Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16
Articulus III. De contritione quoad durationem.
Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de duratione contritionis. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum contritio sit motus instantaneus, vel successivus. Secundo quaeritur de diuturnitate contritionis, utrum homo debeat semper conteri.
Quaestio I. Utrum contritio sit motus instantaneus, an successivus.
Circa primum ostenditur, quod sit successivus hoc modo.
1. Omnis actus, circa quem est minus diuturnum et magis diuturnum, est successivus; sed talis est contritio1: ergo etc.
2. Item, «nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore», ut dicit Philosophus2, quia est animae ut corpori unitae; sed contritio similiter est animae ut corpori unitae: ergo etc.
3. Item, omnis aspectus collativus est successivus; sed in contritione est aspectus collativus, quia3 dolet de peccato in comparatione ad Deum, quem offendit4: ergo etc.
4. Item, quod successive inducatur contritio, videtur: quia omnis forma habens partem et partem inducitur successive; sed contritio habet partem et partem, quia potest intendi et remitti: ergo inducitur successive.
5. Item, omnis forma, quae habet contrariam dispositionem in materia, inducitur successive5; sed contritio habet induci in liberum arbitrium subiectum peccato, per quod privatur gratia et fit ad ma-
lum prona, quae pronitas ex opposito respondet contritioni, sicut culpa ex opposito gratiae: ergo inducitur successive.
Contra: 1. Contritio necessaria est iustificationi impii; et illa est in instanti6: ergo et contritio.
2. Item, Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate7 dicit, quod si oculus esset actu videns, et obiectum ex opposito crearetur, simul esset et videretur: ergo si actus visus potest esse in instanti, multo fortius actus intellectus et affectus: ergo et contritio.
3. Item, «delectatio est in instanti», sicut vult Philosophus8, quia est habens se per modum quietis et non ipsius coniunctionis convenientis cum convenienti: ergo et dolor, qui opponitur ei; sed contritio est dolor: ergo etc.
4. Item, ad illuminationem distantia localis exigitur, et tamen illuminatio in oculo et esse luminis est in instanti9: ergo multo fortius in primo actu gratiae est mutatio subita.
Conclusio
Contritio est successiva quoad durationem et praeparationem in fieri, sed quoad esse et inductionem formae est instantanea.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de contritione quantum ad durationem, et quantum ad esse, et quantum ad fieri. Si quantum ad durationem, cum duret longo tempore; sic dico, quod est successiva, sicut est vivere hominis. Si quantum ad esse, quia est actus fixus in detestatione peccati et actus ut quies; sic dico, quod esse eius est in instanti. — Si quantum ad fieri, est distinguendum, quia in fieri est praeparatio et formae inductio. Dico ergo, quod praeparatio ad actum contritionis est successiva, quia multa oportet prius considerare; sed ipse dissensus animae postea in instanti fit. —
Ad argumenta. Rationes autem probantes, quod sit instantanea, quia probant quoad inductionem in esse et ipsum esse, verae sunt.
Ad 1, 2. Primae duae rationes, quae probant successionem, intelliguntur de inductione et praeparatione naturae10; diuturnitas enim est ratione successionis; similiter nostrum intelligere est ratione acquisitionis speciei per sensum et phantasiam11.
Ad 3. Sed quod obiicitur, quod habet esse successivum per collationem; dicendum, quod collatio potest esse dupliciter: uno modo discursus ab uno in aliud, et haec successiva est; et alio modo duorum comparatio secundum aliquem respectum; et tunc accipiuntur plura in una ratione, et talis potest esse in instanti et simul de pluribus; alioquin nunquam de consonantia musica posset iudicari, cum una vis iudicet de duobus sonis ad invicem comparatis.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habet partem et partem; dicendum, quod forma quae habet partem et partem, aut educitur de materia, aut ab agente exit. Si educitur de materia; sic, quia ibi habet partem suae essentiae, cum est ibi contrarium, pro eo quod contraria habent unam naturam communem, educitur successive, ut albedo. Forma vero, quae totaliter est ab extrinseco, tota et simul datur, qualis est forma luminis, quae, quamvis habeat partem et partem, non tamen in materia, quia eius oppositum est privatio. Talis est contritio, quasi motus procedens a gratia et libero arbitrio, non de materia eductus.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contrarium habet in materia; dicendum, quod est habere contrariam dispositionem in materia, nullo tamen modo resistentem; et haec non facit successionem in inductione formae nec in praeparatione, ut cum Deus de aqua vinum fecit. Et est habere ut resistentem informationi; et tunc est successio in inductione, ut
cum ex calido fit frigidum. Et est habere ut resistentem non informationi, sed usui; et sic pronitas resistit usui gratiae et contritioni, non informationi, quia simul est; et haec ponit successionem in duratione et in usu contritionis, non in prima inductione. Pronitas enim, quia poena est, simul stat cum contritione; culpa vero, quia privatio est, non resistit, sicut nec tenebra inductioni lucis.
I. Primam quaestionem (de qua cfr. infra a. 1. q. 2. et supra a. 1. q. 1. scholion) eodem sensu solvunt Guliel. Antissiod. (Sum. p. IV. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 5.) et Petr. a Tar. (d. 17. q. 1. a. 5. quaestiunc. 1.). Sed Alex. Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 2. § 1.) quoad esse ipsius actus detestationis dissentire videtur. Nam respondet cum hac distinctione: «Quantum ad esse introductum potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo, in quantum contritio dicitur substantia ipsius motus informati gratia, quo primo fit remissio peccati; et hoc modo est in instanti. Alio modo, in quantum dicitur actus vel motus, qui est displicentia mali commissi in offensam et contemptum Dei; sic est successiva». Etiam Scot. (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 2. n. 14–16.) videtur idem docere, scilicet quod licet actus poenitentiae in fieri requirat durationem, non vero in facto esse. Loquitur autem ibi de modo, quo attritio fit contritio, et distinguit actum illum in genere naturae et moris et ut est formatus, insuper ponit tria signa naturae. Sed de hoc loco valde vexato cfr. ibi commentator Scoti. — Alii commentatores Lombardi non tractant praecise hanc quaestionem, sed infra de iustificatione (d. 17. p. I. a. 2.) similia inquirunt.
II. Seq. (2.) quaestio simili modo solvitur a doctoribus. Cfr. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thom., d. 17. q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. 2; Suppl. q. 4. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 33. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Dionys. Carth., d. 17. q. 4.
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Article III. On contrition with respect to its duration.
Next, with respect to the third article, the question is asked concerning the duration of contrition. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether contrition is an instantaneous or a successive motion. Second it is asked concerning the long-lastingness of contrition, whether a man ought always to be contrite.
Question I. Whether contrition is an instantaneous or a successive motion.
Concerning the first, it is shown that it is successive, in this way.
1. Every act, with respect to which there is a less-lasting and a more-lasting, is successive; but such is contrition1: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, "our understanding is with the continuum and with time," as the Philosopher says2, because it belongs to the soul as united to a body; but contrition likewise belongs to the soul as united to a body: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, every comparative regard is successive; but in contrition there is a comparative regard, because3 one grieves over sin in comparison to God, whom one offends4: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, that contrition is induced successively seems to be the case: because every form having part and part is induced successively; but contrition has part and part, since it can be intensified and remitted: therefore it is induced successively.
5. Likewise, every form which has a contrary disposition in the matter is induced successively5; but contrition has to be induced into free will subjected to sin, through which it is deprived of grace and made prone to e-
vil, which proneness corresponds, as its opposite, to contrition, just as fault corresponds, as its opposite, to grace: therefore it is induced successively.
On the contrary: 1. Contrition is necessary for the justification of the impious; and that justification is in an instant6: therefore so too is contrition.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the fourteenth book On the Trinity7 says that if an eye were actually seeing, and an object were created opposite it, the two would exist and be seen at once: therefore if the act of sight can be in an instant, much more can the act of intellect and affection: therefore so too contrition.
3. Likewise, "delight is in an instant," as the Philosopher holds8, because it has itself after the manner of rest and not of the fitting conjunction itself of the fitting with the fitting: therefore so too sorrow, which is opposed to it; but contrition is sorrow: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, for illumination local distance is required, and yet the illumination in the eye and the being of light is in an instant9: therefore much more in the first act of grace is the change sudden.
Conclusion
Contrition is successive with respect to its duration and to its preparation in becoming, but with respect to its being and to the induction of the form it is instantaneous.
I respond: It must be said that one may speak of contrition with respect to its duration, and with respect to its being, and with respect to its becoming. If with respect to duration, since it lasts a long time; in that respect I say that it is successive, just as the living of a man is. If with respect to being, because it is a fixed act in the detestation of sin and an act after the manner of rest; in that respect I say that its being is in an instant. — If with respect to becoming, a distinction must be made, because in the becoming there is preparation and the induction of the form. I say therefore that the preparation for the act of contrition is successive, because many things must first be considered; but the dissent of the soul itself afterward comes to be in an instant. —
To the arguments. The reasons proving that it is instantaneous, since they prove with respect to the induction into being and to the being itself, are true.
To 1, 2. The first two reasons, which prove succession, are to be understood of the induction and preparation of nature10; for the long-lastingness is by reason of the succession; likewise our understanding is by reason of the acquisition of the species through sense and imagination11.
To 3. But as to what is objected, that it has successive being through comparing; it must be said that comparison can be twofold: in one way, a discursion from one thing to another, and this is successive; and in another way, a comparing of two things according to some respect; and then several things are taken in one account, and such comparison can be in an instant and at once concerning several things; otherwise one could never judge concerning musical consonance, since one power judges concerning two sounds compared with one another.
To 4. As to what is objected, that it has part and part; it must be said that a form which has part and part is either educed from matter or proceeds from an agent. If it is educed from matter; thus, because there it has a part of its essence, since the contrary is there, inasmuch as contraries have one common nature, it is educed successively, as whiteness. But a form which is wholly from without is given whole and at once, such as is the form of light, which, although it has part and part, yet not in matter, because its opposite is privation. Such is contrition, as a motion proceeding from grace and free will, not educed from matter.
To 5. As to what is objected, that the contrary has [a disposition] in the matter; it must be said that there is a having of a contrary disposition in the matter, yet in no way resisting; and this does not make succession in the induction of the form nor in the preparation, as when God made wine from water. And there is a having [of it] as resisting the in-formation; and then there is succession in the induction, as
when from hot cold comes to be. And there is a having [of it] as resisting not the in-formation, but the use; and thus proneness resists the use of grace and contrition, not the in-formation, because it is present at the same time; and this posits a succession in the duration and in the use of contrition, not in the first induction. For proneness, since it is a punishment, stands together with contrition; but fault, since it is a privation, does not resist, just as neither does darkness resist the induction of light.
I. The first question (concerning which cf. below a. 1, q. 2 and above a. 1, q. 1, scholion) is solved in the same sense by William of Auxerre (Summa p. IV, tr. 6, c. 2, q. 5) and Peter of Tarentaise (d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, little-question 1). But Alexander of Hales (Summa p. IV, q. 17, m. 2, a. 2, § 1) seems to disagree as to the being of the act of detestation itself. For he answers with this distinction: "As to the introduced being, it can be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as contrition is called the substance of the motion itself in-formed by grace, by which the remission of sin first comes about; and in this way it is in an instant. In another way, insofar as it is called an act or motion which is the displeasure at the evil committed unto the offense and contempt of God; thus it is successive." Scotus too (IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 14–16) seems to teach the same, namely that although the act of penance in its becoming requires duration, yet not in its accomplished being. But he speaks there of the manner in which attrition becomes contrition, and he distinguishes that act in the genus of nature and of morals and as it is formed, and moreover posits three signs of nature. But concerning this much-vexed passage cf. there the commentator on Scotus. — The other commentators on Lombard do not treat precisely this question, but below, concerning justification (d. 17, p. I, a. 2), they inquire into similar things.
II. The following (2.) question is solved in a similar way by the doctors. Cf. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — St. Thomas, d. 17, q. 2, a. 4, little-questions 1, 2; Suppl. q. 4, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 33. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 4, little-question 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 17, q. 4.
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- 1Quaedam enim est brevior, quaedam diuturnior.For one [contrition] is shorter, another more long-lasting.
- 2De Memoria et reminisc. c. 1: Non contingit intelligere aliquid sine continuo neque sine tempore etc.On Memory and Reminiscence c. 1: It does not happen that one understands anything without a continuum nor without time, etc.
- 3Ut ostenditur infra a. 1. q. 1. [scil. a. 1, q. 1, but the running reference here points within the article].As is shown below, a. 1, q. 1.
- 4Cfr. supra pag. 248, nota 4. et 6.Cf. above, p. 248, notes 4 and 6.
- 5Cfr. supra d. 15. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. — Cod. E esset (pro est). Codd. A K informaret. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.Cf. above, d. 15, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 7. — Codex E reads esset (for est). Codices A and K read informaret. — See the scholion to the preceding question.
- 6Vide infra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, a. 2. q. 1. seqq. et dub. 5.See below, d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4; a. 2, q. 1 and following, and dubium 5.
- 7Cap. 10. n. 13: Quaedam vero [cognoscibilia] simul esse incipiunt [cum cognitione], veluti si aliquid visibile, quod omnino non erat, ante nostros oculos oriatur, cognitionem nostram utique non praecedit; aut si aliquid sonet, ubi adest auditor, simul profecto incipiunt esse simulque desinunt et sonus et eius auditus. — Pro videretur codd. et ed. 1 videret.Chapter 10, n. 13: But certain [knowable things] begin to exist together [with the knowledge of them], as for instance if something visible, which was not at all, should arise before our eyes, it surely does not precede our knowledge of it; or if something should sound where a hearer is present, surely both the sound and the hearing of it begin to exist at the same time and cease at the same time. — For videretur the codices and the first edition read videret.
- 8Libr. X. Ethic. c. 3. et 4, ubi ostendit, delectationem nec motum nec generationem esse, cum non fiat in tempore, sed esse similem visioni, quae in momento, in primo instanti temporis completur et quocumque tempore perfecta est, quia ipsa consistit in simplici actione, consequente coniunctionem obiecti cum sensu.Book X of the Ethics, c. 3 and 4, where he shows that delight is neither a motion nor a generation, since it does not come to be in time, but is like vision, which is completed in a moment, in the first instant of time, and is perfect in whatever [length of] time, because it itself consists in a simple action consequent upon the conjunction of the object with the sense.
- 9Haymo exponens illud 1. Cor. 15, 52: In ictu oculi: Ictus oculi est quod palpebra icit i. e. percutit oculum, vel quod melius vult August. [cfr. Epist. 102. alias 49. q. 1. n. 5; IV. de Genes. ad lit. c. 34. n. 54. seq., et Serm. 277. alias 102. de Diversis, c. 10. n. 10. seq.], ne tanta mora fiat in iudicio, ictus oculi intelligitur, quo solis splendore subito, ut vix cogitari possit, feritur oculus. — Cod. bb igitur.Haymo, expounding that passage of 1 Cor. 15:52, In the twinkling of an eye: The "twinkling of an eye" is what the eyelid flicks, that is, strikes the eye; or rather, as Augustine prefers [cf. Epist. 102, otherwise 49, q. 1, n. 5; book IV On Genesis to the Letter c. 34, n. 54 f., and Serm. 277, otherwise 102, On Various Topics, c. 10, n. 10 f.], lest there be such delay in the judgment, the "twinkling of an eye" is understood to be that by which the eye is struck by the sudden splendor of the sun, so swiftly that it can scarcely be thought. — Codex bb reads igitur.
- 10Cod. K (1 a secunda manu) materiae; bene, si post inductione adderetur formae. Post intelligere ex codd. E U substituimus est pro cum, codd. K Y aa est cum; et pro est ratione codd. N aa cum tempore. (Probabilius legendum est cum tempore ratione.) — Ut Aristot. loc. cit. insinuat. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 382, nota 2.Codex K (1 by a second hand) reads materiae; rightly, if after inductione one added formae. After intelligere, from codices E and U, we have substituted est for cum; codices K, Y, aa read est cum; and for est ratione, codices N, aa read cum tempore. (It is more probably to be read est cum tempore ratione.) — As Aristotle, loc. cit., implies. Cf. tome III, p. 382, note 2.
- 11Ita codd. BE (TUX a secunda manu), codd. FG habet successionem et collationem, alii codd. et edd. habet successivum et collativum (codd. H L bb et collationem). — Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 144. seqq. (III. c. 2.), ubi idem docet de sensu communi respectu sensationum sensuum externorum. Vide etiam II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1, ubi dicitur, quod multa simul possumus intelligere et velle, in quantum unum sunt. — Superius pro discursus ed. 1 cum plurimis codd. dissensus (descensus?).So codices B, E (T, U, X by a second hand); codices F, G have successionem et collationem; other codices and editions have successivum et collativum (codices H, L, bb et collationem). — Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 144 ff. (III, c. 2), where he teaches the same concerning the common sense with respect to the sensations of the external senses. Cf. also II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, where it is said that we can understand and will many things at once, insofar as they are one. — Above, for discursus the first edition with very many codices reads dissensus (descensus?).