Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16
Quaestio II. Utrum possibile sit, in dolore contritionis esse excessum.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit, in dolore contritionis cadere excessum. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia omnis motus, cui ad hoc, quod sit bonus, oportet admisceri aliquid de contrario, potest esse nimius; sed dolori contritionis debet admisceri gaudium1: ergo potest nimis intendi.
2. Item, omnis virtus, quae habet obiectum creatum, potest habere nimium; quia, si creatum est, ergo habet sibi debitum limitatum amorem et odium; sed contritio sive poenitentia est huiusmodi2: ergo potest habere excessum.
3. Item, in contritione dolor est passio; sed omnis passio, in re corporali facta, potest magis et magis intendi et per suam intensionem potest inducere mortem3; et quae mortem inducit est superflua: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Contritio est motus gratia informatus4; sed gratia non potest nimis intendi, nec motus eius, quia omnis motus eius est laudabilis: ergo nec contritio.
2. Item, quantum diligenda est alicuius boni praesentia, tantum detestanda est amissio et absentia; sed Deum non potest aliquis nimium amare et appetere: ergo peccatum, quod est a Deo separativum, non potest nimis detestari.
3. Item, Anselmus5 appetebat, viscera exsiccari ex intensione divini amoris: ergo non est malum ex intensione divini amoris talia appetere propter Deum: eadem ratione nec malum ex intensione doloris propter recuperandum Deum.
Conclusio. Contritio quoad displicentiam rationis non potest esse nimia, sed quoad passionem redundantem in sensualitatem posset habere excessum.
Respondeo: Sicut dictum est6, in contritione est dolor, prout est displicentia voluntatis rationalis, et est dolor-passio redundans in sensualitatem. Quantum ergo ad displicentiam rationis concedo, quod non potest esse contritio nimia, quia peccatum nulli potest displicere nimis in quantum peccatum. —
Quantum autem ad passionem redundantem in sensualitatem, vix aut nunquam est nimia; tamen posset esse tantus dolor, quod humana infirmitas non posset sufferre sine magno detrimento; et tunc dico, quod temperandus esset. — Sed esto, quod non temperaret quis, quia non adverteret et raperetur a fervore; non credo, quod in tali casu peccaret, quia daret operam rei licitae7. Si autem advertit, debet temperare; tamen paucis hoc consilium est necessarium. Si autem non temperaret vel per affectionem gaudii, vel per consolationem spei; credo, quod transcenderet metas virtutis, et ita contritionis. Contritio enim sicut caritas, nominat quid informatum gratia. Unde dolor contritionis, manens contritionis, non potest esse nimius, quia displicentia peccati nunquam tantum potest intendi quod possit esse nimia, cum sit ex consideratione recta. — Rationes igitur, quae probant, quod dolor possit esse nimius secundum quod displicentia, solvendae sunt.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa: Ad 1. Quod obiicit, quod debet esse gaudium; dico, quod si esset dolor sine gaudio, ut in desperatis, bene esset excessus; sed talis non est motus contritionis, quae est, praesupposita spe de venia; unde talis, quando videt se dolere, necessario gaudet; et ideo non est superfluus.
Ad 2, 3. Ad aliud dicendum, quod poenitentia est in subiectum et in peccatum; et prout punit subiectum, bene posset excedere; sed prout detestatur peccatum, quia separat a summo Bono, secundum illam rationem respicit infinitatem et non habet excessum. — Tertium argumentum est concedendum: procedit enim de contritione, secundum quod nominat dolorem-passionem, non ipsum motum displicentiae peccati.
Ad argumenta pro parte opposita: Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non potest esse nimius, quia gratia informatus; dicendum, quod informatur ipsa displicentia et per consequens passio sensualitatis; tamen tantum posset illa passio intendi, quod gratia, quae movet ordinate, non informaretur8. — Alia ratio concedenda est, quia loquitur de detestatione.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, dicendum, quod non intelligit, viscera secundum veritatem sibi velle siccari, sed vocat ibi viscera intimos carnis appetitus. — Vel dicendum, quod siccationem viscerum vocat vulnera caritatis, qua anima languet ex absentia ipsius Christi9.
---
Question II. Whether it is possible for there to be excess in the pain of contrition.
Secondly it is asked whether it is possible for excess to occur in the pain of contrition. And that it is so seems [to be the case]:
1. Because every movement to which, in order that it be good, something of its contrary must be mixed in, can be excessive; but joy ought to be mixed into the pain of contrition1: therefore it can be intensified excessively.
2. Likewise, every virtue that has a created object can have an excess; for, if it is created, then it has owed to it a limited love and hatred; but contrition or penance is of this kind2: therefore it can have excess.
3. Likewise, in contrition the pain is a passion; but every passion, occurring in a corporeal thing, can be intensified more and more, and through its intensity can induce death3; and what induces death is superfluous: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. Contrition is a movement informed by grace4; but grace cannot be intensified excessively, nor its movement, because every movement of it is praiseworthy: therefore neither can contrition.
2. Likewise, as much as the presence of some good is to be loved, so much is its loss and absence to be detested; but one cannot love and desire God too much: therefore sin, which separates from God, cannot be too much detested.
3. Likewise, Anselm5 desired that his inward parts be dried up by the intensity of divine love: therefore it is not evil, out of the intensity of divine love, to desire such things for God's sake: by the same reasoning, neither [is it evil to desire] evil out of the intensity of pain for the recovering of God.
Conclusion. Contrition, as regards the displeasure of reason, cannot be excessive, but as regards the passion overflowing into the sensitive part it could have excess.
I respond: As has been said6, in contrition there is pain insofar as it is the displeasure of the rational will, and there is the pain-passion overflowing into the sensitive part. As regards, then, the displeasure of reason, I grant that contrition cannot be excessive, because sin cannot displease anyone too much insofar as it is sin. —
But as regards the passion overflowing into the sensitive part, it is scarcely or never excessive; nevertheless the pain could be so great that human weakness could not bear it without great harm; and then I say that it ought to be tempered. — But suppose that one does not temper it, because he does not advert to it and is carried away by fervor; I do not believe that in such a case he would sin, because he would be applying himself to a lawful thing7. But if he adverts to it, he ought to temper it; yet to few is this counsel necessary. But if he does not temper it either through the affection of joy or through the consolation of hope, I believe that he would transcend the bounds of virtue, and so too of contrition. For contrition, like charity, names something informed by grace. Hence the pain of contrition, remaining [the pain] of contrition, cannot be excessive, because the displeasure at sin can never be intensified so much that it could be excessive, since it proceeds from right consideration. — Therefore the arguments which prove that the pain can be excessive insofar as it is displeasure must be solved.
To the arguments for the affirmative side: To 1. As to the objection that there ought to be joy, I say that if there were pain without joy, as in those who despair, there would indeed be excess; but the movement of contrition is not such, since it is [a movement] with hope of pardon presupposed; hence such a one, when he sees himself grieving, necessarily rejoices; and therefore it is not superfluous.
To 2, 3. To the other it must be said that penance is [directed] toward the subject and toward sin; and insofar as it punishes the subject, it could well exceed; but insofar as it detests sin, because it separates from the highest Good, according to that account it regards infinity and has no excess. — The third argument is to be granted: for it proceeds concerning contrition insofar as it names the pain-passion, not the movement of displeasure at sin itself.
To the arguments for the opposite side: To 1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that it cannot be excessive because it is informed by grace, it must be said that the displeasure itself is informed [by grace], and consequently the passion of the sensitive part; nevertheless that passion could be so intensified that grace, which moves in an ordered way, would not inform it8. — The other reasoning is to be granted, because it speaks of detestation.
To 3. To that which is objected concerning Anselm, it must be said that he does not understand that he wills his inward parts to be dried up according to literal truth, but he there calls "inward parts" the innermost appetites of the flesh. — Or it must be said that by the drying up of the inward parts he means the wounds of charity, by which the soul languishes from the absence of Christ himself9.
---
- 1Cod. G omittit non sensualitatis, pro quo alii codd. cum ed. 1 vel sensualitatis (aliqui codd. sensibilitatis, in aliquibus legi potest sentientis).Codex G omits non sensualitatis, in place of which the other codices, with edition 1, [read] vel sensualitatis (some codices sensibilitatis, in some it can be read sentientis).
- 2Ut insinuatur in libro de Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.); cfr. infra dub. 10. et supra d. 14. p. II. dub. 7.As is suggested in the book On True and False Penance (among the works of Augustine); compare below, dub. 10, and above, d. 14, p. II, dub. 7.
- 3Quia ipsa, ut supra d. 14. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. ostensum est, non est virtus theologica, sed cardinalis. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. — Pro odium cod. aa gaudium.Because it [penance] itself, as was shown above, d. 14, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, is not a theological virtue but a cardinal one. Compare Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6. — For odium codex aa [reads] gaudium.
- 4Nam, sicut dicit Aristot. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.), omnis passio [πάθος, quod ab aliis latine redditur affectus], cum magis fit, detrahit a substantia.For, as Aristotle says, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 6), every passion [πάθος, which by others is rendered in Latin as affectus], when it grows greater, detracts from the substance.
- 5Vide supra a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.See above, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.
- 6Oratione 52: Utinam sic viscera animae meae dulci fervore vestrae [Iesu et Mariae] dilectionis exardescant, ut viscera carnis meae exarescant. Utinam sic intima spiritus mei dulcedine vestri affectus impinguentur, ut medullae corporis mei exsiccentur.In Prayer 52: "Would that the inward parts of my soul might so blaze with the sweet fervor of your [Jesus and Mary's] love, that the inward parts of my flesh might dry up. Would that the inmost parts of my spirit might so be fattened with the sweetness of your affection, that the marrow of my body might be dried up."
- 7Quaest. praeced. et a. I. q. I.The preceding question, and a. I, q. I.
- 8Codd. A K informaret.Codices A K [read] informaret.
- 9Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.