Bonaventure

Articulus I. De cognitione animae separatae.

Quaestio I. Utrum anima separata habeat usum potentiae sensitivae.

De numeratione notarum. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The labels below are therefore page-qualified: notes 2–4 of page 1044, notes 1–12 of page 1045, notes 1–11 of page 1046, and notes 1–2 of page 1047. Note 1 of page 1044 anchors in the preceding divisio chunk; notes 3–4 of page 1047 anchor in the following quaestio.

Quantum ergo ad primum est quaestio, utrum anima separata habeat usum potentiae sensitivae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Evangelii, Lucae decimo sexto²: Elevans oculos vidit Lazarum etc. Omnia illa, quae ibi tanguntur, dicunt cognitionem sensitivam et per modum sensus: ergo etc.

2. Item, Cassiodorus in libro suo de Anima³, loquens de anima separata, dicit: « Videt, audit, tangit ac reliquis sensibus efficacius valet ».

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia tanto substantia per potentiam melius et facilius operatur, quanto est liberior et ab errore immunior; sed substantia animae rationalis separata habet potentiam cognitivam, quia impossibile est, destrui potentiam, quae fundatur in substantia perpetua. Et iterum, est substantia⁴ liberior et spiritualior: ergo ad actum cognitionis liberior: ergo melius potest ea uti, tam interiori quam exteriori, quam nunc.

4. Item, constat, quod anima separata cognoscit res abstractas a conditionibus materialibus, cognoscit res sub conditionibus materialibus, absente materia,

et iterum, cognoscit sub conditionibus individualibus, praesente materia vel obiecto¹; hoc constat: ergo intelligit et imaginatur et sentit, ergo habet usum omnis potentiae.

Si tu dicas, quod hoc facit per unam et eandem vim; contra: 5. Isti actus sunt maioris abstractionis et minoris²: si ergo abstractio maior fit secundum gradus spiritualitatis potentiarum, et una potentia non habet gradus spiritualitatis maioris et minoris: ergo necesse est, quod hoc faciat per tres potentias.

6. Item, si intellectus animae separatae potest haec omnia, tunc videtur, quod cum frustra fiat per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora³, quod frustra dedit Deus tres potentias animae.

7. Item, si potest totum intellectus quantum ad ista tria: ergo deficientibus sensibus, nihilominus poterit cognoscere sensibilia; quod est manifeste falsum et contra experientiam et contra Philosophum⁴, qui dicit, quod « deficiente sensu, necesse est, scientiam deficere, quae est secundum illum sensum ». — Si tu dicas, quod hoc habet anima separata; ego quaero: quare separata potest totum per intellectum, non autem coniuncta? — Si tu dicas, quod hoc est propter molem carnis⁵; obiicitur de statu Adae, ubi anima non habebat carnem opprimentem, nec tamen hoc poterat solo intellectu, quia frustra haberet sensus.

Contra: 1. « Sentire, ut vult Philosophus⁶, est operatio coniuncti »: ergo cum, facta separatione, iam non sit animal, iam non erit operatio sensus.

2. Item, sensus, sive interior⁷ sive exterior, est potentia egens organo determinato: ergo est potentia alligata organo: ergo cessante organo, non habet operationem.

3. Item, hoc videtur experimento: quia caecus habet potentiam videndi, et amisso oculo, non potest videre, nec phreneticus recordari: ergo si perdit organum potentia sensitiva, quando omnino separatur, magis perdit operationem, quam quando organum solum laeditur: ergo cessat omnis eius operatio.

4. Item, in omni potentia cognitiva necesse est reperire agentem et passibilem, et hoc per differentiam⁸. Si enim differunt in intellectu, qui est potentia simplicior et spiritualior, multo magis in potentia sensitiva; sed potentia sensitiva non dividitur in agentem et passibilem in se⁹: ergo necesse est, quod praeter se habeat passibilem. Sed hoc non est nisi organum corporale, quod recipit ad hoc, quod homo cognoscat: ergo cum post separationem sit activa sine passiva, et sine his duabus impossibile est, potentiam cognitivam fieri in actu; ergo etc.

Conclusio

Anima separata per potentiam intellectivam cognoscit ad modum Angelorum omnia quae cognoscebant etiam aliae potentiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem triplex fuit doctorum opinio.

Quidam namque dixerunt, quod anima separata, cum trahat secum omnes potentias, omnibus utitur tanquam substantia liberior; nec dicunt¹⁰ esse credendum philosophis in hac parte: quia nec recte intellexerunt cognitionem post separationem animae nec ulterius unitatem, propter quam in una anima sunt tres potentiae, scilicet rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis, et in eadem substantia perpetuo radicantur, cum qua necessario separantur; quod philosophi non cognoverunt, sed Sancti. Et quoniam fides nostra dicit, animas cruciari ignibus¹¹; et Cassiodorus dicit, quod « aliis sensibus efficacius valet »: ideo posuerunt, animam usum omnium potentiarum habere.

Secunda positio est, quod anima habet potentias sensitivas, illa, inquam, quae rationalis est. Sed quoniam omnes sensitivae exteriores uniuntur in origine et¹² in sensu communi et distinguuntur in organis; ideo necessario, cum separatur anima a corpore, recurrunt omnes potentiae ad unam originem, scilicet ad sensum communem, et per illum sensum potest anima libera, quod poterat per omnes alios exteriores ratione alligationis cum corpore, et

illo utitur ad actus omnium sensuum; et ita utitur sensu interiori, non solum intellectu; et iste sensus est qui trahit secum phantasmata. Et hanc positionem confirmant per Augustinum, qui dicit de Spiritu et anima, et duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram¹, quod anima trahit secum imagines rerum corporalium et per illas imaginatur et cognoscit, cum utitur potentia sensitiva interiori.

Tertia positio est, quod anima rationalis separata nihil cognoscit nisi mediante potentia intellectiva; per illam autem potest cognoscere non solum quod cognoscebat in corpore, sed etiam omne² quod cognoscebant aliae potentiae, propter sui libertatem, sicut unus Angelus. Per potentias sensitivas nihil potest operari, sicut nec per vegetativas, quoniam dependent ab organo corporali, sicut manifestum est intuenti. Ergo sicut corpore corrupto, nihil operatur per potentias, quae respiciunt vegetabilem: ita nihil operatur per potentias, quae respiciunt sensibilem. — Per intellectum autem cognoscit res sub conditionibus materialibus, praesente materia, et hoc est sensus exterioris; et res sub conditionibus materialibus, absente materia, et hoc est imaginationis; et illas etiam res cognoscit, abstractis omnibus materialibus, et hoc est intellectus³; et haec omnia vere facit. Et ideo recte dicitur anima separata sentire, imaginari et intelligere, non per diversas potentias, sed per unam, quae potest omnibus his modis cognoscere, sicut ponere est in Angelo, ut patet ex secundo libro⁴.

Ad maiorem autem intelligentiam est notandum, quod sicut « in omni natura est aliquid, quo est fieri, et aliquid, quo est facere⁵ »; sic et in omni cognitione; et cum haec sit prima divisio potentiae per activum et passivum, necesse est, ista differre; verumtamen secundum gradus maioris et minoris simplicitatis et spiritualitatis habent maiorem et minorem differentiam. Intellectiva namque, pro eo quod est spiritualior et abstractior, habet utramque potentiam, quae respicit substantiam spiritualem, ita quod activa est ratione ipsius quo est, et passiva ratione ipsius quod est, scilicet materiae et formae⁶. — In potentia autem sensitiva, quae est minus spiritualis, activa potentia est ex parte animae, et passiva ex organo; et ideo, quia sensus non est sine actione et passione, ideo sentire dicitur esse operatio coniuncti. Et iterum, cum activa nihil agat sine passiva; et quando anima amittit corpus, amittit passivam respectu actus sentiendi: ideo impossibile est, quod aliquo sensu utatur, sive interiori sive exteriori, quamdiu est separata.

Haec autem opinio magis est rationi consona nec repugnat fidei nec Sanctorum auctoritati. Ponit enim, quod anima per potentiam intellectivam intelligat et cognoscat his tribus modis, quibus nunc, et Angelus similiter, his, inquam, tribus modis a parte rei cognitae; et illud⁷ dicitur intelligere, imaginari et sentire, secundum quod Sancti dicunt. Et ita intelligendae sunt auctoritates Sanctorum.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de illo divite; dicendum, quod lingua illa non erat nisi lingua imaginativa⁸. Anima enim defert imagines non tantum in potentia inferiori; sed, cum separatur, habet in memoria intelligibili, quae non eget organo corporali.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Cassiodoro, dicendum, quod non loquitur de sensibus exterioribus, sed de interioribus, qui nihil aliud sunt quam ipse intellectus, prout habet modum apprehendendi ipsorum sensuum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima separata est liberior; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad potentiam activam; sed quando caret passiva, non potest operari, sicut nec⁹ ignis sine combustibili, non propter imperfectionem sui in se, sed propter hoc, quod necessario exigit ad exeundum in opus.

Ad 4. 5. 6. 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognoscit tripliciter; dicendum, quod hoc facit separata per unam et eandem potentiam¹⁰. — Quod obiicitur de abstractione, dicendum, quod hoc non facit diversitatem, quoniam una potentia est, secundum quam anima ordinat totam lineam praedicamentalem¹¹, et ascendit abstrahendo sive resolvendo ab infimo usque ad supremum, et descendit componendo a generalissimo usque ad individuum. Solius enim

potentiae rationalis est comparare individuum ad speciem et eiusdem considerare genus generalissimum¹; et ideo abstractio in his tribus actibus non est sufficiens ratio ad diversificandum potentias, sed magis coniunctio peroptima et decentissima, secundum quam factum est, ut anima, quamdiu est in carne, habeat potentias, secundum quas alligetur et communicet corpori operationem suam et in regendo sive vivificando et in cognoscendo². — Et sic patet, quare intellectus non habet hoc posse, quamdiu est coniunctus, propter alligationem et ordinem et connexionem potentiarum animae ad se et ad corpus; non sic autem, cum est separatus. — Et sic patet totum.

Article I. On the cognition of the separated soul.

Question I. Whether the separated soul has the use of the sensitive power.

As to the first, then, the question is whether the separated soul has the use of the sensitive power. And that it does, seems to be so:

1. First, by the authority of the Gospel, Luke sixteen²: Lifting up his eyes he saw Lazarus etc. All those things which are touched upon there bespeak a sensitive cognition and one after the manner of sense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Cassiodorus in his book On the Soul³, speaking of the separated soul, says: « It sees, it hears, it touches, and with the remaining senses it is more efficaciously strong ».

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because a substance operates through a power the better and the more easily, the freer it is and the more immune from error; but the substance of the rational soul, once separated, has a cognitive power, because it is impossible that a power be destroyed which is founded in a perpetual substance. And again, it is a substance⁴ freer and more spiritual: therefore freer for the act of cognition: therefore it can use it better, both the interior and the exterior, than now.

4. Likewise, it is agreed that the separated soul knows things abstracted from material conditions; it knows things under material conditions, the matter being absent;

and again, it knows under individual conditions, the matter or the object being present¹; this is agreed: therefore it understands and imagines and senses, therefore it has the use of every power.

If you say that it does this by one and the same power; on the contrary: 5. These acts are of greater and lesser abstraction²: if therefore the greater abstraction comes about according to the degrees of spirituality of the powers, and one power does not have degrees of greater and lesser spirituality: therefore it is necessary that it do this by three powers.

6. Likewise, if the intellect of the separated soul can do all these things, then it seems that, since it is in vain that a thing be done by more when it can be done by fewer³, God gave the three powers to the soul in vain.

7. Likewise, if the intellect can do the whole with respect to these three: therefore, the senses failing, it will nonetheless be able to know sensible things; which is manifestly false and against experience and against the Philosopher⁴, who says that « when the sense fails, the knowledge which is according to that sense must necessarily fail ». — If you say that the separated soul has this; I ask: why can the separated soul do the whole through the intellect, but not the conjoined soul? — If you say that this is on account of the mass of the flesh⁵; the objection is raised concerning the state of Adam, where the soul did not have oppressing flesh, and yet it could not do this by intellect alone, since it would have the senses in vain.

On the contrary: 1. « To sense, as the Philosopher holds⁶, is the operation of the composite »: therefore, since after the separation is made it is no longer an animal, there will no longer be an operation of sense.

2. Likewise, sense, whether interior⁷ or exterior, is a power needing a determinate organ: therefore it is a power bound to an organ: therefore, the organ ceasing, it does not have its operation.

3. Likewise, this is seen by experiment: because a blind man has the power of seeing, and, the eye being lost, he cannot see, nor can a frenzied man remember: therefore, if the sensitive power loses its organ, when it is altogether separated it loses its operation more than when the organ is merely injured: therefore all its operation ceases.

4. Likewise, in every cognitive power it is necessary to find an agent and a patient, and this by a difference⁸. For if they differ in the intellect, which is a simpler and more spiritual power, much more so in the sensitive power; but the sensitive power is not divided into agent and patient within itself⁹: therefore it is necessary that it have the patient outside itself. But this is nothing other than a bodily organ, which receives unto this, that a man may know: therefore, since after the separation it is active without a passive, and without these two it is impossible that a cognitive power be brought into act; therefore etc.

Conclusion

The separated soul, through the intellective power, knows after the manner of the Angels all the things which the other powers also used to know.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this question there was a threefold opinion of the doctors.

For certain men said that the separated soul, since it draws all its powers with itself, uses all of them as a freer substance; nor do they say¹⁰ that the philosophers are to be believed in this matter: because they neither rightly understood cognition after the separation of the soul, nor further the unity on account of which in one soul there are three powers, namely the rational, the sensible and the vegetable, and they are perpetually rooted in the same substance, with which they are necessarily separated; which the philosophers did not know, but the Saints did. And since our faith says that souls are tormented by fire¹¹; and Cassiodorus says that « with the other senses it is more efficaciously strong »: therefore they posited that the soul has the use of all its powers.

The second position is that the soul has the sensitive powers — that soul, I mean, which is rational. But since all the exterior sensitive powers are united in their origin and¹² in the common sense, and are distinguished in their organs; therefore necessarily, when the soul is separated from the body, all the powers run back to one origin, namely to the common sense, and through that sense the soul, once free, can do what it could do through all the other exterior senses by reason of its binding with the body, and

it uses it for the acts of all the senses; and thus it uses an interior sense, not the intellect alone; and this is the sense which draws the phantasms with itself. And they confirm this position through Augustine, who says in On the Spirit and the Soul, and in the twelfth book On Genesis according to the Letter¹, that the soul draws with itself the images of bodily things and through them imagines and knows, when it uses the interior sensitive power.

The third position is that the separated rational soul knows nothing except by the mediation of the intellective power; and through it it can know not only what it knew in the body, but also everything² which the other powers used to know, on account of its freedom, like a single Angel. Through the sensitive powers it can operate nothing, just as neither through the vegetative ones, since they depend on a bodily organ, as is manifest to one who considers. Therefore, just as, the body being corrupted, it operates nothing through the powers which regard the vegetable: so it operates nothing through the powers which regard the sensible. — But through the intellect it knows things under material conditions, the matter being present, and this belongs to exterior sense; and things under material conditions, the matter being absent, and this belongs to imagination; and it knows those same things also with all material conditions abstracted, and this belongs to intellect³; and it truly does all these things. And therefore the separated soul is rightly said to sense, to imagine and to understand, not through diverse powers, but through one, which can know in all these modes, as is to be posited in an Angel, as is clear from the second book⁴.

But for a fuller understanding it is to be noted that, just as « in every nature there is something by which it is to become, and something by which it is to make⁵ »; so also in every cognition; and since this is the first division of power, through the active and the passive, it is necessary that these differ; yet according to the degrees of greater and lesser simplicity and spirituality they have a greater and a lesser difference. For the intellective power, in that it is more spiritual and more abstract, has both powers, which regard a spiritual substance, so that the active is by reason of the by which it is, and the passive by reason of the that which it is, namely of matter and form⁶. — But in the sensitive power, which is less spiritual, the active power is on the part of the soul, and the passive on the part of the organ; and therefore, because sense does not exist without action and passion, therefore to sense is said to be the operation of the composite. And again, since the active does nothing without the passive; and when the soul loses the body, it loses the passive with respect to the act of sensing: therefore it is impossible that it use any sense, whether interior or exterior, as long as it is separated.

Now this opinion is more consonant with reason, nor does it conflict with the faith nor with the authority of the Saints. For it posits that the soul, through the intellective power, understands and knows in these three modes, in which it does now, and the Angel likewise, in these three modes, I say, on the part of the thing known; and that⁷ is called to understand, to imagine and to sense, according to what the Saints say. And in this way the authorities of the Saints are to be understood.

To 1. To that, then, which is objected first concerning that rich man; it must be said that that tongue was only an imaginative tongue⁸. For the soul carries images not only in the lower power; but, when it is separated, it has them in the intelligible memory, which does not need a bodily organ.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning Cassiodorus, it must be said that he does not speak of the exterior senses, but of the interior ones, which are nothing other than the intellect itself, insofar as it has the mode of apprehending of those very senses.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the separated soul is freer; it must be said that this is true as regards the active power; but when it lacks the passive, it cannot operate, just as neither⁹ can fire without something combustible — not on account of an imperfection of itself in itself, but on account of this, that it necessarily requires something for going forth into work.

To 4. 5. 6. 7. To that which is objected, that it knows in three ways; it must be said that the separated soul does this through one and the same power¹⁰. — As to what is objected concerning abstraction, it must be said that this does not make a diversity, since it is one power according to which the soul orders the whole predicamental line¹¹, and ascends by abstracting or resolving from the lowest up to the highest, and descends by composing from the most general down to the individual. For it belongs to the rational power alone

to compare the individual to the species and to consider the most general genus of that same species¹; and therefore abstraction in these three acts is not a sufficient ground for diversifying the powers, but rather a most excellent and most fitting conjunction, according to which it has been brought about that the soul, as long as it is in the flesh, should have powers by which it is bound and communicates its operation to the body, both in governing or vivifying and in knowing². — And thus it is clear why the intellect does not have this capacity as long as it is conjoined, on account of the binding and the order and the connexion of the soul's powers to itself and to the body; but not so, when it is separated. — And thus the whole is clear.