Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

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Dist. 14, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus

p. 318

Tractatio Quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaeritur de poenitentia-virtute, et circa hoc duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de ipsa absolute.

Secundo, in comparatione.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum poenitentia sit virtus.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum sit virtus generalis, an specialis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit virtus theologica, vel cardinalis.

Articulus I. De virtute poenitentiae absolute.

Quaestio I. Utrum poenitentia sit virtus.

Circa primum proceditur sic:

1. Matthaei tertio¹: Poenitentiam agite; Glossa: «Prima virtus est per poenitentiam perimere veterem hominem»; hoc ipsum dicit Magister in littera.

2. Item, sicut dicit Philosophus², «virtus est quae habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit»; sed talis est poenitentia: ergo est virtus.

3. Item, nullus actus est laudabilis nec meritorius nisi actus virtutis³; sed poenitere est laudabile et meritorium: ergo est actus virtutis. Sed est actus poenitentiae: ergo poenitentia est virtus.

4. Item, nihil expellit vitium et peccatum nisi gratia vel virtus⁴; sed poenitentia expellit haec: ergo poenitentia est gratia, vel virtus. Sed non est gratia, quia gratia dicit pure quod a Deo est, poenitentia autem actum nostrum: ergo etc.

5. Item, poenitere non ideo bonum est, quia praeceptum, sed magis e converso: ergo per se bonum. Et iterum, arduum et difficile est modo debito poenitere, et circa ipsum contingit errare: ergo necessario indigemus virtute ordinante ad hoc⁵; sed haec non est nisi poenitentia: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Sacramentum et virtus ex opposito dividuntur⁶; sed poenitentia est Sacramentum: ergo non est virtus. Si dicas, quod poenitentia dupliciter accipitur et secundum duas acceptiones est virtus et Sacramentum; quaeritur: quare magis poenitentia quam baptismus, vel aliud Sacramentum?

2. Item, poenitentia est passio; sed «omnis virtus, ut dicit Philosophus[^7], est habitus»: ergo poenitentia non est virtus.

3. Item, «omnis virtus habet obiectum bonum, sicut scientia verum⁸»; sed poenitentiae obiectum est peccatum — poenitens enim non poenitet recte nisi de culpa — ergo etc.

4. Item, omnes virtutes sunt connexae et manent aliquo modo in patria⁹ et fuerunt in Christo et in primo homine; sed poenitentia non fuit in Christo nec in primo homine nec etiam erit in patria: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Poenitentia recte dici potest gratia, virtus, Sacramentum, actus et passio, et hoc sensu analogo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc multiplex fuit opinio. — Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod poenitentia non est virtus, sed actus virtutis, non unius, sed omnium, et concurrunt omnes ad hunc actum; sicut chordae citharae ad unum sonum secundum regulam tangentis, sic omnes virtutes secundum dictamen prudentiae¹⁰. — Sed ista positio non est conveniens. Si enim iste actus est bonus et difficilis, et circa quem contingit errare;

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sicut ira per zelum est habitus, quo homo irascitur vitiis alienis^1b; sic poenitentia est habitus, quo homo irascitur vitiis propriis. Si enim non esset habitus, tunc non diceretur habere poenitentiam nisi actu poenitens.

Secunda opinio fuit, quod est habitus, non^2b virtutis, sed gratiae; nec tantum nominat gratiam secundum substantiam, sed etiam secundum actum, ut sicut gratia baptismalis dicitur innocentia, sic gratia iustificationis poenitentia. — Sed haec positio non debet stare: quia gratia non dirigit liberum arbitrium ad aliquem motum specialem per se, nisi mediante virtute^3b; quod facit poenitentia.

Tertia positio est, quod poenitentia est virtus, sed non est virtus nisi extenso nomine virtutis. Nam virtus proprie est in dirigendo ad bonum — virtus enim est qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur^4b — sed poenitentia revocat a malo. — Sed haec positio non videtur adhuc sufficiens, quia poenitentia non facit tantum dolere de culpa perpetrata, sed etiam facit emendare; unde eius est subiectum punire et Deo reconciliare^5b; et hoc patet ex definitione^6b, et ita est virtus proprie.

Ultima positio est, quod poenitentia est habitus virtutis et virtutis secundum propriam acceptionem, non tantum secundum communem. — Et haec probabilior est, ut credo, sicut patebit melius in sequentibus^7b.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod poenitentia est expulsiva peccati actualis, quod est macula animam deformans et iterum ad malum inclinans, sive a bono dehabilitans et iterum naturam vulnerans; quam etiam perpetravit quis per actum voluntatis cum delectatione et libidine^8b. Quia igitur delere culpam ut deformantem est gratiae reformantis; ut dehabilitantem, virtutis habilitantis; ut vulnerantem, Sacramenti curantis; ut actu perpetratam, per actum similiter voluntatis; ut cum delectatione perpetratam, cum passione contraria: ideo poenitentia recte dicitur gratia, virtus, Sacramentum, actus et passio. Et iste modus est secundum diversas naturas in ea repertas, tamen per ordinationem ad unum; unde non dicitur poenitentia his modis omnino aequivoce, sed analogice. — Et propter hoc concedendae sunt rationes ad primam partem.

1. 2. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur in contrarium, quia est Sacramentum et passio; patet responsio et ratio illius analogiae; non sic enim est in aliis Sacramentis. Quia enim poenitentia respicit culpam actualem, in cuius deletione concurrit motus liberi arbitrii concordans gratiae ad culpae expulsionem^9b, qui quidem motus rectus et virtuosus est; et propter displicentiam peccati, quod necesse est esse perpetratum, non potest esse sine passione doloris: patet, quare poenitentia magis est virtus quam alia Sacramenta; patet etiam, quare magis habet passionem coniunctam quam alia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus habet obiectum bonum; dicendum, quod falsum est — instantia enim est in temperantia, in pietate et etiam in fortitudine^10b — sed sufficit, quod actus sit bonus. Nihilominus tamen poenitentia duplicem habet actum, scilicet refugere vel detestari malum et emendare; isti sunt actus ordinati, et ratione secundi habet obiectum bonum.

4. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de connexione virtutum et huiusmodi; dicendum, quod virtutes habent connexionem et durationem secundum id quod perfectionis est in ipsis; poenitentia autem habet aliquid perfectionis, et hoc est velle emendare, si in aliquo contingat offendere. Et haec quidem voluntas est in omnibus iustis; impossibile enim est, quod sit voluntas recta sine hoc. Habet etiam aliquid imperfectionis, sicut est luctus pro peccato perpetrato; et ratione huius non attenditur connexio nec duratio, immo potius fit evacuatio, tanquam eius quod est ex parte^11b.

Scholion

I. Vocabulum poenitentiae communiter sumitur quadrupliciter, scilicet ut passio sensibilis doloris pro peccatis, ut habitus virtutis habilitans ad debito modo poenitendum, ut actus eiusdem virtutis, denique ut Sacramentum; quibus S. Bonav. (hic in fine corp.) quintum addit, quod est gratia reformans. De essentia huius virtutis vide infra dub. 1. et p. II. dubia 2-6; quibus locis contra Lutherum, qui veram poenitentiam in sola emendatione vitae futurae posuit, iam stabilitur doctrina Concilii Trident. (Sess. 14. c. 4.) docentis, «contritionem non solum cessationem a peccato et vitae novae propositum et inchoationem, sed veteris etiam odium continere». S. Bonav. docet etiam (infra p. I. et II. dub. 4.), detestationem mali praeteriti esse actum poenitentiae principalem, alterum vero ex consequenti huic annexum. Quod detestatio et displicentia de peccato praeterito sit actus principalis poenitentiae approbat S. Thom. (S. III. q. 85. a. 2); Scot. autem vult (hic q. 2. n. 5.), principalem actum eius esse velle vindicare peccatum (cfr. Bonav., hic p. II. dub. 6.).

II. Quoad 1. quaestionem notamus, B. Albertum tenere 3. opinionem hic relatam, refragante sententia communi. — De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 1. § 1. — Scot. de hac et 2 seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 85. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 2. — Richard. a Med. hic, a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 1.

III. In seq. (2.) quaestione solvenda communiter docetur, quod licet obiectum materiale poenitentiae se extendat ad omnia peccata, etiam venialia (infra q. 16. a. 3. q. 2.), obiectum tamen formale esse quid speciale et constituere virtutem specialem, ut explicatur hic ad 3. De obiecto formali cfr. infra q. 3. et dub. 4; circa quod plures opiniones circumferuntur, quae magis in modo dicendi quam in re notabili inter se differre videntur. — De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

IV. Quoad 3. quaestionem conveniunt doctores in hoc, quod poenitentia non sit virtus theologica, et quod aliquatenus reducenda sit ad cardinalem virtutem iustitiae. Hoc in scholis fit dupliciter: vel reducitur ad iustitiam commutativam — non quidem ut pars eius subiectiva, sed potentialis tantum (quia scilicet ad eam reducitur sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, cum ordinata sit tantum ad aliquos actus secundarios iustitiae commutativae) — vel ad iustitiam vindicativam, licet imperfectam. Illud docet S. Thom. (S. loc. cit. a. 3), hoc vero Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 8.). — Porro constat, quod vera poenitentia sit habitus supernaturalis; sed controvertitur, utrum sit habitus per se infusus, ut dicit schola S. Thomae, an frequenter tantum auxilio gratiae acquisitus, vel etiam infusus per accidens, ut affirmant cum Scoto (loc. cit. n. 20.) Durandus aliique Scotistae. Utramque opinionem ut probabilem ponit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 2.). Redit hic controversia in scholio ad III. Sent. d. 33. a. 1. q. 3. exposita. — Quoad quaestionem ibi tractatam cfr. Bonav., infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 1. — De ipsa 3. quaestione praeter locos citt.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 4. 5; B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

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English Translation

Treatment of the Questions.

For the understanding of this part, inquiry is made concerning penance-as-a-virtue, and concerning this two things are principally asked.

First, [it is] asked concerning it absolutely.

Second, in comparison.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First, it is asked whether penance is a virtue.

Second, granting that it is, it is asked whether it is a general or a special virtue.

Third, it is asked whether it is a theological or a cardinal virtue.

Article I. On the virtue of penance absolutely.

Question I. Whether penance is a virtue.

Concerning the first [point], one proceeds thus:

1. Matthew, chapter three¹: Do penance; the Gloss: «The first virtue is, through penance, to slay the old man»; the Master says this same thing in the text.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher says², «virtue is that which perfects the one having it and renders his work good»; but such is penance: therefore it is a virtue.

3. Likewise, no act is praiseworthy or meritorious except an act of virtue³; but to do penance is praiseworthy and meritorious: therefore it is an act of virtue. But it is the act of penance: therefore penance is a virtue.

4. Likewise, nothing expels vice and sin except grace or virtue⁴; but penance expels these: therefore penance is grace, or virtue. But it is not grace, because grace expresses purely what is from God, whereas penance [expresses] our act: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, to do penance is not good because it is commanded, but rather the converse: therefore it is good in itself. And again, it is arduous and difficult to do penance in the due manner, and in this matter one happens to err: therefore we necessarily need a virtue ordering [us] to this⁵; but this is nothing but penance: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Sacrament and virtue are divided by opposition⁶; but penance is a Sacrament: therefore it is not a virtue. If you say that penance is taken in two ways and according to the two acceptations is a virtue and a Sacrament; it is asked: why penance rather than baptism, or another Sacrament?

2. Likewise, penance is a passion; but «every virtue, as the Philosopher says[^7], is a habit»: therefore penance is not a virtue.

3. Likewise, «every virtue has a good object, as knowledge [has] the true⁸»; but the object of penance is sin — for the penitent does not rightly repent except of fault — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, all the virtues are connected and remain in some manner in the fatherland⁹ and were in Christ and in the first man; but penance was not in Christ nor in the first man nor will it even be in the fatherland: therefore etc.

Conclusion. Penance can rightly be called grace, virtue, Sacrament, act, and passion, and this in an analogous sense.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this there was a manifold opinion. — For certain men wished to say that penance is not a virtue, but an act of virtue — not of one [virtue], but of all, and all concur toward this act; just as the strings of a harp [concur] toward one sound according to the rule of the one playing, so all the virtues [concur] according to the dictate of prudence¹⁰. — But this position is not fitting. For if this act is good and difficult, and one in which one happens to err;

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just as anger through zeal is a habit by which a man is angry at the vices of others^1b, so penance is a habit by which a man is angry at his own vices. For if it were not a habit, then one would not be said to have penance except while actually repenting.

The second opinion was that it is a habit, not^2b of virtue, but of grace; nor does it name grace only according to substance, but also according to act, so that just as baptismal grace is called innocence, so the grace of justification [is called] penance. — But this position cannot stand: because grace does not direct free choice toward any special motion of itself, except by the mediation of virtue^3b; which penance does.

The third position is that penance is a virtue, but is not a virtue except by an extended name of virtue. For virtue properly consists in directing toward the good — for virtue is a quality of mind by which one lives rightly^4b — but penance calls back from evil. — But this position does not yet seem sufficient, because penance does not only make [one] grieve over the fault committed, but also makes [one] amend; whence its [office] is to punish the subject and reconcile [it] to God^5b; and this is clear from the definition^6b, and so it is properly a virtue.

The last position is that penance is a habit of virtue and of virtue according to its proper acceptation, not only according to the common [acceptation]. — And this is more probable, as I believe, as will appear better in what follows^7b.

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that penance is expulsive of actual sin, which is a stain deforming the soul and again inclining [it] to evil, or disabling [it] from the good and again wounding nature; which one has also committed through an act of the will with delight and lust^8b. Since, therefore, to blot out fault as deforming belongs to grace reforming; as disabling, to virtue enabling; as wounding, to the Sacrament healing; as actually committed, through an act likewise of the will; as committed with delight, through a contrary passion: therefore penance is rightly called grace, virtue, Sacrament, act, and passion. And this manner [of speaking] is according to the diverse natures found in it, yet by an ordering toward one [thing]; whence penance is not called [by] these modes altogether equivocally, but analogically. — And on account of this the arguments for the first part are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that which is objected to the contrary, [namely] that it is a Sacrament and a passion; the response and the ground of that analogy is clear; for it is not so in the other Sacraments. For because penance regards actual fault, in whose deletion there concurs a motion of free choice agreeing with grace for the expulsion of fault^9b, which motion indeed is right and virtuous; and on account of the displeasure at the sin, which it is necessary to have been committed, it cannot be without a passion of grief: it is clear why penance is more a virtue than the other Sacraments; it is clear also why it has a passion more conjoined [to it] than the others.

3. To that which is objected, [namely] that every virtue has a good object; it must be said that this is false — for there is a counterinstance in temperance, in piety, and also in fortitude^10b — but it suffices that the act be good. Nevertheless penance has a twofold act, namely to flee or detest evil and to amend; these are ordered acts, and by reason of the second it has a good object.

4. To that, then, which is objected concerning the connection of the virtues and the like; it must be said that the virtues have connection and duration according to that which is of perfection in them; but penance has something of perfection, and this is to will to amend, if one happen to offend in anything. And this will indeed is in all the just; for it is impossible that there be a right will without this. It has also something of imperfection, such as is grief for the sin committed; and by reason of this neither connection nor duration is attended to, nay rather there comes about an evacuation, as of that which is partial^11b.

Scholion

I. The word penance is commonly taken in four ways, namely as the passion of sensible grief for sins, as the habit of virtue enabling [one] to do penance in the due manner, as the act of the same virtue, and finally as a Sacrament; to which S. Bonaventure (here at the end of the body) adds a fifth, which is reforming grace. On the essence of this virtue see below dub. 1 and p. II, dubia 2–6; in which places, against Luther — who placed true penance in the mere amendment of future life — the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. 14, c. 4) is now established, teaching that «contrition embraces not only cessation from sin and the purpose and beginning of a new life, but also a hatred of the old». S. Bonaventure also teaches (below p. I and II, dub. 4) that the detestation of past evil is the principal act of penance, the other [being] annexed to this consequentially. That the detestation of and displeasure at past sin is the principal act of penance S. Thomas approves (S. III, q. 85, a. 2); but Scotus holds (here q. 2, n. 5) that its principal act is to will to punish sin (cf. Bonav., here p. II, dub. 6).

II. As to the 1st question we note that Bl. Albert holds the 3rd opinion here reported, the common opinion gainsaying [it]. — On the same question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 12, m. 1, a. 1, § 1. — Scotus on this and the 2 following questions here in both Writings, q. 2. — S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, little-question 2; S. III, q. 85, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla here, a. 1, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. 1.

III. In the following (2nd) question, to be solved, it is commonly taught that although the material object of penance extends to all sins, even venial ones (below q. 16, a. 3, q. 2), the formal object is nevertheless something special and constitutes a special virtue, as is explained here in the [reply] to [obj.] 3. On the formal object cf. below q. 3 and dub. 4; concerning which several opinions are current, which seem to differ rather in manner of speaking than in any notable matter among themselves. — On the same question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thomas, loc. cit. little-question 3; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. little-question. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 2.

IV. As to the 3rd question the doctors agree in this, that penance is not a theological virtue, and that it is in some measure to be reduced to the cardinal virtue of justice. This is done in the schools in two ways: either it is reduced to commutative justice — not indeed as a subjective part of it, but only as a potential [part] (because, namely, it is reduced to it as the imperfect to the perfect, since it is ordered only to certain secondary acts of commutative justice) — or to vindictive justice, although imperfect. The former S. Thomas teaches (S. loc. cit. a. 3), the latter Scotus (here q. 2, n. 8). — Further, it is established that true penance is a supernatural habit; but it is controverted whether it is a habit infused through itself, as the school of S. Thomas says, or frequently only acquired with the help of grace, or even infused per accidens, as Durandus and the other Scotists affirm with Scotus (loc. cit. n. 20). Richard of Mediavilla posits both opinions as probable (here a. 4, q. 2). The controversy returns here in the scholion expounded on III Sent. d. 33, a. 1, q. 3. — As to the question there treated cf. Bonav., below d. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 6, q. 1. — On the 3rd question itself, besides the passages cited: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. § 3, 4. — S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, little-questions 4, 5; Bl. Albert, here a. 6, 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Vers. 2. — Glossa est ordinaria apud Strabum, Paschas. Radbertum et Lyranum; in ipsa respicitur Eph. 4, 22. et Col. 3, 9. — Cfr. de ipsa August. in Ps. 4, 6. n. 7. — Magistri sententia habetur hic in lit. c. 1.
Verse 2. — The Gloss is the Ordinary [Gloss] in Strabo, Paschasius Radbertus, and Lyranus; in it reference is made to Eph. 4, 22 and Col. 3, 9. — Cf. concerning it Augustine on Ps. 4, 6, n. 7. — The Master's opinion is found here in the text, c. 1.
2
Libr. II. Ethic. c. 6.
Ethics, bk. II, c. 6.
3
Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 12: Laus enim virtutis est. Cfr. ibid. II. c. 5.
Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 12: For praise belongs to virtue. Cf. ibid. II, c. 5.
4
Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. verba Ambrosii ex Expos. in Ps. 118. serm. 22. n. 3. — De minori cfr. Ezech. 18, 21. seq. et 33, 14. seqq. — In hoc arg. post nostrum codd. N aa addunt scilicet motum liberi arbitrii.
See here in the Master's text, c. 2, the words of Ambrose from Exposition on Ps. 118, serm. 22, n. 3. — On the minor [premise] cf. Ezek. 18, 21 ff. and 33, 14 ff. — In this argument, after our, codices N aa add namely, the motion of free choice.
5
Nam, ut ait Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3, «circa id quod difficilius est, semper et ars et virtus versatur». Cfr. ibid. c. 6.
For, as Aristotle says, Ethics II, c. 3, «art and virtue are always engaged about that which is more difficult». Cf. ibid. c. 6.
6
Cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. q. 6. argg. ad oppos.
Cf. above d. 1, p. I, q. 6, the arguments to the contrary.
7
Libr. II. Ethic. c. 3, ubi ostendit, virtutem non esse passionem, neque potentiam, sed habitum. — Maior constat ex eo, quod poenitentia est dolor de peccatis (cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.), qui est una passionum (vide tom. III. pag. 555, nota 7. et pag. 556, nota 5.).
Ethics, bk. II, c. 3, where he shows that virtue is neither a passion nor a power, but a habit. — The major [premise] is established from this, that penance is grief over sins (cf. here the Master's text, c. 2), which is one of the passions (see tom. III, p. 555, note 7, and p. 556, note 5).
8
Secundum Aristot., de quo vide tom. III. pag. 470, nota 8.
According to Aristotle, on whom see tom. III, p. 470, note 8.
9
Cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. q. 6. et d. 36. q. 1. ac 3.
Cf. III Sent. d. 33, q. 6, and d. 36, q. 1 and 3.
10
Cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. q. 6. quaest. seq. et a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. above d. 1, p. I, q. 6, the following question, and a. 2, q. 1.
1b
Vide tom. I. pag. 23, nota 9. — Pro seq. propos. valent verba Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 8: Fieri enim potest, ut habitus, licet adsit, nullum tamen bonum [actum] efficiat; id quod in dormiente... evenit.
See tom. I, p. 23, note 9. — For the following proposition the words of Aristotle hold, Ethics I, c. 8: For it can come about that a habit, although present, nevertheless produces no good [act]; which happens in the case of one asleep...
2b
Plurimi codd. sed non. Mox pro sed gratiae codd. W Y immo gratiae. Subinde pro nec tantum cod. U sed tamen non, omisso post pauca etiam.
Very many codices [read] sed non [but not]. Presently, for but of grace codices W Y [read] nay of grace. Then, for nor only codex U [reads] but yet not, with also omitted a little after.
3b
Cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 33. q. 1.
Cf. III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 33, q. 1.
4b
Secundum August. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 5, et Comment. dub. 3.
According to Augustine. Cf. II Sent., the Master's text, d. XXVII, c. 5, and the Commentary, dub. 3.
5b
Vide infra q. 3. et dub. 1. — Pro subiectum Vat. obiectum, et ideo pro Deo.
See below q. 3 and dub. 1. — For the subject the Vatican [edition reads] the object, and accordingly for to God.
6b
Quaest. 2. et 3. nec non a. 2. q. 1.
Questions 2 and 3, as well as a. 2, q. 1.
7b
Cfr. infra q. 3. et a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. below q. 3 and a. 2, q. 1.
8b
Vat. legit: per actum voluntatis cum delectatione et libidine, similiter est actus voluntatis, et cum passione etc.
The Vatican [edition] reads: through an act of the will with delight and lust, likewise it is an act of the will, and with a passion etc.
9b
Cfr. infra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Inferius verba quod necesse est esse perpetratum aequivalent his: quod [pro poenitentia] necessario supponitur esse perpetratum. Post perpetratum cod. bb addit quae.
Cf. below d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 2 ff. — Below, the words which it is necessary to have been committed are equivalent to these: which [for penance] is necessarily presupposed to have been committed. After committed codex bb adds which.
10b
Vide tom. III. pag. 561, nota 7. Cfr. ibid. d. 33. q. 4. et dub. 3. seq. nec non d. 35. q. 5.
See tom. III, p. 561, note 7. Cf. ibid. d. 33, q. 4, and dub. 3 ff., as well as d. 35, q. 5.
11b
Epist. 1. Cor. 13, 10. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. q. 6; d. 36. q. 1. ad 1. et q. 3; II. Sent. d. 29. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3.
Epistle, 1 Cor. 13, 10. Cf. III Sent. d. 33, q. 6; d. 36, q. 1, ad 1, and q. 3; II Sent. d. 29, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3. ---