Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 17
Articulus I. De his quae necessaria sunt ad iustificationem impii absolute.
Quaestio I. Utrum ad iustificationem impii necessaria sit gratiae infusio.
Circa primum, quod necessaria sit gratiae infusio, videtur.
1. Ad Romanos tertio1: Iustificati per gratiam ipsius etc.
2. Item, ratione videtur: quia peccatum est privatio; sed non removetur privatio nisi per collationem habitus: ergo confertur in deletione peccati aliquis habitus. Sed peccatum Deo displicebat et displicere faciebat: ergo ab oppositis, habitus ille Deo placet et placere facit; sed hunc dicimus gratiam gratum facientem2: ergo etc.
3. Item, per peccatum separatur homo a Deo, ergo ab oppositis, in iustificatione unitur Deo; sed unio in Deo non est sine dispositione uniente, quia tunc3 peccator inimicus Deo haberet ante gratiam Deum: ergo etc.
4. Item, non decet, esse post hunc statum nisi duo loca, scilicet gloriae et poenae4: ergo non decet hominem esse nisi in statu, in quo possit esse in altero istorum: ergo hominem mortalem necesse est esse vel in culpa, vel in gratia; sed per iustificationem recedit a statu culpae: ergo necesse est, sibi conferri habitum gratiae.
Contra: 1. Isaiae quadragesimo tertio5: Ego sum, qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me: ergo deletio culpae erit ante habitum gratiae.
2. Item, non minus est impium iustificare quam creare6; sed Deus creat sine medio: ergo et iustificat.
3. Item, lapsus fuit7 proprie ab innocentia in culpam: ergo cum reformatio respondeat deformationi, debet homo in puram innocentiam restitui; sed haec media est inter culpam et gratiam: ergo etc.
4. Item, si gratia expellit culpam, aut quando est, aut quando non est. Si quando est; sed accidentis esse est inesse8: ergo expellit culpam, cum subiecto inest; quaero: a quo subiecto? Non ab alieno nec a suo, quia prius culpam expelli est quam hominem gratificari. Si quando non est; sed nihil agit, quando non est: ergo non expellit.
5. Item, iustificatio est gratia quaedam: ergo si a gratia, similiter illa ab alia, et sic in infinitum.
Conclusio. Deus decrevit culpam delere per gratiam, quae non tantum restituat innocentiam, sed etiam naturam debilitatam habilitet ad bonum.
Respondeo: Dicendum: quia in omni opere Domini est misericordia et veritas9, hoc maxime in nobili opere oportet esse, scilicet in opere iustificationis. Quoniam igitur homo peccavit et nihil ante gratiae infusionem apud Deum meruit, Deus iusto
iudicio non omnino effectum culpae tollit, immo poenam relinquit; et ideo in priorem statum hominem non statim restituit. Et quoniam misericors est, ideo etiam amplius bonum reddit, quia magis indiget; ideo non tantum restituit innocentiam, sed etiam dat gratiam. Ideo, quamvis delere posset Deus sine medio culpam, decrevit tamen delere per gratiam, quae non tantum faceret innocentem, immo etiam naturam debilitatam habilitaret ad bonum. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus solus delet; dicendum, quod verum est effective, sed formaliter delet ipsa gratia; Deus autem nullius est forma perfectiva10.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solus creat; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia creare dicit opus, quod non respicit materiam recipientem11; sed iustificare respicit materiam subiectam, et ideo non tantum respicit efficientem causam, verum etiam formalem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod culpa aufert innocentiam; dicendum, quod non decrevit Deus restituere innocentiam, quin daret gratiam, ratione prius habita12.
4. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut gratia expellit, quando est etc.; dicendum, quod quando est, et simul est. — Ad illud quod obiicit, quod accidentis esse est inesse; dicendum, quod gratia est accidens et habet ortum realiter ab alio quam a subiecto proprio, scilicet a Deo13. Unde triplicem habet comparationem: ad principium, a quo procedit; ad peccatum contrarium, quod expellit; ad subiectum, quod perficit; et omnes istae comparationes sunt simul tempore, tamen naturaliter prius gratia comparatur ad principium, a quo procedit, secundo ad peccatum, quod expellit, tertio ad subiectum, quod perficit. Unde proprie loquendo, prius est gratia ab efficiente, quam expellat culpam, per naturam. — Et sic patet responsio ad illud. Obiicit enim de esse gratiae, in quantum informat subiectum; prius autem est gratiam creari per naturam, quam subiectum esse gratia informatum. Unde sicut in actione et productione aliarum formarum intelligimus, quod forma prius se habeat in ratione virtutis agentis quam qualitatis informantis; sic in proposito intelligatur, tamen prioritas non est temporis, sed naturae.
5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod gratia aliquando dicitur habitus, aliquando actus, aliquando status est in habitu. Iustificatio autem dicitur magis actus gratiae vel status, quam dicatur ipse habitus. Quare autem magis sic appellatur, infra14 videbitur.
I. Principia hic, in seqq. quaestionibus et in Breviloq. p. V. c. 3. de iustificatione posita illustrantur et confirmantur mirabili doctrina Concilii Trident. in Sess. VI. — Quid sit iustificatio, vide hic q. 1. ad 5, infra dub. 4; II. Sent. d. 5. a. 3. ad 1, ubi duplex distinguitur iustificatio, prout terminus a quo (sive non-iustus) sumitur negative, vel privative. Ad eam a Scholasticis requiruntur quatuor: duo ex parte Dei, scilicet gratiae infusio et peccati remissio, et duo ex parte hominis, nempe motus liberi arbitrii et contritio. Ita infra q. 3. 4; II. Sent. d. 26. dub. 3, et Breviloq. p. V. c. 3; cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 1. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 113. a. 6, et de Veritate q. 28. a. 1. Quo sensu eadem cadat sub merito, docetur hic dub. 4; d. 41. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1, d. 40. q. 2.
II. Circa 1. quaestionem notandum, quod gratia hic intelligitur gratia habitualis (vide supra d. 15. p. II. dub. 1.), quae « formaliter delet » peccatum (hic ad 1.); quod confirmatur a Concilio Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 7. et can. 11.). — Attamen etiam post hoc Concilium fuerant doctores catholici, qui cum Vasquez asseruerunt, in adultis actum contritionis perfectae, etiam praescindendo a gratia habituali, per se iustificare; quae sententia communiter improbatur, cum talis actus, licet eum semper sequatur iustificatio, ad eam concurrat non nisi dispositive et meritorie de congruo. — Libere disputatur inter theologos: primo, utrum forma gratiae sanctificantis iam ex natura sua physica formaliter expellat peccatum, an tantum moraliter sive ex Dei ordinatione; cum Scoto (supra d. 16. q. 2. n. 5; II. Sent. d. 29. n. 7.) Nominales aliique tenent contra scholam S. Thomae. Utroque modo gratiam peccato esse oppositam, S. Bonav. satis clare docet hic et II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; I. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, et Breviloq. loc. cit. — Item secundo controvertitur de possibili, utrum Deus absolute possit sine gratia illa remittere culpam, ut cum Scoto docet S. Bonav. (hic in corp., et II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.); insuper, utrum in alio ordine providentiae possit simul stare gratia materialiter sumta cum statu peccati mortalis, ut putant Scotistae, refragantibus Thomistis. — Denique tertio non conveniunt scholae in solvenda quaestione hic in solut. ad 4. tacta, scilicet de ordine prioritatis inter quatuor, quae eodem tempore fiunt in iustificatione; de quo infra a. 2. q. 1. 2. plura ponuntur; cfr. etiam supra d. 14. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.
III. De eadem 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 4. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3; cfr. IV. Sent. d. 16. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. I. II. q. 113. a. 2; de Verit. q. 28. a. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 1, et Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
IV. De 2. quaestione cfr. Concil. Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 5. 6. can. 4. 9. 11.); Bonav. II. Sent. d. 26. dub. 3, ubi etiam explicatur, quare iustificatio modo tribuatur fidei, modo gratiae, modo poenitentiae. Haec quaestio est de praeparatione tempore praecedente. — De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 3. — Scoti loci de hac et seq. q. collecti in Sum. Hieron. de Montefortino III. p. II. q. 113. a. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 3. 4; de Verit. q. 28. a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. loc. cit. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
V. De 3. quaestione cfr. Concil. Trident. loc. cit. c. 6. can. 8. et Sess. XIV. c. 4. can. 4. 5. Insuper Bonav. infra a. 2. q. 2-4, et d. 16. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. scholion. — Item Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. et a. 2. 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4; S. loc. cit. a. 5; de Verit. loc. cit. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
VI. Quaestionis 4. conclusio omnino intelligenda est de confessione actu facta, non de voto sive proposito confitendi, ut auctor ipse se explicat in solutt. ad 1-6. Hoc confirmatur doctrina Concilii Trident. (Sess. XIV. c. 4.): « Docet praeterea, etsi contritionem hanc aliquando caritate perfectam esse contingat hominemque Deo reconciliare, priusquam hoc Sacramentum actu suscipiatur; ipsam nihilominus reconciliationem ipsi contritioni sine Sacramenti voto, quod in illa includitur, non esse adscribendam » (cfr. Sess. VI. c. 14.). Opposita autem opinio Petri Oxomensis an. 1479 est damnata a Sixto IV, scilicet prop. 1: « Peccata mortalia quantum ad culpam et poenam alterius saeculi delentur per solam cordis contritionem sine ordine ad claves ». De doctrina S. Doctoris circa hanc rem male a pluribus intellecta vide infra scholion ad q. 4. articuli 2. — De eadem (4.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 6. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.
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Article I. On the things which are necessary for the justification of the wicked absolutely.
Question I. Whether for the justification of the wicked an infusion of grace is necessary.
Concerning the first, that an infusion of grace is necessary, it seems [so].
1. To the Romans, the third chapter1: Justified through his grace etc.
2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because sin is a privation; but a privation is not removed except through the conferring of a habit: therefore in the deletion of sin some habit is conferred. But sin was displeasing to God and made [one] displeasing: therefore from opposites, that habit is pleasing to God and makes [one] pleasing; but this we call grace making [one] pleasing2: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, through sin man is separated from God, therefore from opposites, in justification he is united to God; but union in God is not without a disposition uniting [him], because then3 the sinner, an enemy to God, would have God before grace: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, it is not fitting that there be, after this state, [any] but two places, namely of glory and of penalty4: therefore it is not fitting that man be [anywhere] except in a state in which he can be in one of these: therefore mortal man must necessarily be either in guilt or in grace; but through justification he withdraws from the state of guilt: therefore it is necessary that the habit of grace be conferred upon him.
On the contrary: 1. Isaiah, the forty-third chapter5: I am he who blots out your iniquities for my own sake: therefore the deletion of guilt will be before the habit of grace.
2. Likewise, it is no less wicked to justify than to create6; but God creates without a medium: therefore he also justifies.
3. Likewise, the fall was properly from innocence into guilt7: therefore since the reformation should correspond to the deformation, man ought to be restored into pure innocence; but this is intermediate between guilt and grace: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if grace expels guilt, [it does so] either when it [grace] is, or when it is not. If when it is; but the being of an accident is to be-in8: therefore it expels guilt when it is in the subject; I ask: from what subject? Not from another's nor from its own, because the expelling of guilt is prior to the man's being made pleasing by grace. If when it is not; but nothing acts when it is not: therefore it does not expel.
5. Likewise, justification is a certain grace: therefore if [it is] from grace, likewise that [grace is] from another, and so on to infinity.
Conclusion. God decreed to delete guilt through grace, which not only restores innocence, but also fits the weakened nature for good.
I respond: It must be said: since in every work of the Lord there is mercy and truth9, this most of all ought to be in a noble work, namely in the work of justification. Since therefore man sinned and merited nothing before the infusion of grace in God's sight, God by a just
judgment does not wholly take away the effect of guilt, but rather leaves the penalty; and therefore he does not at once restore man to his former state. And since he is merciful, therefore he also renders a greater good, because [man] is in greater need; therefore he not only restores innocence, but also gives grace. Therefore, although God could delete guilt without a medium, he nevertheless decreed to delete [it] through grace, which would not only make [one] innocent, but also would fit the weakened nature for good. Hence the reasons for this are to be granted.
1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that God alone deletes; it must be said that it is true effectively, but grace itself deletes formally; God, however, is the perfective form of nothing10.
2. To that which is objected, that he alone creates; it must be said that it is not the same: because to create names a work which does not regard a recipient matter11; but to justify regards a subject matter, and therefore regards not only the efficient cause, but also the formal.
3. To that which is objected, that guilt takes away innocence; it must be said that God did not decree to restore innocence without giving grace, by the reason previously given12.
4. To that which is asked: whether grace expels [guilt] when it is etc.; it must be said that when it is, it also is together [with the subject]. — To that which objects, that the being of an accident is to be-in; it must be said that grace is an accident and has its origin really from another than from its proper subject, namely from God13. Hence it has a threefold relation: to the principle from which it proceeds; to the contrary sin, which it expels; to the subject, which it perfects; and all these relations are simultaneous in time, yet by nature grace is first related to the principle from which it proceeds, secondly to the sin which it expels, thirdly to the subject which it perfects. Hence properly speaking, grace is prior from the efficient [cause] than that it expel guilt, by nature. — And thus the reply to that [objection] is clear. For it objects concerning the being of grace, insofar as it informs the subject; but it is prior that grace be created by nature, than that the subject be informed by grace. Hence just as in the action and production of other forms we understand that the form is first had in the account of an active power rather than of an informing quality; so let it be understood in the matter proposed, yet the priority is not of time, but of nature.
5. To that which is objected lastly, it must be said that grace is sometimes called a habit, sometimes an act, sometimes a state in a habit. But justification is called rather an act of grace or a state, than that it be called the habit itself. But why it is rather so named, will be seen below14.
I. The principles set down here, in the following questions, and in the Breviloquium p. V. c. 3 concerning justification are illustrated and confirmed by the admirable doctrine of the Council of Trent in Session VI. — What justification is, see here q. 1. ad 5, below dub. 4; II Sent. d. 5. a. 3. ad 1, where a twofold justification is distinguished, according as the terminus a quo (or non-just) is taken negatively or privatively. For it four things are required by the Scholastics: two on the part of God, namely the infusion of grace and the remission of sin, and two on the part of man, namely the movement of free will and contrition. Thus below q. 3. 4; II Sent. d. 26. dub. 3, and Breviloquium p. V. c. 3; cf. also below a. 2. q. 1. St. Thomas, Summa I. II. q. 113. a. 6, and On Truth q. 28. a. 1. In what sense the same falls under merit is taught here dub. 4; d. 41. a. 1. q. 1; III Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1, d. 40. q. 2.
II. Concerning the 1st question it is to be noted that grace here is understood as habitual grace (see above d. 15. p. II. dub. 1.), which "formally deletes" sin (here ad 1.); which is confirmed by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI. c. 7. and can. 11.). — Yet even after this Council there had been Catholic doctors who with Vasquez asserted that in adults the act of perfect contrition, even prescinding from habitual grace, justifies of itself; which opinion is commonly disapproved, since such an act, although justification always follows upon it, concurs to it only dispositively and meritoriously by congruity. — It is freely disputed among theologians: first, whether the form of sanctifying grace already from its physical nature formally expels sin, or only morally or from God's ordination; with Scotus (above d. 16. q. 2. n. 5; II Sent. d. 29. n. 7.) the Nominalists and others hold against the school of St. Thomas. That grace is opposed to sin in both ways, St. Bonaventure teaches clearly enough here and II Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1; III Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; I Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, and Breviloquium loc. cit. — Likewise secondly it is controverted concerning the possible, whether God absolutely can without that grace remit guilt, as with Scotus St. Bonaventure teaches (here in the body, and II Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.); moreover, whether in another order of providence grace taken materially could stand together with the state of mortal sin, as the Scotists think, the Thomists opposing. — Finally thirdly the schools do not agree in solving the question touched here in the solution ad 4, namely concerning the order of priority among the four [things] which happen at the same time in justification; concerning which more is set down below a. 2. q. 1. 2.; cf. also above d. 14. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.
III. On the same 1st question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 17. m. 4. a. 6. § 1. — Scotus, I Sent. d. 17. q. 3; cf. IV Sent. d. 16. q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. subquestion 1; Summa I. II. q. 113. a. 2; On Truth q. 28. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 3. subquestion 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 2. — On this and the following question Durandus, here q. 1, and Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.
IV. On the 2nd question cf. the Council of Trent (Sess. VI. c. 5. 6. can. 4. 9. 11.); Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 26. dub. 3, where it is also explained why justification is now attributed to faith, now to grace, now to penitence. This question is concerning the preparation preceding in time. — On the same question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 3. — Scotus' places on this and the following question are collected in the Summa of Hieronymus de Montefortino III. p. II. q. 113. a. 5. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. subquestion 2. 3; Summa loc. cit. a. 3. 4; On Truth q. 28. a. 3. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. subquestion 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following question, loc. cit. q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.
V. On the 3rd question cf. the Council of Trent loc. cit. c. 6. can. 8. and Sess. XIV. c. 4. can. 4. 5. Moreover Bonaventure below a. 2. q. 2-4, and d. 16. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. scholion. — Likewise Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. and a. 2. 3. 4. — St. Thomas, here loc. cit. subquestion 4; Summa loc. cit. a. 5; On Truth loc. cit. a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. subquestion 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
VI. The conclusion of the 4th question is to be understood entirely of confession actually made, not of the vow or purpose of confessing, as the author himself explains in the solutions ad 1-6. This is confirmed by the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV. c. 4.): "It teaches besides, that although this contrition may sometimes happen to be made perfect by charity and to reconcile man to God, before this Sacrament be actually received; nevertheless that reconciliation is not to be ascribed to the contrition itself without the vow of the Sacrament, which is included in it" (cf. Sess. VI. c. 14.). But the opposite opinion of Peter of Osma in the year 1479 was condemned by Sixtus IV, namely proposition 1: "Mortal sins, as to guilt and the penalty of the other world, are deleted through contrition of heart alone, without order to the keys." Concerning the doctrine of the holy Doctor on this matter, badly understood by many, see below the scholion to q. 4. of article 2. — On the same (4th) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. 2. — Scotus, in both Writings here a single question. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1. subquestion 1; Suppl. q. 6. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. subquestion 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 4. — Durandus, here q. 9. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5.
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- 1[Page 418] Cap. 1. [scil. Ad Rom. 3.] — Vers. 24: Iustificati gratis per etc. — Plurimi codd. omittunt a parte; codd. FG ipsi.[Page 418] Chapter 1 [i.e. Romans 3]. — Verse 24: Justified freely through etc. — Very many codices omit a parte [on the part of]; codices FG [read] ipsi [his].
- 2Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. et d. 35. a. 1. et 2.Cf. II Sent. d. 26. q. 1. and d. 35. a. 1. and 2.
- 3Particula tunc accipienda est pro secus. — Pro in Deo codd. FG cum Deo. Mox pro inimicus codd. IK non unitus, pro Deo codd. HPQ Dei, et pro ante gratiam Deum codd. HN aa clarius ante Deum quam gratiam, codd. RST aliquam gratiam Domini, edd. gratiam Dei.The particle tunc [then] is to be taken for secus [otherwise]. — For in Deo codices FG [read] cum Deo [with God]. Presently, for inimicus codices IK [read] non unitus [not united], for Deo codices HPQ Dei [of God], and for ante gratiam Deum codices HN aa more clearly ante Deum quam gratiam [God before grace], codices RST aliquam gratiam Domini [some grace of the Lord], the editions gratiam Dei [the grace of God].
- 4Vide infra d. 45. a. 1. q. 2.See below d. 45. a. 1. q. 2.
- 5Vers. 25: Ego sum, ego sum ipse, qui etc.Verse 25: I am, I am he myself, who etc.
- 6Secundum August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 72. n. 3. — Codd. omittunt impium.According to Augustine, On the Gospel of John, tract. 72. n. 3. — The codices omit impium [wicked].
- 7Cod. X addit homo. Inferius post debet multi codd. repetunt ergo, pro puram codd. OU primam.Codex X adds homo [man]. Below, after debet many codices repeat ergo [therefore]; for puram codices OU [read] primam [first].
- 8Ut insinuat Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.). Cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 9.As Aristotle suggests, Metaphysics VII. text 2 (VI. c. 1.). Cf. above p. 20, note 9.
- 9Psalm. 24, 10: Universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas. Cfr. infra d. 46. a. 2. q. 3. — Superius codd. TG pro Dicendum, quia bene Dicendum, quod si.Psalm 24, 10: All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Cf. below d. 46. a. 2. q. 3. — Above, codices TG for Dicendum, quia [it must be said that, since] well [read] Dicendum, quod si [it must be said that, if].
- 10Vide I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. et II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2.See I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. and II Sent. d. 26. q. 2.
- 11Edd. praeiacentem.The editions [read] praeiacentem [pre-existing].
- 12Cfr. etiam supra pag. 43, nota 5.Cf. also above p. 43, note 5.
- 13Ut ostensum est II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. — Post pauca verbis ad principium codd. EMRST interserunt Deum. — Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.As was shown II Sent. d. 26. q. 3. — A little later, into the words ad principium codices EMRST insert Deum [God]. — Cf. below a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.
- 14Vide infra a. 2. q. 1.See below a. 2. q. 1.