Dist. 33, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 33
ARTICULUS III.
De poena peccati originalis.
Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad tertium articulum de poena originalis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum decedentes in solo originali puniantur poena ignis materialis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum puniantur poena interioris doloris, an solum carentia visionis1.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur poena ignis materialis.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur poena ignis materialis. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum2: « Firmissime tene, parvulos, qui sine Sacramento baptismatis de hoc saeculo transeunt, aeterni ignis supplicio sempiterno puniendos ».
2. Item, Augustinus3: « Quisquis ita vivere incipit, ut ante finiat vitam, quam ab eius, scilicet originalis, obligatione solvatur, si unius diei vel unius horae spatio anima vixit in corpore, necesse est, eum cum eodem corpore interminabilia gehennae supplicia sustinere ». Ex hoc expresse colligitur, quod originali non tantum debetur carentia visionis Dei, sed etiam poena ignis.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Parvuli in hac vita multas sustinent afflictiones et poenalitates; aut ergo iuste, aut iniuste. Non iniuste; hoc constat, quia omnis poena iusta est. Si iuste; ergo meretur hoc originalis culpa. Si ergo culpa non debet remanere impunita, et originale meretur poenam sensus; videtur, quod parvuli poena sensibili crucientur.
4. Item, illud est magis dignum puniri, in quo magis residet causa peccati; per quae enim quis peccat, per illa debet torqueri4; sed traductio et causa originalis peccati maxime residet penes carnem: ergo videtur, quod illa potissime debet puniri. Si ergo anima merito illius culpae digna est Dei visione privari, multo fortius caro digna est aeternis suppliciis cruciari.
5. Item, parvulis non restituentur corpora dotata5, habebunt igitur corpora passibilia; sed omne passibile necesse est aliquando pati vel ab extrinseco, vel ab intrinseco, maxime cum approximatur agenti activo: ergo videtur, quod parvulorum corpora aliquando patientur et affligentur.
Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in Enchiridio6: « Mitissima sane eorum erit poena, qui praeter peccatum, quod originaliter traxerunt, nullum insuper addiderunt »; sed si parvuli carerent visione Dei et punirentur igne materiali, non haberent mitissimam poenam. Si igitur nemo dubitat, eos visione Dei privandos, videtur nullo modo esse ponendum, ipsos corporali supplicio puniendos.
2. Item, Magister in littera, capitulo Alioquin7: « Pro originali peccato, quod a parentibus parvuli traxerunt, nullam aliam materialis ignis, vel conscientiae vermis poenam sensuri sunt, nisi quod Dei visione carebunt in perpetuum ».
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Iniustum est plus exigere in poena, quam commissum est in culpa: si ergo parvulus nullo actu suo divinum contempsit imperium, videtur, quod nullum debetur sibi aeternale tormentum.
4. Item, acerbitas poenae respondet quantitati delectationis, iuxta illud Apocalypsis8: Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis etc.; sed anima, quae coniuncta fuit corpori parvuli infirmanti et debili, nullam delectationem inordinatam in corpore sensit: ergo non videtur, quod sibi debeatur acerbitas poenae sensibilis.
5. Item, horribilius est continue et aeternaliter in tormentis esse quam omnino non esse: si ergo Deus animam, quam creavit sine perpetratione alicuius peccati, aeternis suppliciis deputaret; nullum videretur sibi beneficium praestare, nec misericordia simul cum iustitia curreret. Quodsi hoc est inconveniens dicere apud Patrem misericordiarum9, videtur etc.
Conclusio.
Parvuli decedentes in peccato originali non sentiunt poenae ignis acerbitatem, privantur tamen Dei visione et ponuntur in loco vili.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic duplex est opinio.
Quidam enim, attendentes rigorem divinae iustitiae ac sententiae, qua Deus hominem pro uno modico mortali, in quo momentanea et quasi nulla fuit delectatio, cruciat aeternaliter; dicunt, quod parvuli cremabuntur igne materiali, longe tamen minus quam illi qui peccaverunt peccato actuali. Et hoc dicunt sensisse Augustinum, cum dixit in Enchiridio « poenam parvulorum esse mitissimam », et in libro de Fide ad Petrum: « Parvuli cruciabuntur aeterno supplicio ». Mitissimam enim illam vocat poenam non absolute, sed respectu aliorum. Nec in
hoc derogatur, ut dicunt, divinae misericordiae, quamvis plus10 manifestetur iustitiae quam misericordiae, pro eo quod minus malum est in tali poena esse quam omnino non esse, cum non sit ibi tanta boni privatio, sicut manifestat Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio11. Et hoc dicunt esse conveniens, ut, sicut in originali peccato erat carentia debitae iustitiae et concupiscentia, sic etiam in poena esset carentia visionis Dei et afflictio ignis aeterni.
Sed cum valde durum illud dicere videatur, quod Deus tam dure et tam aspere agat cum parvulis sic decedentibus, qui omnino non potuerunt vitare nec mortem culpae nec mortem naturae, praesertim cum videamus, Deum cum impiissimis et sceleratissimis peccatoribus in multis misericorditer agere: ideo est alia positio mitior, quae magis concordat pietati fidei et iudicio rationis, quod quia parvuli decedentes cum originali carent iustitia et Spiritus sancti gratia, quae est pignus hereditatis aeternae12, privantur in aeternum visione Dei; quia vero in carne fuit foeditas, ideo ponuntur in loco vili, utpote infernali; sed quia non habuerunt in se actualem delectationem peccati, nec in spiritu nec in carne, ideo non sentiunt poenae ignis acerbitatem. — Hunc modum dicendi magis approbant magistri communiter; et ideo ipsum sustinendo secundum opinionem Magistri, sicut patet in littera13, rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedo.
1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de verbis Augustini, dicendum, quod Augustinus in verbis illis non intendit dicere, quod parvuli sensibiliter crucientur; sed intendit eorum poenam manifestare quantum ad carentiam visionis Dei et quantum etiam ad vilitatem loci. Et hoc valde abundanter exprimit, plus dicens et minus volens intelligi. Nec sine causa loquitur sic. Hoc enim facit ad exstirpandam illam haeresim, quae dicebat, parvulos nulla poena puniri. Unde sicut in moribus documentum est, quod qui vult ab uno extremorum pervenire ad medium, quasi debet declinare ad aliud extremum, sicut docet Philosophus14; sic etiam beatus Augustinus, ut illam haeresim exstirparet, quae dicebat parvulos ab omni poena immunes, et ad medium reduceret, videlicet ad poenam carentiae visionis Dei, simpliciter asseruit, eos cum aliis peccatoribus aeternaliter damnari. Istum autem suum intellectum explanavit in Enchiridio, ubi dixit, poenam eorum esse mitissimam, sicut dicit Magister in littera15.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod parvuli multas poenalitates sustinent in hac vita; dicendum, quod etsi temporaliter puniri pro peccato originali sit iustum, non tamen sequitur, quod aeternaliter. Et ratio huius est, quia poenae temporales non tantum sunt punitivae, sed etiam promotivae; unde Deus non tantum affligit inimicos suos, verum etiam amicos, sicut patet in Tobia et Iob; et ideo in afflictione temporali severitati iustitiae coniuncta est benignitas misericordiae; quae duo eleganter reperiri debent in omni Dei punitione et remuneratione16. Sic autem non contingeret in poena aeterna reperire; hoc enim pure esset de rigore iustitiae, si animas parvulorum ignis gehennalis supplicio cruciaret.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in carne maxime residet causa peccati; dicendum, quod etsi causa peccati quoquo modo resideat in carne, hoc est per modum cuiusdam habitus, non per modum actus. Unde caro non facit animam parvuli concupiscentem, sed concupiscibilem17; et propter hoc nec ipsa nec anima in ipsa debet actuali combustione ignis torqueri; sed sicut anima privatur visione Dei, sic etiam caro privatur stola sua et in loco vili et tenebroso ponitur, cum collocanda esset in caelo empyreo, si a talis foeditatis corruptione fuisset sanata per baptismi efficaciam.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod parvuli non habent corpora dotata, sed potius passibilia; dicendum, quod aliquid non pati ab aliquo dupliciter contingit: aut ex virtute, quam habet in se, aut ex ordine divinae iustitiae. Dico igitur, quia, quod corpora parvulorum sint passione carentia, hoc non est propter virtutem quam habeant resistendi in se, sed potius propter ordinem divinae iustitiae, secundum cuius regulam ignis infernalis agere habet, cum sit instrumentum divinae iustitiae. Unde sicut idem ignis magis cruciat maiorem peccatorem quam minorem, sic in eodem igne patiuntur corpora eorum qui peccaverunt peccato actuali18. Parvulorum vero
corpora, etiam si in ipsis ignibus infernalibus volutentur, passionem non sentiunt, et tamen non habent impassibilitatis19 dotem, quia non superant vim ignis per hoc quod habent a propria virtute. Et si tu obiicias mihi, quod debent pati, passione veniente ab intrinseco, utpote fame et siti, cum non habeant corpora impassibilia et immortalia; dicendum, quod sicut damnatorum corpora, cum sint passibilia et defectibilia, tamen divina virtute sustentante perpetuantur in vita, ut ab ignibus non consumantur; sic et parvulorum corpora eadem virtute divina in vita continuantur, ut non indigeant cibo nec potu; nec tamen habent illam firmitatem et soliditatem, quam habebunt corpora gloriosa.
I. Duae huius articuli quaestiones intime inter se cohaerent. Quod parvuli sine baptismo decedentes non alia poena afficiantur nisi poena damni, seu carentia visionis beatificae, minime autem poena sensus, scil. ignis, omnes antiqui Scholastici docent, si excipias Gregorium Ariminensem (et paucissimos alios obscuros magistros), qui propter quaedam verba S. Augustini haesitat, an illi parvuli non etiam poena sensus plectantur. Dicit enim (hic q. 3.) in fine: « Non vidi partem aliquam expresse determinatam ab Ecclesia; et tremendum mihi videtur negare auctoritates Sanctorum; econtra etiam non est tutum contraire communi opinioni et consensioni magistrorum nostrorum; idcirco neutri parti alteram praeferens, diiudicationem earum lectori relinquo ». — Item communissime ab iisdem Scholasticis docetur, istos parvulos nec habere ex carentia supernaturalis beatitudinis afflictionem spiritualem. Dissensus autem opinionum est in assignanda ratione, quare ex praedicto damno non sentiant afflictionem, utrum ideo, quia omnino non habent cognitionem (quod pluribus non videtur verisimile); an saltem nullam cognitionem huius carentiae; an quia sciant, se ad istam beatitudinem non esse proportionatos; an quia speciali divina providentia talis dolor ab eis removetur, ut putat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 2.). — Denique, nostro Doctori, et ut videtur, etiam Alexandro, B. Alberto et Aegidio placet, quod dicti parvuli generatim nec tristitiam sentiant nec laetitiam. Attamen non pauci antiqui magistri cum S. Thoma (hic q. 2. a. 2; de Malo. q. 5. a. 3.) consentiunt Petro de Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 2.), qui dicit, quod « potius gaudebunt de hoc, quod participabunt multum de bonitate divina et perfectionibus naturalibus ». Unde « contenti sunt bono, quod habent, ex eo quod se sciunt perpetuo esse, vivere et intelligere, multo magis quam aliquis in vita ista aerumnosa, in qua tamen multi sunt, qui nollent eam unquam finire, ut pervenirent ad beatitudinem ». Idem repetit Richard. a Med.; nec dissentit Scot. (hic q. unica n. 3.) docens: « Videtur probabile concedere, quod omnium naturaliter cognoscibilium possunt naturaliter cognitionem habere excellentius, quam aliqui habuerunt pro statu isto; et ita aliqualem beatitudinem naturalem de Deo cognito in universali poterunt attingere ». Idem sentiunt Durand. (hic q. 3.) nec non Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.), qui tamen addit, nihil hic asserendum esse incaute, nisi quantum ex Scripturis et doctrina Ecclesiae innotescat. — Notum autem est, plures et insignes posteriores theologos severius quoad afflictionem spiritualem, vel saltem quoad gaudium naturale iudicium ferre, quam laudati antiqui. Hinc patet, S. Bonaventuram mediam viam pro suo more tenere. — Quoad sententiam S. Augustini notabile est iudicium S. Bonaventurae (q. I. ad 1.), quod hic « valde abundanter exprimit, plus dicens et minus volens intelligi ». Loci autem, in 1. et 2. ad opposit. citati, sunt Fulgentii, non Augustini.
II. De utraque quaest. praeter locos laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 10. § I. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2; de Malo, q. 5. a. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2.
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ARTICLE III.
On the punishment of original sin.
Consequently it is asked, as to the third article, concerning the punishment of original [sin]. And concerning this two [questions] are asked. First it is asked, whether those dying in original [sin] alone are punished with the punishment of material fire. Second it is asked, whether they are punished with the punishment of interior sorrow, or only [with] the lack of the vision1.
QUESTION I.
Whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with the punishment of material fire.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with the punishment of material fire. And that they are, it seems.
1. Augustine, On Faith, to Peter2: « Hold most firmly that little children who pass from this world without the Sacrament of baptism are to be punished with the everlasting torment of eternal fire ».
2. Likewise, Augustine3: « Whoever begins to live in such a way that he ends life before he is loosed from the obligation of it, namely of original [sin], if for the space of one day or one hour the soul has lived in the body, it is necessary that he, together with the same body, sustain the interminable torments of Gehenna ». From this it is expressly gathered that to original [sin] is due not only the lack of the vision of God, but also the punishment of fire.
3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Little children in this life sustain many afflictions and penalties; either therefore justly, or unjustly. Not unjustly; this is established, because every punishment is just. If justly; therefore original guilt merits this. If therefore guilt ought not to remain unpunished, and original [sin] merits the punishment of sense; it seems that little children are tormented with sensible punishment.
4. Likewise, that is more worthy to be punished in which the cause of sin more resides; for through the things by which someone sins, through those he ought to be tormented4; but the transmission and cause of original sin most resides in the flesh: therefore it seems that it especially ought to be punished. If therefore the soul by the merit of that guilt is worthy to be deprived of the vision of God, much more strongly is the flesh worthy to be tormented with eternal torments.
5. Likewise, to little children bodies endowed [with gifts] will not be restored5, they will therefore have passible bodies; but everything passible must at some time suffer either from without, or from within, especially when it is brought near to an active agent: therefore it seems that the bodies of little children will at some time suffer and be afflicted.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the Enchiridion6: « Their punishment indeed will be the mildest, who, besides the sin which they drew originally, added nothing further »; but if little children were to lack the vision of God and be punished with material fire, they would not have the mildest punishment. If therefore no one doubts that they are to be deprived of the vision of God, it seems in no way to be held that they are to be punished with bodily torment.
2. Likewise, the Master in the text, in the chapter Alioquin7: « For the original sin which little children drew from their parents, they will feel no other punishment of material fire, or of the worm of conscience, except that they will lack the vision of God forever ».
3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. It is unjust to exact more in punishment than was committed in guilt: if therefore the little child by no act of his own contemned the divine command, it seems that no eternal torment is due to him.
4. Likewise, the bitterness of the punishment corresponds to the quantity of the delight, according to that [passage] of the Apocalypse8: As much as he glorified himself and was in delights etc.; but the soul which was joined to the body of an infirm and weak little child sensed no inordinate delight in the body: therefore it does not seem that the bitterness of sensible punishment is due to it.
5. Likewise, it is more horrible to be continually and eternally in torments than not to be at all: if therefore God were to assign to eternal torments a soul which he created without the perpetration of any sin; he would seem to bestow no benefit on it, nor would mercy run together with justice. But if it is unfitting to say this of the Father of mercies9, it seems etc.
Conclusion.
Little children dying in original sin do not feel the bitterness of the punishment of fire, yet they are deprived of the vision of God and placed in a base place.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that here there is a twofold opinion.
For some, attending to the rigor of divine justice and of the sentence by which God torments eternally a human for one slight mortal [sin], in which there was a momentary and as it were nothing of delight; say that little children will be burned with material fire, yet far less than those who sinned by actual sin. And they say that Augustine held this, when he said in the Enchiridion that « the punishment of little children is the mildest », and in the book On Faith, to Peter: « Little children will be tormented with eternal torment ». For he calls that punishment the mildest not absolutely, but in respect of others. Nor in
this, as they say, is anything derogated from divine mercy, although more10 is manifested of justice than of mercy, for the reason that it is a lesser evil to be in such a punishment than not to be at all, since there is not there so great a privation of good, as Augustine manifests in the book On Free Choice11. And they say this to be fitting, that, just as in original sin there was the lack of due justice and concupiscence, so also in the punishment there should be the lack of the vision of God and the affliction of eternal fire.
But since it seems very hard to say that God acts so harshly and so severely with little children dying thus, who altogether could not avoid either the death of guilt or the death of nature, especially since we see that God acts mercifully in many things with the most impious and most wicked sinners: therefore there is another, milder position, which more agrees with the piety of faith and the judgment of reason, [namely] that, because little children dying with original [sin] lack justice and the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is the pledge of the eternal inheritance12, they are deprived forever of the vision of God; but because in the flesh there was foulness, therefore they are placed in a base place, namely an infernal one; but because they did not have in themselves actual delight of sin, neither in spirit nor in flesh, therefore they do not feel the bitterness of the punishment of fire. — This way of speaking the masters more commonly approve; and therefore, sustaining it according to the opinion of the Master, as appears in the text13, I grant the reasons which are adduced toward this part.
1. 2. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary concerning the words of Augustine, it must be said that Augustine in those words does not intend to say that little children are tormented sensibly; but he intends to manifest their punishment as to the lack of the vision of God and also as to the baseness of the place. And this he expresses very abundantly, saying more and wishing less to be understood. Nor without cause does he speak thus. For he does this in order to root out that heresy which said that little children are punished with no punishment. Whence just as in moral matters it is a teaching that he who wishes to arrive at the mean from one of the extremes must as it were incline toward the other extreme, as the Philosopher teaches14; so also blessed Augustine, in order to root out that heresy which said that little children are immune from all punishment, and to lead [them] back to the mean, namely to the punishment of the lack of the vision of God, simply asserted that they are eternally damned together with other sinners. But this his meaning he explained in the Enchiridion, where he said that their punishment is the mildest, as the Master says in the text15.
3. To that which is objected, that little children sustain many penalties in this life; it must be said that although to be punished temporally for original sin is just, yet it does not follow that [they are punished] eternally. And the reason for this is that temporal punishments are not only punitive, but also promotive; whence God afflicts not only his enemies, but also his friends, as appears in Tobias and Job; and therefore in temporal affliction the benignity of mercy is joined to the severity of justice; which two ought elegantly to be found in every punishment and reward of God16. But thus it would not happen to be found in eternal punishment; for this would be purely of the rigor of justice, if it tormented the souls of little children with the torment of the fire of Gehenna.
4. To that which is objected, that in the flesh the cause of sin most resides; it must be said that although the cause of sin in some manner resides in the flesh, this is by way of a certain habit, not by way of an act. Whence the flesh does not make the soul of the little child concupiscing, but concupiscible17; and on account of this neither it nor the soul in it ought to be tormented by the actual burning of fire; but just as the soul is deprived of the vision of God, so also the flesh is deprived of its robe and is placed in a base and dark place, when it ought to be placed in the empyrean heaven, if it had been healed from the corruption of such foulness by the efficacy of baptism.
5. To that which is objected, that little children do not have endowed bodies, but rather passible ones; it must be said that for something not to suffer from something happens in two ways: either from the power which it has in itself, or from the order of divine justice. I say therefore that, that the bodies of little children are lacking passion, this is not on account of the power which they have of resisting in themselves, but rather on account of the order of divine justice, according to whose rule the infernal fire has to act, since it is the instrument of divine justice. Whence just as the same fire torments the greater sinner more than the lesser, so in the same fire the bodies of those who sinned by actual sin suffer18. But the bodies of little children,
even if they are rolled about in the very infernal fires, do not feel passion, and yet they do not have the gift of impassibility19, because they do not overcome the force of the fire by that which they have from their own power. And if you object to me that they ought to suffer, by a passion coming from within, such as hunger and thirst, since they do not have impassible and immortal bodies; it must be said that, just as the bodies of the damned, since they are passible and defectible, yet by the sustaining divine power are perpetuated in life, so that they are not consumed by the fires; so also the bodies of little children are continued in life by the same divine power, so that they need neither food nor drink; nor yet do they have that firmness and solidity which the glorious bodies will have.
I. The two questions of this article cohere intimately among themselves. That little children dying without baptism are afflicted with no other punishment than the punishment of loss, that is, the lack of the beatific vision, but by no means with the punishment of sense, namely of fire, all the ancient Scholastics teach, if you except Gregory of Rimini (and very few other obscure masters), who, on account of certain words of St. Augustine, hesitates whether those little children are not also struck with the punishment of sense. For he says (here q. 3.) at the end: « I have not seen any part expressly determined by the Church; and it seems fearful to me to deny the authorities of the Saints; on the contrary also it is not safe to go against the common opinion and consensus of our masters; therefore, preferring neither part to the other, I leave the adjudication of them to the reader ». — Likewise it is most commonly taught by the same Scholastics that those little children do not have spiritual affliction from the lack of supernatural beatitude. But the dissent of opinions is in assigning the reason why from the aforesaid loss they do not feel affliction, whether therefore because they altogether have no cognition (which to many does not seem likely); or at least no cognition of this lack; or because they know that they are not proportioned to that beatitude; or because by special divine providence such sorrow is removed from them, as Richard of Middleton thinks (here a. 3. q. 2.). — Finally, it pleases our Doctor, and as it seems, also Alexander, B. Albert, and Aegidius, that the said little children generally feel neither sadness nor joy. Yet not a few ancient masters with St. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 2; On Evil q. 5. a. 3.) agree with Petrus a Tarantasia (here q. 3. a. 2.), who says that « they will rather rejoice in this, that they will participate much in the divine goodness and in natural perfections ». Whence « they are content with the good which they have, from the fact that they know themselves to exist, live, and understand perpetually, much more than someone in this wretched life, in which nevertheless there are many who would not wish it ever to end, that they might attain to beatitude ». Richard of Middleton repeats the same; nor does Scotus dissent (here q. unica n. 3.), teaching: « It seems probable to grant that of all naturally knowable things they can naturally have a knowledge more excellently than some had for this state; and so they will be able to attain some natural beatitude concerning God known in the universal ». The same think Durandus (here q. 3.) and also Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2.), who however adds that nothing here is to be asserted incautiously, except insofar as it becomes known from the Scriptures and the doctrine of the Church. — But it is known that many and distinguished later theologians judge more severely as to spiritual affliction, or at least as to natural joy, than the praised ancients. Hence it appears that S. Bonaventure holds the middle way after his manner. — As to the opinion of St. Augustine, notable is the judgment of S. Bonaventure (q. I. ad 1.), that here he « expresses very abundantly, saying more and wishing less to be understood ». But the passages cited in the 1st and 2nd [replies] to the opposite are of Fulgentius, not of Augustine.
II. On each question, besides the passages praised: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 10. § I. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1. 2; On Evil, q. 5. a. 1-3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, in the cited place a. 1. 2. — Richard of Middleton, in the cited place q. 1. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. 2.
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- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 adiicit Dei.The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 adds Dei ("of God").
- Cap. 27. n. 70. Textus originalis tum post tene tum post parvulos plura addit.Chapter 27. n. 70. The original text adds more both after tene ("hold") and after parvulos ("little children").
- De Fide ad Petrum, c. 3. n. 36, ubi textus originalis omittit scilicet originalis, dein post anima subiicit illa et post pauca cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 pro eum substituit eam.On Faith, to Peter, c. 3. n. 36, where the original text omits scilicet originalis ("namely of original"), then after anima ("soul") subjoins illa, and a little after, with the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4, substitutes eam for eum.
- Sap. 11, 17. — De minori vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.Wisdom 11, 17. — On the minor see above d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.
- Sive ornata dotibus impassibilitatis, claritatis, subtilitatis et agilitatis, quae conveniunt corporibus gloriosis.That is, adorned with the gifts of impassibility, clarity, subtlety, and agility, which belong to glorious bodies.
- Cap. 93. n. 23. ubi textus originalis pro originaliter habet originale. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro poena, qui Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 poena, quae. Eaedem edd. circa finem arg. omittunt ponendum.Chapter 93. n. 23. where the original text for originaliter has originale. Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For poena, qui the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] poena, quae. The same editions, toward the end of the argument, omit ponendum.
- Hic c. 2.Here c. 2.
- Cap. 18, 7: Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit, tantum date illi tormentum et luctum.Chapter 18, 7: As much as he glorified himself and was in delights, so much give to him torment and grief.
- Respicitur illud II. Cor. 1, 3: Pater misericordiarum et Deus totius consolationis.Reference is made to that [passage] of 2 Cor. 1, 3: The Father of mercies and the God of all consolation.
- Vocula plus (i. e. maior mensura) referenda est ad iustitiae. Vel post manifestetur cum cod. O adde opus, vel cum Vat. via, vel pro iustitiae quam misericordiae cum codd. aa bb et aliis substitue iustitia quam misericordia. Paulo superius pro sed respectu aliorum (Vat. et edd. 3, 4 aliarum) cod. E sed in comparatione ad alios.The little word plus ("more"; i. e. greater measure) is to be referred to iustitiae ("of justice"). Or after manifestetur with cod. O add opus, or with the Vatican [edition] via, or for iustitiae quam misericordiae with codd. aa bb and others substitute iustitia quam misericordia. A little above, for sed respectu aliorum (Vat. and edd. 3, 4 aliarum) cod. E [reads] sed in comparatione ad alios.
- Libr. III. c. 5. n. 12. et c. 23. n. 66. seqq. Ibid. c. 6. n. 18. seqq. ostenditur, non-esse a nemine eligi, ne a miserrimo quidem. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 50. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2, ubi quaeritur, utrum voluntate deliberativa damnati malint non esse quam sic esse. In fine seq. propositionis edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. aeterna pro aeterni.Book III. c. 5. n. 12. and c. 23. n. 66. seqq. In the same place, c. 6. n. 18. seqq., it is shown that not-being is chosen by no one, not even by the most wretched. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 50. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2, where it is asked whether by deliberative will the damned would prefer not to be rather than to be thus. At the end of the following proposition the editions, except 1, with several codices [read] aeterna for aeterni.
- Respicitur Eph. 1, 14, ubi de Spiritu sancto dicitur: qui est pignus hereditatis nostrae. Paulo inferius edd. cum pluribus codd. ponentur pro ponuntur.Reference is made to Eph. 1, 14, where it is said of the Holy Spirit: who is the pledge of our inheritance. A little below, the editions with several codices [read] ponentur for ponuntur.
- Hic c. 2.Here c. 2.
- Libr. II. Ethic. c. ult., ubi ad propositum illustrandum in exemplum adducit eos « qui ligna distorta dirigunt », qui scil. ea dum dirigere volunt, in partem oppositam torquent, quo facto ligna ad medium reducuntur.Book II. of the Ethics, last chapter, where, to illustrate the matter, he adduces as an example those « who straighten distorted [pieces of] wood », who namely, while they wish to straighten them, bend them in the opposite direction, which done, the wood is reduced to the mean.
- Hic c. 2.Here c. 2.
- Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 23. n. 68. seqq., et Epist. 166. (alias 28.) ad Hieronym. c. 6. n. 16, nec non IV. Sent. d. 46. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Mox pro pure Vat. et edd. 3, 4 perperam parum. Dein pro supplicio plures codd., ut F T aa etc., substituunt suppliciis, alii, ut 1 bb ee, cum edd. 1, 2 supplicii.Cfr. Augustine, III. On Free Choice c. 23. n. 68. seqq., and Epist. 166. (otherwise 28.) to Jerome c. 6. n. 16, and also IV. Sent. d. 46. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Presently, for pure the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 wrongly [read] parum. Then for supplicio several codices, as F T aa etc., substitute suppliciis, others, as 1 bb ee, with edd. 1, 2 [read] supplicii.
- Ut dicitur supra d. XXX. lit. Magistri, c. 9. — De stola carnis sive corporis vide supra pag. 786, nota 7. — Pro Unde Vat. et edd. 3, 4 tamen.As is said above d. XXX. in the text of the Master, c. 9. — On the robe of the flesh or of the body see above p. 786, note 7. — For Unde the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 [read] tamen.
- Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. seq.Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. seq.
- Codd. F1KLO (T a prima manu) W ee et alii cum ed. 1 impassibilitatem.Codd. F1KLO (T by a first hand) W ee and others, with ed. 1, [read] impassibilitatem.