Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus

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QUAESTIO III. De efficacia circumcisionis.

Tertio quaeritur de efficacia circumcisionis, et quaeritur, utrum Sacramentum circumcisionis sit gratiae collativum. Et quod non:

1. Dicit Magister Hoc ipsum in littera¹. Dicit Glossa ad Romanos quarto super illud: Signaculum fidei accepit; Glossa: « In circumcisione tantum peccata remittebantur, sed non gratia per eam praestabatur ».

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia in Sacramento aeque vel amplius se extendit ratio significandi quam efficiendi; sed ratio significandi in circumcisione solum est in ablatione²: ergo et efficacia.

3. Item, sicut se habet culpa ad gratiae amotionem, sic gratia ad remotionem culpae; sed Deus, cum homo peccat, subtrahit gratiam, nec tamen facit culpam³: ergo a simili possibile est, quod aliquod remedium removeat culpam, quod tamen non dat gratiam: ergo si hoc est possibile, et concordat ratio et auctoritas, in circumcisione non datur gratia.

4. Item, si Deus esset dator formarum, virtus particularis agentis esset solum in abiiciendo, non in ponendo⁴: ergo cum Deus sit dator gratiae, virtus circumcisionis solum erit in amovendo oppositum gratiae.

2. Item, accidens corrumpitur dupliciter: aut propter corruptionem subiecti, aut propter inductionem contrarii⁷: ergo si circumcisio aufert culpam, cum non corrumpat subiectum, de necessitate inducit contrarium; sed hoc est gratia: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod culpa non est accidens, sed privatio; idem sequitur, quia privatio non removetur ab aliquo nisi per positionem habitus: ergo si culpa est privatio gratiae, nunquam delebitur, nisi ponatur gratia.

3. Item, peccatum dicit non esse moris⁸; sed impossibile est, quod Deus auferat alicui non esse naturae nisi dando esse, immo non est intelligibile: ergo impossibile et non intelligibile est, quod auferat non esse moris nisi dando esse; sed non esse moris est per culpam, esse per gratiam: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia esse et non esse sunt immediata; non sic culpa et gratia⁹; contra hoc est, quia privatio et habitus circa suum susceptibile sunt immediata, sicut affirmatio et negatio: ergo impossibile est privare unum, quin ponatur reliquum.

4. Item, si circumcisio delet culpam, et gratia delet; aut ergo circumcisio delet per gratiam, aut e converso, aut utrumque simul; sed constat, quod non utrumque simul, quia, cum non sint idem in substantia, non habent eandem operationem immediatam¹⁰. Item, non gratia per circumcisionem, quia, si non esset circumcisio, gratia per se sufficienter deleret culpam tanquam immediata causa: ergo circumcisio delet per gratiam: ergo per prius ordinatur circumcisio ad gratiam quam ad culpam delendam.

Contra: 1. Quod in circumcisione detur gratia, ostenditur: quia eadem vi est corruptio unius oppositi et generatio alterius⁵, et eadem vi, qua receditur ab uno oppositorum, acceditur ad reliquum: ergo cum gratia et culpa sint opposita, eadem vi, qua deletur culpa, confertur gratia: ergo si circumcisio est ad delendam culpam, necesse est, in ea conferri gratiam. Si dicas, quod hoc non tenet in moribus; hoc nihil est, quia Ambrosius⁶ dicit, quod « egressus vitii est virtutis ingressus ».

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### CONCLUSIO. In circumcisione conferebatur gratia, sed tantum parvula respectu magnae gratiae, quae datur in baptismo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc diversi diversimode senserunt.

Quorundam enim positio fuit, quod originale, ut est culpa, est concupiscentia cum debito non concupiscendi; et non ideo est culpa, quia concupiscentia — haec enim est in iustificatis — sed ideo, quia est cum debito non concupiscendi. Cum ergo deletur culpa originalis, quia deletur quantum ad reatum et remanet quantum ad actum^1b, dicunt, quod solvitur debitum, id est, non imputatur; et tunc igitur remanet concupiscentia actu poena. Hoc igitur est quod dicunt, originale deleri, id est, debitum non concupiscendi non imputari; et hoc quidem sine alicuius gratiae collatione fieri potest et fit in circumcisione. — Sed haec responsio non potest stare duplici ratione: una quidem, quia, si Deus non imputat hoc debitum ipsi animae, quod prius imputabat; aut ergo aliqua innovatio facta est circa animam, aut mutatio circa Deum; non mutatio circa Deum, ergo innovatio circa animam: ergo aut aliquid est ab ea ablatum, aut positum. Si ablatum, aut bonum, aut malum; non bonum, ergo malum; non malum poenae tantum, ergo culpae: ergo si culpa est privatio, quae non aufertur, nisi aliquid ibi ponatur; necesse est, aliquid poni. Sed nihil ponitur in anima, quod expellat culpam, nisi gratia^2b. — Alia ratio est: quia, si debitum tantum non imputaretur, et gratia non daretur; cum nullus possit videre Deum, quin habuerit gratiam^3b, tunc ergo iustus ab originali peccato mundatus per circumcisionem, si moriatur, cum non habuerit gratiam, non videbit Deum: ergo eandem poenam habebit, ac si haberet originale.

Alia positio magis ultra processit et dixit, quod in circumcisione dabatur gratia, et delebatur culpa; sed culpa delebatur vi circumcisionis, gratia non dabatur vi eius, sed ex liberalitate Dei, qui non delet culpam, quin decoret animam et gratam sibi faciat; quamvis posset aliter facere, quia secundum naturam medium est inter culpam et gratiam, scilicet ipsa innocentia, et delere culpam, hoc est addere innocentiam; sed Deus nunquam reddit innocentiam, quin superaddat gratiam. Et per hoc respondent ad obiecta de contrarietate et de habitu et privatione, quia gratia non est directe et immediate habitus oppositus culpae, sed innocentia. Ad illud autem innocentiam, secundum quod est privatio culpae, ordinatur circumcisio disponens ex parte suscipientis, sed gratia ex parte agentis. — Sed haec positio non potest stare duplici ratione: prima quidem, quia, si innocentia esset medium secundum naturam inter culpam et gratiam, prius naturaliter restitueretur innocentia, et expelleretur culpa, quam infunderetur gratia; sed hoc est manifeste falsum, quia tunc gratia non deleret culpam. Si enim delet, prius naturaliter infunditur^4b, quam culpa deleatur. — Alia ratio est, quia, etsi Deus posset delere culpam sine gratia, non tamen decrevit delere nisi per gratiam^5b: ergo si dat virtutem Sacramento consonantem suo decreto, non dat virtutem ad culpam delendam, nisi disponendo ad gratiam.

Tertia positio est, quod in circumcisione delebatur culpa, et conferebatur gratia, et ad utrumque ordinabatur circumcisio; sed gratia quosdam effectus habet privativos, quosdam positivos; et circumcisio non ordinabatur^6b primo et per se nisi quantum ad effectus privativos; et ideo solum significabat ablationem. Sed quia effectus privativi non sunt sine positivis, ex consequenti erant ibi effectus positivi; et quia ex consequenti, non oportebat eos significari^7b. Exemplum autem manifestum est in conversione panis in corpus Christi, in quo est consequenter caro et sanguis, sed tamen non significatur ibi. Effectus autem gratiae positivi sunt sicut habilitare ad bona opera, privativi, sicut removere culpam. — Sed ista positio non potest stare duplici ratione: prima quidem, quia, si vi circumcisionis ponitur gratia in anima et potentiis, quia delet culpam, quae in his est; cum poni gratiam in anima non sit

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aliud quam gratificari, et in potentiis quam potentias habilitari: ergo non separantur nec secundum rem nec secundum intellectum: ergo impossibile est ponere vel intelligere, quod circumcisio habeat vim ad unum, quin etiam habeat ad reliquum^1c. — Alia ratio est, quia effectus positivi aliqui secundum rem idem sunt cum privativis, quia, sicut lumen materiale nunquam delet tenebras nisi illuminando aëra, sic nec lumen^2c gratiae tenebras peccati.

Quarta positio fuit, quod in circumcisione dabatur gratia, sed tamen parvula respectu eius quae datur in baptismo. Et ratio huius videbitur in sequenti distinctione^3c, cum de profectu Sacramentorum disputabitur. Et quia gratia quantumcumque parva plenum effectum habet ad delendum omnem culpam mortalem, sed semiplenum ad habilitandum animas et perficiendum; ideo circumcisio dicitur ordinari ad effectum ablationis culpae, non quia ipsum solum habeat, sed quia solum habet completum. Et quia Sacramentum non omne significat, quod facit, sed quod plenius et perfectius facit; ideo in circumcisione solum est signum ablationis principaliter.

Et per hoc patent auctoritates et obiecta:

1. quia nec Glossa nec Magister voluerunt negare, quod nullo modo daretur gratia habilitans, sed quod ita parum habilitans et ita parum reprimens concupiscentiam, quod solum merebatur dici deletiva culpae, non habilitativa potentiae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de significatione, patet responsio, quod illud debet Sacramentum significare quod plene et perfecte facit, non omne quod facit ex consequenti sive imperfecte.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus subtrahit gratiam et non facit culpam, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod Deus dicitur subtrahere gratiam, non quia perimat datam, sed quia ultra non apponit; sed homo per culpam perimit datam, et ita non conveniunt in effectu Deus et culpa^4c.

4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod illud nihil valet, quia, sicut solus Deus dat gratiam, ita solus delet oppositum; unde Isaiae quadragesimo tertio^5c: Ego sum, qui deleo iniquitates etc. Praeterea, si positio illa esset vera, nunquam agens particulare aliquid abiiceret^6c.

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English Translation

p. 42

QUESTION III. On the efficacy of circumcision.

Thirdly, the question is asked concerning the efficacy of circumcision, and it is asked whether the Sacrament of circumcision is conferrative of grace. And that it is not:

1. The Master says this same thing in the text¹. The Gloss on Romans four, on that text He received the sign of faith, says: "In circumcision only sins were remitted, but grace was not bestowed through it."

2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason, because in a Sacrament the account of signifying extends equally as far as, or further than, the account of effecting; but the account of signifying in circumcision lies only in removal²: therefore so does its efficacy.

3. Likewise, as guilt stands to the withdrawal of grace, so grace stands to the removal of guilt; but God, when a man sins, withdraws grace, and yet does not make guilt³: therefore by a parallel it is possible that some remedy should remove guilt which nevertheless does not give grace: therefore if this is possible, and reason and authority agree, in circumcision grace is not given.

4. Likewise, if God were the giver of forms, the power of the particular agent would lie only in casting out, not in positing⁴: therefore since God is the giver of grace, the power of circumcision will lie only in removing the opposite of grace.

2. Likewise, an accident is corrupted in two ways: either through the corruption of the subject, or through the introduction of the contrary⁷: therefore if circumcision takes away guilt, since it does not corrupt the subject, of necessity it introduces the contrary; but this [contrary] is grace: therefore etc. If you say that guilt is not an accident, but a privation; the same follows, because a privation is not removed from anything except through the positing of a habit: therefore if guilt is the privation of grace, it will never be blotted out unless grace be posited.

3. Likewise, sin signifies a non-being of morals⁸; but it is impossible that God should take away from anyone the non-being of nature except by giving being—indeed it is not intelligible: therefore it is impossible and unintelligible that he should take away the non-being of morals except by giving being; but the non-being of morals is through guilt, and being through grace: therefore etc. If you say that it is not parallel, because being and non-being are immediate, but not so guilt and grace⁹; against this is that privation and habit, with respect to their subject of inherence, are immediate, just as affirmation and negation: therefore it is impossible to deprive of the one without the other being posited.

4. Likewise, if circumcision blots out guilt, grace also blots it out; either, then, circumcision blots out through grace, or conversely, or both at once; but it is established that not both at once, because, since they are not the same in substance, they do not have the same immediate operation¹⁰. Likewise, grace [does] not [act] through circumcision, because, if there were no circumcision, grace by itself would sufficiently blot out guilt as the immediate cause: therefore circumcision blots out through grace: therefore circumcision is ordered prior toward grace than toward the blotting-out of guilt.

On the contrary: 1. That in circumcision grace is given is shown: because by the same power there is the corruption of one opposite and the generation of the other⁵, and by the same power by which one departs from one of the opposites, one approaches the other: therefore since grace and guilt are opposites, by the same power by which guilt is blotted out, grace is conferred: therefore if circumcision is for the blotting-out of guilt, it is necessary that in it grace be conferred. If you say that this does not hold in morals; this is nothing, because Ambrose⁶ says that "the going-out of vice is the entrance of virtue."

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### CONCLUSION. In circumcision grace was conferred, but only a small [grace] in comparison with the great grace which is given in baptism.

I respond: It must be said that on this point different men have held different views.

For the position of some was that original [sin], as it is guilt, is concupiscence with the debt of not coveting; and it is not guilt because of concupiscence—for this is [also] in the justified—but because it is with the debt of not coveting. When, therefore, original guilt is blotted out, since it is blotted out as to liability and remains as to act^1b, they say that the debt is discharged, that is, not imputed; and so then concupiscence remains, in act a penalty. This, then, is what they say original [sin] is blotted out means, that is, the debt of not coveting is not imputed; and this indeed can be done, and is done in circumcision, without the conferral of any grace. — But this answer cannot stand, for two reasons: one indeed, because, if God does not impute to the soul itself this debt which before he imputed; then either some innovation has been made about the soul, or a change about God; not a change about God, therefore an innovation about the soul: therefore either something has been removed from it, or posited. If removed, either a good or an evil; not a good, therefore an evil; not an evil of penalty only, therefore of guilt: therefore if guilt is a privation, which is not taken away unless something be posited there; it is necessary that something be posited. But nothing is posited in the soul which expels guilt, except grace^2b. — The other reason is: that, if only the debt were not imputed, and grace were not given; since no one can see God who has not had grace^3b, then a just man cleansed from original sin through circumcision, if he die, since he has not had grace, will not see God: therefore he will have the same penalty as if he had original [sin].

Another position went somewhat further, and said that in circumcision grace was given, and guilt was blotted out; but guilt was blotted out by the power of circumcision, [while] grace was not given by its power, but from the liberality of God, who does not blot out guilt without adorning the soul and making it pleasing to himself; although he could do otherwise, because according to nature there is a mean between guilt and grace, namely innocence itself, and to blot out guilt is to add innocence; but God never restores innocence without superadding grace. And by this they answer the objections about contrariety and about habit and privation, because grace is not directly and immediately the habit opposed to guilt, but innocence is. And to that innocence, insofar as it is the privation of guilt, circumcision is ordered, disposing on the part of the recipient, but grace on the part of the agent. — But this position cannot stand, for two reasons: the first indeed, because, if innocence were a mean according to nature between guilt and grace, innocence would be naturally restored, and guilt expelled, prior to grace being infused; but this is manifestly false, because then grace would not blot out guilt. For if it blots it out, it is naturally infused first^4b, before guilt is blotted out. — The other reason is, that, although God could blot out guilt without grace, nevertheless he decreed to blot it out only through grace^5b: therefore if he gives to the Sacrament a power consonant with his decree, he does not give a power for blotting out guilt except by disposing toward grace.

The third position is that in circumcision guilt was blotted out, and grace was conferred, and circumcision was ordered toward both; but grace has some privative effects, some positive; and circumcision was not ordered^6b first and per se except as to the privative effects; and therefore it signified only removal. But because the privative effects are not without the positive, the positive effects were there as a consequence; and because [they were there only] as a consequence, it was not necessary that they be signified^7b. And the manifest example is in the conversion of bread into the body of Christ, in which there is consequently flesh and blood, but yet it is not signified there. Now the positive effects of grace are such as to enable for good works, the privative such as to remove guilt. — But this position cannot stand, for two reasons: the first indeed, because, if by the power of circumcision grace is posited in the soul and its powers, since it blots out the guilt which is in these; since to posit grace in the soul is nothing

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other than to be gratified, and [to posit it] in the powers nothing other than for the powers to be enabled: therefore they are not separated either in reality or in understanding: therefore it is impossible to posit or to understand that circumcision should have power toward the one without having it also toward the other^1c. — The other reason is, that some positive effects are in reality the same as the privative, because, just as material light never blots out darkness except by illuminating the air, so neither does the light^2c of grace [blot out] the darkness of sin [except by enabling the soul].

The fourth position was that in circumcision grace was given, but yet a small one in comparison with that which is given in baptism. And the reason for this will be seen in the following distinction^3c, when the advancement of the Sacraments is discussed. And because grace, however small, has a full effect for blotting out all mortal guilt, but a half-full effect for enabling and perfecting souls; therefore circumcision is said to be ordered toward the effect of the removal of guilt, not because it has that alone, but because it has that alone in complete [measure]. And because a Sacrament does not signify everything that it does, but what it does more fully and more perfectly; therefore in circumcision there is a sign chiefly of removal only.

And by this the authorities and objections are made clear:

1. because neither the Gloss nor the Master willed to deny that enabling grace was given in any way at all, but [held] that it enabled so little and so little repressed concupiscence, that it merited only to be called blotting-out of guilt, not enabling of the power.

2. To that which is objected concerning signification, the answer is clear: that the Sacrament ought to signify that which it does fully and perfectly, not everything which it does as a consequence or imperfectly.

3. To that which is objected, that God withdraws grace and does not make guilt, therefore etc.; it must be said that God is said to withdraw grace, not because he destroys what was given, but because he no longer adds [more]; but a man through guilt destroys what was given, and so God and guilt do not coincide in the effect^4c.

4. To the last [objection] it must be said that it has no force, because, just as God alone gives grace, so he alone blots out the opposite; hence in Isaiah forty-three^5c: I am he that blots out iniquities, etc. Moreover, if that position were true, a particular agent would never cast anything out^6c.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Hic c. 9. — Seq. textus est Rom. 4, 11, et Glossa exhibetur a Petro Lombardo in hunc loc.
Here, c. 9. — The following text is Rom. 4:11, and the Gloss is presented by Peter Lombard on this passage.
2
Vide supra q. 1.
See above, q. 1.
3
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — In codd. M O, finito hoc arg., duo alia subiiciuntur: Item, si conferretur in circumcisione gratia, et auferretur culpa, tunc non excederetur a baptismo, et hinc Sacramenta veteris legis novis aequipararentur. — Item, si temporis illius Sacramenta contulerunt gratiam, sicut huius temporis Sacramenta, quare nunc dicitur tempus gratiae potius quam tunc?
Cf. Sentences Book II, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — In codd. M O, when this argument is finished, two others are subjoined: Likewise, if grace were conferred in circumcision, and guilt taken away, then it would not be surpassed by baptism, and hence the Sacraments of the old law would be made equal to the new. — Likewise, if the Sacraments of that time conferred grace, just as the Sacraments of this time, why is the present rather than then called the time of grace?
4
Respicitur opinio Avicennae, qua distinguitur duplex principium formarum, scil. praeparans i. e. quod praeviis permutationibus materiam disponit, et perficiens i. e. quod tribuit formam constituentem, hocque « est extra naturalia » et vocatur « dator formarum ». Vide eius I. Sufficientiae c. 5. et 10, nec non Metaph. tr. 9. c. 5, cuius in tom. II. pag. 198, nota 3. mentionem fecimus. — Pro particularis, quod habent codd. A B C E F H P Q Z bb, cod. K secundi, alii codd. et ed. 1 perperam primi, Vat. primarii.
Reference is made to the opinion of Avicenna, by which a twofold principle of forms is distinguished, namely the preparing one, i.e. that which disposes the matter by prior changes, and the perfecting one, i.e. that which bestows the constituting form, and this "is outside the natural [agents]" and is called the "giver of forms." See his Sufficientia I, cc. 5 and 10, as well as Metaphysics tr. 9, c. 5, of which we made mention in tom. II, p. 198, note 3. — For particular, which codd. A B C E F H P Q Z bb have, cod. K [reads] of the second, other codd. and ed. 1 wrongly of the first, the Vatican edition primary.
5
Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 17. (c. 3.): Huius corruptio alterius est generatio, et huius generatio alterius est corruptio. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 1. ad oppos., ubi affertur exemplum de pondere, per quod corpus recedit ab una differentia positionis et accedit ad alteram. In huius arg. solutione negatur similitudo exempli et docetur, quod non valeat in voluntariis, sive, ut hic dicitur, in moribus. — Mox pro vi cod. M (I a secunda manu) via.
Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 17 (c. 3): the corruption of the one is the generation of the other, and the generation of the one is the corruption of the other. Cf. also Sentences Book III, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 1 at the objections, where the example of weight is brought forward, by which a body departs from one differentia of position and approaches another. In the solution of that argument the parallel of the example is denied, and it is taught that it does not hold in voluntary matters, or, as is said here, in morals. — Soon after, for power cod. M (I by a second hand) [reads] way.
6
Libr. II. de Cain et Abel, c. 4. n. 16: Egressus enim malitiae virtutis operatur ingressum. — Pro est ingressus cod. G operatur ingressum. Non pauci codd. Boethius dicit (cfr. III. de Consolat. prosa 4. et in Categorias sive Praedicam. Aristot. c. de Oppositis), cod. bb Hilarius dicit.
On Cain and Abel Book II, c. 4, n. 16: For the going-out of malice works the entrance of virtue. — For is the entrance cod. G [reads] works the entrance. Not a few codd. [read] Boethius says (cf. On Consolation III, prose 4, and on Aristotle's Categories or Predicaments, c. On Opposites), cod. bb Hilary says.
7
Secundum Aristot., de quo vide tom. II. pag. 192, nota 7. — Inferius pro sed hoc plures codd. sed haec. Subinde pro accidens cod. Z habitus aliquis.
According to Aristotle, on whom see tom. II, p. 192, note 7. — Lower down, for but this several codd. [read] but these. Then for accident cod. Z [reads] some habit.
8
Vide tom. II. pag. 640, nota 8. et ibid. d. 35. dub. 6.
See tom. II, p. 640, note 8, and ibid. d. 35, dub. 6.
9
Cfr. III. Sent. d. 36. q. 4. ad 6. — De subnexis vide Aristot. de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis.
Cf. Sentences Book III, d. 36, q. 4, ad 6. — On what is subjoined see Aristotle, On the Predicaments, c. On Opposites.
10
Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 14: Quorum enim substantia est eadem, horum et... actio [ἐνέργεια] eadem; quorum autem diversa substantia, horum et diversa... actio.
[John] Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 14: For those whose substance is the same, of these the... operation [ἐνέργεια] is also the same; but those whose substance is diverse, of these the... operation is also diverse.
1b
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Post pauca verbis non imputatur codd. E G K N Y Z aa bb praemittunt illud debitum. Inferius pro non concupiscendi, quod habent codd. F H (K a secunda manu), alii codd. cum edd. perperam concupiscendi.
Cf. Sentences Book II, d. 30, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 32, a. 1, q. 1f. — After a little, before the words is not imputed, codd. E G K N Y Z aa bb prefix that debt. Lower down, for of not coveting, which codd. F H present (K by a second hand), the other codd. with the editions wrongly [read] of coveting.
2b
Vide II. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. — Ante verba aliquid poni cod. Z (bb a secunda manu) repetit ibi.
See Sentences Book II, d. 26, q. 1. — Before the words something be posited, cod. Z (bb by a second hand) repeats there.
3b
Ut ostensum est II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, et III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. et 3. — De seq. propos. cfr. II. Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1.
As was shown in Sentences Book II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, and Book III, d. 14, a. 1, qq. 1 and 3. — On the following proposition cf. Sentences Book II, d. 33, a. 3, q. 1.
4b
Cod. cc supplet gratia. Ed. 1 legit: Si enim deleret prius innocentia, quam culpa deleretur, Vat.: Sic enim prius naturaliter deleretur culpa per innocentiam, quam gratia infunderetur. Nostra lectio praebetur a codd., quorum tamen aliqui male omittunt delet et incongrue substituunt infundatur pro infunditur. — De hac ratione vide infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.
Cod. cc supplies grace. Ed. 1 reads: For if innocence blotted out [guilt] before guilt were blotted out, the Vatican edition: For thus guilt would be blotted out naturally first through innocence, before grace were infused. Our reading is given by the codices, some of which however wrongly omit blots out and incongruously substitute be infused for is infused. — On this reasoning see below, d. 17, part I, a. 2, q. 1.
5b
Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 4. m. 7. a. 4. § 1: Etsi innocentia sit medium inter gratiam et culpam, habito respectu ad statum naturae conditae, non tamen est medium, habito respectu ad statum lapsus etc. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.
Alexander of Hales, Summa part IV, q. 4, m. 7, a. 4, § 1: Although innocence is a mean between grace and guilt, regard being had to the state of created nature, nevertheless it is not a mean, regard being had to the state of the fall, etc. Cf. Sentences Book II, d. 28, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6, and d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6.
6b
Cod. F (V a secunda manu) addit ad gratiam. Mox plures codd. et ed. 1 significat pro significabat.
Cod. F (V by a second hand) adds toward grace. Soon, several codd. and ed. 1 [read] signifies for signified.
7b
Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 4. m. 7. a. 4. § 1. supplet Sacramento circumcisionis. Vat., interpunctione mutata, et quia ex consequenti non oportebat eos significari, ideo ablationem culpae privativum effectum solum significabat. Exemplum etc.
Alexander of Hales, Summa part IV, q. 4, m. 7, a. 4, § 1, supplies to the Sacrament of circumcision. The Vatican edition, with the punctuation changed: and because as a consequence it was not necessary that they be signified, therefore it signified only the privative effect, the removal of guilt. The example etc.
1c
Vide II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Superius post non [cod. R nihil] sit aliud cod. Z prosequitur quam eam gratificari, et gratiam in potentiis.
See Sentences Book II, d. 26, q. 5, and d. 27, a. 1, q. 1. — Above, after not [cod. R nothing] be other, cod. Z continues than to gratify it, and grace in the powers.
2c
Cod. U addit spirituale, scilicet lumen.
Cod. U adds spiritual, namely light.
3c
Art. 1. q. 2. — Inferius pro animas cod. G animam, edd. potentias animae. Immediate post pro et perficiendum plures codd. et proficiendum, codd. I V et ad proficiendum, cod. A et edd. ad proficiendum.
Article 1, q. 2. — Lower down, for souls cod. G [reads] soul, the editions the powers of the soul. Immediately after, for and perfecting several codd. [read] and advancing, codd. I V and for advancing, cod. A and the editions for advancing.
4c
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 4. ad 5, d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 1, d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. Sentences Book II, d. 26, q. 4, ad 5; d. 36, a. 3, q. 2, ad 1; d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.
5c
Vers. 25. — Inferius pro particulare Vat. principale.
Verse 25. — Lower down, for particular the Vatican edition [reads] principal.
6c
Vide scholion ad 4. huius articuli quaest.
See the scholion to the 4th[?] question of this article.