not of the received, codex cc and edition 1 read recipitur for reciperetur.
  4. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 25. (c. 32.): Eadem iisdem eadem erunt. Cfr. VII. Topic. c. 1. et I. Phys. text. 17. (c. 2.). — Hoc et seq. arg. ponit Averroes in III. de Anima, text. 5.
    Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 25 (c. 32): Things the same as the same are the same. Cf. Topics VII c. 1 and Physics I, text 17 (c. 2). — Averroes lays down this and the following argument in On the Soul III, text 5.
  5. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 48. (c. 9.) iuxta translationem Arabico-latinam: Si igitur natura nihil facit otiose etc. — Averroes, in XII. Metaph. text. 44. ait: Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, quod si aliquae substantiae essent non moventes, essent otiosae. — Paulo inferius post essent in cod. A additur spirituales.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 48 (c. 9), according to the Arabic-Latin translation: If, therefore, nature does nothing idly, etc. — Averroes, on Metaphysics XII, text 44, says: And therefore Aristotle says that if there were certain substances that were not moving, they would be idle. — A little below, after essent, codex A adds spirituales.
  6. Libr. II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.), ubi etiam principia seq. arg. insinuantur. Cfr. ibid. I. text. 53. (c. 3.). — De entelechia vide supra pag. 33, nota 3.
    Book II of On the Soul, text 26 (c. 2), where also the principles of the following argument are intimated. Cf. ibid. I, text 53 (c. 3). — On entelechy see above p. 33, note 3.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 3. (III. c. 2.). August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 6. n. 8; Boeth., de Unitate et uno: « Quidquid est, ideo est quod unum est; quod sic ostenditur. Omne enim esse ex forma est in rebus creatis; sed nullum esse ex forma est, nisi cum forma materiae unita est. Esse enim non est nisi ex coniunctione formae cum materia. Unde philosophi dicunt illud describentes: Esse est existentia formae in materia. Cum autem forma materiae unitur, ex coniunctione utriusque necessario aliquid unum constituitur » etc. Idem ostendit III. de Consol. prosa 11. — Averroes ipse haec argg., sicut et plura impossibilia, quae ex sua opinione sequuntur, sibi obiicit, et propter ipsa fatetur, hanc quaestionem esse valde difficilem (III. de Anima, text. 5.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 3 (III, c. 2). Augustine, On the Manners of the Manichaeans II, c. 6, n. 8; Boethius, On Unity and the One: « Whatever is, is for the reason that it is one; which is shown thus. For all being is from form in created things; but no being is from form except when the form is united to matter. For being is not except from the conjunction of form with matter. Whence the philosophers describing it say: Being is the existence of form in matter. But when form is united to matter, from the conjunction of the two there is necessarily constituted something one », etc. The same he shows in On Consolation III, prose 11. — Averroes himself raises these arguments to himself, as well as many other impossibilities which follow from his opinion, and on account of them he confesses that this question is very difficult (On the Soul III, text 5).
  8. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (14.): Simul autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria. August., de Quantit. animae, c. 32. n. 69: Si enim dixero, unam esse animam, conturbaberis, quod in altero beata est, in altero misera; nec una res simul et beata et misera potest esse. — Paulo superius post secundum numerum Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, subiungit et in eadem parte, cum non habeat diversas partes. Dein post restat multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt quod; in fine huius propositionis supple: impossibile est.
    Aristotle, Perihermeneias II, c. 4 (14): But it does not happen that contraries are simultaneously in the same thing. Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul c. 32, n. 69: For if I say that the soul is one, you will be disturbed, since in the one it is blessed, in the other miserable; nor can one thing simultaneously be both blessed and miserable. — A little above, after according to number, the Vatican edition with the other editions, excepting 1, adds and in the same part, since it does not have diverse parts. Then after restat many codices with editions 1 and 2 omit quod; at the end of this proposition supply: it is impossible.
  9. Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4. nullum bonum irremuneratum et nullum malum impunitum. Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 713, nota 2.
    According to Boethius, On Consolation IV, prose 1 and 4, no good is unrewarded and no evil unpunished. Cf. tom. 1, p. 713, note 2.
  10. Libr. IV. c. 31; VII. c. 6. et 23, ubi hanc opinionem tribuit Varroni. Isidor., VIII. Etymol. c. 6. n. 19. referens sententias philosophorum de Deo ait: « Quidam [Deum esse dicunt] animum in omnibus commeantem (alias: commanentem) et lucidum, ut Pythagoras ». Idem dicit Cicero, I. de Natura Deor. c. 11; Lactantius, I. Div. Inst. c. 5; Minucius Felix in Octavio, c. 19.
    Book IV, c. 31; VII, cc. 6 and 23, where he attributes this opinion to Varro. Isidore, Etymologies VIII, c. 6, n. 19, reporting the opinions of philosophers concerning God, says: « Some [say that God is] a mind passing through all things (variant: remaining in all things) and luminous, as Pythagoras ». The same is said by Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I, c. 11; Lactantius, Divine Institutes I, c. 5; Minucius Felix, in the Octavius, c. 19.
  11. Graece ὕλη, i. e. materia prima, de qua vide supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1.
    In Greek ὕλη, that is, prime matter, on which see above d. 12, a. 1, q. 1.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius nonnulli codd. maxima pro manifesta.
    Cf. above d. 17, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above, several codices read maxima for manifesta.
  13. Libr. III. de Anima, text. 4. (c. 4.), ubi dicit de intellectu, quod sit immixtus i. e. ut explicat Averroes, quod sit nec corpus nec virtus in corpore. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 445, nota 1.
    Book III of On the Soul, text 4 (c. 4), where he says of the intellect that it is unmixed — that is, as Averroes explains, that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. Cf. also above p. 445, note 1.
  14. Libr. III. text. 4-8. et text. 18. seqq.
    Book III, texts 4–8 and texts 18 and following.
  15. Vide supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam in fundam. 5. haec opinio tangitur. — Text. 5.
    See above d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, where this opinion is also touched on in fundamentum 5. — Text 5.
  16. Loco cit. — In his verbis edd. Venet. an. 1489 et 1560 legunt: et absque hoc nihil intelligit [intellectus recipiens sive materialis]; et intendit [Aristoteles] per intellectum passivum virtutem imaginativam. — Ibid. etiam comparatio visus cum intellectu habetur. — Paulo superius codd. M aa substituunt Illam autem tertiam pro Animam autem tertiam.
    Loc. cit. — In these words the Venice editions of 1489 and 1560 read: and without it [the receiving or material intellect] understands nothing; and [Aristotle] means by passive intellect the imaginative power. — Ibid. also the comparison of vision with intellect is found. — A little above, codices M aa substitute Illam autem tertiam for Animam autem tertiam.
  17. Libr. I. de Anima, text. 66. (c. 4.). — Quid sit intellectus adeptus declarat Averroes, loc. cit. Relata enim praedicta comparatione visus cum intellectu, ait: Secundum hoc igitur est intelligendum de intellectu materiali [recipiente] et agente. Et cum intellectus materialis fuerit copulatus, secundum quod perficitur per intellectum agentem, tunc nos sumus copulati cum intellectu agente; et ista dispositio dicitur adeptio, et intellectus adeptus.
    Book I of On the Soul, text 66 (c. 4). — What the acquired intellect is, Averroes declares loc. cit. For having reported the aforesaid comparison of vision with intellect, he says: According to this, then, it is to be understood concerning the material [receiving] and agent intellect. And when the material intellect has been conjoined, inasmuch as it is perfected through the agent intellect, then we are conjoined with the agent intellect; and this disposition is called acquisition, and the intellect acquired.
  18. Cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. circa finem, et I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 4, ubi verba Augustini hac de re explicantur.
    Cf. below d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, in the body near the end, and I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 4, where Augustine's words on this matter are explained.
  19. Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 2.
    Dist. 17, a. 1, q. 2.
  20. De quo cfr. Aristot., III. de Partib. animal. c. 3. seq. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.
    Concerning which cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals III, c. 3 and following. See also I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 3.
  21. Dist. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.
    Dist. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2.
  22. Avicenna, V. Metaph. c. 2: Quod igitur in anima intelligitur de homine est id quod est universale; eius autem universalitas non est ex hoc, quod est in anima, sed ex hoc, quod consideratur ad multa signata habentia esse vel opinata; eorum enim iudicium quantum ad ipsum idem est. Ex hoc autem, quod haec forma est dispositio in anima aliqua, est unum de individuis scientiarum vel formationum; quia, sicut aliquid diversis respectibus est genus et species, similiter aliquid diversis respectibus est universale et singulare. Haec igitur forma, secundum hoc quod est in anima, est aliqua formarum animae et est singularis, et secundum hoc, quod in ea multa conveniunt secundum aliquem trium praedictorum modorum, est universalis. Inter haec autem duo non est contrarietas. Non enim est impossibile, haec simul esse, scil. ut sit una essentia, et accidat ei communio relatione multorum; communio enim multitudinis non potest esse nisi relatione tantum; nisi enim relatio fieret ad multa, non esset communio etc. — Paulo superius plures codd. quod qualificat, Vat. quod vel quae qualificat pro quae qualificat.
    Avicenna, Metaphysics V, c. 2: What therefore is understood in the soul concerning the human being is that which is universal; but its universality is not from the fact that it is in the soul, but from the fact that it is considered with respect to many designated things having being or supposed to have being; for the judgement concerning them as to itself is the same. From the fact, however, that this form is a disposition in some soul, it is one of the individuals of the sciences or formations; for just as something in diverse respects is genus and species, similarly something in diverse respects is universal and singular. This form, therefore, insofar as it is in the soul, is one of the soul's forms and is singular; and insofar as in it many things come together according to one of the three aforesaid modes, it is universal. Between these two there is no contrariety. For it is not impossible that these be simultaneously, namely that there be one essence, and that to it accrue community by relation to many; for community of multitude cannot be except by relation only; for unless a relation were made to many, there would be no community, etc. — A little above, many codices read quod qualificat, Vatican quod vel quae qualificat for quae qualificat.
  23. Sicut fecit in XII. Metaph. text. 42. seqq. (XI. c. 8.) et Averroes, Epitom. in Metaph. tract. 4. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3 si in huiusmodi defecit pro si in huiusmodi deficit.
    As he did in Metaphysics XII, text 42 and following (XI, c. 8), and Averroes, Epitome of the Metaphysics, tract 4. — A little below, several codices with editions 2 and 3 read si in huiusmodi defecit for si in huiusmodi deficit. ---
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