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Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus
p. 320

Quaestio II. Utrum poenitentia sit virtus generalis, an specialis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum poenitentia sit virtus generalis, an specialis. Et ostenditur, quod generalis:

1. Augustinus in libro de Quinque Responsionibus1: « Poenitentia est quaedam res optima et perfecta, omnes defectus revocans ad perfectum »; sed alio habitu restauratur defectus concupiscibilis et irascibilis: ergo poenitentia respicit omnes habitus. Sed hoc non posset facere, si esset specialis virtus: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione videtur; quia eiusdem virtutis, cuius est delectari in aliquo, est tristari et detestari oppositum; sed continentiae est delectari de actu castitatis2: ergo eiusdem est detestari actum incontinentiae, et sic de aliis. Sed poenitens detestatur omne peccatum: ergo etc.

3. Item, « habitus cognoscuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta »3; sed obiectum poenitentiae est peccatum in communi, quia ipsa omne peccatum detestatur et omne peccatum expellit: ergo poenitentia est virtus generalis et communis.

Contra: 1. Specialis virtutis est diligere bonum, quia bonum, scilicet caritatis4: ergo a simili, specialis virtutis est odire sive detestari malum, quia malum; sed hoc est poenitentiae: ergo etc.

2. Item, specialis doni est refugere malum faciendum sive declinare a malo, ut timoris5: ergo specialis virtutis est refugere malum iam factum; sed hoc est poenitentiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, poenitentia ordinatur ad unum actum tantum liberi arbitrii, non ad omnes, quia solum ad poenitere et dolere: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Poenitentia est virtus specialis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic fuit multiplex positio. — Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod est virtus generalis, et est pars iustitiae generalis, cuius est facere bonum et declinare a malo6. Unde sicut facere omne bonum est iustitiae generalis, sic declinare ab omni malo facto est iustitiae generalis; et hoc est poenitentiae: et ideo poenitentia est pars

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iustitiae generalis. Et quoniam iustitia generalis dicitur non per praedicationem, sed per quandam virtutum aggregationem, quia comprehendit multas virtutes — sicut una vinea multas vites, ut dicit Chrysostomus7, sic poenitentia comprehendit omnes virtutes — quando poenitet de malo luxuriae, tangit chordam continentiae; quando de malo superbiae, chordam humilitatis; ut sit venter conscientiae resonans in fletu quasi cithara, secundum illud Isaiae decimo sexto8: Venter meus ad Moab quasi cithara sonabit; quia, si secundum omnes virtutes flenda sunt peccata aliena, multo magis propria.

Sed haec positio non debet stare: quia, etsi poenitentia respiciat malum in communi, tamen respicit sub propria ratione et habet actum specialem, qui indiget virtute non tantum praecipiente, sed eliciente; ut, sicut ira per zelum, quae detestatur omne peccatum in proximo, est specialis virtus, quia respicit illud sub ratione digni poenae; et obedientia specialis virtus, quia respicit exsequendum sub ratione mandati9: sic etiam poenitentia specialis virtus, quia respicit sub ratione mali proprii a se contra Deum perpetrati, prout homo ex hoc dignus est puniri.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod effectum habet generalem; dicendum, quod illud est verum ratione connexionis virtutum, quia omnes defectus reparat; et magis est verum de ipsa quam de alia, quia aliorum actus est in formando10, actus poenitentiae in reformando.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eiusdem virtutis est gaudere de aliquo et de opposito tristari; dicendum, quod verum est imperative, sed non elicitive. Et hoc patet, quia caritas dictat et imperat fugere peccatum: sed tamen timor elicit motum fugae. Alterius enim virtutis est imperare, et alterius elicere, ut obedientia dictat Deo obediendum in hoc praecepto11: Non moechaberis, et continentia elicit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obiecto, dicendum, quod etsi non contrahatur ad speciale peccatum, tamen illud considerat sub speciali et propria ratione, hoc est, in quantum a se perpetratum et Dei offensivum, cui vult reconciliari et emendam facere; ideo est virtus specialis, quia virtus ponitur generalis vel specialis, non ratione obiecti, quod est materiale, sed secundum quod habet rationem motivi12.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether penance is a general or a special virtue.

Secondly it is asked, whether penance is a general or a special virtue. And it is shown that it is general:

1. Augustine in the book On the Five Responses1: "Penance is a certain most excellent and perfect thing, recalling all defects to perfection"; but it is by another habit that the defect of the concupiscible and the irascible [power] is restored: therefore penance regards all habits. But it could not do this, if it were a special virtue: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it appears by reason; for it belongs to the same virtue whose [property] it is to take delight in something, to be saddened by and to detest its opposite; but it belongs to continence to take delight in the act of chastity2: therefore it belongs to the same [virtue] to detest the act of incontinence, and so of the others. But the penitent detests every sin: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, "habits are known through acts, and acts through objects"3; but the object of penance is sin in general, because it itself detests every sin and expels every sin: therefore penance is a general and common virtue.

On the contrary: 1. It belongs to a special virtue to love the good, because it is good, namely [to the virtue] of charity4: therefore by similarity, it belongs to a special virtue to hate or detest evil, because it is evil; but this belongs to penance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it belongs to a special gift to flee from doing evil, or to turn away from evil, as [it belongs] to fear5: therefore it belongs to a special virtue to flee from evil already done; but this belongs to penance: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, penance is ordered to only one act of free choice, not to all, because [it is ordered] only to repenting and grieving: therefore etc.

Conclusion. Penance is a special virtue.

I respond: It must be said that here there was a manifold position. — For some wished to say that it is a general virtue, and is a part of general justice, whose [property] it is to do good and turn away from evil6. Hence just as to do every good belongs to general justice, so to turn away from every evil deed belongs to general justice; and this belongs to penance: and therefore penance is a part

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of general justice. And since general justice is so called not by predication, but by a certain aggregation of virtues, because it comprehends many virtues — just as one vineyard [comprehends] many vines, as Chrysostom says7, so penance comprehends all virtues — when one repents of the evil of lust, it touches the chord of continence; when of the evil of pride, the chord of humility; so that the belly of conscience may resound in weeping like a lyre, according to that [word] of Isaiah, the sixteenth [chapter]8: My belly shall sound like a lyre for Moab; because, if according to all the virtues the sins of others are to be wept over, much more one's own.

But this position ought not to stand: because, although penance regards evil in general, nevertheless it regards [it] under its proper account and has a special act, which requires a virtue not only commanding but eliciting; so that, just as anger through zeal, which detests every sin in one's neighbor, is a special virtue, because it regards it under the account of [being] deserving of punishment; and obedience [is] a special virtue, because it regards the carrying out [of a command] under the account of a mandate9: so too penance [is] a special virtue, because it regards [sin] under the account of an evil proper [to oneself], perpetrated by oneself against God, inasmuch as man is on this account deserving of punishment.

1. To the objection therefore which is raised on the contrary, that it has a general effect; it must be said that this is true by reason of the connection of the virtues, because it repairs all defects; and it is more true of it than of another [virtue], because the act of others is in forming10, but the act of penance in reforming.

2. To the objection which is raised, that it belongs to the same virtue to rejoice over something and to be saddened by its opposite; it must be said that this is true commandingly, but not elicitively. And this is clear, because charity dictates and commands the fleeing of sin: but nevertheless fear elicits the motion of flight. For it belongs to one virtue to command, and to another to elicit, as obedience dictates that God be obeyed in this precept11: Thou shalt not commit adultery, and continence elicits [the act].

3. To the objection which is raised concerning the object, it must be said that although it is not contracted to a special sin, nevertheless it considers it under a special and proper account, that is, inasmuch as [it is] perpetrated by oneself and offensive to God, with whom one wishes to be reconciled and to make amends; therefore it is a special virtue, because a virtue is reckoned general or special, not by reason of the object, which is material, but according as it has the account of a motive12.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Libr. III. (Hypognost. inter opera August.) c. 9, ubi textus originalis quae defectus revocat pro omnes defectus revocans. — In minori pro restauratur cod. I revocatur.
    Book III ([Hypognosticon,] among the works of Augustine) c. 9, where the original text [reads] which recalls the defect for recalling all defects. — In the minor [premise], for restauratur codex I [reads] revocatur.
  2. 2
    Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3; VII. c. 3. seqq., et de Virtutibus, c. 3. — Finem arg. Vat. exhibet sic: sed poenitentia detestatur omne peccatum sive expellit: ergo poenitentia est virtus communis et generalis.
    Cf. Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 3; VII, c. 3 ff., and On the Virtues, c. 3. — The end of the argument the Vatican [edition] presents thus: but penance detests or expels every sin: therefore penance is a common and general virtue.
  3. 3
    Secundum Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 2: Habitus operationibus definitur [definitio, per quam res cognoscitur, fit per priora et notiora, ut dicitur VI. Topic. c. 3.], et iis quorum habitus est. Cfr. ibid. II. c. I, et II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Vide tom. III. pag. 470, nota 8.
    According to Aristotle, Ethics IV, c. 2: A habit is defined by its operations [a definition, by which a thing is known, is made through what is prior and more known, as is said in Topics VI, c. 3], and by those things of which it is the habit. Cf. ibid. II, c. 1, and On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4). See tom. III, p. 470, note 8.
  4. 4
    Cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. I. ad 5.
    Cf. III Sent., d. 27, a. I, q. I, ad 5.
  5. 5
    Vide III. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. seqq., et Comment. p. II. per totam. Respicitur Ps. 36, 27: Declina a malo et fac bonum. — Non pauci codd. amoris.
    See III Sent., text of the Master, d. XXXIV, c. 4 ff., and the Commentary, p. II, throughout. Reference is made to Ps. 36:27: Turn away from evil and do good. — Not a few codices [read] amoris [of love].
  6. 6
    Cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. dub. I. — Superius post dicere, quod cod. W supplet poenitentia.
    Cf. III Sent., d. 33, dub. I. — Above, after dicere, quod codex W supplies poenitentia.
  7. 7
    Homil. 34. in Matth. 20, I. seqq. (op. imperfect.): « Vinea enim iustitia est, in qua diversae species iustitiarum positae sunt quasi vites, ut puta mansuetudo, castitas, patientia, longanimitas, ceteraque innumerabilia bona, quae omnia generaliter iustitiae appellantur ». Bernard., Serm. 63. in Cantic. n. 3: Bona vinea iustus, cui virtus vitis, cui actio palmes etc. — Superius pro iustitia generalis multi codd. et ed. I iustus generalis, cod. F virtus generalis.
    Homily 34 on Matthew 20:1 ff. (the Opus imperfectum): "For justice is a vineyard, in which the diverse species of justices are set like vines, as for instance gentleness, chastity, patience, longanimity, and the other innumerable goods, which are all in general called [the goods] of justice." Bernard, Sermon 63 on Canticles, n. 3: The just man is a good vineyard, whose virtue is the vine, whose action is the branch, etc. — Above, for general justice many codices and the first edition [read] the general just man, codex F general virtue.
  8. 8
    Vers. 11. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. I. in corp., et III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. fundam. 1. verba Hieronymi in hunc locum.
    Verse 11. Cf. below a. 2, q. I, in the body, and III Sent., d. 36, q. 1, fundam. 1, the words of Jerome on this passage.
  9. 9
    Cfr. quaest. seq. et infra d. 16. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. ad 3. — Post quia respicit codd. et ed. I omittunt exsequendum. Superius post sed cod. F supplet etiam.
    Cf. the following question and below d. 16, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3; III Sent., d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3. — After quia respicit the codices and the first edition omit exsequendum. Above, after sed codex F supplies etiam.
  10. 10
    Cod. E (I L a secunda manu) in informando; cfr. infra a. 3, et I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. I. ad 4.
    Codex E (I L by a second hand) [reads] in informando; cf. below a. 3, and I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. I, ad 4.
  11. 11
    Exod. 20, 14. Cfr. quaest. seq.
    Exod. 20:14. Cf. the following question.
  12. 12
    Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Cf. III Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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