Dist. 33, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 33
Articulus II. De continentia virginali.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de continentia virginali. Et circa hoc tria quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de ipsa virginitate quantum ad genus suum. Secundo, de comparatione continentiae virginalis ad matrimonium sive coniugium. Tertio, de virginitate per comparationem ad praemium.
Quaestio I. Utrum virginitas sit virtus.
Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum virginitas sit virtus. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per definitionem virtutis: quia « virtus est bona qualitas mentis1 » etc.; et per definitionem Philosophi illud idem.
2. Item, hoc ostenditur per definitionem virginitatis, quam ponit Augustinus2 dicens: « Virginitas est in carne corruptibili incorruptionis perpetuae meditatio »: sed meditari incorruptionem perpetuam hoc est maxime arduum et difficile, et tale est virtutis genus: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc iterum videtur ratione: quia abstinere a coitu illicito est virtutis; sed difficilius est ab omni coitu abstinere quam ab illicito: ergo si illud est virtutis, multo fortius istud.
4. Item, in virginitate meremur non tantum auream, sed etiam aureolam3; sed omne meritum consistit mediante virtute, vel dono, vel beatitudine: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Omnis virtus, quae non est in finem, in medietate consistit4; sed virginitas in extremo, quia omnino abstinet: ergo etc.
2. Item, actus omnis virtutis est in praecepto, quia est necessarius5 ad salutem; sed actus virginitatis non est in praecepto: ergo virginitas non est virtus.
3. Item, nulla virtute quis male utitur, ut patet; sed virginitate contingit male uti, ut patet de fatuis virginibus, Matthaei vigesimo quinto6.
4. Item, omnes virtutes sunt connexae, unde qui habet unam habet omnes7; sed hoc non est de virginitate: ergo etc.
5. Item, nulla virtus expellitur vel amittitur nisi per vitium et peccatum; sed virginitas perditur sine peccato in his quae violenter corrumpuntur: ergo etc. Si tu dicas de his, quod non amittunt8; obiicitur de his quae transeunt de continentia virginali ad coniugalem, quae virginitatem perdunt sine culpa.
6. Item, omnis virtus perdita recuperatur per poenitentiam, quia et gratia, in qua est omnis virtus; sed virginitas perdita nunquam recuperatur9: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Virginitas, secundum illud quod nominat habitum, est virtus et consistit in medio.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod continentia virginalis sive virginitas tria dicit: primum est abstinentia ab omni coitu illicito; secundum est abstinentia ab omni coitu licito; tertium est integritas mentis et carnis. Quantum ad primum dicit habitum, quantum ad secundum dicit virtutis statum, quantum ad tertium dicit decorem; unde virginitas est habitus continentiae perfectus et decorus. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, virginitatem virtutem esse, secundum id quod nominat habitum.
Ad 2–6. Quae vero obiiciuntur in contrarium, omnia procedunt ratione status, vel decoris, quantum ad quem statum ad extremum tendit. — Ratione etiam status non est in praecepto, ratione cuius status potest perdi per descensum ad inferiorem statum, ratione cuius status non est aliis connexa. — Ratione vero decoris contingit, quod perdatur, homine invito; contingit etiam superbe et male uti; p. 754 contingit etiam, ut amissa non possit recuperari. — Quantum vero ad illud quod est ibi habitus substrati, omnes conditiones virtutum in ea reperiuntur.
Ad 1. Et sic patent omnia praeter primum, quod obiicit de medietate, quia ita similiter posset opponi de continentia viduali. — Et propterea dicendum, quod quando dicitur, quod virtus consistit in medietate, hoc non est intelligendum1 respectu obiecti — quia sic nullus esset castus, nisi cognosceret medietatem omnium mulierum de mundo, quia illud est medium inter aliquam et nullam — sed istud intelligitur, ut sic medium teneatur, et virtus sit medium circa delectationes et tristitias2. Nam qui omnino nihil sentit de passionibus carnis, hic insensibilis iudicatur, sed hoc habet per naturam; qui vero omnino eis consentit, hic luxuriosus est; qui vero excitatur, sed tamen non consentit, talis virtuosus est; et hoc omnino bene est in virginibus, quia aliquo modo caro excitat, quamvis non ita, sicut in corruptis. Hoc autem intelligitur, loquendo secundum virtutes politicas3 et naturam lapsam; nam per superabundantem gratiam potest esse, quod non sentiat, et tamen virtutem habeat, ut patet in Christo et eius Matre dulcissima.
I. Definitio illa S. Augustini (2. fundam.) a S. Thom. (hic q. 3. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 152. a. 1.) speciali quaestione explicatur, ubi distinguit triplicem integritatem, scilicet corporalem tantum, corporalem simul et spiritualem, denique spiritualem tantum, quae ultima idem est cum habitu virginitatis secundum locutionem S. Bonaventurae. — Difficultas principalis huius 1. quaestionis consistit in eo, ut explicetur quomodo haec virtus consistat in medio secundum determinationem Aristotelis; de quo diffuse tractat S. Thom., locis citt. a. 2. et in S. a. 3. et I. II. q. 64. a. 1. ad 3. De 1. quaestione praeter S. Thomam: Scot., supra d. 31. q. unica n. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — De hac et 2 seqq. qq. Durand., hic q. 4; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
II. Quoad 2. quaestionem Conc. Trident. (Sess. XXIV. can. 10.) damnavit errorem dicentium, « statum coniugalem anteponendum esse statui virginitatis, vel caelibatus, et non esse melius ac beatius manere in virginitate aut caelibatu quam iungi matrimonio ». De hac 2. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 3; S. II. II. q. 152. a. 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2.
III. De praemio virginitatis (q. 3.), scilicet de fructu centesimo et de aureola, alii commentatores Lombardi hic vel tacent vel breviter illud in praecedente quaestione tangunt; plures de eo tractant infra d. 49. Rem tangit Scot. supra d. 1. q. 6. n. 6. Plura de aureolis generatim habent: S. Thom., infra d. 49. q. 5. a. 1-5; Suppl. q. 96. a. 1-12 (de aureola virginitatis etiam hic q. 3. a. 3. ad 3.). — Richard. a Med., infra d. 49. a. 5. q. 1-7. — Dionys. Carth., infra d. 49. q. 8.
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Article II. On virginal continence.
Consequently, with respect to the second article, inquiry is made concerning virginal continence. And concerning this, three questions are asked. First, it is asked concerning virginity itself with respect to its genus. Second, concerning the comparison of virginal continence to marriage or wedlock. Third, concerning virginity by comparison to its reward.
Question I. Whether virginity is a virtue.
With respect to the first, then, it is asked whether virginity is a virtue. And that it is, seems [to be shown]:
1. By the definition of virtue: for « virtue is a good quality of the mind1 » etc.; and by the definition of the Philosopher, the same thing.
2. Likewise, this is shown by the definition of virginity, which Augustine2 gives, saying: « Virginity is, in corruptible flesh, the meditation of perpetual incorruption »: but to meditate on perpetual incorruption is a thing most arduous and difficult, and such is the class of virtue: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, this again seems [to hold] by reason: for to abstain from illicit intercourse is [a matter] of virtue; but it is more difficult to abstain from all intercourse than from the illicit: therefore, if that is [a matter] of virtue, much more strongly is this.
4. Likewise, in virginity we merit not only the aurea, but also the aureola3; but all merit consists by means of a virtue, or a gift, or a beatitude: therefore, etc.
On the contrary: 1. Every virtue which is not toward an end consists in a mean4; but virginity [consists] in an extreme, since it abstains altogether: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, the act of every virtue is under precept, since it is necessary5 for salvation; but the act of virginity is not under precept: therefore virginity is not a virtue.
3. Likewise, no one uses a virtue badly, as is evident; but it happens that virginity is used badly, as is evident from the foolish virgins, Matthew 256.
4. Likewise, all the virtues are connected, whence he who has one has all7; but this is not the case with virginity: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, no virtue is expelled or lost except through vice and sin; but virginity is lost without sin in those things which are violently corrupted: therefore, etc. If you should say concerning these, that they do not lose [it]8; the objection is raised concerning those who pass over from virginal continence to conjugal [continence], who lose their virginity without fault.
6. Likewise, every lost virtue is recovered through penance, since [so is] grace also, in which is every virtue; but virginity once lost is never recovered9: therefore, etc.
Conclusion. Virginity, according to that which it names a habit, is a virtue and consists in a mean.
I respond: It must be said that virginal continence, or virginity, says three things: the first is abstinence from all illicit intercourse; the second is abstinence from all licit intercourse; the third is integrity of mind and flesh. With respect to the first it says a habit, with respect to the second it says the state of virtue, with respect to the third it says comeliness; whence virginity is a habit of continence, perfect and comely. — Therefore the reasons proving that virginity is a virtue, according to that which it names a habit, are to be granted.
To 2–6. But the things which are objected to the contrary all proceed by reason of the state or of the comeliness, with respect to which state it tends toward an extreme. — Also, by reason of the state it is not under precept; by reason of which state it can be lost through descent to a lower state; by reason of which the state is not connected with the others. — But by reason of the comeliness it happens that it is lost with the person unwilling; it happens also that one uses it proudly and badly; p. 754 it happens also that, once lost, it cannot be recovered. — But with respect to that which is there the underlying habit, all the conditions of the virtues are found in it.
To 1. And thus all [the points] are clear except the first, which objects concerning the mean, since likewise it could be objected concerning widowed continence. — And therefore it must be said that when it is said that virtue consists in a mean, this is not to be understood1 with respect to the object — for thus no one would be chaste unless he knew the mean of all the women in the world, since that is the mean between some [woman] and none — but this is understood in such a way that the mean be held, and virtue be a mean concerning pleasures and sorrows2. For he who feels nothing at all of the passions of the flesh is judged insensible, but this he has by nature; but he who altogether consents to them is lustful; but he who is aroused, yet nevertheless does not consent, such a one is virtuous; and this is altogether well [the case] in virgins, since in some way the flesh is aroused, though not as in the corrupt. But this is understood as speaking according to the political virtues3 and fallen nature; for through superabundant grace it can be that one does not feel [it], and nevertheless has virtue, as is evident in Christ and in His most sweet Mother.
I. That definition of St. Augustine (2nd fundamentum) is explained by St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 1; Summa II-II q. 152, a. 1) in a special question, where he distinguishes a threefold integrity, namely bodily only, bodily and spiritual together, and finally spiritual only — which last is the same as the habit of virginity according to St. Bonaventure's manner of speaking. — The principal difficulty of this first question consists in this, that it be explained how this virtue consists in a mean according to Aristotle's determination; on which St. Thomas treats at length in the places cited, a. 2, and in the [Summa] a. 3, and I-II q. 64, a. 1, ad 3. On the first question, besides St. Thomas: Scotus, above d. 31, q. unica, n. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 1. — On this and the two following questions: Durandus, here q. 4; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
II. As to the second question, the Council of Trent (Session XXIV, can. 10) condemned the error of those saying « that the conjugal state is to be preferred to the state of virginity or of celibacy, and that it is not better and more blessed to remain in virginity or celibacy than to be joined in marriage ». On this second question: St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 3; Summa II-II q. 152, a. 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following question, q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 2.
III. On the reward of virginity (q. 3), namely on the hundredfold fruit and on the aureola, the other commentators on Lombard here either are silent or touch on it briefly in the preceding question; many treat of it below, d. 49. Scotus touches on the matter above, d. 1, q. 6, n. 6. On the aureolae in general many have [treatments]: St. Thomas, below d. 49, q. 5, a. 1–5; Supplement q. 96, a. 1–12 (on the aureola of virginity also here q. 3, a. 3, ad 3). — Richard of Middleton, below d. 49, a. 5, q. 1–7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, below d. 49, q. 8.
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- 1Vide supra pag. 319, nota 4. et pag. 326, nota 4. — De definitione, quam Aristot. (II. Ethic. c. 6.) exhibet, et quam codd. N aa post illud idem subiungunt scilicet virtus est, quae habentem perficit, cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 4.See above p. 319, note 4, and p. 326, note 4. — On the definition which Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 6) gives, and which codices N aa append after illud idem ("that same thing"), namely scilicet virtus est, quae habentem perficit ("that is, virtue is that which perfects the one having it"), cf. above p. 113, note 4.
- 2De Sancta Virginitate, c. 13. n. 12. — In fine arg. pro genus, quod plures codd. omittunt, Vat. obiectum. Vide supra pag. 318, nota 5. verba Aristot.[Augustine,] On Holy Virginity, c. 13, n. 12. — At the end of the argument, for genus ("class"), which many codices omit, the Vatican [edition reads] obiectum ("object"). See above p. 318, note 5, the words of Aristotle.
- 3Cfr. infra q. 3.Cf. below, q. 3.
- 4Cfr. supra pag. 389, nota 3. et tom. II. pag. 671, nota 9. — Pro medietate edd. medio, quae etiam mox post virginitas supplent consistit, codd. F Z (E a secunda manu) est.Cf. above p. 389, note 3, and vol. II p. 671, note 9. — For medietate ("mean") the editions [read] medio; and likewise soon after, following virginitas, they supply consistit ("consists"), [whereas] codices F Z (E by a second hand) [read] est.
- 5Permulti codd. et ed. 1 quia sunt necessariae [virtutes].Very many codices and the first edition [read] quia sunt necessariae ("because they [the virtues] are necessary").
- 6Vers. 2. seqq. — In maiori respicitur definitio virtutis in 1. fundam. allata.Verses 2 ff. — In the major [premise] the definition of virtue adduced in the first fundamentum is regarded.
- 7Cfr. III. Sent. d. 36. q. 1. et 3.Cf. III Sentences, d. 36, q. 1 and 3.
- 8Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 4.
- 9Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3. — Pro quia et [supple recuperatur] edd. quia ex.Cf. above p. 338, note 3. — For quia et [supply recuperatur] the editions [read] quia ex.
- 1Cod. F addit de medietate.Codex F adds de medietate ("concerning the mean").
- 2Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3. et 6.See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 3 and 6.
- 3Cfr. tom. II. pag. 901, nota 5. — Pro excitat codd. I K (E a secunda manu) excitatur.Cf. vol. II p. 901, note 5. — For excitat ("it arouses") codices I K (E by a second hand) [read] excitatur ("it is aroused"). ---