Bonaventure

The numbered notes below are Quaracchi's page footers. Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on each printed page, so the notes are labelled by page: notes 1–10 belong to page 967 and notes 1–7 to page 968.

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod sine intermissione perpetuos etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Iob vigesimo quarto¹ dicitur: Transierunt ab aquis nivium ad calorem nimium: ergo saltem videtur, quod in illo transitu sit intermissio. — Item, super illud Isaiae decimo quarto²: Tu autem proiectus es; Glossa: « Etsi omnes animae aliquando habebunt requiem, tu nunquam »: et ita videtur, quod animae aliquando ibi requiescant.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod punitio gehennalis erit sine omni intermissione; et hoc patet per illud quod dicitur Apocalypsis decimo quarto³: Ascendit fumus tormentorum in saecula saeculorum, et non habebunt requiem die ac nocte. Cum enim non sit interpolatio in culpa, non debet esse in poena.

Quod obiicitur de transitu, dicendum, quod dupliciter potest intelligi: vel sicut est transitus subiecti ab uno contrariorum immediatorum in aliud⁴, ita tamen, quod semper est sub altero contrariorum; sic intelligitur in proposito; vel ita, quod non intelligatur successio, sed nec transitus cum successione, sed varietas cum confusione.

Quod obiicitur de Glossa, dicendum, quod loquitur non simpliciter, sed sub conditione, ad exaggerandum magnitudinem peccati illius.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quae si sola esset alienari a regno etc. Videtur enim male dicere: quia, ut dicit Augustinus⁵, haec est mitissima poenarum omnium: ergo contradicit sibi nunc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus⁶ loquitur de illis qui damnum habent et non animadvertunt, vel animadvertunt, non tamen habent conscientiae remorsum. — Vel dicendum, quod quia ipse comparat carentiam visionis Dei aeternam ad poenam temporalem, dicens⁷, quod illa excedit omnem temporalem, quia ibi est privatio boni aeterni, sed hic temporalis. Cum autem dicit, ipsam esse mitissimam, loquitur de poenis aeternis.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod quantumcumque mali sint, de poena relaxare. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Ecclesiastici quadragesimo⁸: A praesidente etc.; dicit Glossa: « In inferno nulla erit mitigatio ».

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic loquitur de relaxatione, quae fit in taxatione poenae, sed ibi de mitigatione post poenam taxatam. — Aliqui tamen exponunt, quod non erit mitigatio ad liberationem, sicut exponit Magister quasdam alias auctoritates in littera⁹; sed ista expositio extorta esse videtur. Aliud est enim poenam mitigari, aliud a poena omnino liberari.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius! quia videtur dicere contra illud quod dicitur in Psalmo¹⁰: In labiis meis pronuntiavi omnia iudicia oris tui. Si enim potuit pronuntiare: ergo et comprehendere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod iudicia Dei dicuntur dupliciter: uno modo iudicialia praecepta, quae erant in Lege, quae frequenter in Psalmo vocantur iudicia. Alio modo dicuntur divina dispositio et divini consilii definitio, et ista sunt inscrutabilia quantum ad cognitionem si est, antequam fiant; et quantum ad cognitionem propter quid, ex quo facta sunt, nisi Spiritus Dei revelet, qui scrutatur etiam profunda Dei¹. Et sic patet, quod alio modo accipitur hic et ibi iudicium.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod quaedam sunt, quibus ostenditur misericors et aequus distributor. Videtur enim male dicere: quia opera Dei non ostendunt misericordiam et iustitiam, nisi sicut effectus causam: si ergo misericordia et iustitia est eadem causa omnino, ut dicit in littera², ergo eisdem effectibus, quibus ostenditur iustus, ostenditur et misericors.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod causa in Deo, quamvis non dicat veram habitudinem et dependentiam ex parte Dei, dicit tamen habitudinem ex parte creaturae; et sicut ex parte creaturae est habitudinis veritas, ita et multiplicitas; et secundum illorum habituum multiplicitatem est divinam essentiam multipliciter intelligere et significare³. Quoniam igitur alium modum habet effectus, qui respicit meritum, alium, qui respicit misericordiae effectum⁴; et iustitia et misericordia istas habitudines connotant; quamvis principale significatum sit unum, tamen ille effectus, qui attribuitur iustitiae, nec potest nec debet attribui misericordiae⁵.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod aliud significat sapientia, aliud iustitia etc.; quia supra⁶ cum dictum sit, quod non dicitur diversitas significati, videtur, quod contra se dicat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud intelligitur ratione connotati; sed illud quod superius dictum est, intelligitur ratione principalis significati. — Vel dicendum, quod alietas non notatur in re significata absolute, sed sub ratione intelligendi, quae est alia et alia, quia voces sunt signa intellectuum⁷. Et sic patet illud.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what he says, that without intermission perpetual etc. For it seems that he speaks badly, because in Job the twenty-fourth chapter¹ it is said: They shall pass from the waters of snows to excessive heat: therefore at least it seems that in that passage there is an intermission. — Likewise, upon that text of Isaiah the fourteenth chapter²: But thou art cast out; the Gloss: « Although all souls shall at some time have rest, thou never »: and so it seems that souls do at some time rest there.

Respondeo: It must be said that the punishment of hell will be without any intermission; and this is plain from what is said in the Apocalypse, the fourteenth chapter³: The smoke of their torments ascendeth for ever and ever, and they have no rest day nor night. For since there is no interruption in the fault, there ought not to be one in the punishment.

To what is objected concerning the passage, it must be said that it can be understood in two ways: either as there is a passage of a subject from one of two immediate contraries into the other⁴, yet in such a way that it is always under one of the two contraries — thus it is understood in the case proposed; or in such a way that no succession is understood, nor even a passage with succession, but a variation together with confusion.

To what is objected concerning the Gloss, it must be said that it speaks not absolutely, but conditionally, in order to exaggerate the magnitude of that sin.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Which, if it were the only one, would be to be estranged from the kingdom etc. For it seems that he speaks badly: because, as Augustine says⁵, this is the mildest of all punishments: therefore he now contradicts himself.

Respondeo: It must be said that Augustine⁶ is speaking of those who suffer the loss and do not advert to it, or who do advert to it yet have no remorse of conscience. — Or it must be said that he compares the eternal lack of the vision of God to a temporal punishment, saying⁷ that the former exceeds every temporal one, because there is the privation of an eternal good, but here of a temporal one. But when he says that it is the mildest, he is speaking of the eternal punishments.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that however evil they may be, to relax something of the punishment. For it seems that he speaks badly, because in Ecclesiasticus the fortieth chapter⁸: From him that sitteth etc.; the Gloss says: « In hell there will be no mitigation ».

Respondeo: It must be said that here he is speaking of a relaxation which takes place in the assessing of the punishment, but there of a mitigation after the punishment has been assessed. — Some, however, expound it as meaning that there will be no mitigation unto deliverance, as the Master expounds certain other authorities in the text⁹; but that exposition seems forced. For it is one thing for a punishment to be mitigated, another to be delivered from the punishment altogether.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: How incomprehensible are his judgments! because he seems to speak against what is said in the Psalm¹⁰: With my lips I have pronounced all the judgments of thy mouth. For if he could pronounce them: therefore also comprehend them.

Respondeo: It must be said that the judgments of God are spoken of in two ways: in one way, the judicial precepts which were in the Law, which are frequently called judgments in the Psalm. In another way there are called judgments the divine disposition and the determination of the divine counsel, and these are inscrutable as regards the knowledge whether it is, before they come to be; and as regards the knowledge on account of what, once they have been done, unless the Spirit of God reveal it, who searcheth even the deep things of God¹. And thus it is plain that judgment is taken in one way here and in another there.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that there are certain things by which he is shown to be merciful and an equitable distributor. For it seems that he speaks badly: because the works of God do not show mercy and justice except as an effect shows its cause: if therefore mercy and justice are altogether the same cause, as he says in the text², therefore by the same effects by which he is shown to be just, he is shown also to be merciful.

Respondeo: It must be said that cause in God, although it does not state a true relation and dependence on the part of God, nevertheless does state a relation on the part of the creature; and just as on the part of the creature there is truth of relation, so also multiplicity; and according to the multiplicity of those relations it is possible to understand and to signify the divine essence in manifold ways³. Since therefore an effect which regards merit has one mode, and one which regards the effect of mercy another⁴; and justice and mercy connote these relations; although the principal thing signified is one, nevertheless that effect which is attributed to justice neither can nor ought to be attributed to mercy⁵.

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that wisdom signifies one thing, justice another etc.; because, since it was said above⁶ that no diversity of the thing signified is asserted, it seems that he contradicts himself.

Respondeo: It must be said that the former is understood by reason of what is connoted; but what was said above is understood by reason of the principal thing signified. — Or it must be said that otherness is not noted in the thing signified absolutely, but under the manner of understanding, which is one and another, because words are signs of acts of understanding⁷. And thus that is plain.

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