Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 4

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus

p. 567

Distinctio XXIV, Pars I, Articulus II. De divisione potentiarum animae.

Quaestio IV. Utrum intellectus agens et possibilis sint una potentia, an diversae.

Quarto et ultimo ad maiorem evidentiam praecedentium quaeritur de divisione potentiarum animae per agentem et possibilem, secundum quas differentias intellectus noster dividi consuevit. Est igitur quaestio, utrum agens intellectus et possibilis sint una potentia, vel diversae. Et quod diversae, videtur.

1. « Materialis causa nunquam simul incidit in idem cum aliis causis », sicut vult Philosophus¹, sed « sicut se habet materia ad formam, vel efficientem, ita se habet intellectus possibilis ad agentem », sicut Philosophus dicit: ergo intellectus possibilis et agens sunt potentiae diversae.

2. Item, prima divisio potentiae est per activam et passivam, sicut innuit Philosophus in libro nono primae Philosophiae²; sed inter haec membra primo dividentia est maxima differentia, quae sit in illo genere: ergo inter potentiam activam et passivam est maxima potentiarum differentia: ergo impossibile est, unam potentiam esse possibilem et agentem.

3. Item, impossibile est, idem secundum idem esse in actu et in potentia simul et semel³; sed anima secundum intellectum agentem est continue in suo actu, secundum possibilem autem non: ergo etc.

4. Item, impossibile est, idem secundum essentiam esse illuminans et illuminatum; sed intellectus agens se habet sicut lux, intellectus possibilis sicut illuminatum a luce⁵: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. « In perpetuis non differt esse et posse », sicut vult Philosophus⁴, ergo nec actus et potentia, multo minus nec potentia activa et passiva; sed anima est perpetua et eius intellectus: ergo non est differentia potentiae possibilis ad agentem.

2. Item, in imaginatione, quae est multo magis materialis virtus quam intellectus, non sunt duae potentiae imaginativae, quarum una sit activa, altera passiva⁷: ergo si multo potentior est virtus intellectiva quam imaginativa, videtur, quod per agentem et possibilem diversificari non habeat.

3. Item, potentia receptiva et abstractiva in corporalibus possunt concurrere in unitatem organi, sicut patet in oculo cati, qui potest speciem suscipere et eam in se de nocte facere: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortiori, videtur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis reperiantur in una potentia spirituali⁸.

p. 568 4. Item, intelligere est actus unus per se: ergo est a potentia una simplici; sed ad nostrum intelligere concurrunt intellectus possibilis et intellectus agens: ergo non sunt diversae potentiae.

5. Item, vel intellectus possibilis intelligit, vel non. Si non: ergo non debet dici intellectus nec potentia intellectiva. Si intelligit: ergo aliquo modo est potentia activa: ergo non videtur, quod intellectus possibilis sit alia potentia ab agente.

6. Item, intellectus agens aut intelligit, aut non. Si non: ergo non debet dici intellectus nec potentia intellectiva. Si sic; cum intellectus non possit intelligere aliud a se, nisi speciem illius habeat in se et penes se, et omne illud quod est susceptibile speciei, sit aliquo modo possibile: ergo intellectus agens est aliquo modo possibilis⁹: ergo non dividitur per essentiam a possibili.

Conclusio. Intellectus agens et possibilis sunt duae ipsius potentiae intellectivae differentiae, quae in unam operationem completam intelligendi inseparabiliter concurrunt.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est praenotandum, quod variis modis tentaverunt praedecessores nostri assignare differentiam intellectus possibilis ad agentem. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod differunt sicut duae substantiae. Alii dixerunt, quod differunt sicut duae potentiae. Tertio modo dixerunt alii, quod differunt sicut habitus et potentia. Quarto modo dixerunt alii, quod differunt sicut potentia absoluta et comparata.

Primus autem modus dicendi, quo dicitur, quod differunt secundum substantiam, dupliciter habet intelligi. — Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod intellectus agens sit intelligentia separata; intellectus autem possibilis sit anima corpori coniuncta. Et modus iste ponendi et dicendi fundatus est super multa verba philosophorum, qui posuerunt, animam rationalem illustrari a decima intelligentia et perfici ex coniunctione sui ad illam. — Sed iste modus dicendi falsus est et erroneus, sicut supra improbatum fuit distinctione octava¹¹. Nulla enim substantia creata potentiam habet illuminandi et perficiendi animam, proprie intelligendo; immo secundum mentem immediate habet a Deo illuminari, sicut in multis locis Augustinus ostendit.

Alius modus intelligendi est, quod intellectus agens esset ipse Deus, intellectus vero possibilis esset noster animus. Et iste modus dicendi super verba Augustini est fundatus, qui in pluribus locis¹² dicit et ostendit, quod « lux, quae nos illuminat, magister, qui nos docet, veritas, quae nos dirigit, Deus est », iuxta illud Ioannis¹³: Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem etc. — Iste autem modus dicendi, etsi verum ponat et fidei catholicae consonum, nihil tamen est ad propositum: quia, cum animae nostrae data sit potentia ad intelligendum, sicut aliis creaturis data est potentia ad alios actus, sic Deus, quamvis sit principalis operans in operatione cuiuslibet creaturae, dedit tamen cuilibet vim activam, per quam exiret in operationem propriam¹⁴. Sic credendum est indubitanter, quod animae humanae non tantummodo dederit intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem, ita quod uterque est aliquid ipsius animae. — Et ideo primus modus assignandi differentiam tanquam ad propositum impertinens omittendus est, quo scilicet dicitur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis differunt sicut duae substantiae.

Secundus autem modus dicendi, quo scilicet dicitur, quod differunt sicut duae potentiae, dupliciter potest intelligi, et uno modo false, alio modo vere.

Unus modus intelligendi et dicendi est, quod intellectus possibilis sit potentia pure materialis, quae inest animae ex parte suae materiae¹⁵; intellectus vero agens sit potentia pure formalis, quae inest animae ex parte suae formae. Et hic modus dicendi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi¹⁶, qui dicit, quod « intellectus possibilis est, quo est omnia fieri; intellectus agens, quo est omnia facere », sicut contingit in forma et materia reperire. — Sed hic modus dicendi non consonat veritati. Si enim intellectus possibilis esset potentia pure passiva et se teneret ex parte materiae, in omnibus posset poni, in quibus est reperire materiale principium. Praeterea, sicut oculus non dicitur visus, sic talis potentia non deberet dici intellectus.

Alius vero modus intelligendi est, ut dicatur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis sint duae intellectus differentiae, datae uni substantiae, quae rep. 569spiciunt totum compositum. Appropriatur autem intellectus agens formae et possibilis materiae, quia intellectus possibilis ordinatur ad suscipiendum, intellectus agens ordinatur ad abstrahendum; nec intellectus possibilis est pure passivus; habet enim supra speciem existentem in phantasmate se convertere, et convertendo per auxilium intellectus agentis illam suscipere, et de ea iudicare. Similiter nec intellectus agens est omnino in actu; non enim potest intelligere aliud a se, nisi adiuvetur a specie, quae abstracta a phantasmate intellectui habet uniri. Unde nec possibilis intelligit sine agente, nec agens sine possibili. — Et iste modus dicendi verus est et super verba Philosophi¹⁷ fundatus. Dicit enim, agentem et possibilem esse duas differentias intellectus; unde sicut duo intelligimus necessario in medio, ad hoc quod abstrahatur species ab obiecto, videlicet lucem et diaphaneitatem, ita quod per unum abstrahit et per aliud defert et suscipit; sic et in proposito conformiter potest intelligi, ita ad unum actum haec duo concurrere, ut hoc sine illo non habeat operationem suam complete.

Tertius modus assignandi differentiam, quo dicitur, quod differunt sicut potentia et habitus, dupliciter habet intelligi. — Uno modo, ut intellectus agens dicatur habitus quidam constitutus ex omnibus intelligibilibus; intellectus vero possibilis intelligatur idem ipse, prout est in potentia ad acquirendam cognitionem per phantasmata. Et hic modus ponendi fundari videtur super verba Boethii¹⁸, qui dicit, quod « summam retinens, singula perdit ». Quod voluerunt aliqui intelligi sic, quod intellectus noster dicatur habere apud se cognitionem universalium innatam, alioquin non posset per virtutem suam, abstrahendo etiam a sensibus et phantasmatibus, facere intellectum possibilem actu intelligentem; omne enim quod educit alterum de potentia in actum, est ens in actu. — Sed iste modus dicendi verbis Philosophi¹⁹ non consonat, qui dicit, « animam esse creatam sicut tabulam rasam », « nec habere cognitionem habituum sibi innatam, sed acquirere mediante sensu et experientia ».

Alius modus dicendi est, ut dicatur intellectus agens differre a possibili, sicut habitus a potentia; non quia agens sit pure habitus, sed quia est potentia habitualis. — Et iste modus dicendi probabilis est et verus et super verba philosophica et catholica fundatus. Verum enim est secundum Dionysium²⁰, quod substantiae intellectuales, eo ipso quod intellectuales substantiae, « lumina sunt »: ergo perfectio et complementum substantiae intellectualis lux est spiritualis: ergo illa potentia, quae consequitur animam ex parte intellectus sui, quoddam lumen est in ipsa, de quo lumine potest intelligi illud Psalmi²¹: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine. Et hoc lumen videtur Philosophus intellexisse esse intellectum agentem. Dicit enim, quod « ille intellectus, quo est omnia facere, est sicut habitus quidam, ut in lumine; quodam enim modo et lumen facit colores potentia actu colores », sicut habetur tertio²² de Anima. Huius autem simile potest poni in oculo cati, qui non solum habet potentiam suscipiendi per naturam perspicui, sicut alii oculi, sed etiam potentiam faciendi in se speciem per naturam luminis sibi inditi.

Quartus autem modus assignandi differentiam inter possibilem et agentem, quo scilicet differunt sicut potentia absoluta et comparata, dupliciter habet intelligi. — Uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod una omnino et eadem est potentia intellectus agens et possibilis, differens comparatione sola: ut agens sit, prout est in se considerata, possibilis vero, prout unitur corpori et phantasmatibus. Et hic modus dicendi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi²³, qui vult, quod « intellectus agens semper est in suo actu, possibilis vero aliquando sic, aliquando non ». Quod enim anima lassetur et perturbetur in actu intelligendi, hoc est ex coniunctione sui ad corpus. — Sed hic modus ponendi deficit a veritate, quoniam anima separata habet intellectum, quo est omnia facere, habet etiam intellectum, quo est omnia fieri: ergo habet agentem et possibilem, etiam cum separata est: ergo intellectus possibilis non inerat ei solum ex coniunctione sui cum corpore.

Alius modus intelligendi praedictam differentiam est, ut dicatur intellectus agens differre a possibili, sicut potentia absoluta a comparata; non quia sit omnino eadem potentia comparatione²⁴ differens, sed quia, cum sit alia et alia intellectus differentia, una est, per quam ordinatur anima ad suscipiendum, alp. 570tera vero, per quam ordinatur ad abstrahendum; et ita una de se quodam modo completa²⁵ et habilitata, alia vero indigens habilitatione et complemento; et cum sit nata ad illud complementum venire mediante auxilio corporis et corporalium sensuum, inest ipsi animae, secundum quod habet inclinari ad corpus. Et ex hoc contrahit duplicem possibilitatem: unam respectu actus, quia non est semper in actu suo propter impedimentum a parte corporis; alteram respectu phantasmatum, a quibus excitari habet; et hanc possibilitatem non habet nisi ex coniunctione sui cum corpore, quamvis sit potentia de natura sua, qua est omnia fieri, quae non solum est in anima coniuncta, sed etiam in anima separata.

Sic igitur patet, quomodo ex multis modis dicendi elicitur quidam intellectus differentiae²⁶ inter intellectum agentem et possibilem. Cum enim sint quatuor principales modi assignandi differentiam inter hos intellectus, et quilibet subdividatur in duos, sicut in prosequendo monstratum est, solummodo tres modi digni sunt approbari, quorum unus ab altero non discordat, sed unus ortum habet ex altero. Quia enim diversae sunt differentiae intellectus, quae etsi respiciant²⁷ totum compositum, una tamen magis respicit animae complementum, alia vero materiale principium; hinc est, quod una non solum tenet rationem potentiae, immo etiam potentiae habitualis; altera vero tenet pure rationem potentiae. Et hinc est, quod una dicitur convenire animae secundum se, altera vero in comparatione ad corpus, et una semper esse²⁸ in actu, altera vero non; non quia semper anima actu intelligat per intellectum agentem, sed quia, sicut lumen corporale semper lucet et de se promptum est ad illuminandum, res autem illuminabilis non semper illuminatur propter aliquod impedimentum; sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, intellectum agentem et possibilem duas differentias esse intellectivae potentiae, licet aliquae ex eis non sint multum cogentes.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa: Ad 1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod non differt posse et esse in perpetuis; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de esse substantiali et de differentia non secundum naturam, sed de distantia secundum tempus, quia in eis materia tempore non praecedit actum; et ideo nihil facit ad propositum, quia intellectus possibilis non dicitur possibilis respectu esse primi, sed actus secundi²⁹.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de imaginatione, quod non differt potentia activa et passiva; dici pop. 571test, quod magis differt quam in intellectu, quia organum corporale, in quo recipiuntur phantasmata, est ei loco potentiae passivae; ipsa vero vis imaginaria³⁰ est loco potentiae activae. — Aliter potest dici, quod non est simile, quia, cum species defertur a sensu usque ad imaginationem, non exit genus abstractionis, quae quidem fuit in sensu particulari; sed cum species pervenit ad intellectum, novum genus abstractionis ibi exigitur et aliud genus luminis. Ideo magis indiget potentia activa, distincta a possibili, ipse intellectus quam imaginatio vel sensus³¹.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de oculo cati, dicendum, quod etsi potentia receptiva et abstractiva possint concurrere ad unius organi completionem, nunquam tamen concurrunt in eandem unius organi dispositionem. Alia enim est dispositio in oculo cati, per quam recipit, scilicet perspicuitas, et alia per quam abstrahit, scilicet luminositas, et alterius et alterius naturae. Sic et in potentia intellectiva; etsi concurrant ad complementum et perfectionem potentiae intellectivae potentia, per quam recipit, et potentia, per quam abstrahit; non sunt tamen eiusdem naturae nec per eandem naturam insunt animae³²: et ideo non sunt una differentia potentiae, sed diversae.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intelligere est actus unus et simplex; dicendum, quod etsi intelligere possit quodam genere simplicitatis dici actus simplex, nihilominus tamen ad nostrum intelligere concurrit recipere et iudicare, sive abstrahere et suscipere; et hi sunt plures actus ad invicem ordinati, ex quibus resultat unus actus perfectus. Sic et in potentiis intelligendum est se habere, quod sic sunt diversae differentiae intellectus³³, ut tamen in suis actionibus ad invicem ordinatae sint et coniunctae ad actum intelligendi perficiendum, sicut materiale et formale principium ad unum esse compositi constituendum.

Ad 5 et 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus possibilis intelligit, et intellectus agens similiter recipit; dicendum, quod intellectus possibilis non est pure passivus, sicut supra ostensum est; habet enim potentiam se convertendi; nec tamen est adeo activus, sicut agens, quia non potest sua conversione nec speciem abstrahere, nec de specie iudicare, nisi adiutorio ipsius agentis. Similiter nec ipse intellectus agens operationem intelligendi potest perficere, nisi formetur acies intellectus possibilis ab ipso intelligibili, ex qua formatione est in pleniori actualitate respectu eius quod debet cognoscere, quam erat prius, cum carebat specie. — Et ita, cum cogitamus de intellectu agente et possibili, non debemus cogitare quasi de duabus substantiis, vel quasi de duabus potentiis ita separatis, quod una sine alia habeat operationem suam perficere, et aliquid intelligat intellectus agens sine possibili, et aliquid cognoscat intellectus agens, quod tamen homo, cuius est ille intellectus, ignoret. Haec enim vana sunt et frivola, ut aliquid sciat intellectus meus, quod ego nesciam; sed sic cogitandae sunt esse illae duae differentiae, quod in unam operationem completam intelligendi veniant inseparabiliter, sicut lumen et diaphanum veniunt in abstractionem coloris. — Nec sunt hic sequenda communiter verba philosophorum, quia pro magna parte decepti sunt in influentia intelligentiae super animam, quam non admittit fides catholica.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio magni momenti est, ut recte intelligatur S. Bonaventurae doctrina de ratione cognitionis humanae. Accurate etiam hic recensentur variae illius aetatis de hac re opiniones, magna ex parte erroneae. Insuper manifeste ostenditur, S. Doctorem ab aliis principalibus Scholasticis in hac doctrina non discrepare nisi in modo loquendi, vel in re exigui momenti. Communis autem Scholasticorum doctrina tenebat haec principia.

1. Recipienda est Aristotelica distinctio inter intellectum agentem et possibilem. Huic communi doctrinae refragatur solus Durand. (I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 3.) asserens, « fictitium esse ponere intellectum agentem ».

2. Ratio eiusdem distinctionis sumenda est ex singulari cognitionis humanae natura, quae, cum incipiat suam actionem a rebus sensibilibus, quarum phantasmata, conditionibus materiae coniuncta, non sunt intelligibilia in actu, sed tantum in potentia, indiget aliqua « virtute ex parte intellectus, quae faciat intelligibilia in actu per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus » (S. Thom., S. I. q. 79. a. 3.). Hinc in intellectu Angelorum talis distinctio vel omnino non est, ut vult S. Thom., vel non in eodem sensu, ut putat S. Bonav., de quo vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, schol. — Observabant etiam iidem communiter, superfluum esse intellectum agentem, si admitterentur ideae Platonicae, quasi fontes luminis intelligibilis, a quibus species intelligibiles in intellectum humanum deriventur. Ad rem Ægid. R. (hic p. I. q. 1. a. 4.) allegat « differentiam, quam dat Themistius inter Platonem et Aristotelem, quia illud, in cuius virtute immutatur intellectus noster, Plato assimilat soli, quia ipsa idea, quae est quidam Deus et quidam sol intellectualis, immutat intellectum nostrum. Sed Aristoteles assimilat illud lumini, quia intellectus agens, qui est quoddam lumen et qui est omnia facere, est illud, in cuius virtute immutatur intellectus possibilis ». Ibidem Ægid. assignat quinque causas, quare necesse fuerit ponere intellectum agentem, videlicet, prout intellectus comparatur ad phantasmata — ad speciem intelligibilem — ad actum intelligendi — prout ad phantasmata comparantur colores — et colores ad potentiam visivam. — Quoad rationem eiusdem distinctionis cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69. m. 2. a. 2. 3; — Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. n. 8; II. Sent. d. 3. q. 11. n. 4. seqq.; Report. II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3-5; S. c. Gent. II. c. 76-78; de Anima a. 4; de Spiritual. Creaturis, a. 10.

3. Haeretica est sententia Avicennae et Averrois, qui asserebant, intellectum agentem esse pro omnibus hominibus unam substantiam separatam, scil. intelligentiam creatam, quem errorem S. Bonav. saepe reprobavit (cfr. pag. 568, nota 2. et supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1.).

4. Nec ipse Deus apte vocari potest intellectus agens, licet sit lux, quae illuminat omnem hominem atque generaliter influat per concursum in omnem intellectum creatum.

5. Sed tam intellectus possibilis quam agens omnino est aliquid proprium et essentiale animae; intellectus autem agens est animae virtus seu vis activa et quoddam « lumen creatum ». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; infra huius d. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, nec non S. Thom., S. I. q. 79. a. 4.

6. Non conceditur, intellectum habere innatam cognitionem universalium, sed quoad hoc approbatur verbum Aristotelis, animam esse creatam sicut tabulam rasam. Quo autem sensu habitus innati a S. Doctore ponantur, explicatur I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 4, et II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.

II. Differentia tamen inter doctores est in modo loquendi de natura distinctionis inter utrumque intellectum. S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Ægid. R. et non pauci Scotistae eosdem nominant duas potentias, sed S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. duas differentias intellectivae potentiae. In fine autem huius quaestionis (vide corollarium) Seraphicus mentem suam explicat: « Non debemus cogitare quasi de duabus substantiis, vel quasi de duabus potentiis ita separatis » etc. Stephanus Brulifer (in hunc locum) refert varias Scoti interpretationes, ipse autem, dissentiens a S. Bonav., sequitur eam quae tenet, intellectum agentem et possibilem non esse duas potentias ac nullo modo distingui realiter inter se.

III. De intellectu agente et possibili idem docet Ioan. a Rupella, Sum. de Anima p. II. c. 37-39. (ed. Prato 1882). Praeter iam citatos: B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1-3. q. 93. m. 1. 2; tr. 1. q. 4. m. 2. a. 3, cfr. etiam tr. 13. q. 76. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. —

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English Translation

Distinction XXIV, Part I, Article II. On the division of the powers of the soul.

Question IV. Whether the agent and possible intellect are one power or diverse.

Fourthly and lastly, for the greater clarity of what precedes, it is asked about the division of the powers of the soul by the agent and the possible [intellect], according to which differences our intellect is customarily divided. The question, then, is whether the agent intellect and the possible are one power or diverse. And that they are diverse, it seems.

1. "A material cause never coincides at the same time with the other causes in the same thing," as the Philosopher holds¹, but "as matter is related to form, or to the efficient [cause], so is the possible intellect related to the agent," as the Philosopher says: therefore the possible and agent intellect are diverse powers.

2. Likewise, the first division of power is by the active and the passive, as the Philosopher intimates in the ninth book of the First Philosophy²; but among these members that divide first there is the greatest difference that exists in that genus: therefore between the active and the passive power there is the greatest difference of powers: therefore it is impossible that one power be possible and agent.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the same thing in the same respect be in act and in potency at once and at the same time³; but the soul according to the agent intellect is continually in its act, but according to the possible it is not: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible that the same thing according to essence be illuminating and illuminated; but the agent intellect is related as light, the possible intellect as that which is illuminated by light⁵: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. "In perpetual things, to be and to be able do not differ," as the Philosopher holds⁴; therefore neither do act and potency, much less active and passive power; but the soul is perpetual, and so is its intellect: therefore there is no difference of the possible power from the agent.

2. Likewise, in the imagination, which is a far more material power than the intellect, there are not two imaginative powers, of which one is active and the other passive⁷: therefore if the intellective power is far more potent than the imaginative, it seems that it does not have to be diversified by the agent and the possible.

3. Likewise, the receptive and abstractive power in corporeal things can concur into the unity of one organ, as is plain in the eye of the cat, which can receive a species and produce it in itself at night: therefore by parallel reasoning, indeed by a far stronger one, it seems that the agent and possible intellect are found in one spiritual power⁸.

4. Likewise, to understand is one act in itself: therefore it is from one simple power; but to our act of understanding the possible intellect and the agent intellect concur: therefore they are not diverse powers.

5. Likewise, either the possible intellect understands, or it does not. If it does not: then it ought not to be called an intellect nor an intellective power. If it understands: then it is in some way an active power: therefore it does not seem that the possible intellect is a power other than the agent.

6. Likewise, the agent intellect either understands or it does not. If it does not: then it ought not to be called an intellect nor an intellective power. If it does; since the intellect cannot understand anything other than itself unless it has the species of it in itself and with itself, and everything that is receptive of a species is in some way possible: therefore the agent intellect is in some way possible⁹: therefore it is not divided in essence from the possible.

Conclusion. The agent and possible intellect are two differences of the intellective power itself, which concur inseparably into one complete operation of understanding.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted beforehand that our predecessors attempted in various ways to assign the difference of the possible intellect from the agent. For some said that they differ as two substances. Others said that they differ as two powers. In a third way others said that they differ as habit and potency. In a fourth way others said that they differ as absolute and compared power.

Now the first manner of speaking, by which it is said that they differ according to substance, can be understood in two ways. — For some wished to say that the agent intellect is a separate intelligence, but the possible intellect is the soul joined to the body. And this manner of positing and speaking is founded on many sayings of the philosophers, who held that the rational soul is illumined by the tenth intelligence and perfected by its conjunction to it. — But this manner of speaking is false and erroneous, as was disproved above in the eighth distinction¹¹. For no created substance has the power of illuminating and perfecting the soul, properly understood; rather, according to the mind it is immediately illumined by God, as Augustine shows in many places.

Another manner of understanding is that the agent intellect is God himself, but the possible intellect is our mind. And this manner of speaking is founded on the words of Augustine, who in several places¹² says and shows that "the light which illumines us, the master who teaches us, the truth which directs us, is God," according to that text of John¹³: He was the true light, which enlightens every man, etc. — But this manner of speaking, although it posits something true and consonant with the Catholic faith, is nonetheless nothing to the point: because, since to our soul a power of understanding has been given, just as to other creatures a power for other acts has been given, so God, although he is the principal agent in the operation of any creature whatever, has nevertheless given to each an active power, by which it might go forth into its proper operation¹⁴. So it must be believed without doubt that to the human soul he gave not only the possible intellect, but also the agent, so that each is something of the soul itself. — And therefore the first manner of assigning the difference is to be omitted as irrelevant to the point, by which, namely, it is said that the agent and possible intellect differ as two substances.

Now the second manner of speaking, by which, namely, it is said that they differ as two powers, can be understood in two ways, and in one way falsely, in the other way truly.

One manner of understanding and speaking is that the possible intellect is a purely material power, which is in the soul on the part of its matter¹⁵; but the agent intellect is a purely formal power, which is in the soul on the part of its form. And this manner of speaking seems to be founded on the words of the Philosopher¹⁶, who says that "the possible intellect is that by which it is to become all things; the agent intellect, that by which it is to make all things," just as happens to be found in form and matter. — But this manner of speaking is not consonant with the truth. For if the possible intellect were a purely passive power and held itself on the part of matter, it could be posited in all things in which a material principle is to be found. Furthermore, just as the eye is not called sight, so such a power ought not to be called intellect.

But another manner of understanding is to say that the agent and possible intellect are two differences of intellect, given to one substance, which regard the whole composite. Now the agent intellect is appropriated to form and the possible to matter, because the possible intellect is ordered to receiving, the agent intellect is ordered to abstracting; nor is the possible intellect purely passive; for it has the power to turn itself upon the species existing in the phantasm, and by turning to receive it through the help of the agent intellect, and to judge concerning it. Likewise neither is the agent intellect wholly in act; for it cannot understand anything other than itself unless it is aided by the species, which, abstracted from the phantasm, must be united to the intellect. Hence neither does the possible understand without the agent, nor the agent without the possible. — And this manner of speaking is true and founded on the words of the Philosopher¹⁷. For he says that the agent and the possible are two differences of intellect; whence, just as we necessarily understand two things in the medium, in order that the species be abstracted from the object, namely light and transparency, so that by the one it abstracts and by the other carries and receives; so also in the matter at hand it can be conformably understood that these two concur to one act, such that the one without the other does not have its operation completely.

The third manner of assigning the difference, by which it is said that they differ as potency and habit, can be understood in two ways. — In one way, so that the agent intellect is called a certain habit constituted out of all the intelligibles; but the possible intellect is understood as the very same, insofar as it is in potency to acquiring cognition through phantasms. And this manner of positing seems to be founded on the words of Boethius¹⁸, who says that "retaining the sum, it loses the singulars." Which some wished to be understood thus, that our intellect is said to have within itself an innate cognition of universals, otherwise it could not by its own power, by abstracting even from the senses and phantasms, make the possible intellect actually understanding; for everything that draws another from potency into act is a being in act. — But this manner of speaking is not consonant with the words of the Philosopher¹⁹, who says that "the soul is created like a blank tablet," and "does not have cognition of habits innate to it, but acquires it through the mediation of sense and experience."

Another manner of speaking is to say that the agent intellect differs from the possible as habit from potency; not because the agent is purely habit, but because it is a habitual potency. — And this manner of speaking is probable and true and founded on philosophical and Catholic words. For it is true according to Dionysius²⁰ that intellectual substances, by the very fact that they are intellectual substances, "are lights": therefore the perfection and complement of an intellectual substance is spiritual light: therefore that power which follows upon the soul on the part of its intellect is a certain light within it, of which light that text of the Psalm²¹ can be understood: The light of thy countenance is sealed upon us, O Lord. And this light the Philosopher seems to have understood to be the agent intellect. For he says that "that intellect by which it is to make all things is as a certain habit, as in light; for in a certain way light too makes colors that are in potency to be actually colors," as is had in the third book²² of On the Soul. Now something like this can be posited in the eye of the cat, which not only has the power of receiving through the nature of the transparent, like other eyes, but also the power of producing a species in itself through the nature of the light implanted in it.

The fourth manner of assigning the difference between the possible and the agent, by which, namely, they differ as absolute and compared power, can be understood in two ways. — In one way, so that it be understood that the agent and possible intellect are one wholly and the same power, differing by comparison alone: so that it is agent insofar as it is considered in itself, but possible insofar as it is united to the body and to phantasms. And this manner of speaking seems to be founded on the words of the Philosopher²³, who holds that "the agent intellect is always in its act, but the possible sometimes thus, sometimes not." For that the soul grows weary and is disturbed in the act of understanding, this comes from its conjunction to the body. — But this manner of positing falls short of the truth, since the separated soul has the intellect by which it is to make all things, has also the intellect by which it is to become all things: therefore it has the agent and the possible, even when it is separated: therefore the possible intellect was not in it solely from its conjunction with the body.

Another manner of understanding the aforesaid difference is to say that the agent intellect differs from the possible as absolute from compared power; not because it is wholly the same power differing by comparison²⁴, but because, since there is one and another difference of intellect, one is that by which the soul is ordered to receiving, and the other that by which it is ordered to abstracting; and thus the one of itself in a certain way complete²⁵ and made-fit, but the other needing the making-fit and the complement; and since it is born to come to that complement through the help of the body and the corporeal senses, it is in the soul itself according as it is inclined to the body. And from this it contracts a twofold possibility: one with respect to act, because it is not always in its act on account of an impediment on the part of the body; the other with respect to phantasms, by which it must be aroused; and this possibility it does not have except from its conjunction with the body, although it is a power of its own nature, by which it is to become all things, which is not only in the conjoined soul, but also in the separated soul.

So therefore it is plain how, out of the many manners of speaking, a certain difference of intellect²⁶ is elicited between the agent and the possible intellect. For since there are four principal manners of assigning the difference between these intellects, and each is subdivided into two, as has been shown in the pursuing, only three manners are worthy to be approved, of which one does not disagree with the other, but one takes its origin from the other. For since the differences of intellect are diverse, which, although they regard²⁷ the whole composite, yet one regards more the complement of the soul, the other the material principle; hence it is that one not only holds the account of a power, but even of a habitual power; the other holds purely the account of a power. And hence it is that one is said to belong to the soul in itself, the other in comparison to the body, and the one always to be²⁸ in act, the other not; not because the soul always actually understands through the agent intellect, but because, just as corporeal light always shines and is of itself ready to illumine, while the illuminable thing is not always illumined on account of some impediment; so also it must be understood in the matter at hand. — Therefore the reasons showing that the agent and possible intellect are two differences of the intellective power are to be conceded, although some of them are not very compelling.

Replies to the arguments for the affirmative part: To 1. To that which is objected, that to be able and to be do not differ in perpetual things; it must be said that this is understood of substantial being and of difference not according to nature, but of distance according to time, because in them matter does not precede act in time; and therefore it is nothing to the point, because the possible intellect is not called possible with respect to the first being, but the second act²⁹.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning the imagination, that active and passive power do not differ; it can be said that it differs more than in the intellect, because the corporeal organ in which the phantasms are received is to it in place of a passive power; but the imaginative force itself³⁰ is in place of an active power. — Otherwise it can be said that it is not similar, because, when the species is carried from sense up to the imagination, it does not pass out of the genus of abstraction which indeed was in the particular sense; but when the species reaches the intellect, a new genus of abstraction is there required and another genus of light. Therefore the intellect itself needs more an active power, distinct from the possible, than the imagination or sense does³¹.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning the eye of the cat, it must be said that, although the receptive and abstractive power can concur to the completion of one organ, nevertheless they never concur into the same disposition of one organ. For one is the disposition in the eye of the cat by which it receives, namely transparency, and another by which it abstracts, namely luminosity, and they are of one and another nature. So also in the intellective power; although there concur to the complement and perfection of the intellective power the power by which it receives and the power by which it abstracts; nevertheless they are not of the same nature, nor are they in the soul through the same nature³²: and therefore they are not one difference of power, but diverse.

To 4. To that which is objected, that to understand is one and simple act; it must be said that although to understand can in a certain kind of simplicity be called a simple act, nevertheless to our act of understanding there concur receiving and judging, or abstracting and receiving; and these are several acts ordered to one another, out of which there results one perfect act. So also it must be understood to be the case in the powers, that they are diverse differences of intellect³³ in such a way that nevertheless in their actions they are ordered to one another and joined for the perfecting of the act of understanding, as the material and formal principle are for constituting one being of the composite.

To 5 and 6. To that which is objected, that the possible intellect understands, and the agent intellect likewise receives; it must be said that the possible intellect is not purely passive, as was shown above; for it has the power of turning itself; nor yet is it so active as the agent, because by its turning it can neither abstract the species nor judge concerning the species, except by the aid of the agent itself. Likewise neither can the agent intellect itself perfect the operation of understanding, unless the edge of the possible intellect be formed by the intelligible itself, from which formation it is in a fuller actuality with respect to that which it must know than it was before, when it lacked the species. — And so, when we think about the agent and possible intellect, we ought not to think as of two substances, or as of two powers so separated that one without the other has its operation perfected, and the agent intellect understands something without the possible, and the agent intellect knows something which nevertheless the man whose intellect it is does not know. For these are vain and frivolous things, that my intellect should know something which I do not know; but those two differences are to be thought of as coming inseparably into one complete operation of understanding, just as light and the transparent come into the abstraction of color. — Nor are the words of the philosophers here to be followed in common, because for a great part they were deceived concerning the influence of the intelligence upon the soul, which the Catholic faith does not admit.

Scholion

I. This question is of great moment for rightly understanding St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the account of human cognition. Here too the various opinions of that age on this matter, for a great part erroneous, are accurately reviewed. Moreover it is manifestly shown that the holy Doctor does not differ from the other principal Scholastics in this doctrine except in manner of speaking, or in a matter of slight moment. Now the common doctrine of the Scholastics held these principles.

1. The Aristotelian distinction between the agent and the possible intellect is to be received. To this common doctrine only Durandus is opposed (I Sent. d. 3 p. II q. 3), asserting that "it is fictitious to posit an agent intellect."

2. The ground of this distinction is to be drawn from the singular nature of human cognition, which, since it begins its action from sensible things, whose phantasms, joined to the conditions of matter, are not intelligible in act but only in potency, needs some "power on the part of the intellect, which makes things intelligible in act by the abstraction of the species from material conditions" (S. Thom., S. I q. 79 a. 3). Hence in the intellect of the Angels such a distinction either is not at all, as St. Thomas holds, or not in the same sense, as St. Bonaventure thinks, on which see above d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 1, scholion. — The same authors also commonly observed that the agent intellect would be superfluous if the Platonic ideas were admitted, as fountains of intelligible light from which the intelligible species might be derived into the human intellect. On this point Ægidius Romanus (here p. I q. 1 a. 4) adduces "the difference which Themistius gives between Plato and Aristotle, because the thing in whose power our intellect is changed Plato likens to the sun, since the idea itself, which is a certain God and a certain intellectual sun, changes our intellect. But Aristotle likens it to light, because the agent intellect, which is a certain light and which is to make all things, is that in whose power the possible intellect is changed." In the same place Ægidius assigns five causes why it was necessary to posit an agent intellect, namely, insofar as the intellect is compared to phantasms — to the intelligible species — to the act of understanding — insofar as colors are compared to phantasms — and colors to the visive power. — On the ground of this distinction cf. also Alex. Hal., S. p. II q. 69 m. 2 a. 2. 3; — Scot., I Sent. d. 3 q. 6 n. 8; II Sent. d. 3 q. 11 n. 4 seqq.; Report. II Sent. d. 9 q. 2. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3-5; S. c. Gent. II c. 76-78; de Anima a. 4; de Spiritual. Creaturis a. 10.

3. Heretical is the opinion of Avicenna and Averroes, who asserted that the agent intellect is for all men one separate substance, namely a created intelligence, which error St. Bonaventure often reproved (cf. p. 568, note 2, and above d. 18 a. 2 q. 1).

4. Nor can God himself fittingly be called the agent intellect, although he is the light which illumines every man and generally flows in by concurrence into every created intellect.

5. But both the possible intellect and the agent are altogether something proper and essential to the soul; the agent intellect is the soul's virtue or active force and a certain "created light." Cf. II Sent. d. 17 a. 1 q. 1 ad 6; below in this d. p. II a. 1 q. 1 in the body, and d. 39 a. 1 q. 2, as also S. Thom., S. I q. 79 a. 4.

6. It is not granted that the intellect has an innate cognition of universals, but as to this the saying of Aristotle is approved, that the soul is created like a blank tablet. But in what sense innate habits are posited by the holy Doctor is explained in I Sent. d. 17 p. I q. 4, and II Sent. d. 39 a. 1 q. 2.

II. Nevertheless there is a difference among the doctors in manner of speaking about the nature of the distinction between the two intellects. St. Thomas, Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Middleton, Ægidius Romanus, and not a few Scotists name them two powers, but St. Bonaventure with Alexander of Hales names them two differences of the intellective power. Now at the end of this question (see the corollary) the Seraphic Doctor explains his mind: "We ought not to think as of two substances, or as of two powers so separated," etc. Stephanus Brulifer (on this passage) reports various interpretations of Scotus, but he himself, dissenting from St. Bonaventure, follows the one that holds the agent and possible intellect not to be two powers and to be in no way really distinguished from each other.

III. On the agent and possible intellect the same is taught by John of La Rochelle, Summa de Anima p. II c. 37-39 (ed. Prato 1882). Besides those already cited: B. Albert., S. p. II tr. 1-3 q. 93 m. 1. 2; tr. 1 q. 4 m. 2 a. 3, cf. also tr. 13 q. 76 m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3 a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2 q. 1. —

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 17. seqq. (c. 5.).
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 17 ff. (c. 5).
Libr. II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.). Vide supra pag. 15, nota 2. — Seq. textus est III. de Anima, text. 17. seq. (c. 5.).
Physics II, text 70 (c. 7). See above p. 15, note 2. — The following text is On the Soul III, text 17 f. (c. 5).
Text. 2. (VIII. c. 1.).
Text 2 (VIII c. 1).
Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 40. (c. 5.).
Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 40 (c. 5).
Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 18. (c. 5.).
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 18 (c. 5).
Communis Aristotelicorum sententia est, pro nullo sensu admittendum esse sensum agentem, distinctum a sensu patiente, tum quia, ut asseverant, Aristoteles nullibi eius mentionem faciat; tum quia Aristoteles, II. de Anima, text. 51. 59. 60. (c. 5.) doceat, sensum esse de virtutibus passivis; tum quia nulla prorsus sit necessitas talem ponendi sensum.
The common opinion of the Aristotelians is that for no sense is an agent sense, distinct from the patient sense, to be admitted, both because, as they assert, Aristotle nowhere makes mention of it, and because Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 51, 59, 60 (c. 5), teaches that sense belongs to the passive powers, and because there is no necessity whatever for positing such a sense.
Libr. III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.). — Paulo inferius pro activa et passiva plurimi codd. et primae edd. activa a passiva.
Physics III, text 32 (c. 4). — A little below, for active and passive very many codices and the first editions [read] active from passive.
Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 speciali. Paulo superius codd. cc et cd. 1 de se, edd. 3, 4 et Vat. a se pro in se.
The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] speciali. A little above, codices cc and cd. 1 [read] de se, editions 3, 4 and the Vatican [read] a se for in se.
In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 deest haec prima conclusio: ergo intellectus agens est aliquo modo possibilis.
In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 this first conclusion is lacking: therefore the agent intellect is in some way possible.
Part. II. q. 2. 4. 5, sed praecipue d. 10. (quae etiam ab aliquibus codd., ut R Y, citatur) a. 2. q. 1. et 2, ubi et Augustini verba afferuntur. Cfr. etiam d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
Part II, q. 2, 4, 5, but especially d. 10 (which is also cited by some codices, as R Y) a. 2 q. 1 and 2, where Augustine's words too are adduced. Cf. also d. 1 p. I a. 2 q. 2.
De Magistro, c. 11. n. 38. seqq.; V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 30. et XII. c. 31. n. 59; super Ioan. tract. 13. n. 19. et tract. 20. n. 3; VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. 10. et XI. c. 27; de Cognitione verae vitae (inter opera August.), c. 36. Cfr. opusc. a nobis edit. de Humanae Cognitionis ratione.
On the Teacher c. 11 n. 38 ff.; On Genesis according to the Letter V c. 13 n. 30 and XII c. 31 n. 59; On John tract. 13 n. 19 and tract. 20 n. 3; City of God VIII c. 7, 10 and XI c. 27; On the Cognition of the True Life (among Augustine's works) c. 36. Cf. the little work edited by us On the Account of Human Cognition.
Cap. 1, 9.
[John] ch. 1, 9.
Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5, et pag. 198, nota 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. ait: Sed quamvis verissimum sit, intellectum nostrum non posse reduci de potentia in actum nisi per divinam virtutem principaliter operantem; tamen non sic est consuetudo loquendi, ut ipsum [Deum] vocemus nomine intellectus agentis, cum non determinando verba loquimur de intellectu possibili et agente, sed intendimus, hoc ad animae nostrae naturam pertinere vel ad eius naturales proprietates.
Cf. above p. 197, note 5, and p. 198, note 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2 q. 1, says: But although it is most true that our intellect cannot be brought from potency into act except by the divine power operating principally, nevertheless it is not the custom of speaking that we call it [God] by the name of agent intellect, since we do not speak of the possible and agent intellect by determining the words, but we mean this to pertain to the nature of our soul or to its natural properties.
Cfr. supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
Cf. above d. 17 a. 1 q. 2 and d. 3 p. I a. 1 q. 1.
Libr. III. de Anima, text. 18. (c. 5.).
On the Soul III, text 18 (c. 5).
Libr. III. de Anima, text. 17. seq., ubi etiam est comparatio lucis ac colorum cum intellectu agente et possibili. — Aliquanto inferius pro ut hoc [plures codd., ut F W aa, hic] sine illo Vat. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 ut haec sine alia (ed. 1 illa).
On the Soul III, text 17 f., where there is also the comparison of light and colors with the agent and possible intellect. — A little below, for ut hoc [very many codices, as F W aa, hic] sine illo, the Vatican edition with editions 1, 3, 4 [reads] ut haec sine alia (ed. 1 illa).
Libr. V. de Consol. metr. 3: An cum mentem cerneret altam, / Pariter summam [universale] et singula norat? / Nunc membrorum condita nube, / Non in totum est oblita sui, / Summamque tenet, singula perdens. — Paulo inferius post cognitionem universalium in Vat. et ed. 4 adiicitur habitualem, quod ab ed. 3 ponitur pro universalium.
On the Consolation [of Philosophy] V, metre 3: "Or, when it discerned the lofty mind, / did it know equally the sum [the universal] and the singulars? / Now, buried in the cloud of the members, / it has not wholly forgotten itself, / and holds the sum, while losing the singulars." — A little below, after the cognition of universals, in the Vatican edition and ed. 4 is added habitual, which by ed. 3 is put in place of of universals.
Prior text. cit. habetur III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4.); alter invenitur I. Poster. c. 14. (c. 18.), II. c. 18. (c. 15.), I. Metaph. c. 1. — Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. seqq. (VIII. c. 8.) docet, actum priorem esse potentia, et « semper ex eo, quod potentia est, fit actu ens ab actu existente ».
The former text cited is had in On the Soul III, text 14 (c. 4); the latter is found in Posterior [Analytics] I c. 14 (c. 18), II c. 18 (c. 15), Metaphysics I c. 1. — Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 13 ff. (VIII c. 8), teaches that act is prior to potency, and "always from that which is in potency a being in act comes to be from a being existing in act."
De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 3. § 2. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 2. et 22. Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.
On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 3 § 2 and On the Divine Names c. 4 § 2 and 22. Cf. above p. 83, note 1.
Psalm. 4, 7.
Psalm 4, 7.
Text. 18. (c. 5.). — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. ut lumen pro ut in lumine; lectio Vat. concordat cum textu Graeco οἷον τι φῶς. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius post suscipiendi adiicit in se speciem.
Text 18 (c. 5). — The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, [reads] ut lumen for ut in lumine; the Vatican reading agrees with the Greek text οἷον τι φῶς. The same Vatican edition, a little below, after suscipiendi, adds in se speciem.
Libr. III. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 5.).
On the Soul III, text 20 (c. 5).
Plures codd., ut A Y aa, voci comparatione praefigunt sola.
Several codices, as A Y aa, prefix sola to the word comparatione.
Codd. Z cc et ed. 1 hic subiiciunt est; mox post complemento multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 incongrue omittunt et.
Codices Z cc and ed. 1 here add est; soon after, following complemento, many codices with editions 2, 3 incongruously omit et.
Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 eliciuntur quaedam [edd. 2, 3, 4 quidam] intellectus differentiae.
The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] certain differences of intellect are elicited [editions 2, 3, 4: quidam].
Ita plurimi codd. et ed. 1, Vat. respiciunt.
So very many codices and ed. 1; the Vatican edition [reads] respiciunt [they regard].
Plures codd., ut F aa, cum edd., exc. 1, est. Aliquanto inferius pro illuminatur Vat. cum aliquibus codd. illuminabitur.
Several codices, as F aa, with the editions, except 1, [read] est. A little below, for illuminatur the Vatican edition with some codices [reads] illuminabitur [shall be illumined].
Cfr. supra pag. 63, nota 2.
Cf. above p. 63, note 2.
Cod. cc et ed. 1 imaginativa.
Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] imaginativa.
Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121. (c. 12.) et III. text. 38. (c. 8.) seq.
Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 121 (c. 12) and III, text 38 (c. 8) f.
Cfr. supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 quod etsi sint diversae differentiae intellectus, attamen… ordinatae sunt etc. Item Cod. aa sine pro nisi.
Cf. above d. 17 a. 1 q. 2. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] that although there be diverse differences of intellect, nevertheless… they are ordered, etc. Likewise codex aa [reads] sine for nisi.

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