Bonaventure

Quaestio IV. Utrum Deus possit aliquem pure remunerare ex iustitia, vel pure ex misericordia.

Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The notes below are therefore labelled by page: note 13 of page 965, then notes 1–10 of page 966.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum possit Deus aliquem pure remunerare ex iustitia, vel pure ex misericordia, ita quod ista duo separentur. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Hugo de sancto Victore¹³ dicit, quod si Deus totam poenam relaxaret, non propter hoc esset iniustus: ergo si misericordia velit relaxare poenam, et iustitia non repugnat; patet etc.

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia Deus est summe iustus et summe misericors; sed « albius est quod est nigro impermixtius¹ »: ergo cum misericordia temperet iustitiam, et iustitia misericordiam, istud est summae misericordiae, quod nihil habet de iustitia, et e converso: ergo si Deus summus est in utroque, potest facere opus de iustitia, in quo non sit misericordia.

3. Item, tantae culpae debetur tanta poena; quaeritur igitur, utrum Deus possit tantam infligere. Si non, ergo non est omnipotens; si potest, et hoc erat² purae iustitiae: ergo potest facere opus purae iustitiae; similiter concluditur, quod opus purae misericordiae.

4. Item, homo potest punire hominem tantum, quantum meruit, potest etiam totum remittere: ergo si Deus est iustior et misericordior homine, multo fortius Deus potest hoc facere.

Contra: 1. Secundae ad Timotheum secundo³: Iustus est et negare se ipsum non potest: si ergo non potest facere contra se nec se negare, non potest facere, quin puniat; et sic etc.

2. Item, proprium est Dei misereri⁴; sed proprium non potest relinquere illud cuius est proprium: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquem remuneret, quin misericorditer faciat.

3. Item, culpa est totam culpam prosequi, et culpa est malum relinquere impunitum: ergo sicut Deus non potest mentiri⁵, quia malum est, sine culpa; sic nec omnino iuste punire nec omnino misericorditer parcere.

4. Item, sicut Deus creat in quantum unus, verus et bonus; ita regit et remunerat in quantum misericors et iustus; sed impossibile est, Deum facere effectum, qui non habeat modum, speciem et ordinem, quae respondent unitati, veritati et bonitati⁶: ergo impossibile est, quod retribuat, quin in effectu illo aliquid retribuat iustitiae, aliquid misericordiae.

Conclusio

In omni Dei retributione misericordia et iustitia sic coniunctae sunt, ut impossibile sit, eas ab invicem separari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in omni retributione Domini sic sunt coniunctae misericordia et iustitia, quod impossibile est, separari eas ab invicem. — Et ratio huius est: quia, sicut in nobis, quaedam sunt virtutes, quarum perfectio attenditur per accessum ad extremum, ut puta caritas; quaedam per accessum ad medium, ut iustitia et misericordia⁷; unde non dicitur summe iustus per excessum severitatis, nec summe misericors propter omnimodam remissionem culpae; sed quia tantum miseretur, quantum est conveniens, similiter et tantum punit. — Et ratio huius est, quia iustitia et misericordia maxime dicuntur respectu actuum et meritorum nostrorum.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod dicit Hugo, quod potest totam poenam remittere; dicendum, quod verum est de potentia simpliciter, sed non est verum de potentia ordinata ad merita. — Vel intelligitur de poena subsequente, non de poena concomitante culpam, quia, ut dicitur in primo Confessionum⁸, « impossibile est, esse dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae ».

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est summe iustus; dicendum est, quod non dicitur summe iustus per recessum a misericordia ad severitatem, sed per recessum ab iniustitia.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum possit isti tantam poenam infligere; dico, quod non potest, et hoc, quia misericordia repugnat, et non potest suam misericordiam negare, hoc enim est non-posse; unde sicut non posse esse nimis rigidum⁹ non sonat in defectum, sed in nobilitatem; sic in proposito intelligendum. — Posset etiam dici, quod ratione offensae, quae est in Deum infinitum, poena non possit sufficiens taxari, nec peccator esset capax; unde defectus est ex parte naturae suscipientis, non naturae infligentis.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo potest parcere totum; dicendum, quod est homo, ad quem spectat misereri, ut est ille qui recepit iniuriam, et iste non potest omnino punire, quin excedat; et homo, ad quem spectat punire, ut est iudex, et iste non potest omnino dimittere, quin excedat. Et quoniam Deus gerit istam duplicem personam, scilicet eius qui offenditur, et eius qui iudicat; cum¹⁰ non possit excedere, facit utrumque.

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Article II. Question IV. Whether God can reward anyone purely out of justice, or purely out of mercy.

Fourth it is asked whether God can reward anyone purely out of justice, or purely out of mercy, so that these two are separated. And that this is so, it seems:

1. Because Hugh of St. Victor¹³ says that if God were to remit the whole punishment, he would not on that account be unjust: therefore if mercy should will to remit the punishment, justice too does not oppose it; it is plain, etc.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because God is supremely just and supremely merciful; but "that is whiter which is less mixed with black¹": therefore, since mercy tempers justice, and justice mercy, that belongs to supreme mercy which has nothing of justice, and conversely: therefore if God is supreme in both, he can do a work of justice in which there is no mercy.

3. Likewise, to so great a fault so great a punishment is due; it is asked therefore whether God can inflict so great a one. If not, then he is not omnipotent; if he can, then this also would be² of pure justice: therefore he can do a work of pure justice; and in like manner it is concluded that he can do a work of pure mercy.

4. Likewise, a man can punish a man only as much as he has deserved, and he can also remit the whole: therefore if God is more just and more merciful than man, much more strongly can God do this.

Contra: 1. In the second chapter of the Second Letter to Timothy³: He is faithful and cannot deny himself: if therefore he cannot act against himself nor deny himself, he cannot act without punishing; and so forth.

2. Likewise, it is proper to God to have mercy⁴; but what is proper cannot leave behind that of which it is proper: therefore it is impossible that he should reward anyone without acting mercifully.

3. Likewise, it is a fault to prosecute a fault to the full, and it is a fault to leave an evil unpunished: therefore, just as God cannot lie⁵, because it is an evil, without fault; so neither can he punish wholly justly nor spare wholly mercifully.

4. Likewise, just as God creates inasmuch as he is one, true and good; so he governs and rewards inasmuch as he is merciful and just; but it is impossible for God to make an effect which does not have measure, species and order, which correspond to unity, truth and goodness⁶: therefore it is impossible that he should repay without repaying in that effect something of justice and something of mercy.

Conclusion

In every retribution of God mercy and justice are so joined together that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another.

I respond: It must be said that in every retribution of the Lord mercy and justice are so joined together that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another. — And the ground of this is: because, just as among us some virtues are such that their perfection is measured by approach to an extreme, as for instance charity; some by approach to a mean, as justice and mercy⁷; hence he is not called supremely just by an excess of severity, nor supremely merciful on account of an all-encompassing remission of fault; but because he has mercy just so much as is fitting, and likewise punishes just so much. — And the ground of this is that justice and mercy are chiefly spoken of in respect of our acts and merits.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which Hugh says, that he can remit the whole punishment; it must be said that this is true of power taken simply, but it is not true of power ordered to merits. — Or it is to be understood of the punishment that follows, not of the punishment accompanying the fault, because, as is said in the first book of the Confessions⁸, "it is impossible that the disgrace of sin should be without the beauty of justice."

To 2. To that which is objected, that he is supremely just; it must be said that he is not called supremely just by a withdrawal from mercy toward severity, but by a withdrawal from injustice.

To 3. To that which is asked, whether he can inflict so great a punishment on this man; I say that he cannot, and this because mercy opposes it, and he cannot deny his own mercy, for this is a not-being-able; hence, just as not being able to be too rigid⁹ does not sound as a defect but as a nobility; so it is to be understood in the case proposed. — It could also be said that, by reason of the offence, which is against the infinite God, a sufficient punishment could not be assessed, nor would the sinner be capable of it; hence the defect is on the side of the nature receiving, not of the nature inflicting.

To 4. To that which is objected, that a man can spare the whole; it must be said that there is the man to whom it belongs to have mercy, as is he who has received the injury, and this one cannot punish wholly without exceeding; and there is the man to whom it belongs to punish, as is the judge, and this one cannot wholly dismiss without exceeding. And since God bears this twofold person, namely of him who is offended and of him who judges; since¹⁰ he cannot exceed, he does both.

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