Dist. 33, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 33
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur aliquo dolore interiore.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur aliquo dolore interiori. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per illud Ioannis Chrysostomi1, qui dicit: « Excludi a bonis aeternis, et alienum effici ab his quae praeparata sunt iustis, tantum generat cruciatum, tantum dolorem, ut etiam, si nulla extrinsecus poena torqueret, haec sola sufficeret ». Ergo si parvuli excludentur, sicut adulti: videtur, quod maxime cruciabuntur interiori dolore et gemitu.
2. Item, quandocumque aliquis desiderat aliquid et illo privatur, necessarium est, illum tristari et dolere2; sed omnes homines naturaliter desiderant beatitudinem: ergo si parvulorum animae aeterna beatitudine privantur, videtur, quod ex hoc necessario tristentur.
3. Item, anima parvuli, dum unitur carni, contrahit concupiscentiam3; cum ergo separatur a corpore, remanet in ea infectio illa contracta, et ipsa potest exire in actum; hoc constat: ergo potest concupiscere. Sed concupiscentia semper est vel cum delectatione, vel cum poena: cum delectatione, si habet quod desiderat; cum poena, si non habet: ergo si animae parvulorum delectationibus erunt privatae, videtur, quod doloribus interius erunt afflictae.
4. Item, parvuli decedentes cum originali, et antiqui Patres in limbo existentes, utrique privabantur visione divina: si ergo ampliori debebant poena puniri parvuli, qui habebant culpam, quam Patres, qui nullam habebant culpam; videtur, quod ex ipsa carentia visionis Dei aliquam tristitiam animae parvulorum habeant.
5. Item, maior dolor est alicui, quando privatur aliquo bono sine causa, quam quando privatur ex causa aliqua: ergo pari ratione maior debet esse dolor, quando privatur ex minori causa, quam quando privatur ex maiori. Si ergo animae parvulorum ex minori causa privantur visione divina quam animae adultorum, videtur, quod magis doleant interius.
6. Item, animae parvulorum per naturam habent affectiones; sed affectiones necesse est vel quietari, vel per eas animam affligi — inquietudo enim affectionum non modica est afflictio — sed affectiones parvulorum non erunt quietatae, alioquin iam essent in quadam beatitudine — solus enim Deus est, qui quietat desiderium animae4 — ergo videtur, quod si anima erit in affectionum varietate et inquietudine, quod erit continue in dolore et in afflictione.
Sed contra: 1. Magister in littera5: « Nullam aliam poenam sensuri sunt parvuli, ignis materialis, vel conscientiae vermis, nisi quod Dei visione carebunt in perpetuum »: ergo videtur, quod non habeant dolorem internum.
2. Item, originale inest animae ex unione ad carnem: ergo si aliquo dolore debet anima cruciari merito originalis peccati, illo potissime cruciari debet, qui inest animae secundum carnem. Si ergo caro non cremabitur igne materiali6, videtur, quod anima non cruciabitur dolore spirituali.
3. Item, si parvuli decedentes in originali dolebunt post hanc vitam, aut dolebunt de culpa, aut de damno. Si de culpa dolebunt, ergo erunt iusti. Si de damno dolebunt, cum illud damnum et poena carentiae visionis Dei sit iusta, et qui dolet de iusto est iniustus; videtur, quod in animabus decedentibus cum originali non tantum sit culpa originalis, sed etiam actualis.
4. Item, si parvuli dolebunt de amissione illius summi boni, cum ipsi virtutem patientiae non habeant, et qui dolet de aliquo malo, carens virtute patientiae, murmurat contra punientem vel infligentem: ergo videtur, quod animae parvulorum murmurent contra Deum. Sed nullus potest murmurare contra Deum nisi inique et iniuste: ergo videtur, quod post egressum a corpore animae decedentes in originali magis efficiantur iniquae quam ante; quod est impossibile.
5. Item, si dolent, aut credunt, se habituros7 illud bonum, aut certi sunt, quod nunquam habebunt. Constat, quod non exspectant illud bonum habendum, cum non habeant spem. Si ergo dolorem habent de bono amisso cum certitudine nunquam habendi, videtur, quod habeant desperationem; sed desperatio est acerbissima omnium poenarum infernalium: ergo parvuli punirentur poena acerbissima; quod impium est dicere.
6. Item, si dolent, aut dolent in summo, aut non. Si in summo dolent, ergo acerbissime puniuntur. Si non dolent in summo: ergo processu temporis possunt magis et magis dolere, cum dolor ille ortum habeat ex interiori affectione: ergo in eadem dispositione manente culpa, videtur, quod in eis crescat poena; quae duo sunt incompossibilia.
Conclusio.
Parvuli decedentes in peccato originali carebunt interiore dolore, non autem cognitione.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quia super hac quaestione nec expresse loquitur Scriptura, nec expresse eam Sancti determinant; ideo doctores theologiae8 hic opinantur contraria.
Quidam enim volunt dicere, quod parvuli carebunt et cognitione et dolore. Cognitione quidem carebunt, exigente iustitia; dolore carebunt, exigente misericordia. Iustitia namque exigit, ut non detur eis post hanc vitam donum aliquod cognitionis, quod in hac vita non habuerunt. Unde sicut caruerunt cognitione fidei et omni genere cognitionis intellectivae illi qui mortui sunt ante usum rationis; sic etiam carebunt post hanc vitam; nec diuturnitate temporis addiscent, sicut nec moriones9, qui nihil plus sciunt, quando moriuntur, quam quando nascuntur, etiamsi multo tempore vixerunt. Misericordia exigit, ut non habeant poenam actualis doloris, cum non habuerint maculam culpae actualis; et ideo iusto suo iudicio privat eos Deus omnium eorum cognitione, quae possent eis inferre dolorem. Melius est enim talia ignorare quam scire, sicut peccatori proclivo ad peccatum melius est ignorare, quam nosse ea quae eum inclinant ad peccatum.
Sed quia difficile est intelligere, quod anima separata non habeat usum rationis et non cognoscat ea saltem, quorum cognitio est ei naturaliter inserta, cum ex parte corporis impedimentum non habeat10;
ideo alii aliter opinantur, quod animae parvulorum et habebunt cognitionem et habebunt etiam dolorem. Scient enim, propter quid factae sunt, et scient, se illo bono merito originalis culpae esse privatas; et propterea dolorem habebunt, et affectiones doloris in eis alternabuntur. Attamen non habebunt dolorem, qui mereatur dici vermis, quia non habebunt remorsum, quod perdiderint illud bonum propter propriam negligentiam et contemptum; et pro tanto dolor eorum erit multo mitior quam dolor adultorum.
Sed quoniam plura videntur inconvenientia sequi, si ponatur, ipsos dolere, sicut in opponendo monstratum est, tum propter hoc, quod dolor ille est absque patientia et absque spe, et ita cum murmure et desperatione; tum etiam, quia dolor animae redundat in carnem; et si talis dolor ex deliberatione procedit, non videtur esse absque actuali obligatione: propter haec et his similia est tertius modus dicendi, videlicet quod animae parvulorum carebunt actuali dolore et afflictione, non tamen carebunt cognitione. — Et illud potest satis rationabiliter intelligi per hunc modum. Decedentes enim in solo originali quasi medium tenent inter habentes gratiam et culpam actualem; et quoniam status retributionis debet respondere statui vitae praesentis, in tali statu debent animae parvulorum poni, ut quasi medium teneant inter Beatos et aeternis ignibus cruciatos. Quoniam igitur Beati carent malo poenae sensibilis et cum hoc habent Dei visionem, damnati e contrario sunt in tenebris et puniuntur poena sensibili; parvuli secundum rectum ordinem divinae aequitatis debent communicare in uno cum damnatis, et in alio cum Beatis. Sed non possunt communicare cum Beatis in habendo divinam praesentiam, quia tunc in nullo communicarent cum damnatis; praesentia enim visionis Dei non stat cum poena sensibili. Ideo cum Beatis communicant in hoc, quod carent omni afflictione exteriori et interiori; cum damnatis vero in hoc, quod privantur visione Dei et lucis corporalis. Parvuli igitur, sic divino iudicio iusto inter Beatos et simpliciter miseros quasi in medio constituti, hoc noverunt, et cum11 ex una parte consideratio generet desolationem, ex altera consolationem; ita aequa lance divino iudicio eorum cognitio et affectio libratur et in tali statu perpetuatur, ut nec tristitia deiiciat, nec laetitia reficiat. Et in hoc mirabilis ostenditur ordo divinae sapientiae, qui cuncta novit suis locis disponere12 et ad sui gloriam ordinare. Nam sicut in Beatis potissime manifestatur misericordia, et in damnatis potissime claret iustitia; sic in istis manifestatur misericordia simul et iustitia. Et ex hoc patet, quod non facit frustra Deus animas, quas novit de corpore ante susceptionem baptismatis egressuras. Omnia enim facit Deus ad gloriam suam manifestandam13.
Unde si tu quaeras, quid parvuli faciant, utrum addiscant, vel conferant, vel aliquod aliud opus exerceant; breviter ego respondeo, quod divinae iustitiae aequitas et immutabilitas in eodem statu quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam, sive quoad cognitivam et quoad affectivam, perpetualiter eos consolidat, ut nec proficiant nec deficiant, nec laetentur nec tristentur, sed semper sic uniformiter maneant, ut sint materia laudandi divinum iudicium, quod sic est aequum et iustum, ut nullum bonum remaneat irremuneratum, nullum malum remaneat impunitum14, et perfectissime teneat medium inter superfluum et diminutum. — Secundum hanc igitur positionem concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod parvuli non sentient15 spiritualem dolorem.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Ioanne Chrysostomo, dicendum, quod intelligit de his qui excluduntur merito actualis peccati, qui vermem conscientiae et remorsum sunt habituri, et ideo non habet locum in parvulis.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tristitia necessario sequitur, quando desiderium non impletur; dicendum, quod verum est, quando nec impletur in se, nec fit recompensatio secundum aestimationem desiderantis. Quando vero secundum aestimationem desiderantis aliqua recompensatio fit, non necesse est tristari; sicut multi, qui vellent esse in paradiso, bene consolantur de statu vitae praesentis, quia contenti sunt eis quae habent, quamvis modicum habeant. Sic et in parvulis intelligendum est esse, quod eis sufficiat status suus; nec elevant oculos ad opes, quas habere non possunt16.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima parvuli habet concupiscentiam; dicendum, quod sicut in hac vita nec concupivit nec desideravit aliquid, quod non debuerit, sic etiam nec in futura vita; sed ipsi divina sententia collocati erunt inter fugam et appetitum, ita quod neutrum eis dominabitur; et ideo nec habebunt actuale gaudium nec actuale supplicium; unum enim reprimitur per alterum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sanctis Patribus, dicendum, quod sancti Patres spem et certitudinem habebant de futura gloria habenda, et gratiam etiam habebant, per quam Dominum aliquo modo cognoscebant; et ideo non sequitur, quod aequaliter punirentur, ut parvuli, pro eo quod plus habebant consolationis.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior dolor est alicui, cum privatur absque causa; dicendum, quod parvuli bene scient, ex causa se esse privatos. Sed quia illam causam non a se habuerunt, sed aliunde contraxerunt; ideo nec dolorem nec remorsum habebunt. Verbum autem praedictum intelligitur in punitione iniusta, et in qua punitus punienti remurmurat; sic autem non est in proposito.
6. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod affectiones parvulorum stabiliuntur iudicio aequitatis divinae; non tamen totaliter quietantur, sicut affectiones Beatorum in patria. Unde sicut differt immunitas a passione sive a sensu poenae in parvulis et Beatis, quia in Beatis est dos, in parvulis non, sicut dictum est; sic intelligendum est de quietatione ex parte affectionum animae17.
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QUESTION II.
Whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with any interior sorrow.
Second it is asked, whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with any interior sorrow. And that they are, it seems:
1. By that [saying] of John Chrysostom1, who says: « To be excluded from eternal goods, and to be made alien from those things which are prepared for the just, generates so much torment, so much sorrow, that even if no punishment from without were to torture [them], this alone would suffice ». Therefore if little children will be excluded, just as adults: it seems that they will be tormented in the highest degree with interior sorrow and groaning.
2. Likewise, whenever someone desires something and is deprived of it, it is necessary that he be saddened and grieve2; but all humans naturally desire beatitude: therefore if the souls of little children are deprived of eternal beatitude, it seems that from this they are necessarily saddened.
3. Likewise, the soul of a little child, while it is united to the flesh, contracts concupiscence3; when therefore it is separated from the body, that contracted infection remains in it, and it can go forth into act; this is established: therefore it can be concupiscent. But concupiscence is always either with delight, or with punishment: with delight, if it has what it desires; with punishment, if it does not have [it]: therefore if the souls of little children will be deprived of delights, it seems that they will be afflicted interiorly with sorrows.
4. Likewise, little children dying with original [sin], and the ancient Fathers existing in limbo, both were deprived of the divine vision: if therefore little children, who had guilt, ought to be punished with a fuller punishment than the Fathers, who had no guilt; it seems that from the very lack of the vision of God the souls of little children have some sadness.
5. Likewise, there is greater sorrow for someone when he is deprived of some good without cause, than when he is deprived from some cause: therefore by parity of reason the sorrow ought to be greater when one is deprived from a lesser cause than when one is deprived from a greater. If therefore the souls of little children are deprived of the divine vision from a lesser cause than the souls of adults, it seems that they grieve more interiorly.
6. Likewise, the souls of little children have affections by nature; but affections must either be quieted, or the soul be afflicted through them — for the unquiet of affections is no small affliction — but the affections of little children will not be quieted, otherwise they would already be in a certain beatitude — for God alone is he who quiets the desire of the soul4 — therefore it seems that if the soul will be in a variety and unquiet of affections, it will be continually in sorrow and in affliction.
On the contrary: 1. The Master in the text5: « Little children will feel no other punishment of material fire, or of the worm of conscience, except that they will lack the vision of God forever »: therefore it seems that they do not have internal sorrow.
2. Likewise, original [sin] is in the soul from the union with the flesh: therefore if the soul ought to be tormented with any sorrow by the merit of original sin, it ought especially to be tormented with that which is in the soul according to the flesh. If therefore the flesh will not be burned with material fire6, it seems that the soul will not be tormented with spiritual sorrow.
3. Likewise, if little children dying in original [sin] will grieve after this life, either they will grieve over guilt, or over loss. If they will grieve over guilt, then they will be just. If they will grieve over loss, since that loss and the punishment of the lack of the vision of God is just, and he who grieves over what is just is unjust; it seems that in souls dying with original [sin] there is not only original guilt, but also actual.
4. Likewise, if little children will grieve over the loss of that highest good, since they themselves do not have the virtue of patience, and he who grieves over some evil, lacking the virtue of patience, murmurs against the one punishing or inflicting: therefore it seems that the souls of little children murmur against God. But no one can murmur against God except wickedly and unjustly: therefore it seems that after the departure from the body the souls dying in original [sin] are made more wicked than before; which is impossible.
5. Likewise, if they grieve, either they believe that they will have7 that good, or they are certain that they will never have [it]. It is established that they do not expect to have that good, since they do not have hope. If therefore they have sorrow over the lost good with the certainty of never having [it], it seems that they have despair; but despair is the most bitter of all the infernal punishments: therefore little children would be punished with the most bitter punishment; which it is impious to say.
6. Likewise, if they grieve, either they grieve in the highest degree, or not. If they grieve in the highest degree, then they are punished most bitterly. If they do not grieve in the highest degree: then in the course of time they can grieve more and more, since that sorrow has its origin from interior affection: therefore, with the guilt remaining in the same disposition, it seems that the punishment increases in them; which two things are incompossible.
Conclusion.
Little children dying in original sin will lack interior sorrow, but not cognition.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, because concerning this question neither does Scripture speak expressly, nor do the Saints expressly determine it; therefore the doctors of theology8 here hold contrary opinions.
For some wish to say that little children will lack both cognition and sorrow. They will lack cognition, justice demanding it; they will lack sorrow, mercy demanding it. For justice demands that there not be given to them after this life any gift of cognition which they did not have in this life. Whence just as those who died before the use of reason lacked the cognition of faith and every kind of intellective cognition; so also will they lack [it] after this life; nor will they learn by the length of time, just as neither do the moriones9, who know nothing more when they die than when they are born, even if they have lived a long time. Mercy demands that they not have the punishment of actual sorrow, since they did not have the stain of actual guilt; and therefore by his just judgment God deprives them of all cognition of those things which could bring sorrow upon them. For it is better to be ignorant of such things than to know [them], just as for a sinner prone to sin it is better to be ignorant than to know those things which incline him to sin.
But since it is difficult to understand that a separated soul should not have the use of reason and not know at least those things whose cognition is naturally implanted in it, since on the part of the body it has no impediment10;
therefore others hold otherwise, that the souls of little children will both have cognition and will also have sorrow. For they will know on account of what they were made, and they will know that they have been deprived of that good by the merit of original guilt; and on this account they will have sorrow, and the affections of sorrow will alternate in them. Yet they will not have a sorrow which would deserve to be called a worm, because they will not have remorse that they lost that good through their own negligence and contempt; and to that extent their sorrow will be much milder than the sorrow of adults.
But since several unfitting things seem to follow, if it is held that they grieve, as was shown in the objecting — both on account of this, that that sorrow is without patience and without hope, and so with murmuring and despair; and also because the sorrow of the soul redounds upon the flesh; and if such sorrow proceeds from deliberation, it does not seem to be without actual obligation: on account of these things and things like these there is a third way of speaking, namely that the souls of little children will lack actual sorrow and affliction, yet they will not lack cognition. — And that can be understood reasonably enough in this way. For those dying in original [sin] alone hold as it were a mean between those having grace and actual guilt; and since the state of retribution ought to correspond to the state of the present life, the souls of little children ought to be placed in such a state that they hold as it were a mean between the Blessed and those tormented in eternal fires. Since therefore the Blessed lack the evil of sensible punishment and with this have the vision of God, the damned on the contrary are in darkness and are punished with sensible punishment; little children, according to the right order of divine equity, ought to share in one thing with the damned, and in another with the Blessed. But they cannot share with the Blessed in having the divine presence, because then they would share in nothing with the damned; for the presence of the vision of God does not stand together with sensible punishment. Therefore with the Blessed they share in this, that they lack all exterior and interior affliction; but with the damned in this, that they are deprived of the vision of God and of corporeal light. Little children therefore, thus by just divine judgment constituted as it were in the mean between the Blessed and the simply wretched, know this, and since11 on the one part the consideration generates desolation, on the other consolation; thus by an even balance, by divine judgment, their cognition and affection is weighed and perpetuated in such a state, that neither does sadness cast [them] down, nor does joy refresh [them]. And in this the marvelous order of divine wisdom is shown, which knows how to dispose all things in their places12 and to order [them] to its own glory. For just as in the Blessed mercy is most especially manifested, and in the damned justice most especially shines forth; so in these mercy and justice are manifested together. And from this it appears that God does not make in vain the souls which he knows will depart from the body before the reception of baptism. For God makes all things to manifest his glory13.
Whence if you ask what little children do, whether they learn, or confer, or exercise some other work; I respond briefly that the equity and immutability of divine justice in the same state as to the body and as to the soul, that is, as to the cognitive and as to the affective [power], perpetually consolidates them, so that they neither profit nor fail, neither rejoice nor are saddened, but always remain so uniformly, that they are matter for praising the divine judgment, which is so equitable and just that no good remains unrewarded, no evil remains unpunished14, and it most perfectly holds the mean between the excessive and the deficient. — According to this position therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that little children will not feel15 spiritual sorrow.
1. But to that which is objected to the contrary concerning John Chrysostom, it must be said that he understands [it] of those who are excluded by the merit of actual sin, who are going to have the worm of conscience and remorse, and therefore it has no place in little children.
2. To that which is objected, that sadness necessarily follows when desire is not fulfilled; it must be said that it is true, when it is neither fulfilled in itself, nor is recompense made according to the estimation of the one desiring. But when according to the estimation of the one desiring some recompense is made, it is not necessary to be saddened; just as many who would wish to be in paradise are well consoled concerning the state of the present life, because they are content with the things which they have, although they have little. So also in little children it is to be understood that their state suffices for them; nor do they raise their eyes to the riches which they cannot have16.
3. To that which is objected, that the soul of a little child has concupiscence; it must be said that just as in this life it neither was concupiscent nor desired anything which it ought not [to have], so also neither [will it] in the future life; but they themselves by divine sentence will be placed between flight and appetite, so that neither will dominate them; and therefore they will have neither actual joy nor actual torment; for the one is repressed by the other.
4. To that which is objected concerning the holy Fathers, it must be said that the holy Fathers had hope and certitude concerning the future glory to be had, and they also had grace, through which they knew the Lord in some manner; and therefore it does not follow that they would be punished equally, like little children, for the reason that they had more of consolation.
5. To that which is objected, that there is greater sorrow for someone when he is deprived without cause; it must be said that little children will well know that they have been deprived from a cause. But because they did not have that cause from themselves, but contracted it from elsewhere; therefore they will have neither sorrow nor remorse. But the aforesaid word is understood in an unjust punishment, and in which the one punished murmurs back against the one punishing; but it is not so in the case proposed.
6. To the last it must be said that the affections of little children are stabilized by the judgment of divine equity; yet they are not totally quieted, like the affections of the Blessed in the fatherland. Whence just as the immunity from passion or from the sense of punishment differs in little children and in the Blessed, because in the Blessed there is the dowry [of glory], in little children there is not, as has been said; so it is to be understood concerning the quieting on the part of the affections of the soul17.
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- Adhort. I. ad Theodorum lapsum, n. 9: A tantis autem excidisse bonis tantum infert doloris, afflictionis, angustiae, ut etiamsi nullum aliud esset supplicium peccatoribus destinatum, illud solum posset graviorem aliis gehennae cruciatibus inferre poenam animaeque perturbationem. Cfr. ibid. n. 11. et Hom. 23. in Matth. n. 7. seq.Exhortation I. to the fallen Theodore, n. 9: But to have fallen away from such great goods brings so much sorrow, affliction, [and] anguish, that even if no other punishment were destined for sinners, that alone could inflict a punishment and a perturbation of the soul graver than the other torments of Gehenna. Cfr. the same place, n. 11, and Homily 23 on Matthew, n. 7. seq.
- Cfr. supra pag. 287, nota 4. De minori cfr. supra pag. 517, nota 2.Cfr. above p. 287, note 4. On the minor [premise] cfr. above p. 517, note 2.
- Ut probatum est supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.As was proved above d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. I. a. 3. q. 2.Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
- Hic c. 2.Here c. 2.
- Ut ostensum est in quaest. praeced.As was shown in the preceding question.
- Fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 habere.Nearly all codices and edd. 1, 2 [read] habere ("to have").
- Codd. M Y aa hic interserunt probabiliter.Codd. M Y aa here insert probabiliter ("probably").
- August., Epist. 166. (alias 28.) c. 6. n. 17: Quidam [parvuli] vero tantae sunt fatuitatis, ut non multum a pecoribus differant, quos moriones [μῶρος, i. e. stultus] vulgo vocant. Cfr. Epist. 143. (alias 7.) n. 3. — Pro moriones Vat. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 maiores, cod. V embryones. Paulo superius post et omni in codd. F Y aa subiungitur alio.Augustine, Epist. 166. (otherwise 28.) c. 6. n. 17: But some [little children] are of such great foolishness that they do not differ much from cattle, whom they commonly call moriones [μῶρος, i. e. foolish]. Cfr. Epist. 143. (otherwise 7.) n. 3. — For moriones the Vatican [edition] with edd. 1, 2, 3 [reads] maiores, cod. V embryones. A little above, after et omni, in codd. F Y aa alio is subjoined.
- Plura de cognitione animae a corpore separatae habentur IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. Ibid. a. 2. q. 1. seq. exponitur etiam, quid sit vermis damnatorum, cuius mentio fit paulo inferius.More concerning the cognition of the soul separated from the body is had in IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. In the same place, a. 2. q. 1. seq., it is also expounded what the worm of the damned is, of which mention is made a little below.
- Pro et cum Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 ut tamen, edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. et tamen. Post pauca pro generet ed. 1 et secunda manus in cod. T substituit generat.For et cum the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] ut tamen, edd. 1, 2 with several codices et tamen. A little after, for generet ed. 1 and a second hand in cod. T substitutes generat.
- August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 1: Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. — Pro qui cuncta edd., excepta 1, quae cuncta.Augustine, XIX. On the City of God, c. 13. n. 1: Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, assigning to each its own places. — For qui cuncta the editions, except 1, [read] quae cuncta.
- Ut expositum est supra d. I. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.As was expounded above d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.
- Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2. — Aliquanto superius pro et quoad affectivam Vat. cum pluribus codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 sive quoad affectivam.According to Boethius, IV. On Consolation, prose 1. and 4. Cfr. tom. I. p. 713, note 2. — Somewhat above, for et quoad affectivam the Vatican [edition] with several codices and edd. 2, 3, 4 [reads] sive quoad affectivam.
- Codd. K T cc et ed. 1 sentiant.Codd. K T cc and ed. 1 [read] sentiant.
- Cfr. quae supra pag. 565, nota 1. diximus de distinctione voluntatis in voluntatem possibilium et impossibilium, secundum Damascenum; cui distinctioni respondet distinctio desiderii in desiderium efficax et inefficax. Desiderium efficax, cum non expletur, sequitur tristitia, quae non sequitur desiderium inefficax, non expletum.Cfr. what we said above p. 565, note 1, concerning the distinction of will into the will of possible and impossible things, according to Damascene; to which distinction corresponds the distinction of desire into efficacious and inefficacious desire. Efficacious desire, when it is not fulfilled, is followed by sadness, which does not follow inefficacious desire, [when] not fulfilled.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.