Quaest. 1
Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica · Quaestio I: De humilitate quoad actum ipsius, utrum scilicet christianae perfectionis sit se ipsum vilificare pro Christo
Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica
Volentes1 circa evangelicam perfectionem aliqua indagare, primo exordium inquisitionis nostrae sumendum est ab humilitate.
Et primo quaeramus de ipsa tanquam de totius perfectionis radice.
Secundo, de paupertate.
Tertio, de continentia.
Quarto, de obedientia.
Quaestio I. De humilitate quoad actum ipsius, utrum scilicet ch[r]istianae perfectionis sit se ipsum vilificare pro Christo.
Et quoniam habitus cognoscitur per actus2, ideo quaerendum est de humilitate quantum ad actum ipsius. Est igitur quaestio, utrum christianae perfectionis sit se ipsum vilificare pro Christo. Et quod sic, ostenditur:
1. Primo auctoritate ipsius Christi, qui dicit Matthaei decimo octavo3: Nisi conversi fueritis et efficiamini sicut parvuli, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum; sed se ipsum parvificare non est aliud quam sibi vilescere et ab aliis vilem se reputatum velle: ergo etc.
2. Item, Matthaei vigesimo4: Qui voluerit inter vos primus esse erit vester servus; sed facere se ipsum servum aliorum, hoc est se ipsum vilificare vilificatione permaxima: ergo etc.
3. Item, Lucae decimo septimo5: Cum feceritis omnia, quae praecepta sunt vobis, dicite: servi inutiles sumus; sed qui recte aliquid dicit vult sibi credi, et credit, verum esse quod dicit: ergo ad hoc, quod aliquis sit perfectus discipulus Christi, necesse est, quod se vilem reputet et quod talis velit ab aliis reputari.
4. Item, Lucae vigesimo secundo6: Qui maior est in vobis fiat sicut minor, et qui praecessor est, sicut ministrator; sed si minimus faceret se sicut maximum, esset summa ambitio et elatio: ergo e converso, cum maior fit minor et praecessor sicut ministrator, erit summa ipsius abiectio; et hoc debet fieri secundum evangelicam doctrinam: ergo etc.
5. Item, Ioannis decimotertio7: Vos vocatis me magister et domine etc., usque ibi: lavare pedes; ex hac auctoritate ratiocinatione colligitur, quod Christi discipulus ratione magistri inclinare se debet usque ad humiliationis et abiectionis genus extremum.
6. Item, ad Philippenses secundo8: Hoc sentite in vobis, quod et in Christo Iesu, qui cum in forma etc.; sed semetipsum exinanire, nihil aliud est quam se ipsum vilificare: si igitur Christum in
hoc debemus imitari, exinanitio sui et vilificatio convenit evangelicae perfectioni.
7. Item, super illud verbum dicit Bernardus in sermone de Nativitate Domini1: «Quae necessitas fuit, ut sic exinaniret se, sic humiliaret, sic abbreviaret Deus maiestatis, nisi ut vos similiter faciatis? Iam clamat exemplo quod praedicaturus est verbo». Et paulo post: «Intolerabilis impudentiae est, ut, ubi se exinanivit maiestas, infletur vermiculus et intumescat». Si ergo in huiusmodi exinanitione debemus Christum imitari, restat, quod ad perfectionem virtutis spectat vilificari.
8. Secundi Regum sexto2 super illud: Respiciens Michol, filia Saul, vidit regem David subsilientem et despexit eum in corde suo; dicit Gregorius: «Ecce, quem Dominus ceteris singulariter praetulit, sese sub Domino exaequando minimis et abiecta exhibendo contemnit. Non potestas regni ad memoriam reducitur, non oculis subiectorum saltando vilescere metuit; quid de his factis ab aliis sentiatur, ignoro; ego David plus stupeo saltantem quam pugnantem; pugnando hostem vicit, saltando coram Domino se ipsum vicit». Si igitur semetipsum vincere opus est perfectae virtutis; et hoc fit in vilificatione sui: ergo etc.
9. Item, paulo post ibidem3: Ludam et vilior fiam etc.; super quae Gregorius dicit: «Ac si aperte dicat: vilescere coram hominibus appeto, quia servare me coram Deo ingenuum per humilitatem quaero». Si igitur esse coram Deo ingenuum nihil aliud est quam esse perfectum; et vilificatio sui ingenuum facit coram Deo: ergo ipsa est actus perfectae virtutis.
10. Item, Ionae tertio4 super illud: Operiantur saccis homines et iumenta; Glossa: «Ecce, rex Ninive de solio surgit, purpuram sacco, unguenta luto, munda sordibus commutat»; sed hoc est maxime vilificare se ipsum, non solum interius, verum etiam exterius, et per hoc placatus fuit Deus iratus: ergo vilificatio sui est opus Deo maxime acceptum.
11. Item, Augustinus, de Vera Religione5: «Omnia, quae habere cupientes non recte vitabamus, Christus carendo vilia fecit; non enim ullum peccatum committi potest, nisi dum appetuntur quae ille contempsit, aut fugiendo quae ille sustinuit»; sed Christus sustinuit vilificationem non compulsus, sed voluntate, et refutavit honores: si ergo pro illo vilificari volumus, in disciplina morum ipsi conformemur.
12. Item, Gregorius in primo libro Dialogorum6 dicit sic: «In laudibus Constantii pensandum, cuius apud se humilitatis fuerit, qui despicientem se rusticum amplius amavit; qualis enim quisque apud se lateat, contumelia illata probat. Nam sicut superbi honoribus, sic plerumque humiles sua despectione gratulantur; cumque se et in alienis oculis viles aspiciunt, idcirco gaudent, quia per hoc iudicium confirmari intelligunt, quod de se et ipsi apud semetipsos habuerunt». Ex hac auctoritate manifeste colligitur, quod non est vere humilis, nisi sit in oculis suis vilis et velit esse in oculis alienis.
13. Item, Bernardus super Cantica, homilia decima sexta7: «Verus humilis vult vilis reputari, non humilis praedicari»; sed non est humilitas virtuosa, nisi sit humilitas vera: ergo si humilitas vera non potest esse sine voluntaria sui vilificatione, pari ratione nec humilitas virtuosa.
14. Hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione. Sicut se habet superbia ad sublimitatem, sic se habet humilitas ad vilitatem; sed nunquam est superbia, quin cum ea sit appetitus sublimitatis8: ergo nunquam est humilitas vera sine appetitu vilitatis.
15. Item, sicut lascivia se habet ad austeritatem, sic superbia ad vilitatem; sed lascivia non eradicatur a nobis nisi per rigorem austeritatis: ergo nec superbia nisi per vilitatem abiectionis9: ergo vilificatio sui est actus exstinctivus superbiae, ac per hoc actus virtutis perfectae.
16. Item, nullus potest iustificari a culpa originali, nisi se ipsum subiiciat Sacramentis, quae sunt signa sensibilia; subiicere autem se ipsum signo
sensibili non potest esse sine magna abiectione1; sed plus requiritur ad peccatum actuale amovendum: ergo ad hoc, quod aliquis iustificetur, requiritur non solum, ut interius, verum etiam, ut exterius humilietur.
17. Item, contemptor Dei est dignus summo opprobrio et contemptu; sed peccator est Dei contemptor, ergo est summe contemnendus: ergo qui se ipsum contemnit tanquam peccatorem facit quod debet et se ipsum iudicat iuste2. Sed hoc spectat ad virtutem perfectam: ergo etc.
18. Item, duo sunt in peccato, scilicet libido et contemptus Dei3; sed non potest homo iustificari a peccato, in quo fuit libido, nisi adsit dolor compunctionis: ergo pari ratione nec a superbia nec a contemptu Dei iustificari poterit nisi per contemptum et vilificationem sui.
19. Item, civitas Dei ex opposito se habet ad civitatem Babylonis; sed civitas Babylonis incipit ab amore sui et pervenit usque ad contemptum Dei: ergo e contrario civitas Dei incipit a contemptu sui et pervenit usque ad amorem Dei4. Si ergo se ipsum contemnere et vilificare spectat ad divinae civitatis fundationem: ergo est opus virtutis perfectae.
20. Item, nullus recte per viam virtutis incedit, nisi qui honorem debitum Deo persolvit; sed qui se ipsum propter Deum vilificat, ille est, qui Deum honorat: ergo etc. Maior manifesta est per se; minor probatur per illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastici tertio5: Magna est potentia Dei solius et ab humilibus honoratur; et Baruch secundo: Anima, quae tristis est super magnitudine mali et incedit curva et infirma, et oculi deficientes, et anima esuriens dat tibi gloriam et iustitiam, Domine.
21. Item, quanto quis ad exemplar virtutum magis configuratur, tanto est perfectior; sed Christus in cruce exemplar est virtutis perfectae, ubi fuit in abiectione summa6: ergo tanto quisque perfectior est, quanto magis ad illam accedit.
22. Item, nulla virtus est in vera perfectione virtutis, nisi approbet unumquodque, secundum quod est approbandum; sed, sicut dicitur in Psalmo7, universa vanitas omnis homo vivens: ergo nullus est virtutis perfectae, nisi reputet se vanum et inutilem, et talem se velit reputari a quolibet.
23. Item, nulla est virtus perfecta, nisi, cum potest, exeat in opus extra8; sed opus exterius correspondens interiori abiectioni est exterior vilificatio sui: ergo nullus habet in se virtutem humilitatis perfectae, nisi velit exterius se vilem et abiectum ostendere, cum locus et tempus se offert.
24. Item, virtus humilitatis perfectae reformat quod deformavit vitium superbiae; sed superbia deordinat cognitionem per praesumtionem, affectionem per arrogantiam, locutionem per iactantiam, gestum per ostentationem et insolentiam: ergo nullus habet humilitatem perfectam, nisi habeat horum contraria in cogitatu, affectu, locutione et gestu.
25. Item, perfecta virtus non solum elongat9 a vitiis, verum etiam a vitiorum fomentis; sed apparitio interiorum et honorificatio exterior sunt fomenta superbiae: ergo humilitas perfecta ab istis elongat. Elongari autem ab honorificatione est accedere ad vilitatem et ignominiam: ergo etc.
Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ 1.: «Virtus est habitus mentis in modum naturae rationi consentaneus10»; sed natura naturaliter appetit promoveri et non deiici: ergo contra dictamen naturae est vilificatio sui: ergo non est opus perfectae humilitatis.
2. Item, «virtus est ordo amoris», sicut dicitur in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae11; sed cum maior subiicit se inferiori, ibi est inordinatio et perversio ordinis: ergo non est opus virtutis.
3. Item, virtus est in medietate consistens12; sed qui semetipsum vilificat accedit ad extremum: ergo recedit ab actu virtutis perfectae.
4. Item, omnis virtus habet substramentum veritatis; ubi enim veritas deest, ibi virtus esse non
potest; sed vir iustus et perfectus, reputans se aliis viliorem, dum tale quid cogitat, falsum iudicat: ergo si talis cogitatio repugnat veritati1, necesse est, quod repugnet virtuti.
5. Item, qui vilificat facturam vilificat factorem; sed homo est factura Dei2: ergo qui vilificat se ipsum vilificat Deum. Vilificare autem Deum non est virtutis perfectae, sed culpa: ergo etc.
6. Item, inter ceteras creaturas homo est creatura nobilissima, ergo maxime honoranda et appretianda in tota rerum universitate: ergo qui vilificat se ipsum deordinat universum.
7. Item, vilificare alterum est peccatum; sed homo tenetur diligere se ipsum sicut et proximum3: ergo qui se contemptibilem reddit facit contra ordinem caritatis.
8. Item, cum alius putat te vilem, peccat: ergo si vis, quod alius te vilem reputet, tu vis, quod alius peccet; sed hoc est voluntas inordinata: ergo etc.
9. Item, anima est imago Dei, ergo naturaliter nata est configurari4; sed Deus est summe bonus, sapiens et excelsus: ergo appetitus excellentiae competit reformationi imaginis mentis nostrae: ergo e contrario appetitus vilificationis sui non est opus virtutis.
10. Item, tria sunt appetibilia, scilicet bonum, verum et arduum5; sed nulla virtus vel appetitus virtutis consistit in appetendo contrarium veri vel boni: ergo nec in appetendo contrarium ardui. Sed huiusmodi est vilificatio: quare etc.
11. Item, omnis virtus et actus virtutis habet exemplar in Deo6; sed vilificatio sui in Deo non habet exemplar, quia Deus nullo modo se ipsum vilificat.
12. Item, omnis virtus reddit hominem conformem ad statum gloriae, pro eo quod «ipsa est dispositio perfecti ad optimum7»; sed vilificatio sui directe repugnat glorificationi: ergo etc.
13. Item, obiicitur contra humiliationem exteriorem: quia illa est signum interioris; sed superbia est fateri verbo, se esse humilem; ergo superbia est hoc ipsum ostendere signo.
14. Item, tu, qui praetendis humilitatem in signo, aut reputas te humilem, aut non; si sic: ergo attribuis tibi virtutem nobilem, ergo superbis; si non: ergo cum habitus exterius ostendat te humilem, aliud geris in animo, et aliud ostendis in signo: ergo es hypocrita8.
15. Item, turpis est omnis pars, quae suo non convenit universo; sed singularitates istae habituum deturpare videntur statum bonum ecclesiasticum: ergo non spectat ad virtutem perfectam seu perfectionem christianam.
Conclusio. Totius perfectionis christianae fundamentum est humilitas, cuius actus est interior et exterior vilificatio sui ipsius.
Sᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod summa totius christianae perfectionis in humilitate consistit, cuius actus est exterior et interior vilificatio sui. Totius enim christianae perfectionis summa versatur circa tria, scilicet circa gratiam, iustitiam et sapientiam, secundum quae tria dicitur Christus esse via, veritas et vita9. Nam donum gratiae viam praebet ad veritatem iustitiae, in qua consistit exercitium actionis; veritas iustitiae perducit ad gustum sapientiae, in qua consistit solatium contemplationis; quibus perfecte adeptis, ad culmen conscenditur evangelicae perfectionis, quam verbo et exemplo docuit Christus Iesus, qui se magistrum humilitatis specialiter professus est, Matthaei undecimo10: Discite a me etc. Est enim humilitas ostium sapientiae, fundamentum iustitiae et habitaculum gratiae.
Est ostium sapientiae: quia sapientia est «cognitio causarum altissimarum et primarum11», non tantum per modum cognitionis speculativae et intellectualis, verum etiam saporativae et experimentalis. Quoniam ergo omnia, quaecumquae facta sunt, ab uno principio manant et de nihilo sunt producta; ille vere sapiens est, qui veraciter recognoscit suam et aliorum nihilitatem et primi principii sublimitatem. Unde orat Augustinus in secundo libro Soliloquiorum12: «Noverim te, noverim me». Nullus autem pervenit ad plenam notitiam Dei nisi per veram notitiam sui
et rectam; nec recte se ipsum cognoscit qui suam ipsius nihilitatem non attendit; nam qui se existimat aliquid esse, cum nihil sit, ipse se seducit, ut dicit Apostolus ad Galatas ultimo1; sui autem nihilitatem cognoscere, hoc est se ipsum humiliare: est ergo humilitas ostium sapientiae. — Et hoc dicit Sapiens Proverbiorum undecimo: Ubi humilitas, ibi et sapientia; hoc est etiam quod dicit ipsa Sapientia Matthaei undecimo: Revelasti ea parvulis etc.; super quo Bernardus, de Gradibus humilitatis2: «Apparet, quod veritas, quae superbis absconditur, humilibus revelatur. Est autem humilitas virtus, qua homo vera cognitione sui ipse sibi vilescit; hoc autem convenit his qui, ascensionibus in corde dispositis, de gradu in gradum proficiunt, donec in culmen humilitatis perveniunt, in quo velut in Sion positi veritatem prospiciunt». Et paulo post: «Qui iussit humilitatem perducit ad veritatem»; unde et scala Iacob «quid nobis aliud innuit, nisi quod in culmine humilitatis consistit cognitio veritatis»? Et paulo post: «Bona via humilitatis, qua veritas reperitur, caritas acquiritur, generationes sapientiae participantur».
Est etiam fundamentum iustitiae. Nam iustitiae est «reddere unicuique quod suum est3», tam Deo quam sibi quam proximo. Deo autem principaliter debetur honor et reverentia; et ad hoc reddendum praecipue disponit humilitas, secundum illud Ecclesiastici tertio4: Quam magna potentia Dei solius et ab humilibus honoratur. Quoniam ergo initium totius iustitiae est cultus et honor divinus, et hic exhibetur Deo ab humilibus; hinc est, quod totius iustitiae radix et fundamentum est humilitas. — Unde super illud Matthaei tertio5: Sic decet nos implere; Glossa: «id est, omnem humilitatem, quae est omnis iustitia». Et Gregorius in Homilia6: «In ceteris, quae agitis, radicem bonae operationis humilitatem tenete. Nam etsi quaelibet adsint opera, nulla tamen sunt, nisi ex humilitate condiantur; miranda quippe actio cum elatione non elevat, sed gravat. Qui enim sine humilitate virtutes congregat in ventum pulverem portat; et unde videre cernitur, inde deterius excaecatur». Idem: «Totum ruinae crescit, quod aedificas, si ante molem fabricae humilitatis fundamenta non procuras».
Est nihilominus habitaculum gratiae. Nam gratia facit hominem Deo gratum; gratus autem est Deo qui cognoscit divinae dignationis et condescensionis donum; nullus autem hoc cognoscit nisi circumspector suae indignitatis; et talis est vere humilis: et hinc est, quod gratia Spiritus sancti super solos humiles requiescit. — Unde Isaiae ultimo7: Super quem requiescit Spiritus meus nisi super humilem etc.; Augustinus, libro tertio de Doctrina christiana: «Ad hoc peccata magnorum virorum scripta sunt, ut apostolica illa sententia ubique timenda sit: Quapropter qui videtur stare videat, ne cadat. Nulla enim pagina sanctorum librorum est, in qua non sonet: Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam». — Quia ergo humilitas est habitaculum gratiae, hinc est, quod in ipsa consistit summa totius perfectionis evangelicae. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus ad Dioscorum8: «Non aliam tibi ad capessendam et obtinendam veritatem viam invenias, quam quae inventa est ab illo qui gressuum nostrorum tanquam Deus videt infirmitatem. Est autem prima humilitas, secunda humilitas, tertia humilitas; et quoties interrogares, hoc dicerem, non quod alia praecepta non sint, quae dicantur, sed nisi humilitas omnia, quaecumque bene facimus, et praecesserit et comitata et secuta fuerit, et proposita, quam intueamur, et apposita, cui adhaereamus et imposita, qua reprimamur; iam nobis de aliquo bono facto gaudentibus totum extorquet de manu superbia. Itaque, si interrogares et quoties interrogares de praeceptis
christianae religionis, non me aliud respondere nisi humilitatem liberet; et si forte alia dicerem, necessitas cogeret».
Huiusmodi autem humilitatis actus est non tantum interior, verum etiam exterior humiliatio et vilificatio sui. Et ratio huius est: quia, cum duplex sit esse, scilicet naturae et gratiae, duplex est nihilitas: uno modo per oppositionem ad esse naturae, alio modo per oppositionem ad esse moris et gratiae. Et secundum hoc humilitas, quae est per considerationem vel quae est considerativa nostrae nihilitatis, duplex est: una quidem dici potest humilitas veritatis, quae consurgit ex consideratione nihilitatis per oppositionem ad esse naturae; et haec non tantum reperitur in hominibus, verum etiam in Angelis, non tantum in viatoribus, verum etiam in Beatis. Alia potest dici humilitas severitatis, quae consurgit ex consideratione culpae; qua, dum homo per elationem cogitat se esse demersum, severa quadam censura per humilitatem consurgit adversum semetipsum, se vilificando non tantum interius in oculis propriis, verum etiam exterius in oculis alienis. Unde vilificatio sui non tantum exterior, verum etiam interior actus est humilitatis-virtutis1, evangelicae nihilominus perfectioni consonus, si attendatur in ea debitus ortus et modus et fructus. — Originaliter enim humiliatio exterior procedere debet ab humilitate interiori secundum dictamen et regulam muneris divini; et hoc potest fieri secundum legem divini praecepti, vel divini complaciti, vel divini consilii. Praeceptum universaliter omnes respicit; complacitum respicit eos quibus divina voluntas specialiter inspiratur; consilium vero eos qui ad culmen perfectionis ascendunt. Et de his tribus ad Romanos2 dicitur, ut probetis, quae sit voluntas Dei bona, beneplacens et perfecta. Recte igitur se humiliat qui se voluntati divinae secundum aliquem trium modorum conformat, secundum quos diversos ad diversa humiliationum genera spiritus verae humilitatis inclinat.
Modus autem humiliationis exterior est, ut servetur in eo virilitas, veritas et honestas; virilitas contra pusillanimitatem, quae animum deiicit; veritas contra hypocrisim, quae homines fallit; honestas contra stoliditatem, quae homines dehonestat et stultizare3 facit.
Fructus autem huius humiliationis est, quia valet ad humilitatem acquirendam, ad exercendam et ad perficiendam. Unde super illud Ioannis decimo tertio4: Et vos debetis alter alterius lavare pedes; Glossa: «Qui ad pedes inclinatur, ei in corde humilitas excitatur; vel si iam est in corde, confirmatur humilitatis affectus». Et Bernardus in quadam epistola ad Ogerium5: «Humilitas, ad quam utique ducit humiliatio, totius est fabricae spiritualis fundamentum; siquidem humiliatio via est ad humilitatem, sicut patientia ad pacem, sicut lectio ad scientiam. Si virtutem appetis humilitatis, viam non refugias humiliationis; nam si non potes humiliari, non poteris ad humilitatem provehi». Hanc autem humiliationem vocat sui ipsius vilificationem; unde et subdit6: «Ludam et vilior fiam, ludam scilicet, ut illudar. Bonus ludus, quo Michol irascitur, et Deus delectatur; bonus ludus, qui hominibus quidem ridiculum, sed Angelis spectaculum praebet; bonus, inquam, ludus, in quo efficimur opprobrium abundantibus et despectio superbis. Hoc casto et religioso ludo ludebat qui dicebat: Spectaculum facti sumus huic mundo et Angelis et hominibus. Hoc ludo etiam nos interim ludamus, ut illudamur et confundamur et humiliemur, donec veniat qui potentes deponit et exaltat humiles, qui nos laetificet, exaltet et glorificet in aeternum». — Ex his manifeste colligitur, quod se ipsum humiliare et vilificare pro Christo opus est virtutis perfectae et religioni et perfectioni consonans christianae. Unde rationes et auctoritates, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod virtus consonat naturae, et natura semper appetit promoveri; dicendum, quod etsi secundum exteriorem faciem actus humilitatis, qui est vilificatio sui, dissonare videatur ab instinctu naturae, secundum veritatem tamen et intrinsecam rationem plurimum ipsi naturae consonat et quantum ad originem et quantum ad conservationem, quantum etiam ad profectum. Nam natura omnis ex eo, quod de nihilo est, defectum aliquem in se habet et defectivam se clamat. — Natura etiam conservatur in hoc, quod unitatem in suis principiis componentibus et etiam in partibus quantitativis servat pro viribus suis; in hoc etiam, quod expellit omne illud, quod dispersionem inducit, quantum possibile sibi7. — Proficit autem in hoc, quod appetit suscipere influentiam a natura superiore, cui se subiicit, ut ab illa possit compleri. Quoniam ergo humilitatis est suum defectum
recognoscere; ad quandam parvitatem unitivam se ipsum redigere, spiritum inflationis et superbiae tanquam dispersivum a se repellere; influentiae supernae gratiae se subiicere et offerre: hinc est, quod ipsa secundum veritatem consonat actui et instinctui naturali. Unde ratio illa falsum assumit, cum dicit, humilitatem dissonare ab instinctu naturae et actum eius, qui est vilificare se. — Posset etiam aliter dici, quod illa definitio est virtutis moralis, quae radicatur in naturali dictamine. Hic autem actus humilitatis fundatur in fide Iesu Christi, qui est actus super rationem et excedit terminos naturae. Et ideo ratio illa non valet1.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est ordo amoris; dicendum, quod ordo amoris, qui attenditur in virtute, principaliter, radicaliter et essentialiter hoc respicit, quod Deus praeferatur creaturae; et omnis ordo alius annexus est et quasi ordinans ad istum ordinem tanquam ad ordinem principalem. Quoniam ergo, ut dicit Augustinus2, ad hoc, quod Creator in corde dulcescat, opportunum est, quod creatura vilescat; et quia creatura illa, quae maxime huic obviat ordini, est persona propria et privatum bonum: ideo ad perfectum virtutis ordinem conservandum hoc maxime consonat, ut quis vilificet se ipsum; quod facit, cum se propter Deum alteri subiicit et alium sibi praeponit, salva tamen dignitate ordinis ecclesiastici, quem vera humilitas non pervertit nec negligit nec postponit, sed potius conservat, dum interius in corde servatur humilitas, et exterius auctoritas in suo gradu perdurat.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est habitus in medietate consistens; dicendum, quod illud verbum intelligitur non de medietate quantum ad quantitatem ex parte obiecti, sed quantum ad elongationem a diminutione et excessu habente rationem vitii, et sic est vilificatio sui, quae est opus virtutis mediae inter pusillanimitatem et arrogantiam. Unde licet videatur declinare ad extremum, secundum veritatem tamen tenet medium3. — Praeterea, sicut tactum est, vilificatio sui non tantum est actus virtutis informantis naturam, sed exemplum etiam reparantis; unde plus tenet rationem medicativi quam completivi; et quia morbus corrumpens genus humanum maxime est superbiae et arrogantiae fastus, et medicativum debet esse per contrarium4: ideo declinando ad alterum extremum reducit ad medium; sicut per simile videri potest in arctatione ieiunii et abstinentiae contra morbum lasciviae.
4. Ad illud, quod virtus omnis habet substramentum veritatis; dicendum, quod hoc est verum et in humilitate habet locum: quia ipsa veritas legis divinae dictat, quod unusquisque de se ipso magis quam de alio debet humiliora sentire. Unde sicut unusquisque magis sentit morbum proprium afflictivum naturaliter quam alienum, sic unusquisque certius et proximius et frequentius recogitare debet suum defectum, et ob hoc se debet reputare aliis viliorem, non quia certus sit, se esse talem, sed quia magis certus est de sua quam de aliena vanitate vel vilitate. Ideo, sicut dicitur in Glossa ad Philippenses secundo5: In humilitate superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes, «non hoc ita debemus aestimare, ut nos aestimare fingamus, sed vere aestimemus, posse esse aliquid occultum in alio, quo nobis superior sit, etiam si bonum nostrum, quo illo videmur superiores, non sit occultum». Et sic apparet, quod vilificatio sui non fundatur super falsum, sed super verum, secundum scilicet experimentalem cognitionem defectus proprii, quam quilibet homo respectu alterius quasi singulariter habet; sicut et quilibet iustus respectu alterius aliquam singularem excellentiam habet, ratione cuius in laude cuiuslibet Confessoris dicitur6: Non est inventus similis illi.
5. Ad illud: qui vilificat facturam; dicendum, quod factura, quia a Deo facta est de nihilo et vitiata est in homine primo originali peccato, habet in se aliquid deiformitatis7 ratione eius a quo est, et aliquid defectibilitatis ratione eius de quo est, et aliquid deformitatis ratione vitii, sub quo est; et sicut ratione deiformitatis est honoranda, quia relucet in ea vestigium, imago et similitudo divina; sic ratione defectibilitatis parvipendi potest, ratione deformitatis vilis reputari, non ad contumeliam, sed ad honorem Dei, cum auferatur honor solum per deformitatem vitii et peccati.
6. Ad illud, quod homo est creatura nobilissima; dicendum, quod ratione, qua habet in se deiformitatem imaginis, ceteris praeponitur; sed ratione, qua habet defectibilitatem et nihilitatem, aliis aequatur; quia vero habet deformitatem vitiositatis, ceteris postponitur; unde impii in inferno8 ratione peccati ordinatissime collocantur, et ratione huius
competit peccatori vilificatio sui, quae, cum voluntaria est, tenet rationem virtutis et medicamenti.
7. Ad illud, quod vilificare alterum est peccatum; dicendum, quod alterum vilificare est se alteri praeponere, vilificare autem se est se alteri subiicere; et primum est superbiae, secundum est humilitatis et reverentiae; et ideo non est simile hinc et inde.
8. Ad illud, quod qui vult ab alio vilis reputari vult, quod ille peccet; dicendum, quod istud argumentum dupliciter deficit: primo, quia passio potest esse bona, licet actio sit mala, sicut patet in passione Christi, in qua meritum fuit ex parte Christi sustinentis, et demeritum ex parte crucifixoris1; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi aliquis velit pati aliquid, in quo alter peccat, quod propter hoc velit, alterum peccare. — Praeterea, cum quis vult vilis reputari, non hoc vult ratione naturae vel personae, sed ratione culpae contra naturam; et qui illam despicit vel odit, sive in se, sive in altero, meritorie hoc potest facere et absque peccato.
9. Ad illud, quod anima appetit naturaliter Deo configurari; dicendum, quod quaedam sunt propria divinae excellentiae, sicut divinum iudicium et vindicta, honor2 etc.; et in talibus qui appetit configurari inordinato modo appetit, sicut lucifer fecit. Quaedam autem sunt, quae communicat creaturae, sicut bonitatem, veritatem et virtutem, quae maxime ostenditur, cum quis potest dominari sibi; et ideo non sequitur, quod vilificatio sui repugnet imagini.
10. Ad illud, quod tria sunt appetibilia, scilicet verum, bonum et arduum; dicendum, quod sicut virtus consistit circa verum bonum, et vitium circa bonum apparens; sic superbia arduitatem respicit apparentem, quam valde difficile est et arduum contemnere; humilitas autem est vilificatio sui, quae veram includit arduitatem, licet repugnet apparenti. — Praeterea, nullus vere humilis se vilificat nisi propter hoc, quod vult aeternaliter exaltari.
11. 12. Ad illud, quod omnis virtus habet exemplar in Deo; dicendum, quod humilitas quantum ad hoc quod est completionis in ipsa, scilicet non excedere metas suas, exemplar habet in Deo; quantum ad hoc autem, quod respicit defectum et subiectionem ad alterum, non habet exemplar in Deo, qui nullum habet defectum, nullum habet superiorem. Ut tamen homo propter defectum exemplaris non negligeret humiliari, placuit Deo assumere formam servi3 et in illa humiliari, contemni et vilificari, ut ceteri ex tanto exemplari inflammarentur ad vilificationem sui perfectam.
13. 14. Ad illud de humiliatione exteriori, quod est signum interioris; dicendum, quod humiliatio illa non est signum humilitatis iam acquisitae, sed voluntatis se exercendi ad acquirendam humilitatem; et hoc quidem debet esse et est in omni bono homine, qui religionem gerit in corde4. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quia per hoc non dicit homo nec iactat nec ostentat, se esse humilem, sed humilitatem se velle acquirere et habere.
15. Ad ultimo obieetum, quod turpis est omnis pars, quae non convenit etc.; dicendum, quod, ut dicit Augustinus5, «si omnia essent aequalia, non essent omnia». Et ideo ordo, distinctio et multiformitas in professionibus et habitibus non deturpat, sed ornat ipsius Ecclesiae universum; unde sicut impugnator esset universitatis mundi qui nollet, has creaturas parvulas in universo esse; sic impugnator est universalis Ecclesiae, si quis de ipsa velit exstirpare habitus viles et abiectos.
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Disputed Questions on Evangelical Perfection
Wishing1 to investigate some things concerning evangelical perfection, we must take the first beginning of our inquiry from humility.
And first let us inquire about it as about the root of all perfection.
Second, about poverty.
Third, about continence.
Fourth, about obedience.
Question I. On humility as to its act, namely whether it belongs to Christian perfection to make oneself vile for Christ.
And since a habit is known through its acts2, therefore we must inquire about humility as to its act. The question therefore is whether it belongs to Christian perfection to make oneself vile for Christ. And that it does, is shown:
1. First by the authority of Christ himself, who says in Matthew, chapter 183: Unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven; but to make oneself little is nothing other than to grow vile to oneself and to wish to be reputed vile by others: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Matthew, chapter 204: He that will be first among you shall be your servant; but to make oneself the servant of others is to make oneself vile with the very greatest making-vile: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, Luke, chapter 175: When you shall have done all things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; but whoever rightly says something wishes to be believed, and believes that what he says is true: therefore, for someone to be a perfect disciple of Christ, it is necessary that he repute himself vile and that he wish to be reputed such by others.
4. Likewise, Luke, chapter 226: He that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger, and he that is the leader, as he that serveth; but if the least were to make himself as the greatest, it would be the height of ambition and elation: therefore conversely, when the greater becomes lesser and the leader as one who serves, it will be the height of his abjection; and this ought to be done according to the evangelical teaching: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, John, chapter 137: You call me Master and Lord etc., up to: to wash feet; from this authority it is gathered by reasoning that the disciple of Christ, by reason of the Master, ought to bow himself down even to the uttermost kind of humiliation and abjection.
6. Likewise, Philippians, chapter 28: Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus, who being in the form etc.; but to empty oneself is nothing other than to make oneself vile: if therefore we ought to imitate Christ in
this, the emptying of oneself and the making of oneself vile befits evangelical perfection.
7. Likewise, on that word Bernard says in the sermon on the Nativity of the Lord1: «What necessity was there that the God of majesty should so empty himself, so humble himself, so shorten himself, unless that you should do likewise? Already he cries out by example what he is about to preach by word». And a little after: «It is a shamelessness not to be borne that, where majesty has emptied itself, a little worm should be puffed up and swell». If therefore in such an emptying we ought to imitate Christ, it remains that to be made vile pertains to the perfection of virtue.
8. In the second book of Kings, chapter 62, on that text: Michol, the daughter of Saul, looking, saw king David leaping, and she despised him in her heart; Gregory says: «Behold, he whom the Lord preferred singularly to the rest, by making himself equal to the least under the Lord and by displaying abject things, despises himself. The power of the kingdom is not called back to memory; he does not fear to grow vile in the eyes of his subjects by dancing; what is thought by others of these deeds, I do not know; I, for my part, am more amazed at David dancing than fighting; by fighting he conquered the enemy, by dancing before the Lord he conquered himself». If therefore to conquer oneself is a work of perfect virtue; and this is done in the making of oneself vile: therefore etc.
9. Likewise, a little after in the same place3: I will play, and I will become viler etc.; on which Gregory says: «As if he were saying openly: I seek to grow vile before men, because I seek to keep myself free-born before God through humility». If therefore to be free-born before God is nothing other than to be perfect; and the making of oneself vile makes one free-born before God: therefore it is an act of perfect virtue.
10. Likewise, Jonas, chapter 34, on that text: Let men and beasts be covered with sackcloth; the Gloss: «Behold, the king of Ninive rises from his throne, exchanges purple for sackcloth, ointments for mud, clean things for filth»; but this is in the highest degree to make oneself vile, not only inwardly but also outwardly, and by this God, who was angry, was appeased: therefore the making of oneself vile is a work most acceptable to God.
11. Likewise, Augustine, On True Religion5: «All the things which, desiring to have them, we were not rightly avoiding, Christ made vile by going without them; for no sin can be committed except while those things are sought which he despised, or by fleeing those things which he endured»; but Christ endured being made vile, not compelled but by will, and refused honours: if therefore we wish to be made vile for him, let us be conformed to him in the discipline of morals.
12. Likewise, Gregory in the first book of the Dialogues6 speaks thus: «In the praises of Constantius it must be weighed how great his humility was within himself, who loved the more the rustic who despised him; for what each one secretly is within himself, an insult inflicted proves. For just as the proud rejoice in honours, so the humble for the most part rejoice in being despised; and when they see themselves vile in the eyes of others too, they are glad for this reason, that they understand the judgment to be confirmed by this which they themselves also held of themselves within themselves». From this authority it is manifestly gathered that one is not truly humble unless he is vile in his own eyes and wishes to be so in the eyes of others.
13. Likewise, Bernard on the Canticles, the sixteenth homily7: «The truly humble man wishes to be reputed vile, not to be proclaimed humble»; but humility is not virtuous unless it is true humility: therefore if true humility cannot be without the voluntary making of oneself vile, by equal reason neither can virtuous humility.
14. This same thing is shown by reason. As pride stands to loftiness, so humility stands to vileness; but there is never pride without there being with it an appetite for loftiness8: therefore there is never true humility without an appetite for vileness.
15. Likewise, as wantonness stands to austerity, so pride stands to vileness; but wantonness is not rooted out of us except by the rigour of austerity: therefore neither is pride, except by the vileness of abjection9: therefore the making of oneself vile is an act that extinguishes pride, and on this account an act of perfect virtue.
16. Likewise, no one can be justified from original guilt unless he subjects himself to the Sacraments, which are sensible signs; but to subject oneself to a
sensible sign cannot be without great abjection1; but more is required for removing actual sin: therefore, for someone to be justified, it is required not only that he be humbled inwardly, but also that he be humbled outwardly.
17. Likewise, the despiser of God is worthy of the highest reproach and contempt; but the sinner is a despiser of God, therefore he is to be despised in the highest degree: therefore whoever despises himself as a sinner does what he ought and judges himself justly2. But this pertains to perfect virtue: therefore etc.
18. Likewise, there are two things in sin, namely lust and contempt of God3; but a man cannot be justified from a sin in which there was lust unless the sorrow of compunction be present: therefore by equal reason he can be justified neither from pride nor from contempt of God except through contempt and the making vile of himself.
19. Likewise, the city of God stands opposite to the city of Babylon; but the city of Babylon begins from love of self and reaches even to contempt of God: therefore, on the contrary, the city of God begins from contempt of self and reaches even to the love of God4. If therefore to despise oneself and to make oneself vile pertains to the founding of the divine city: therefore it is a work of perfect virtue.
20. Likewise, no one walks rightly along the way of virtue except one who pays the honour due to God; but whoever makes himself vile on account of God is the one who honours God: therefore etc. The major is manifest of itself; the minor is proved by what is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter 35: Great is the power of God alone, and he is honoured by the humble; and Baruch, chapter 2: The soul that is sorrowful for the greatness of evil, and goeth bowed down and feeble, and the eyes that fail, and the hungry soul give glory and justice to thee, O Lord.
21. Likewise, the more someone is conformed to the exemplar of the virtues, the more perfect he is; but Christ on the cross is the exemplar of perfect virtue, where he was in the highest abjection6: therefore each one is the more perfect, the more he approaches it.
22. Likewise, no virtue is in the true perfection of virtue unless it approves each thing according as it is to be approved; but, as is said in the Psalm7, all things are vanity, every man living: therefore no one is of perfect virtue unless he reputes himself vain and useless, and wishes to be reputed such by anyone whatever.
23. Likewise, no virtue is perfect unless, when it can, it goes out into outward work8; but the outward work corresponding to inward abjection is the outward making of oneself vile: therefore no one has in himself the virtue of perfect humility unless he wishes to show himself outwardly vile and abject, when place and time offer themselves.
24. Likewise, the virtue of perfect humility reforms what the vice of pride deformed; but pride disorders cognition through presumption, affection through arrogance, speech through boasting, bearing through ostentation and insolence: therefore no one has perfect humility unless he has the contraries of these in thought, affection, speech and bearing.
25. Likewise, perfect virtue removes one far9 not only from vices, but also from the kindlings of vices; but the display of inward things and outward honouring are kindlings of pride: therefore perfect humility removes one far from these. But to be removed far from honouring is to approach vileness and ignominy: therefore etc.
Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ 1.: «Virtue is a habit of the mind in the manner of nature, in accord with reason10»; but nature naturally desires to be advanced and not to be cast down: therefore the making of oneself vile is against the dictate of nature: therefore it is not a work of perfect humility.
2. Likewise, «virtue is the order of love», as is said in the book On the Morals of the Church11; but when the greater subjects himself to an inferior, there is disorder and a perversion of order: therefore it is not a work of virtue.
3. Likewise, virtue is a thing consisting in the mean12; but whoever makes himself vile approaches an extreme: therefore he withdraws from the act of perfect virtue.
4. Likewise, every virtue has the underlay of truth; for where truth is lacking, there virtue cannot
be; but a just and perfect man, reputing himself viler than others, while he thinks some such thing, judges falsely: therefore if such a thought is repugnant to truth1, it is necessary that it be repugnant to virtue.
5. Likewise, whoever makes the handiwork vile makes the maker vile; but man is the handiwork of God2: therefore whoever makes himself vile makes God vile. But to make God vile is not a matter of perfect virtue, but a fault: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, among the other creatures man is the most noble creature, therefore most to be honoured and prized in the whole universe of things: therefore whoever makes himself vile disorders the universe.
7. Likewise, to make another vile is a sin; but a man is bound to love himself as also his neighbour3: therefore whoever renders himself contemptible acts against the order of charity.
8. Likewise, when another thinks you vile, he sins: therefore if you wish that another repute you vile, you wish that another sin; but this is a disordered will: therefore etc.
9. Likewise, the soul is the image of God, therefore it is naturally apt to be conformed to him4; but God is supremely good, wise and exalted: therefore the appetite for excellence befits the reforming of the image of our mind: therefore, on the contrary, the appetite for making oneself vile is not a work of virtue.
10. Likewise, there are three things desirable, namely the good, the true and the arduous5; but no virtue or appetite of virtue consists in desiring the contrary of the true or of the good: therefore neither in desiring the contrary of the arduous. But such is the making vile: wherefore etc.
11. Likewise, every virtue and act of virtue has an exemplar in God6; but the making of oneself vile has no exemplar in God, because God in no way makes himself vile.
12. Likewise, every virtue renders a man conformed to the state of glory, because «it is the disposition of the perfect to the best7»; but the making of oneself vile is directly repugnant to glorification: therefore etc.
13. Likewise, it is objected against outward humiliation: because it is a sign of the inward; but it is pride to confess in word that one is humble; therefore it is pride to show this very thing by a sign.
14. Likewise, you who put forward humility in a sign either repute yourself humble, or not; if so: then you attribute to yourself a noble virtue, therefore you are proud; if not: then, since your habit outwardly shows you humble, you bear one thing in your mind and show another in the sign: therefore you are a hypocrite8.
15. Likewise, every part is unseemly which does not fit its whole; but these singularities of habits seem to disfigure the good ecclesiastical state: therefore it does not pertain to perfect virtue or to Christian perfection.
Conclusio. The foundation of all Christian perfection is humility, whose act is the inward and outward making vile of one's own self.
Sᴏʟᴜᴛɪᴏ: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the sum of all Christian perfection consists in humility, whose act is the outward and inward making vile of oneself. For the sum of all Christian perfection turns about three things, namely about grace, justice and wisdom, according to which three Christ is said to be the way, the truth and the life9. For the gift of grace affords the way to the truth of justice, in which consists the exercise of action; the truth of justice leads through to the taste of wisdom, in which consists the solace of contemplation; and when these have been perfectly attained, one ascends to the summit of evangelical perfection, which Christ Jesus taught by word and example, who professed himself especially the master of humility, Matthew, chapter 1110: Learn of me etc. For humility is the door of wisdom, the foundation of justice and the dwelling-place of grace.
It is the door of wisdom: because wisdom is «the cognition of the highest and first causes11», not only by the mode of speculative and intellectual cognition, but also of savouring and experiential cognition. Since, therefore, all things whatsoever that have been made flow from one principle and have been produced from nothing; he is truly wise who truthfully recognises his own and others' nothingness and the loftiness of the first principle. Whence Augustine prays in the second book of the Soliloquies12: «May I know thee, may I know myself». But no one arrives at a full knowledge of God except through a true
and right knowledge of himself; nor does he rightly know himself who does not attend to his own nothingness; for if any man think himself to be something, whereas he is nothing, he deceiveth himself, as the Apostle says in the last chapter to the Galatians1; but to know one's own nothingness, this is to humble oneself: humility, therefore, is the door of wisdom. — And this is what the Wise Man says in Proverbs, chapter 11: Where humility is, there also is wisdom; this is also what Wisdom herself says in Matthew, chapter 11: Thou hast revealed them to little ones etc.; on which Bernard, On the Degrees of Humility2: «It is apparent that the truth which is hidden from the proud is revealed to the humble. Now humility is the virtue by which a man, through true knowledge of himself, grows vile to himself; and this befits those who, having disposed ascents in their heart, advance from degree to degree, until they arrive at the summit of humility, on which, set as on Sion, they look out upon the truth». And a little after: «He who commanded humility leads through to truth»; whence also the ladder of Jacob, «what else does it intimate to us, but that the cognition of truth consists in the summit of humility»? And a little after: «Good is the way of humility, by which truth is found, charity is acquired, the generations of wisdom are shared».
It is also the foundation of justice. For it belongs to justice «to render to each one what is his own3», to God as to oneself as to one's neighbour. Now to God is owed principally honour and reverence; and humility especially disposes one to render this, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 34: How great is the power of God alone, and he is honoured by the humble. Since, therefore, the beginning of all justice is divine worship and honour, and this is shown to God by the humble; hence it is that the root and foundation of all justice is humility. — Whence on that text of Matthew, chapter 35: So it becometh us to fulfil; the Gloss: «that is, all humility, which is all justice». And Gregory in a Homily6: «In the other things that you do, hold humility as the root of good working. For even if any works whatever be present, they are nothing unless they are seasoned with humility; for a marvellous action joined with elation does not lift up, but weighs down. For whoever gathers virtues without humility carries dust into the wind; and whence he is seen to see, thence he is the worse blinded». The same: «The whole of what you build grows into a ruin, if before the mass of the fabric you do not provide the foundations of humility».
It is nonetheless the dwelling-place of grace. For grace makes a man pleasing to God; and he is pleasing to God who recognises the gift of the divine deigning and condescension; but no one recognises this except one who looks carefully upon his own unworthiness; and such a one is truly humble: and hence it is that the grace of the Holy Spirit rests upon the humble alone. — Whence Isaias, the last chapter7: Upon whom shall my Spirit rest, but upon the humble etc.; Augustine, in the third book On Christian Doctrine: «To this end the sins of great men have been written, that that apostolic sentence may everywhere be feared: Wherefore he that seemeth to stand, let him take heed lest he fall. For there is no page of the holy books on which it does not sound: God resisteth the proud, but to the humble he giveth grace». — Since, therefore, humility is the dwelling-place of grace, hence it is that in it consists the sum of all evangelical perfection. And this is what Augustine says to Dioscorus8: «You will find no other way for grasping and obtaining the truth than that which was found by him who, as God, sees the infirmity of our steps. Now the first is humility, the second humility, the third humility; and as often as you should ask, I would say this, not that there are no other precepts that might be spoken of, but unless humility have gone before, accompanied and followed all things whatever that we do well, and been set before us for us to gaze upon, and set beside us for us to cling to, and set upon us to restrain us; pride wrests the whole from our hand even as we rejoice over some good deed. Therefore, if you should ask, and as often as you should ask, concerning the precepts
of the Christian religion, it would please me to answer nothing other than humility; and if perhaps I were to say other things, necessity would compel».
Now the act of such humility is not only an inward, but also an outward humiliation and making vile of oneself. And the reason for this is: because, since being is twofold, namely of nature and of grace, nothingness is twofold: in one way by opposition to the being of nature, in another way by opposition to the being of morals and of grace. And according to this, humility, which is through consideration, or which is considerative of our nothingness, is twofold: one can indeed be called the humility of truth, which arises from the consideration of nothingness by opposition to the being of nature; and this is found not only in men but also in Angels, not only in wayfarers but also in the Blessed. The other can be called the humility of severity, which arises from the consideration of guilt; by which, when a man considers that he has been sunk down through elation, by a certain severe censure through humility he rises up against himself, making himself vile not only inwardly in his own eyes, but also outwardly in the eyes of others. Hence the making of oneself vile, not only outward but also inward, is an act of the humility-virtue1, and none the less consonant with evangelical perfection, if in it there be attended to its due origin and mode and fruit. — For in its origin outward humiliation ought to proceed from inward humility according to the dictate and rule of the divine gift; and this can be done according to the law of the divine precept, or of the divine good pleasure, or of the divine counsel. The precept regards all universally; the good pleasure regards those to whom the divine will is specially inspired; but the counsel those who ascend to the summit of perfection. And of these three it is said to the Romans2, that you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God. He therefore rightly humbles himself who conforms himself to the divine will according to any one of the three modes, according to which the spirit of true humility inclines diverse persons to diverse kinds of humiliations.
Now the mode of outward humiliation is that there be kept in it manliness, truth and seemliness; manliness against faintheartedness, which casts down the mind; truth against hypocrisy, which deceives men; seemliness against stolidity, which dishonours men and makes them play the fool3.
And the fruit of this humiliation is that it avails for acquiring humility, for exercising it and for perfecting it. Whence on that text of John, chapter 134: You also ought to wash one another's feet; the Gloss: «Whoever bows down to the feet, in him humility is stirred up in the heart; or if it is already in the heart, the affection of humility is confirmed». And Bernard in a certain letter to Ogerius5: «Humility, to which humiliation surely leads, is the foundation of the whole spiritual fabric; for humiliation is the way to humility, as patience to peace, as reading to knowledge. If you desire the virtue of humility, do not flee the way of humiliation; for if you cannot be humiliated, you will not be able to be advanced to humility». Now this humiliation he calls the making vile of one's own self; whence he also adds6: «I will play, and I will become viler, I will play, that is, that I may be mocked. A good play, at which Michol is angered and God delighted; a good play, which to men indeed offers a laughing-stock, but to Angels a spectacle; a good play, I say, in which we are made a reproach to the rich and a contempt to the proud. In this chaste and religious play he played who said: We are made a spectacle to this world, and to Angels, and to men. Let us too meanwhile play at this play, that we may be mocked and confounded and humbled, until he comes who puts down the mighty and exalts the humble, who may gladden us, exalt us and glorify us for ever». — From these things it is manifestly gathered that to humble oneself and to make oneself vile for Christ is a work of perfect virtue, and consonant both with religion and with Christian perfection. Hence the reasons and authorities which are brought forward for this side are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected first, that virtue is consonant with nature, and nature always desires to be advanced, it must be said that, although according to the outward face the act of humility, which is the making of oneself vile, seems to be dissonant from the instinct of nature, yet according to truth and its intrinsic reason it is in the highest degree consonant with nature itself, both as to origin and as to conservation, and also as to advancement. For every nature, by the fact that it is from nothing, has some defect in itself and proclaims itself defective. — Nature is also conserved in this, that it keeps unity in its composing principles and also in its quantitative parts as far as its powers allow; in this also, that it expels everything that induces dispersion, so far as is possible to it7. — And it advances in this, that it desires to receive influence from a superior nature, to which it subjects itself, so that it may be completed by it. Since, therefore, it belongs to humility to
recognise its own defect; to bring itself back to a certain unitive littleness, to drive back from itself the spirit of inflation and of pride as something dispersive; to subject and offer itself to the influence of supernal grace: hence it is that according to truth it is consonant with natural act and instinct. Hence that argument assumes a falsehood when it says that humility and its act, which is to make oneself vile, are dissonant from the instinct of nature. — It could also be said otherwise, that that definition is of moral virtue, which is rooted in the natural dictate. But this act of humility is founded in the faith of Jesus Christ, which is an act above reason and exceeds the bounds of nature. And therefore that argument is not valid1.
2. To that which is objected, that virtue is the order of love, it must be said that the order of love which is attended to in virtue regards principally, radically and essentially this, that God be preferred to the creature; and every other order is annexed and as it were ordering to this order as to the principal order. Since, therefore, as Augustine says2, in order that the Creator may grow sweet in the heart, it is fitting that the creature grow vile; and since that creature which most of all opposes this order is one's own person and private good: therefore, for preserving the perfect order of virtue, this is most of all consonant, that one make oneself vile; which one does when on account of God one subjects oneself to another and puts another before oneself, saving, however, the dignity of the ecclesiastical order, which true humility does not pervert, nor neglect, nor set aside, but rather preserves, while inwardly in the heart humility is kept, and outwardly authority endures in its own degree.
3. To that which is objected, that virtue is a habit consisting in the mean, it must be said that that word is understood not of a mean as to quantity on the part of the object, but as to removal from the deficiency and the excess that have the character of vice; and thus is the making of oneself vile, which is the work of a virtue midway between faintheartedness and arrogance. Hence, although it seems to decline to an extreme, yet according to truth it holds the mean3. — Moreover, as has been touched on, the making of oneself vile is not only an act of virtue informing nature, but also an example of virtue repairing it; hence it holds more the character of the medicinal than of the completive; and because the disease corrupting the human race is most of all the haughtiness of pride and arrogance, and the medicinal ought to work through the contrary4: therefore by declining to the other extreme it brings back to the mean; as by a likeness can be seen in the constraint of fasting and abstinence against the disease of wantonness.
4. To that, that every virtue has the underlay of truth, it must be said that this is true and has place in humility: because the very truth of the divine law dictates that each one ought to think humbler things of himself than of another. Hence, as each one naturally feels his own afflicting disease more than another's, so each one ought to consider his own defect more certainly and more nearly and more frequently, and on this account ought to repute himself viler than others, not because he is certain that he is such, but because he is more certain of his own than of another's vanity or vileness. Therefore, as is said in the Gloss on Philippians, chapter 25: In humility, esteeming one another superior to themselves, «we ought not so to esteem this as to pretend that we esteem it, but truly to esteem that there can be something hidden in another by which he is superior to us, even if our good, by which we seem superior to him, is not hidden». And thus it appears that the making of oneself vile is founded not upon the false but upon the true, namely according to the experiential cognition of one's own defect, which each man has as it were singularly with respect to another; just as also each just man has some singular excellence with respect to another, by reason of which it is said in the praise of every Confessor6: There was not found the like to him.
5. To that: whoever makes the handiwork vile, it must be said that the handiwork, because it was made by God from nothing and was vitiated in man by the first, original sin, has in itself something of deiformity7 by reason of him from whom it is, and something of defectibility by reason of that out of which it is, and something of deformity by reason of the vice under which it is; and just as by reason of deiformity it is to be honoured, because there shines back in it the divine vestige, image and likeness; so by reason of defectibility it can be held of small account, and by reason of deformity be reputed vile, not to the insult but to the honour of God, since honour is taken away only through the deformity of vice and sin.
6. To that, that man is the most noble creature, it must be said that by reason of the fact that he has in himself the deiformity of the image, he is set before the others; but by reason of the fact that he has defectibility and nothingness, he is made equal to the others; but since he has the deformity of viciousness, he is set after the others; whence the impious are placed in hell8 in the most ordered way by reason of sin, and by reason of this
the making of oneself vile befits the sinner, which, when it is voluntary, holds the character of virtue and of medicine.
7. To that, that to make another vile is a sin, it must be said that to make another vile is to put oneself before another, but to make oneself vile is to subject oneself to another; and the first belongs to pride, the second to humility and reverence; and therefore it is not alike on the one side and on the other.
8. To that, that whoever wishes to be reputed vile by another wishes that the other sin, it must be said that this argument fails in two ways: first, because a passion can be good, although the action is evil, as is plain in the passion of Christ, in which there was merit on the part of Christ who endured, and demerit on the part of the crucifier1; and therefore it does not follow that, if someone wishes to suffer something in which another sins, he therefore wishes the other to sin. — Moreover, when someone wishes to be reputed vile, he does not wish this by reason of nature or of person, but by reason of the guilt that is against nature; and whoever despises or hates that, whether in himself or in another, can do this meritoriously and without sin.
9. To that, that the soul naturally desires to be conformed to God, it must be said that some things are proper to the divine excellence, such as divine judgment and vengeance, honour2 etc.; and in such things whoever desires to be conformed desires in a disordered manner, as lucifer did. But there are some things which he communicates to the creature, such as goodness, truth and virtue, which is most of all shown when someone is able to be master of himself; and therefore it does not follow that the making of oneself vile is repugnant to the image.
10. To that, that there are three things desirable, namely the true, the good and the arduous, it must be said that, as virtue has to do with the true good, and vice with the apparent good; so pride regards an apparent arduousness, which it is very difficult and arduous to despise; but humility is the making of oneself vile, which includes a true arduousness, although it is repugnant to the apparent. — Moreover, no one who is truly humble makes himself vile except on account of this, that he wishes to be exalted eternally.
11. 12. To that, that every virtue has an exemplar in God, it must be said that humility, as to that which belongs to its completion, namely not to exceed its own bounds, has an exemplar in God; but as to that which regards defect and subjection to another, it has no exemplar in God, who has no defect and has no superior. Yet, so that man should not neglect to be humbled on account of the lack of an exemplar, it pleased God to take the form of a servant3 and in it to be humbled, despised and made vile, so that the rest might be inflamed by so great an exemplar to the perfect making vile of themselves.
13. 14. To that concerning outward humiliation, that it is a sign of the inward, it must be said that that humiliation is not a sign of humility already acquired, but of a will to exercise oneself in acquiring humility; and this indeed ought to be and is in every good man who bears religion in his heart4. — And by this the answer is plain to the following objection, because by this a man does not say, nor boast, nor show off that he is humble, but that he wishes to acquire and to have humility.
15. To the last objection, that every part is unseemly which does not fit etc., it must be said that, as Augustine says5, «if all things were equal, all things would not be». And therefore order, distinction and multiformity in professions and habits does not disfigure but adorns the universe of the Church itself; hence, just as he would be an assailant of the universe of the world who would not wish these little creatures to be in the universe; so he is an assailant of the universal Church, if anyone should wish to root out of it habits that are vile and abject.
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- 1Hanc quaestionem sumsimus ex codicibus E D I. Respectu cod. I notamus, quod in ipso plerumque scripta non sunt nisi initia locorum s. Scripturae; deinde quod non raro syllogismorum conclusiones omittit, substituens tantum ergo etc., quod in solut. obiect. verba obiectionum non repetit, sed simpliciter dicit: ad 1. dicendum; demum, quod interdum etiam alia contrahere vel mutare solet. Unde fere constanter sequimur egregium et perantiquum codicem E, cui fere omnino convenit D, nisi quod hic plures librarii errores habeat.We have taken this question from codices E, D, I. With respect to cod. I we note that in it for the most part only the beginnings of the passages of holy Scripture are written; next, that not rarely it omits the conclusions of syllogisms, substituting only therefore etc.; that in the solution of the objections it does not repeat the words of the objections, but simply says: to 1. it must be said; lastly, that at times it is also wont to contract or change other things. Hence we almost constantly follow the excellent and very ancient codex E, with which D agrees almost entirely, except that the latter has more copyists' errors.
- 2Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.) et II. Ethic. c. 1. seq.Compare Aristotle, II On the Soul, text. 33 (c. 4), and II Ethics, c. 1 f.
- 3Vers. 3. — Inferius pro reputatum I reputari.Verse 3. — Below, for reputatum ("reputed"), I has reputari ("to be reputed").
- 4Vers. 27.Verse 27.
- 5Vers. 10. — Finem arg. I sic exhibet: quod velit vilem (vilis?) ab aliis reputari.Verse 10. — I gives the end of the argument thus: quod velit vilem (vilis?) ab aliis reputari ("that he wish vile [vile?] to be reputed by others").
- 6Vers. 26.Verse 26.
- 7Vers. 13. et 14.Verses 13 and 14.
- 8Vers. 5. seqq.: Hoc enim sentite etc. — In fine arg. pro si... debemus... evangelicae I cum... debeamus... christianae.Verse 5 ff.: For let this mind be in you etc. — At the end of the argument, for si... debemus... evangelicae ("if... we ought... evangelical"), I has cum... debeamus... christianae ("since... we ought... Christian").
- 1Serm. 1. (de Fontibus Salvatoris) n. 1.Sermon 1 (on the Fountains of the Saviour), n. 1.
- 2Vers. 16: Michol, filia Saul, prospiciens per fenestram vidit etc. — Post subsilientem Vulgata addit: atque saltantem coram Domino. Verba Gregorii sunt in XXVII. Moral. c. 46. n. 77. Textus originalis, post metuit pluribus additis, subinde prosequitur: Quid de eius factis... pugnando quippe hostes subdidit, saltando autem coram Domino semetipsum vicit. — Codd. pro Gregorius perperam Chrysostomus; in ipso textu substituunt contemnitur pro contemnit, et quae oculis pro non oculis.Verse 16: Michol, the daughter of Saul, looking out through a window, saw etc. — After subsilientem ("leaping") the Vulgate adds: and dancing before the Lord. Gregory's words are in XXVII Morals, c. 46, n. 77. The original text, after metuit ("fears"), with several things added, then continues: What of his deeds... for by fighting he subdued the enemies, but by dancing before the Lord he conquered himself. — The codices wrongly have Chrysostomus for Gregorius; in the text itself they substitute contemnitur ("is despised") for contemnit ("despises"), and quae oculis ("which to the eyes") for non oculis ("not in the eyes").
- 3Vers. 22. (II. Reg. 6.): Et ludam etc. — Gregorii verba habentur loc. cit. in praeced. nota. — Pro humilitatem codd. hilaritatem.Verse 22 (II Kings 6): And I will play etc. — Gregory's words are found at the place cited in the preceding note. — For humilitatem ("humility") the codices have hilaritatem ("cheerfulness").
- 4Vers. 8: Et operiantur etc. — Glossa (ordinaria apud Lyranum) sumta est ex Hieron. in hunc loc., in eaque textus originalis substituit munditias pro munda. — Inferius respicitur Ion. 3, 10: Et vidit Deus opera eorum... et misertus est Deus super malitiam, quam locutus fuerat, ut faceret eis, et non fecit. — Vocibus Deus iratus I interserit prius.Verse 8: And let them be covered etc. — The Gloss (the ordinary Gloss, in Lyra) is taken from Jerome on this place, and in it the original text substitutes munditias ("cleanliness") for munda ("clean things"). — Below, Jon. 3:10 is in view: And God saw their works... and God had mercy with regard to the evil which he had said that he would do to them, and he did it not. — Between the words Deus iratus ("God… angry") I inserts prius ("before").
- 5Cap. 16. n. 31: Omnia, quae habere cupientes non recte vivebamus, carendo vilefecit [in ed. Maurin. in nota adiecta dicitur: «Ita in mss. At in editis, vilia fecit». D E legunt Christo carendo vilescit (vilescunt?)]. Omnia quae vitare cupientes a studio deviabamus veritatis, perpetiendo deiecit. Non enim... nisi aut dum... aut fugiuntur quae etc.Chapter 16, n. 31: All the things by desiring to have which we were not living rightly, he made vile by going without [in the Maurist edition, in an appended note, it is said: «Thus in the manuscripts. But in the printed editions, vilia fecit». D E read Christo carendo vilescit ("grows vile to Christ by going without") (vilescunt, "grow vile"?)]. All the things by desiring to avoid which we were straying from the pursuit of truth, he cast down by enduring them. For not... except either while... or those things are fled which etc.
- 6Cap. 5. Cum textu originali substituimus aspiciunt pro ostendunt, quod exhibent codd. Textus originalis pro quia, per hoc iudicium habet quia hoc iudicium.Chapter 5. With the original text we have substituted aspiciunt ("they see") for ostendunt ("they show"), which the codices give. For quia, per hoc iudicium ("that by this the judgment") the original text has quia hoc iudicium ("that this judgment").
- 7Sive Sermone 16. n. 10. — In D desideratur finis arg. nisi... virtuosa.Or Sermon 16, n. 10. — In D the end of the argument, nisi... virtuosa ("unless... virtuous"), is lacking.
- 8Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18, ubi docet, quod «superbia sit amor excellentiae propriae».Compare Augustine, XI On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 14, n. 18, where he teaches that «pride is the love of one's own excellence».
- 9Vide Gaufrid., Declamation. ex S. Bernardi sermonibus (inter opera Bernard.), c. 36. seq. n. 42-44., qui ex his verbis Ps. 24, 18: Vide humilitatem meam et laborem meum elicit duo latera scalae ad caelum, quae sunt vilitas et asperitas (austeritas), quibus deinceps internae virtutis et gratiae gradus firmiter inserendae sunt. «Sane ubi sic stabilieris et firmaveris in corde tuo, asperitatem corporalis abstinentiae ac laboris amplecti et omni vilitate et extremitate esse contentus, bona sunt latera, securus iam insere gradus exercitii spiritualis etc.See Geoffrey, Declamations from the Sermons of St. Bernard (among the works of Bernard), c. 36 f., n. 42–44, who from these words of Ps. 24:18, See my humility and my labour, draws out the two sides of the ladder to heaven, which are vileness and harshness (austerity), into which the rungs of inner virtue and grace are thereafter to be firmly fitted. «Truly, when you have so established and confirmed it in your heart to embrace the harshness of bodily abstinence and labour and to be content with all vileness and extremity, the sides are good; now fit in securely the rungs of spiritual exercise etc.
- 1Cfr. IV. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 5, et ibid. Commentar. p. I. q. 1. in corp. — D omittit sensibilia, et pro sensibili habet lacunam; E utroque loco habet lacunam.Compare IV Sentences, the text of the Master, d. I, c. 5, and ibid., the Commentary, p. I, q. 1, in the body. — D omits sensibilia ("sensible"), and for sensibili ("sensible") has a gap; E has a gap in both places.
- 2Quo sensu Bernard. Serm. 45. in Cantic. n. 2. docet, quod «in eo qui graviter peccavit, etsi amanda, non tamen admiranda humilitas». Cfr. ibid. Serm. 36. n. 5.In which sense Bernard, Sermon 45 on the Canticles, n. 2, teaches that «in one who has sinned gravely humility is, though to be loved, yet not to be admired». Compare ibid., Sermon 36, n. 5.
- 3Sive conversio ad creaturam et aversio a Deo; quae duo August., de Mendacio, c. 7. n. 10, nomine libidinis comprehendit dicens: Libido quoque ipsa recte definitur appetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia praeponuntur. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 754, nota 9. et ibid. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2, nec non III. Sent. d. 38. dub. 2. — I prosequitur: sed homo, in quo fuit libido, non potest iustificari a peccato, nisi adsit etc.That is, conversion to the creature and aversion from God; which two Augustine, On Lying, c. 7, n. 10, comprehends under the name of lust, saying: Lust itself also is rightly defined as the appetite of the mind by which any temporal things whatever are put before eternal goods. Compare tome II, p. 754, note 9, and ibid., d. 42, a. 3, q. 2, and also III Sentences, d. 38, dub. 2. — I continues: but a man in whom there was lust cannot be justified from sin unless there be present etc.
- 4August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 28: Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Ibid. XVII. c. 16. n. 2: Civitas diaboli Babylon, quae confusio interpretatur... populus additus veris et carne et fide Israelitis civitas est Dei. Cfr. Apoc. 18, 2. seqq. — Inferius pro spectat I pertinet.Augustine, XIV On the City of God, c. 28: Two loves, then, have made two cities, the earthly namely love of self even to contempt of God, the heavenly love of God even to contempt of self. Ibid. XVII, c. 16, n. 2: The city of the devil is Babylon, which is interpreted confusion... the people added to the true Israelites both in flesh and in faith is the city of God. Compare Apoc. 18:2 ff. — Below, for spectat ("pertains") I has pertinet ("belongs").
- 5Vers. 21: Quoniam magna potentia Dei solius etc. — Seq. locus est Baruch 2, 18, ubi Vulgata Domino pro Domine.Verse 21: For great is the power of God alone etc. — The following place is Baruch 2:18, where the Vulgate has Domino ("to the Lord") for Domine ("O Lord").
- 6Cfr. August., Serm. 304. (alias 37. de Diversis) c. 3. seq. n. 3, ubi expendens haec verba Phil. 2, 6-8: Qui cum in forma Dei... mortem autem crucis, ait: Habemus tale humilitatis exemplum, superbiae medicamentum. Quid ergo intumescis, o homo? etc.Compare Augustine, Sermon 304 (otherwise 37 On Various Things), c. 3 f., n. 3, where, weighing these words of Phil. 2:6–8, Who being in the form of God... even the death of the cross, he says: We have such an example of humility, a medicine for pride. Why then do you swell, O man? etc.
- 7Psalm. 38, 6. — Subinde pro ergo nullus est virtutis perfectae I ergo nemo perfectus est, qui etiam pro a quolibet ponit ab aliis.Psalm 38:6. — Next, for ergo nullus est virtutis perfectae ("therefore no one is of perfect virtue") I has ergo nemo perfectus est ("therefore no one is perfect"), and it also puts ab aliis ("by others") for a quolibet ("by anyone whatever").
- 8Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 4, tria ad virtutem requiruntur, scilicet scire, velle et impermutabiliter operari. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 924, nota 12.According to Aristotle, II Ethics, c. 4, three things are required for virtue, namely to know, to will and to act unchangeably. Compare tome II, p. 924, note 12.
- 9I elongatur, et subinde apparitio exterior pro apparitio interiorum.I has elongatur ("is removed far"), and next apparitio exterior ("outward display") for apparitio interiorum ("display of inward things").
- 10Ut dicit Cicero; cfr. supra pag. 53, nota 4. In fine legendum videtur virtutis pro humilitatis.As Cicero says; compare above, p. 53, note 4. At the end it seems one should read virtutis ("of virtue") for humilitatis ("of humility").
- 11Libr. I. c. 15. n. 25. Vide tom. II. pag. 672, nota 3. — I prosequitur: sed cum maior subiicitur minori sive inferiori etc.Book I, c. 15, n. 25. See tome II, p. 672, note 3. — I continues: but when the greater is subjected to the lesser or inferior etc.
- 12Cfr. Aristot. II. Ethic. c. 6; et tom. II. pag. 671. nota 9.Compare Aristotle, II Ethics, c. 6; and tome II, p. 671, note 9.
- 1August., de Natura et gratia contra Pelag. c. 34. n. 38, approbat dictum Pelagii, «ut in parte veritatis, non in parte falsitatis magis humilitas collocetur». Bernard., Epist. 201. n. 2: Nec humilitas praeter veritatem laudabilis.Augustine, On Nature and Grace against Pelagius, c. 34, n. 38, approves the saying of Pelagius, «that humility should rather be placed on the side of truth, not on the side of falsehood». Bernard, Letter 201, n. 2: Nor is humility praiseworthy apart from truth.
- 2Eph. 2, 10: Ipsius enim sumus factura etc.Eph. 2:10: For we are his workmanship etc.
- 3Cfr. Matth. 19, 19. et 22, 39. — Pro sed homo I sed quilibet.Compare Matt. 19:19 and 22:39. — For sed homo ("but a man") I has sed quilibet ("but anyone").
- 4Vide II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — Inferius pro appetitus vilificationis I appetere vilificationem.See II Sentences, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1. — Below, for appetitus vilificationis ("the appetite for making vile") I has appetere vilificationem ("to desire making vile").
- 5Cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 2. q. 4. in corp.Compare III Sentences, d. 26, a. 2, q. 4, in the body.
- 6Vide I. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 1.See I Sentences, d. 36, a. 3, q. 1.
- 7Haec virtutis definitio datur ab Aristot. VII. Phys. text. 17. (c. 3.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 671, nota 7.This definition of virtue is given by Aristotle, VII Physics, text. 17 (c. 3). Compare tome II, p. 671, note 7.
- 8Hieron., IV. Comment. in Isai. 9, 14. seqq.: Omnis hypocrita est aliud simulans et aliud agens; promittens castitatem et vivens luxuriose, praeferens paupertatem et replens marsupium. Ibid. VI. c. 16, 14: Si castum esse me simulo, et aliud est in conscientia mea; habeo non gloriam mercenarii, sed supplicia peccatoris. Et in comparatione duorum malorum levius malum est aperte peccare, quam simulare et fingere sanctitatem.Jerome, IV Commentary on Isaias, 9:14 ff.: Every hypocrite is one who pretends one thing and does another; promising chastity and living luxuriously, displaying poverty and filling his purse. Ibid. VI, c. 16:14: If I pretend to be chaste, and there is something else in my conscience, I have not the glory of the hireling but the punishments of the sinner. And in the comparison of two evils it is a lighter evil to sin openly than to pretend and feign holiness.
- 9Ioan. 14, 6: Ego sum via et veritas et vita. Cfr. Bernard., de Gradibus humilit. c. 1. seq. n. 1. seqq.John 14:6: I am the way, and the truth, and the life. Compare Bernard, On the Degrees of Humility, c. 1 f., n. 1 ff.
- 10Vers. 29.Verse 29.
- 11Secundum Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. et III. text. 3. (II. c. 2.). Idem dicit VI. Ethic. c. 7, sapientiam esse «scientiam rerum praestantissimarum». Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. — Codd. non bene omittunt Est ostium sapientiae.According to Aristotle, I Metaphysics, c. 1 ff., and III, text. 3 (II, c. 2). He says the same in VI Ethics, c. 7, that wisdom is «the science of the most excellent things». Compare III Sentences, d. 35, q. 1. — The codices not well omit Est ostium sapientiae ("It is the door of wisdom").
- 12Cap. 1. n. 1. — Superius cum E posuimus nihilitatem, alii vilitatem. Inferius pro qui... non attendit I nisi qui... attendit.Chapter 1, n. 1. — Above, with E, we have put nihilitatem ("nothingness"); the others have vilitatem ("vileness"). Below, for qui... non attendit ("who... does not attend") I has nisi qui... attendit ("unless one who... attends").
- 1Vers. 3: Nam si quis existimat se aliquid etc. — Seq. locus est Prov. 11, 2: Ubi autem est humilitas etc.; tertius Matth. 11, 25.Verse 3: For if any man think himself to be something etc. — The following place is Prov. 11:2: But where humility is etc.; the third, Matt. 11:25.
- 2Cap. 1. n. 1. seq.: Et in hoc apparet... revelatur. Humilitatis vero talis potest esse definitio: humilitas est virtus, qua homo verissima sui agnitione sibi ipsi vilescit. Haec autem convenit his... in corde suo dispositis [Ps. 83, 6.], de virtute in virtutem [Ps. 83, 8.], id est de gradu... donec ad culmen humilitatis perveniant, in quo velut in Sion, id est in speculatione, positi veritatem prospiciant... Qui iussit humilitatem perducet ad veritatem. Ibid. c. 2. n. 3: Illud quoque, quod in scala illa, quae in typo humilitatis Iacob monstrata est, Dominus desuper innixus apparuit [Gen. 28, 12. seq.], quid nobis... humilitatis constituitur cognitio veritatis? Ibid. n. 5: Bona tamen via humilitatis, qua veritas inquiritur, caritas etc.Chapter 1, n. 1 f.: And in this it is apparent... is revealed. Now of humility such a definition can be given: humility is the virtue by which a man, through the truest acknowledgment of himself, grows vile to himself. And this befits those... having disposed in their heart [Ps. 83:6], from virtue to virtue [Ps. 83:8], that is, from degree... until they arrive at the summit of humility, on which, set as on Sion, that is, in contemplation, they may look out upon the truth... He who commanded humility will lead through to truth. Ibid. c. 2, n. 3: That also, that on that ladder which was shown to Jacob as a figure of humility the Lord appeared leaning upon it from above [Gen. 28:12 f.], what to us... is the cognition of truth established of humility? Ibid. n. 5: Yet good is the way of humility, by which truth is sought, charity etc.
- 3De hac definitione iustitiae cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 1. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum in Matth. 5, 6: Iustitia est sua cuique tribuere, sibi et proximis et Deo.On this definition of justice compare tome III, p. 728, note 1. The ordinary Gloss, in Strabo, on Matt. 5:6: Justice is to render to each his own, to oneself and to one's neighbours and to God.
- 4Vers. 21: Quoniam magna etc.Verse 21: For great etc.
- 5Vers. 15: Sic enim decet etc. — Glossa est ordinaria apud Lyranum. Cfr. August., Serm. 292. (alias 23. de Sanctis) c. 4. n. 4; Bernard., Serm. in Octava Epiphan. n. 4.Verse 15: For so it becometh etc. — The Gloss is the ordinary Gloss, in Lyra. Compare Augustine, Sermon 292 (otherwise 23 On the Saints), c. 4, n. 4; Bernard, Sermon on the Octave of the Epiphany, n. 4.
- 6Libr. I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 7. n. 4. Textus originalis primam propos. (In ceteris... tenete) ut ultimam (post excaecatur) exhibet sic: Sed etsi quaelibet bona adsint... congregat, in ventum pulverem portat; et unde aliquid ferre cernitur, inde deterius caecatur. In cunctis ergo, quae agitis, fratres mei, radicem etc. — Codd. allegant lib. XXVI. vel XXVII. Moralium, sed perperam, etiam si referretur ad locum seq., quem Gregor. profert XXXIV. Moral. c. 23. n. 51; verba vide tom. IV. pag. 582, nota 7.Book I of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 7, n. 4. The original text gives the first proposition (In the other things... hold) as the last (after is blinded), thus: But even if any good things whatever be present... gathers, carries dust into the wind; and whence he is seen to bear something, thence he is the worse blinded. In all things, therefore, that you do, my brethren, the root etc. — The codices cite book XXVI or XXVII of the Morals, but wrongly, even if it were referred to the following place, which Gregory brings forward in XXXIV Morals, c. 23, n. 51; for the words see tome IV, p. 582, note 7.
- 7Vers. 2: Ad quem autem respiciam, nisi ad pauperculum et contritum spiritu (Septuaginta interpretes: Et super quem respiciam nisi super humilem et quietum). I addit et cap. undecimo [v. 2.]: Et requiescet super eum etc. — Verba August. habentur III. de Doctr. christian. c. 23. n. 33. Primus locus Scripturae in hoc textu est I. Cor. 10, 12: Itaque qui se existimat stare etc.; secundus est Iac. 4, 6. et I. Petr. 5, 5. Pro timenda textus originalis tremenda. — Superius pro Nam gratia I Nam humilitas.Verse 2: But to whom shall I have respect, but to him that is poor and little and of a contrite spirit (the Septuagint translators: And upon whom shall I look but upon the humble and quiet). I adds and in chapter eleven [v. 2]: And shall rest upon him etc. — Augustine's words are found in III On Christian Doctrine, c. 23, n. 33. The first place of Scripture in this text is I Cor. 10:12: Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand etc.; the second is Jas. 4:6 and I Pet. 5:5. For timenda ("to be feared") the original text has tremenda ("to be trembled at"). — Above, for Nam gratia ("For grace") I has Nam humilitas ("For humility").
- 8Epist. 118. (alias 56.) c. 3. n. 22: Nec aliam... viam munias, quam quae munita est ab illo... et praecesserit et comitetur et consecuta fuerit etc. Post superbia textus originalis plura addit. Pro quaecumque bene facimus I bona quae facimus, et pro bono facto D E I contra textum originalem beneficio. In fine verborum textus originalis dicere pro dicerem.Letter 118 (otherwise 56), c. 3, n. 22: Nor should you pave another way... than that which has been paved by him... and have gone before and accompany and have followed etc. After superbia ("pride") the original text adds more. For quaecumque bene facimus ("whatever we do well") I has bona quae facimus ("the good things that we do"), and for bono facto ("good deed") D E I, against the original text, have beneficio ("benefit"). At the end of the words the original text has dicere ("to say") for dicerem ("I would say").
- 1I Huiusmodi autem vilificatio tam exterior quam interior est actus humilitatis-virtutis. Subinde I omittit evangelicae.I has Huiusmodi autem vilificatio tam exterior quam interior est actus humilitatis-virtutis ("Now such making vile, outward as well as inward, is an act of the humility-virtue"). Next, I omits evangelicae ("evangelical").
- 2Cap. 12, 2. — Superius pro potest fieri I potest esse.Chapter 12:2. — Above, for potest fieri ("can be done") I has potest esse ("can be").
- 3Secundum Du Cange, Glossarium etc., stultizare idem est ac insanire, in furiam verti.According to Du Cange, Glossarium etc., stultizare is the same as insanire, in furiam verti ("to be mad, to be turned to frenzy").
- 4Vers. 14. — Glossa est secundum August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 58. n. 4: Cum enim ad pedes fratris inclinatur corpus, etiam in corde ipso vel excitatur, vel si iam inerat, confirmatur ipsius humilitatis affectus.Verse 14. — The Gloss follows Augustine, On the Gospel of John, tract. 58, n. 4: For when the body is bowed down at the feet of a brother, in the heart itself too the affection of humility is either stirred up, or, if it was already there, confirmed.
- 5Epist. 87. ad Ogerium [codd. nostri perperam Rogerium] canonicum regularem, n. 11: Putasne, parum hoc mihi conferat religionis emolumentum, cum humilitas, ad quam... totius sit spiritualis fabricae fundamentum? Siquidem... Nam si non pateris humiliari etc.Letter 87, to Ogerius [our codices wrongly Rogerius], canon regular, n. 11: Do you think this confers little profit of religion on me, since humility, to which... is the foundation of the whole spiritual fabric? For indeed... For if you do not suffer yourself to be humiliated etc.
- 6Ibid. n. 12. — Loci Scripturae sunt II. Reg. 6, 22 (cfr. supra fundam. 9.); Ps. 122, 4; I. Cor. 4, 9, ubi Vulgata omittit huic; Luc. 1, 52: Deposuit potentes de sede et exaltavit humiles. — Textus originalis post sed Angelis addit pulcherrimum et post despectio superbis plures subiungit propositiones.Ibid. n. 12. — The places of Scripture are II Kings 6:22 (compare above, fundamentum 9); Ps. 122:4; I Cor. 4:9, where the Vulgate omits huic ("this"); Luke 1:52: He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble. — The original text after sed Angelis ("but to Angels") adds pulcherrimum ("a most beautiful [spectacle]"), and after despectio superbis ("a contempt to the proud") joins on several more propositions.
- 7Cfr. loci supra pag. 61, nota 4. ex Boethio allegati.Compare the places from Boethius cited above, p. 61, note 4.
- 1Vide supra Quaest. de mysterio Trin. q. 1. a. 2. ad 5.See above, Question on the Mystery of the Trinity, q. 1, a. 2, reply to 5.
- 2Enarrat. in Ps. 30. sermo 3. n. 8: Vilescat totum, quidquid praeter Deum est. Lib. Soliloq. animae ad Deum (inter opera August.), c. 22: Sed omnia mihi peto ut amarescant, ut tu solus dulcis appareas animae meae, qui es dulcedo inaestimabilis, per quam cuncta amara dulcorantur. De ipsa solut. cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. ad 1. — Inferius pro persona propria I perfectio propria.Expositions on the Psalms, Ps. 30, sermon 3, n. 8: Let the whole grow vile, whatever is besides God. The Book of the Soliloquies of the Soul to God (among the works of Augustine), c. 22: But I ask that all things grow bitter to me, so that you alone may appear sweet to my soul, you who are the inestimable sweetness through which all bitter things are sweetened. On the solution itself compare III Sentences, d. 33, q. 2, reply to 1. — Below, for persona propria ("one's own person") I has perfectio propria ("one's own perfection").
- 3Vide III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2; d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4., et IV. Sent. d. 33. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1.See III Sentences, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, reply to 2; d. 34, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, reply to 4; and IV Sentences, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, reply to 1.
- 4Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 37, nota 4, ubi praeter Gregor. allata sunt verba Aristot. — Lib. II. Ethic. c. ult. tradens praecepta, quibus medium i. e. virtutem consequi possimus, Aristoteles in exemplum adducit eos «qui ligna distorta dirigunt», qui scil. ea, dum dirigere volunt, in partem oppositam torquent, quo facto ligna ad medium reducuntur. — Superius pro genus humanum I naturam.Compare tome IV, p. 37, note 4, where besides Gregory the words of Aristotle are brought forward. — In book II of the Ethics, last chapter, handing down precepts by which we may attain the mean, that is, virtue, Aristotle brings forward as an example those «who straighten crooked timber», who namely, when they wish to straighten it, bend it to the opposite side, by which the timber is brought back to the middle. — Above, for genus humanum ("the human race") I has naturam ("nature").
- 5Vers. 3. — Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum quaedam omittit; verbotenus apud Petr. Lombard. in hunc locum, et est sumta ex August., 83 Qq. q. 71. n. 5. — In principio solut. post Ad illud quod I legit obiicitur de sustentamento.Verse 3. — The ordinary Gloss in Strabo omits some things; it stands word for word in Peter Lombard on this place, and is taken from Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 71, n. 5. — At the beginning of the solution, after Ad illud quod ("To that which"), I reads obiicitur de sustentamento ("is objected concerning the underlay").
- 6Eccli. 44, 20. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 9. q. 8. in corp.Ecclus. 44:20. Compare II Sentences, d. 9, q. 8, in the body.
- 7Codd., ut ex subnexis colligitur, perperam deformitatis.The codices, as is gathered from what follows, wrongly have deformitatis ("of deformity").
- 8Id est in loco infimo; cfr. IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 1. q. 1. et 2.That is, in the lowest place; compare IV Sentences, d. 45, a. 1, q. 1 and 2.
- 1Cfr. II. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et III. Sent. d. 20. dub. 3. seq. — Inferius pro contra naturam D circa naturam. August., Epist. 153. (alias 54.) c. 1. n. 3: In uno simul et culpam improbes et naturam approbes, ac propterea culpam iustius oderis, quod ea foedatur natura, quam diligis.Compare II Sentences, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2, in the body, and III Sentences, d. 20, dub. 3 f. — Below, for contra naturam ("against nature") D has circa naturam ("about nature"). Augustine, Letter 153 (otherwise 54), c. 1, n. 3: In one and the same person you may at once disapprove the guilt and approve the nature, and on that account hate the guilt the more justly, because by it is befouled the nature which you love.
- 2Rom. 12, 19: Mihi vindicta, ego retribuam, dicit Dominus [Eccli. 28, 1. seqq.]; Isai. 42, 8: Gloriam meam alteri non dabo; Malach. 1, 6: Ubi est honor meus?Rom. 12:19: Revenge is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord [Ecclus. 28:1 ff.]; Isa. 42:8: I will not give my glory to another; Mal. 1:6: Where is my honour?
- 3Phil. 2, 7. — Superius post ad alterum supplevimus non habet exemplar in Deo, exigente hoc contextu orationis.Phil. 2:7. — Above, after ad alterum ("to another"), we have supplied non habet exemplar in Deo ("it has no exemplar in God"), the context of the sentence requiring this.
- 4Bernard., Serm. 34. in Cantic. n. 3: Non humiliatis, sed humilibus Deus dat gratiam [Iac. 4, 6.]. Est autem humilis, qui humiliationem convertit in humilitatem, et ipse est qui dicit Deo: Bonum mihi, quod humiliasti me [Ps. 118, 71]. — Mox pro ostentat I ostendit.Bernard, Sermon 34 on the Canticles, n. 3: Not to the humiliated, but to the humble God gives grace [Jas. 4:6]. And he is humble who turns humiliation into humility, and he it is who says to God: It is good for me that thou hast humbled me [Ps. 118:71]. — Presently, for ostentat ("shows off") I has ostendit ("shows").
- 5Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41: Quia non essent omnia, si essent aequalia; non enim essent multa rerum genera, quibus conficitur universitas, primas et secundas et deinceps usque ad ultimas ordinatas habens creaturas; et hoc est quod dicitur omnia. — Inferius pro viles I humiles.Book of 83 Questions, q. 41: Because all things would not be, if they were equal; for there would not be the many kinds of things of which the universe is made up, having creatures ordered first and second and so on down to the last; and this is what is meant by all things. — Below, for viles ("vile") I has humiles ("humble").