Quaest. 4, Art. 2
Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica · Quaestio IV: De obedientia
Articulus II. Utrum sit consonum evangelicae perfectioni, quod unus se astringat voto ad obediendum alteri.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit consonum evangelicae perfectioni, quod unus astringat se voto ad obediendum alteri. Et videtur, quod non.
1. Lex enim evangelica est libertatis2; sed subdere se homini per votum est necessitatis: ergo astringere se voto ad obediendum homini repugnat libertati evangelicae legis.
2. Item, Anselmus, in libro Cur Deus homo3: «Deus hominem per semetipsum redimere voluit, ut in pristinam libertatem hominem revocaret»; sed in statu pristinae libertatis nullus erat astrictus ad obediendum alteri: ergo ad pristinam libertatem per Redemptorem reductus nulli ad obediendum debet esse astrictus.
3. Item, Gregorius4: «Servitia, quanto minus debita, tanto magis grata»: ergo ab oppositis, quanto magis debita, tanto minus grata; sed astringens se voto ad obediendum homini tenetur illi obedire: ergo hic est minus gratus Deo. Sed illud, per quod efficitur homo minus gratus Deo, est contrarium evangelicae perfectioni: ergo etc.
4. Item, lex evangelica est iugum suave et onus leve5; sed grave est homini per omnia obtemperare: ergo astringere se ad obediendum homini non concordat levitati evangelicae perfectionis.
5. Item, lex evangelica, quia est onus leve, non compatitur secum onus et servitutem legis scriptae: ergo cum gravius sit obedire indistincte praeceptis hominis, quam distincte obtemperare caeremoniis et praeceptis veteris legis; videtur, quod astringere se ad obediendum homini non possit esse cum perfectione evangelica.
6. Item, grave est obedire mandatis divinis: ergo multo gravius est obedire mandatis divinis pariter et humanis; sed qui ex voto subiicit se homini astringit se6 mandatis illius: ergo etc.
7. Item, Lucae sexto7: Perfectus erit omnis, si sit sicut magister eius; sed de Christo non legitur, quod fuerit sub alio per votum: ergo alteri subdere se per votum non est perfectum, sed, ut videtur, potius superstitiosum.
8. Item, si votum obedientiae auget perfectionem virtutis obedientiae; cum iste gradus non fuerit in Christo, videtur, quod implens hunc gradum sit perfectior Christo; sed hoc est absurdum et inconveniens: ergo et inconveniens est dicere, quod voto se alteri subiicere8 augeat perfectionem virtutis obedientiae.
9. Item, Apostoli evangelicam perfectionem potissime in se habuerunt; sed nulli obedientiam devoverunt: ergo etc.
10. Item, videtur, quod istud facere sit praesumtuosum: quia aut talis reputat se sufficientem ad mandata divina implenda, aut non. Si non: ergo stulte facit, cum astrictus ad divina praecepta se obligat ad mandata humana implenda; si autem reputat se sufficientem ad implenda mandata divina, praesumtuosus est: ergo ulterius se obligare ad mandata hominis maius videtur iudicium praesumtionis.
11. Item, si hoc est perfectionis vovere: ergo qui profitetur hoc, profitetur se esse perfectum; sed hoc est praesumtuosum: ergo etc.
12. Item, velle praeesse iusto viro et perfecto est superbia et praesumtio: ergo consentire alii et cooperari, ut praesit, est consentire superbiae et praesumtioni; sed qui astringit se ad obediendum alteri consentit et cooperatur illi, ut praesit: ergo etc.
13. Item, hoc videtur esse periculosum: quia committere se homini, de cuius scientia et conscientia ignorat, est periculum; sed qui astringit se voto ad obediendum homini ignorat frequenter, an sit sapiens, vel bonus, seu de ipsius scientia et conscientia: ergo etc.
14. Item, quanto maioribus et pluribus homo astringitur, tanto est in maioribus periculis constitutus; sed qui vovet obedientiam homini pluribus astringitur, quam prius esset astrictus: ergo maioribus exponitur periculis: ergo etc.
15. Item, lex evangelica dissuadet iuramentum propter periurii periculum1; sed qui vovet obedientiam homini est in periculo transgressionis voti: ergo talis offert se discrimini.
16. Item ostenditur, quod istud sit imperfectum. Qui enim peccat, alio suggerente, minus peccat, quam ille qui peccat, proprio motu instigante2: ergo similiter qui obedit, alio imperante, minus meretur, quam qui sponte agit, seu solo Deo iubente: ergo qui astringit se voto ad obediendum alteri imperfectius agit, quam qui se non astringit; sed quod diminuit de perfectione dissonat ab evangelica lege: ergo etc.
17. Item, tanto perfectius quis movetur, quanto immediatius fertur in Deum; sed qui solo Deo obedit immediatius fertur in Deum, quam qui subiicit se homini: ergo etc.
18. Item, optimum genus monachorum est anachoretarum, secundum quod dicit beatus Benedictus in principio regulae suae3; sed tales non astringebantur voto ad obediendum homini: igitur ex voto subiicere se alii non est evangelicae perfectionis.
19. Item, qui infirmo praecludit viam sanitatis non curat perfectionem, sed a perfectione recedit; sed qui astringit4 se voto ad obediendum alteri claudit sibi multas vias ad salutem, cum talis ante votum multimode aliter salvari possit, quod non potest post votum: ergo talis imperfectissime agit.
20. Item, quanto quis pluribus subiicitur, tanto humilius et perfectius agit; sed qui vovet obedientiam pluribus male facit: ergo vovere obedientiam alteri non est humilitatis nec perfectionis.
Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ hoc sic obiicitur. 1. Matthaei tertio5: Sic decet nos implere omnem iustitiam; Glossa: «Perfecta humilitas habet tres gradus: primus est subdere se maiori, secundus subdere se pari, tertius subdere se minori, in quo est omnis iustitia; et hoc Christus implevit»: ergo si perfecta iustitia est subdere se alteri, hoc autem maxime fit per obedientiae votum; videtur, quod istud sit maxime perfectioni evangelicae consonum.
2. Item, primae Petri secundo6: Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum: ergo quanto quis hoc efficacius facit, tanto perfectius agit; sed qui per votum alteri se subiicit, hoc efficacissime facit: ergo talis perfectissime agit.
3. Item, Gregorius7: «Maius est relinquere se ipsum quam sua»; sed qui propter Deum relinquit sua perfecte facit: ergo qui relinquit se ipsum, perfectius. Sed hoc maxime fit in abnegatione voluntatis per obedientiae votum: ergo etc.
4. Item, Anselmus8: «Sicut voluntas Dei est origo omnis boni, sic voluntas propria est origo omnis mali»; sed qui perfecte amovet originem omnis mali perfectissime facit: ergo qui totaliter voluntatem propriam abnegat per votum obedientiae agit perfectissime.
5. Item, Hugo9: «Obedientia est virtus, quae, propria voluntate postposita, animo amplectitur iniuncta opere implenda»; sed qui alteri obedientiam vovet maxime postponit propriam voluntatem: ergo etc.
6. Item, Bernardus, homilia quadragesima secunda super Cantica10: «Parum est, subditum esse Deo, nisi sis et omni humanae creaturae propter Deum: subdere paribus, subdere minoribus; sic enim decet nos implere omnem iustitiam»; sed hoc potissime fit astringendo se voto ad obediendum alteri: ergo etc.
7. Item, sufficiens iustitia est servare divina mandata, ergo abundans1 super haec servare humana; sed hoc facit qui alteri ad obediendum se subiicit.
8. Item, humilitas est consona perfectioni evangelicae: ergo summa humilitas est maxime consona eidem; sed astringere se voto ad obediendum alteri est maximae humilitatis: ergo etc.
9. Item, liberalitas est consona evangelicae perfectioni; sed hoc est summa liberalitas, cum homo propter Deum non solum dat sua2, sed se ipsum, propriam voluntatem postponendo, per obedientiae votum: ergo etc.
10. Item, conformitas ad Christum est consona perfectioni evangelicae; sed Christus mera liberalitate subiecit se homini, Lucae secundo3: Et erat subditus illis: ergo se ipsum alteri subiicere facit Christo conformem. Sed hoc maxime fit per obedientiae votum: ergo etc.
11. Item, quod maxime nos elongat a mundo maxime consonat perfectioni evangelicae; sed astringere se voto ad obediendum homini maxime elongat nos a mundo, quia omne, quod est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, vel concupiscentia oculorum, vel superbia vitae4, a quibus maxime elongamur per obedientiae votum: ergo etc.
12. Item, quod maxime nos elongat a diabolo maxime spectat ad perfectionem evangelicam; sed velle subesse et non praeesse maxime nos elongat a peccato diaboli, qui omnino voluit praeesse sine subesse5: ergo etc.
13. Item, omne, quod conformat nos caelesti hierarchiae, consonum est perfectioni evangelicae; sed in hierarchia caelesti videmus quod unus Angelus subiicit se obediendo alteri, et Angeli inferiorum ordinum sine repugnantia obediunt Angelis superiorum6: ergo in hierarchia ecclesiastica quod unus homo subiiciat se obediendo alii, conformat nos ordini caelesti, ac per hoc est maxime consonum perfectioni evangelicae.
CONCLUSIO.
Astringere se voto ad obediendum alteri, non in omnem eventum, sed ad ea quae evangelicis consiliis sunt consona, hoc est perfectionis constitutivum, expeditivum et consummativum.
Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod dupliciter aliquis potest se astringere ad obediendum alteri homini: vel in omnem eventum et omnia beneplacita voluntatis illius, vel ad ea quae evangelicis consiliis sunt consona secundum aliquam certam vivendi normam, a fonte legis evangelicae derivatam. Primo modo nec est perfectum nec perfectioni consonum, immo temerarium et stultum; secundo modo perfectum est, quia hoc et perfectionis est constitutivum et expeditivum et consummativum. Sic enim obedientiam vovere ad hominem et est ipsius perfectionis pars constitutiva et via praeambula et completio ultimata. — Pars, inquam, constitutiva est, quia ipsa est unum de illis tribus consiliis evangelicis, in quibus consistit principaliter integritas evangelicae perfectionis.
Via praeambula est, quia consilia illa melius et perfectius et expeditius servari possunt, cum quis alieno consortio et adiutorio et exemplo fulcitur, quam si sibi soli relinquatur. Consortium autem non iuvat, nisi sit pacificum; nec pacificum esse potest, nisi sit connexum et ordinatum7; hoc autem esse non potest, nisi per reductionem plurium voluntatum ad unius imperium, secundum cuius nutum ordinentur et dirigantur et per consequens connectantur.
Est etiam completio ultimata, propter hoc quod in ipsa completur potissime iustitia abundans, cuiusmodi est iustitia evangelica, secundum illud Matthaei quinto8: Nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum. — Est enim iustitiae triplex actus, scilicet rectificare, coordinare et compensare. Iustitia namque nihil aliud est quam recta voluntas, ordinata et recompensativa, quia per ipsam «redditur unicuique quod suum», secundum quod competit rectitudini iuris et ordinis dignitati. — Perfecta ergo rectificatio iustitiae abundantis attenditur secundum conformitatem voluntatis ad veritatem; veritas autem unumquemque humiliat, ut de se minora quam de alio sentiat. Ille igitur perfecte et abundanter rectificatur, qui, secundum quod veritas dictat, non invite, sed voluntarie voluntatem suam sub alio humiliat et quodam modo in servitutem quandam redigit et captivat9; quod quidem fit per obedientiam alteri homini exhibitam, quae maxime repugnat arrogantiae et ambitioni, qua quis vult aliis se praeferre. Unde Bernardus, quadragesima secunda homilia super Cantica10: «Time Deum et noli hanc rem
pessimam facere, ut quem humiliat veritas extollat voluntas. Magis autem acquiesce Deo, et sit voluntas subdita veritati».
Perfecta etiam ordinatio secundum regulam abundantis iustitiae est, ut non solum inferior superiori, et par pari, verum etiam ut superior inferiori voluntarie se supponat, iuxta quod Matthaei tertio1 dicitur: Sic decet nos implere omnem iustitiam; ubi Glossa: «Sic, subdendo se servo et inferiori, omnem iustitiam, id est humilitatem, quae est omnis iustitia, decet implere. — Et haec humilitas tres habet gradus: primus, subdere se maiori, et hic vocatur sufficiens; secundus est subdere se aequali, et hic dicitur abundans; tertius est subesse minori, in quo est omnis iustitia. Hunc Christus implevit». Quoniam ergo perfecte tunc subiicitur homo homini, quando se astringit voluntarie, in his quae secundum Deum sunt, alterius imperiis obedire, maxime eius2 qui maior eo non erat, sed vel aequalis, aliquando etiam minor — quia omnis homo in aliquo alium excedit, saltem secundum animam — hinc est, quod ad perfectionem iustitiae ordinantis secundum viam ordinis dignativi, qui currit secundum legem gratiae, quo maior reputat se minorem, concurrit et plurimum facit obedientia, quae uni homini ab altero exhibetur.
Perfecta nihilominus recompensatio iustitiae abundantis in hoc attenditur, ut quis totum danti totum reddat. Quoniam ergo Christus Dominus non tantum dedit nos nobis, sed etiam se dedit nobis; et propter nos non tantum se hominem fecit, sed etiam hominibus subdidit: hinc est, quod, ad hoc quod pro modulo nostrae imbecillitatis recompensemus, secundum quod possumus, non tantum Deo, verum etiam homini, non solum quae habemus et membra, sed etiam quod sumus, id est voluntatem nostram, congruit ut subdamus. Unde Bernardus, super Cantica3: «Constat, Deum caritate exinanitum, caritate minoratum ab Angelis, caritate parentibus subditum, caritate Baptistae manibus inclinatum, caritate carnis infirma passum, caritate postremo morti obnoxium, cruce inglorium exstitisse». Ex quo concludit, quod mera voluntate in horum recompensationem debet homo homini propriam subdere voluntatem. — Et in hoc vere perfectio consistit, cum quis voluntatem libertatis pro ipso donat, quae est impretiabile bonum4, quo nihil maius ab homine dari potest; qua data, et omnia dantur. Unde si perfectum vere dicitur «cui nihil deest», quod etiam «propriam virtutem attingit5»; in hoc potissime convenit consummatio perfectionis, ita ut inchoetur ab abrenuntiatione bonorum temporalium per paupertatem, proficiat in castificatione membrorum corporalium per castitatem; consummetur autem in dedicatione virtutum interiorum et mentalium per voluntatis abnegationem et votum obedientiae, in qua proprie dicitur homo semetipsum abnegare, iuxta illud Domini, Lucae nono6: Si quis vult venire post me, abneget semetipsum et tollat crucem suam et sequatur me; ubi praecipue et potissime votum obedientiae commendatur.
Ex his igitur liquide colligitur, quod cum sint tria consilia evangelica, secundum bonum exterius, inferius et interius, quae opponuntur triplici origini vitiorum7; triplex debet esse votum integrativum perfectionis evangelicae, scilicet paupertatis, continentiae et obedientiae, inter quae obedientia, sicut iam ostensum est, dat toti perfectioni evangelicae altissimum et nobilissimum complementum. — Unde et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo, quod lex evangelica est lex libertatis, quae repugnat necessitati; dicendum, quod duplex est necessitas: una est coactionis, et altera tentionis. Prima repugnat, secunda non. Nam praeceptum obligat, sicut et votum, et ipsum non excludit libertatem legis evangelicae; dicitur ergo lex Evangelii esse lex libertatis, non per exclusionem obligationis ex praecepto seu voto venientis, sed per exclusionem oneris servitutis legalis ex timore servili procedentis8.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod in pristinam libertatem Christus redimendo hominem revocavit; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur respectu totalis speciei, non respectu cuiuslibet individui. Nam onus servitutis corporalis stare potest cum gratia Spiritus sancti et Sacramento baptismi9; ac per hoc multo fortius onus subiectionis voluntariae, quod ex mera voluntate manat, libertati gratiae non repugnat.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod servitia, quanto minus debita, tanto magis grata; dicendum, quod ratio debiti est duplex: una, quae venit ex promissione liberali; alia, quae venit ex obligatione pacti et commercii mercimonialis. Prima in nullo repugnat
gratiositati obsequii, sed solum secunda. Et ratio huius est: quia, licet secunda fundetur super amorem privatum et mercenarium, prima fundatur super amorem liberalissimum, quo aliquis non solum vult offerre Deo arboris fructum, verum etiam stipitem et radicem. Unde sicut exemplificat Anselmus1 de duobus, quorum unus offert Deo arboris fructum, proprietatem sibi reservans; alter vero offert utrumque; et ille magis placet, qui utrumque offert: sic et in proposito intelligendum est.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lex evangelica est iugum suave; dicendum, quod duplex est onus, scilicet onus aggravans, et onus vigorans et adminiculans, et per consequens allevians et supportans. Iugum igitur obedientiae, superadditum evangelicae sarcinae, simile est oneri non gravanti, sed confortanti; sicut currus non aggravat pondus equi, sed alleviat, et multitudo pennarum aves sursum potius sublevat, quam deorsum trahat2: sic et obedientia, quae superponit hominem simili, pondus superbiae et arrogantiae, quod veniebat ex amore proprii sensus et propriae voluntatis, excludit, quod maxime repugnabat evangelicae perfectioni; ideo ad illam ferendam habilem facit et agilem.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lex evangelica non compatitur secum servitutem legis scriptae; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia servitus caeremonialium et iudicialium praeceptorum a nova lege dissonat et propter velamina figurarum et propter gravamina poenarum affligentium; ideo lex Evangelii, quae introducta est per Christum, per quem facta est gratia et veritas3, excludit utrumque genus illorum praeceptorum et servitutem in observantia eorundem, non propter difficultatem, sed propter imperfectionem. Quoniam ergo, licet difficile sit homini obedire, haec difficultas non repugnat nec veritati nec gratiae nec perfectae virtuti, quae est «circa arduum et difficile»; non repugnat per consequens evangelicae perfectioni, immo potius complementum dat illi.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod grave est obedire mandatis divinis; iam patet responsio: quia, sicut ostensum est, gravitas et difficultas operis perfectioni evangelicae potius consonat, quam repugnet; et ille vere perfectus est, qui gravia portat cum promptitudine voluntatis.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Christo, dicendum, quod Christus, quantum conveniebat redemptioni humani generis, hominibus se subiecit, et hoc voluntate optima et perfecta; et quia voluntas eius in bono confirmata erat nec erat vertibilis, sicut nostra: ideo non erat opus, quod esset per votum astricta.
8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod additio voti non facit ad complementum obedientiae, quae non fuit in Christo; iam patet responsio: quia in Christo fuit aliquid loco voti tam respectu obedientiae quam paupertatis quam castitatis, scilicet confirmata voluntas, quae est excellentior voto4; et quia ad illam accedimus per propositi roborationem et voti emissionem: hinc est, quod votum, nos astringendo et quodam modo roborando, sua inviolabilitate reddit conformes Christo; et ideo perfectionis cumulus crescit ex ipso, licet in Christo non fuerit secundum emissionem vocalis verbi.
9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tale votum obedientiae non fuit in Apostolis; dicendum, quod tripliciter contingit loqui de obedientia, scilicet quantum ad actum et habitum et modum. Fuit igitur in Apostolis promptitudo obediendi per habitum perfectum; fuit etiam actus, quo Christo obedientes fuerunt usque ad mortem et ad diversa genera tormentorum, ita quod non solum obedientes fuerunt ad operationes exsequendas, verum etiam ad passiones sustinendas. Modus autem obedientiae, quo quis subiiciat se alii tanquam praelato, non fuit eis competens nisi pro tempore, quo fuerunt cum Christo; quia ipsi erant praelati Ecclesiae et a plenitudine Spiritus sancti agebantur, et recti alios gubernabant. Fuerunt tamen et ipsi prius obedientes ipsi Christo, et post reverentiam debitam exhibebant Apostolo Petro5; et ideo ex hoc concludi non potest nec debet, obedientiam non debere voveri ab illis potissime, quibus competit ab aliis gubernari.
10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praesumtuosum sit vovere, quia aut reputat se sufficientem etc.; dicendum, quod attribuere sufficientiam virtutibus suis et libero arbitrio, hoc praesumtionis est respectu quantumcumque parvi boni, cum dicat Apostolus secundae ad Corinthios tertio6: Non quod simus sufficientes etc.; sed attribuere hoc gratiae divinae, quam sperat sibi non defuturam propter divinam munificentiam, non est hoc praesumtionis, sed fiduciae et certitudinis spei, qua credimus, Deum adiutorem esse homini, qui vult suis consiliis adhaerere. Propter quod et idem Apostolus statim post praemissum verbum subiungit: Sufficientia nostra ex Deo est; et idem, ad Philippenses ultimo: Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat; et hac spe debet fulciri qui, divino afflatus Spiritu, evangelicorum consiliorum perfectionem non tantum proponit, verum etiam vovendo promittit.
11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod profiteri, se esse perfectum, est praesumtuosum; dicendum, quod est perfectio quantum ad meritum et quantum ad
statum. Profiteri, se esse perfectum quantum ad meritum, hoc praesumtionis est, non perfectionis, cum Paulus dicat ad Philippenses tertio1: Non quod iam perfectus sim. Profiteri autem se perfectum quantum ad statum non est praesumtionis, quia hoc ponit laudem non circa ipsam personam in se, quae potest esse culpabilis per merita propria, sed circa vitam communem et modum vivendi per Christi oris consilium approbatum.
12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod superbia est velle praeesse viro iusto; dicendum, quod praeesse alii potest quis velle dupliciter: vel quia vult praeesse simpliciter, vel quia vult praeesse sublimiter per amorem excellentiae propriae2; et sic voluntas haec depravata est et in illo qui vult, et in aliis, qui sibi consentiunt, sicut fuit in lucifero et daemonibus ceteris adhaerentibus sibi. — Alio modo vult aliquis praeesse, ut praesit utiliter, per amorem reipublicae et universalis Ecclesiae, excitatus spiritu caritatis supernae; et hoc modo nec ipse peccat, nec alii, qui sibi consentiunt, cum Deus sic ordinaverit corpus Christi mysticum gubernandum secundum praecellentias graduum, officiorum et dignitatum.
13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod periculosum est committere se homini ignoto ex toto; dicendum, quod si quis committeret se, nulla lege, nulla norma, nulla regula praefixa, sed in omnem eventum, hoc absque dubio esset stultum; cum autem quis vovet obedientiam secundum formam regulae approbatam, nullum est ibi periculum: quia, cum sint quaedam secundum regulam, quaedam citra regulam, quaedam supra regulam, quaedam contra regulam; ad prima se astringit etiam sine mandato superioris, ad secunda vero ex mandato, ad tertia autem non astringitur, nisi velit ex perfectione facere, sicut dicit beatus Benedictus3, quod utique perfecte obediens aggredi debet, si sibi imponatur etiam impossibile; quod tamen non est necessitatis, sed supererogationis ipsis etiam perfectis. Quod autem est contra regulam nullo modo, nullo pacto per obedientiam astringitur observare4; similiter et quod est contra legem Dei, quale est omne, quod vergit in dispendium nostrae salutis vel divini honoris: et ideo nullum incurrit periculum in emittendo votum secundum modum praedictum.
14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto homo maioribus et pluribus astringitur, tanto est in maioribus periculis constitutus; dicendum, quod hoc est verum, ceteris paribus; sed hic non sunt cetera paria, quia in emissione voti gratia iuvans additur, opportunitas peccandi diminuitur, et vis impellens in periculum enervatur, quia, quanto quis magis recedit a mundanis et accedit ad Christum, tanto minus periculorum mundanorum laqueis implicatur, ac per hoc liberior et securior ad caelestia sublevatur.
15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lex evangelica amovet iuramentum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia iuramentum de se propinquum est malo et modicae utilitatis est5; votum autem perfectionis propinquissimum est bono et optimo, ac per hoc maximae utilitatis; et ideo a lege Evangelii vetari non debet, sed potius suaderi.
16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imperfectum est, quia fit, alio imperante, sicut peccatum est minus, quod fit, alio suggerente; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia impulsio ad peccatum minuit rationem peccati, quia diminuit rationem voluntarii6; sed imperium respectu boni rationem voluntarii non minuit, quia ex mera caritate et voluntate imperium fieri potest; unde salva libertate voluntatis, facit ad complementum voluntatis, ac per hoc ad culmen perfectionis meriti perfecti.
17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tanto quis perfectius movetur, quanto immediatius movetur in Deum; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in his qui ita plene iuncti sunt Deo, quod non indigent aliquo medio deducente7, sicut sunt Beati in patria. In his autem, qui sunt in statu viae et indigent per gradus ascendere, non habet hoc veritatem, immo melius conscendunt, et non inordinate8 mediantibus gradibus creaturarum perveniunt ab imo usque ad summum — propter quod etiam oramus non solum Deum, sed etiam Sanctos, ut per ipsos deducamur in Deum — sic etiam voluit Deus, quod homo homini subderetur, ut per hominis ministerium reduceretur in ipsum, et meritum obedientiae augeretur.
18. Ad illud quod obiicitur de anachoretis, dicendum, quod anachoretae per obedientiam eligebantur; et hoc quidem non concedebatur nisi adeo iam probatis in observantia obedientiae regularis, ut indubitanter esse crederentur idonei ad immediatum regimen Spiritus sancti interius gubernantis1; ad quod pervenire nequaquam potuissent, nisi per subiectionem voluntariam ad obediendum homini se primitus astrinxissent.
19. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per hoc clauditur infirmo via salutis; dicendum, quod falsum est; sed de multis viis, in quibus vagari potest et etiam aberrare, aliqua certior et melior eligitur tanquam compendiosa via et efficacior medicina.
20. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pluribus se subiicere maioris perfectionis est; dicendum, quod istud est verum per reverentiam et condescensionem benignitatis et exhibitionem honoris, non autem est verum per votum obedientiae et professionem regularem, quia secundum hanc certis personis debent certi homines subiici, ut in omnibus vitetur confusio, et rectitudo ordinis observetur.
Article II. Whether it is consonant with evangelical perfection that one bind himself by vow to obeying another.
Secondly it is asked whether it is consonant with evangelical perfection that one bind himself by vow to obeying another. And it seems that it is not.
1. For the evangelical law is a law of liberty2; but to place oneself under a man by vow is a matter of necessity: therefore to bind oneself by vow to obeying a man is repugnant to the liberty of the evangelical law.
2. Again, Anselm, in the book Why God Became Man3: «God willed to redeem man through himself, so as to call man back into his pristine liberty»; but in the state of pristine liberty no one was bound to obey another: therefore he who has been brought back to his pristine liberty through the Redeemer ought to be bound to obey no one.
3. Again, Gregory4: «Services, the less they are owed, the more welcome they are»: therefore by the opposites, the more they are owed, the less welcome; but one who binds himself by vow to obeying a man is held to obey him: therefore this man is less pleasing to God. But that through which a man is made less pleasing to God is contrary to evangelical perfection: therefore etc.
4. Again, the evangelical law is a sweet yoke and a light burden5; but it is heavy for a man to comply in all things: therefore to bind oneself to obeying a man does not accord with the lightness of evangelical perfection.
5. Again, the evangelical law, because it is a light burden, does not bear along with itself the burden and servitude of the written law: therefore, since it is heavier to obey the precepts of a man without distinction than to comply with the determinate ceremonies and precepts of the old law, it seems that to bind oneself to obeying a man cannot stand with evangelical perfection.
6. Again, it is heavy to obey the divine commands: therefore it is far heavier to obey divine and human commands alike; but he who by vow subjects himself to a man binds himself6 to that man's commands: therefore etc.
7. Again, Luke the sixth7: Every one shall be perfect, if he be as his master; but of Christ it is not read that he was under another by vow: therefore to place oneself under another by vow is not perfect, but rather, as it seems, superstitious.
8. Again, if the vow of obedience increases the perfection of the virtue of obedience, then, since that degree was not in Christ, it seems that one who fulfils this degree is more perfect than Christ; but this is absurd and unfitting: therefore it is also unfitting to say that to subject oneself to another by vow8 increases the perfection of the virtue of obedience.
9. Again, the Apostles had evangelical perfection in themselves most of all; but they vowed obedience to no one: therefore etc.
10. Again, it seems that to do this is presumptuous: because either such a man reckons himself sufficient for fulfilling the divine commands, or not. If not: then he acts foolishly, since, being bound to the divine precepts, he obliges himself to fulfilling human commands as well; but if he reckons himself sufficient for fulfilling the divine commands, he is presumptuous: therefore to oblige himself further to the commands of a man seems the greater judgment of presumption.
11. Again, if to vow this belongs to perfection, then he who professes it professes himself to be perfect; but this is presumptuous: therefore etc.
12. Again, to will to be over a just and perfect man is pride and presumption: therefore to consent to another and to cooperate with him that he may be over us is to consent to pride and presumption; but he who binds himself to obeying another consents to him and cooperates with him that he may be over him: therefore etc.
13. Again, this seems to be dangerous: because to commit oneself to a man of whose knowledge and conscience one is ignorant is a danger; but he who binds himself by vow to obeying a man is frequently ignorant whether he is wise, or good, or as to his knowledge and conscience: therefore etc.
14. Again, the more and the greater the things a man is bound to, the greater the dangers in which he is placed; but he who vows obedience to a man is bound to more things than he was bound to before: therefore he is exposed to greater dangers: therefore etc.
15. Again, the evangelical law dissuades from an oath because of the danger of perjury1; but he who vows obedience to a man is in danger of transgressing the vow: therefore such a man exposes himself to peril.
16. Again, it is shown that this is imperfect. For he who sins at another's suggestion sins less than he who sins at his own motion's prompting2: therefore likewise he who obeys at another's command merits less than he who acts of his own accord, or at God's command alone: therefore he who binds himself by vow to obeying another acts more imperfectly than he who does not bind himself; but what diminishes perfection is dissonant from the evangelical law: therefore etc.
17. Again, the more immediately one is borne into God, the more perfectly one is moved; but he who obeys God alone is borne more immediately into God than he who subjects himself to a man: therefore etc.
18. Again, the best kind of monks is that of the anchorites, according to what blessed Benedict says at the beginning of his Rule3; but such men were not bound by vow to obeying a man: therefore to subject oneself to another out of a vow does not belong to evangelical perfection.
19. Again, he who closes off the way of health to a sick man does not care for perfection, but withdraws from perfection; but he who binds4 himself by vow to obeying another closes off to himself many ways to salvation, since before the vow such a man could be saved in many other ways, which he cannot after the vow: therefore such a man acts most imperfectly.
20. Again, the more one subjects oneself to more persons, the more humbly and perfectly one acts; but he who vows obedience to several acts badly: therefore to vow obedience to another belongs neither to humility nor to perfection.
Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ, this is objected thus. 1. Matthew the third5: So it becometh us to fulfil all justice; the Gloss: «Perfect humility has three degrees: the first is to place oneself under a greater, the second to place oneself under an equal, the third to place oneself under a lesser, in which is all justice; and this Christ fulfilled»: therefore, if perfect justice is to place oneself under another, and this is done most of all through the vow of obedience, it seems that this is most consonant with evangelical perfection.
2. Again, the first of Peter, the second6: Be ye subject to every human creature for God's sake: therefore the more efficaciously one does this, the more perfectly one acts; but he who subjects himself to another by vow does this most efficaciously: therefore such a man acts most perfectly.
3. Again, Gregory7: «It is more to leave oneself than one's own things»; but he who leaves his own things for God's sake acts perfectly: therefore he who leaves his very self acts more perfectly. But this is done most of all in the abnegation of the will through the vow of obedience: therefore etc.
4. Again, Anselm8: «As the will of God is the origin of all good, so one's own will is the origin of all evil»; but he who perfectly removes the origin of all evil acts most perfectly: therefore he who wholly abnegates his own will through the vow of obedience acts most perfectly.
5. Again, Hugh9: «Obedience is a virtue which, one's own will being set aside, embraces in mind the things enjoined, to be fulfilled in deed»; but he who vows obedience to another sets aside his own will most of all: therefore etc.
6. Again, Bernard, in the forty-second homily on the Canticle10: «It is little to be subject to God, unless thou be subject also to every human creature for God's sake: to place thyself under equals, to place thyself under lesser men; for so it becometh us to fulfil all justice»; but this is done most of all by binding oneself by vow to obeying another: therefore etc.
7. Again, sufficient justice is to keep the divine commands, therefore abundant1 justice is, over and above these, to keep human ones; but this he does who subjects himself to another for obeying.
8. Again, humility is consonant with evangelical perfection: therefore the highest humility is most consonant with it; but to bind oneself by vow to obeying another belongs to the highest humility: therefore etc.
9. Again, liberality is consonant with evangelical perfection; but this is the highest liberality, when a man for God's sake gives not only his own things2, but his very self, setting aside his own will, through the vow of obedience: therefore etc.
10. Again, conformity to Christ is consonant with evangelical perfection; but Christ of pure liberality subjected himself to a man, Luke the second3: And he was subject to them: therefore to subject one's very self to another makes one conformed to Christ. But this is done most of all through the vow of obedience: therefore etc.
11. Again, what removes us farthest from the world is most consonant with evangelical perfection; but to bind oneself by vow to obeying a man removes us farthest from the world, because all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life4, from which we are removed farthest through the vow of obedience: therefore etc.
12. Again, what removes us farthest from the devil looks most of all to evangelical perfection; but to will to be under and not to be over removes us farthest from the devil's sin, who willed utterly to be over without being under5: therefore etc.
13. Again, everything that conforms us to the heavenly hierarchy is consonant with evangelical perfection; but in the heavenly hierarchy we see that one Angel subjects himself by obeying to another, and the Angels of the lower orders obey the Angels of the higher without repugnance6: therefore in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, that one man subject himself by obeying to another conforms us to the heavenly order, and through this is most consonant with evangelical perfection.
CONCLUSION.
To bind oneself by vow to obeying another, not in every event, but to those things which are consonant with the evangelical counsels, is constitutive, expeditive and consummative of perfection.
Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of what has been said it is to be noted that a man can bind himself to obeying another man in two ways: either in every event and to all the good pleasure of that man's will, or to those things which are consonant with the evangelical counsels according to some determinate norm of living, derived from the fount of the evangelical law. In the first way it is neither perfect nor consonant with perfection, but rather rash and foolish; in the second way it is perfect, because this is both constitutive and expeditive and consummative of perfection. For to vow obedience to a man in this way is both a constitutive part of that perfection and a preambular way and its ultimate completion. — A constitutive part, I say, it is, because it is itself one of those three evangelical counsels in which the integrity of evangelical perfection principally consists.
It is a preambular way, because those counsels can be kept better and more perfectly and more expeditiously when one is supported by another's fellowship and help and example than if he is left to himself alone. But fellowship does not help unless it is peaceful; nor can it be peaceful unless it is connected and ordered7; and this cannot be except through the reduction of many wills to the command of one, at whose nod they are ordered and directed and consequently connected.
It is also the ultimate completion, for this reason, that in it is most fully completed that abundant justice, of which kind evangelical justice is, according to that saying of Matthew the fifth8: Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. — For there is a threefold act of justice, namely to rectify, to co-ordinate and to recompense. For justice is nothing else than a will right, ordered and recompensing, since through it «there is rendered to each one what is his own», according to what belongs to the rectitude of right and the dignity of order. — The perfect rectification, therefore, of abundant justice is attended to according to the conformity of the will to truth; but truth humbles each one, so that he think of himself lesser things than of another. He, therefore, is perfectly and abundantly rectified who, according to what truth dictates, not unwillingly but voluntarily humbles his own will under another and in a certain way reduces and takes it captive into a kind of servitude9; which indeed is done through the obedience shown to another man, which is most repugnant to the arrogance and ambition by which one wishes to prefer himself to others. Whence Bernard, in the forty-second homily on the Canticle10: «Fear God and do not do this most evil thing,
that the will exalt him whom truth humbles. Rather acquiesce to God, and let thy will be subject to truth».
The perfect ordination also, according to the rule of abundant justice, is that not only the inferior place himself under the superior, and the equal under the equal, but that even the superior voluntarily place himself under the inferior, according to what is said in Matthew the third1: So it becometh us to fulfil all justice; where the Gloss says: «So, by placing himself under a servant and an inferior, all justice, that is humility, which is all justice, it becometh him to fulfil. — And this humility has three degrees: the first, to place oneself under a greater, and this is called sufficient; the second is to place oneself under an equal, and this is called abundant; the third is to be under a lesser, in which is all justice. This Christ fulfilled». Since, therefore, a man is then perfectly subjected to a man when he binds himself voluntarily to obey another's commands in those things which are according to God, and most of all the commands of one2 who was no greater than he, but either equal, and sometimes even lesser — because every man exceeds another in something, at least according to the soul — hence it is that to the perfection of ordering justice according to the way of the order of deigning, which runs according to the law of grace, whereby the greater reckons himself the lesser, obedience which is shown by one man to another contributes, and does very much.
The perfect recompensation of abundant justice, nonetheless, is attended to in this, that one render the whole to him who gave the whole. Since, therefore, Christ the Lord not only gave us to ourselves, but also gave himself to us; and for our sake not only made himself man, but also subjected himself to men: hence it is that, in order that, according to the measure of our weakness, we may recompense, as far as we can, not only God but also man, it is fitting that we place under him not only what we have and our members, but also what we are, that is our will. Whence Bernard, on the Canticle3: «It is certain that God was emptied out by charity, made less than the Angels by charity, subject to his parents by charity, bowed under the Baptist's hands by charity, suffering in the weakness of the flesh by charity, at last subject to death by charity, inglorious on the cross». From which he concludes that of pure will a man ought, in recompense for these things, to place his own will under a man. — And in this perfection truly consists, when one gives for his sake the will of liberty, which is a priceless good4, than which nothing greater can be given by a man; and when that is given, all things are given too. Whence, if that is truly called perfect «which lacks nothing», and which also «attains its own virtue5», in this most of all does the consummation of perfection meet, so that it is begun from the renunciation of temporal goods through poverty, advances in the chastening of the bodily members through chastity, and is consummated in the dedication of the interior and mental virtues through the abnegation of the will and the vow of obedience, in which a man is properly said to abnegate himself, according to that word of the Lord in Luke the ninth6: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me; where the vow of obedience is chiefly and most of all commended.
From these things, therefore, it is clearly gathered that, since there are three evangelical counsels, according to the exterior, the lower and the interior good, which are opposed to the threefold origin of vices7, the vow which is integrative of evangelical perfection must be threefold, namely of poverty, of continence and of obedience; among which obedience, as has now been shown, gives to the whole of evangelical perfection its highest and noblest complement. — Whence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected first, that the evangelical law is a law of liberty, which is repugnant to necessity; it must be said that necessity is twofold: one is of coercion, and the other of holding. The first is repugnant to it, the second is not. For a precept obliges, just as a vow does, and it does not exclude the liberty of the evangelical law; the law of the Gospel is therefore called the law of liberty, not by the exclusion of the obligation which comes from a precept or a vow, but by the exclusion of the burden of legal servitude proceeding from servile fear8.
2. To that which is objected from Anselm, that Christ, by redeeming man, called him back into his pristine liberty; it must be said that this is understood in respect of the whole species, not in respect of any particular individual. For the burden of bodily servitude can stand together with the grace of the Holy Spirit and the Sacrament of baptism9; and through this, much more strongly, the burden of voluntary subjection, which flows from pure will, is not repugnant to the liberty of grace.
3. To that which is objected, that services, the less they are owed, the more welcome they are; it must be said that the account of what is owed is twofold: one which comes from a liberal promise; another which comes from the obligation of a pact and of merchant commerce. The first is in no way repugnant
to the graciousness of the service, but only the second. And the reason of this is that, although the second is founded upon a private and mercenary love, the first is founded upon a most liberal love, by which someone wills to offer to God not only the fruit of the tree, but also the trunk and the root. Whence, as Anselm illustrates it1 by two men, of whom one offers to God the fruit of the tree, reserving the property to himself, while the other offers both; and he is the more pleasing who offers both: so it is to be understood in the matter proposed.
4. To that which is objected, that the evangelical law is a sweet yoke; it must be said that a burden is twofold, namely a burden which weighs down, and a burden which gives vigour and supports, and consequently lightens and bears up. The yoke of obedience, therefore, added upon the evangelical burden, is like a burden which does not weigh down but comforts; just as a cart does not weigh down the horse's load, but lightens it, and the multitude of feathers lifts birds upward rather than drags them down2: so also obedience, which sets a man over one like himself, excludes the weight of pride and arrogance which came from the love of one's own sense and one's own will, which was most repugnant to evangelical perfection; and therefore it makes him fit and nimble for bearing that perfection.
5. To that which is objected, that the evangelical law does not bear along with itself the servitude of the written law; it must be said that the case is not alike: because the servitude of the ceremonial and judicial precepts is dissonant from the new law both because of the veils of the figures and because of the burdens of afflicting penalties; therefore the law of the Gospel, which was introduced through Christ, through whom grace and truth were made3, excludes both kinds of those precepts and the servitude in the observance of them, not because of their difficulty, but because of their imperfection. Since therefore, although it is difficult for a man to obey, this difficulty is repugnant neither to truth nor to grace nor to perfect virtue, which is «about the arduous and difficult»; consequently it is not repugnant to evangelical perfection, but rather gives it its complement.
6. To that which is objected, that it is heavy to obey the divine commands; the answer is already clear: because, as has been shown, the heaviness and difficulty of a work is rather consonant with evangelical perfection than repugnant to it; and he is truly perfect who bears heavy things with promptitude of will.
7. To that which is objected concerning Christ, it must be said that Christ, as far as was fitting for the redemption of the human race, subjected himself to men, and this by a will most good and perfect; and because his will was confirmed in the good and was not changeable, as ours is: therefore there was no need that it be bound by a vow.
8. To that which is objected, that the addition of a vow does not contribute to the complement of obedience, which was not in Christ; the answer is already clear: because in Christ there was something in place of a vow, in respect of obedience as much as of poverty and of chastity, namely a confirmed will, which is more excellent than a vow4; and because we approach to that confirmed will through the strengthening of our purpose and the emission of a vow: hence it is that the vow, by binding us and in a certain way strengthening us, by its inviolability renders us conformed to Christ; and therefore the heaping up of perfection grows from it, although in Christ it was not present according to the emission of a spoken word.
9. To that which is objected, that such a vow of obedience was not in the Apostles; it must be said that it is possible to speak of obedience in three ways, namely as to act and habit and mode. There was, therefore, in the Apostles a promptitude of obeying through a perfect habit; there was also the act, by which they were obedient to Christ unto death and unto diverse kinds of torments, so that they were obedient not only for operations to be carried out, but also for passions to be endured. But the mode of obedience, by which one subjects himself to another as to a prelate, did not belong to them except for the time during which they were with Christ; because they themselves were the prelates of the Church and were acted upon by the fulness of the Holy Spirit, and rightly governed others. Yet they too were first obedient to Christ himself, and afterwards showed the reverence due to the Apostle Peter5; and therefore from this it cannot and ought not to be concluded that obedience is not to be vowed, most of all by those to whom it belongs to be governed by others.
10. To that which is objected, that it is presumptuous to vow, because either one reckons himself sufficient etc.; it must be said that to attribute sufficiency to one's own virtues and free choice is a matter of presumption in respect of however small a good, since the Apostle says in the second to the Corinthians, the third6: Not that we are sufficient etc.; but to attribute this to the divine grace, which he hopes will not fail him because of the divine munificence, is not a matter of presumption, but of confidence and of the certitude of hope, by which we believe that God is a helper to the man who wills to adhere to his counsels. For which reason the same Apostle straightway after the foregoing word subjoins: Our sufficiency is from God; and the same, in the last chapter to the Philippians: I can do all things in him who strengtheneth me; and by this hope he ought to be supported who, breathed upon by the divine Spirit, not only proposes the perfection of the evangelical counsels, but also promises it by vowing.
11. To that which is objected, that to profess oneself to be perfect is presumptuous; it must be said that there is a perfection as to merit and as to
state. To profess oneself to be perfect as to merit is a matter of presumption, not of perfection, since Paul says to the Philippians, the third1: Not as though I were already perfect. But to profess oneself perfect as to state is not a matter of presumption, because this places the praise not about the person himself, who can be blameworthy through his own merits, but about the common life and the manner of living approved by the counsel of Christ's own mouth.
12. To that which is objected, that it is pride to will to be over a just man; it must be said that one can will to be over another in two ways: either because he wills to be over him simply, or because he wills to be over him loftily, through love of his own excellence2; and thus this will is depraved both in him who wills it and in the others who consent to him, as it was in Lucifer and in the other demons adhering to him. — In another way someone wills to be over others in order to be over them usefully, through love of the commonwealth and of the universal Church, roused by the spirit of supernal charity; and in this way neither does he himself sin, nor do the others who consent to him, since God has so ordained that the mystical body of Christ be governed according to the pre-eminences of ranks, offices and dignities.
13. To that which is objected, that it is dangerous to commit oneself wholly to an unknown man; it must be said that if someone were to commit himself with no law, no norm, no rule laid down beforehand, but in every event, this without doubt would be foolish; but when someone vows obedience according to the form of an approved rule, there is no danger in it: because, since some things are according to the rule, some short of the rule, some above the rule, some against the rule; to the first he binds himself even without the superior's mandate, to the second by mandate, but to the third he is not bound unless he wills to do it out of perfection, as blessed Benedict says3, that one who is perfectly obedient ought by all means to attempt it, if even the impossible be imposed upon him; which nevertheless is not a matter of necessity, but of supererogation, even for the perfect themselves. But what is against the rule he is in no way, by no pact, bound through obedience to observe4; and likewise what is against the law of God, which is everything that tends to the loss of our salvation or of the divine honour: and therefore he incurs no danger in emitting a vow according to the aforesaid mode.
14. To that which is objected, that the more and the greater the things a man is bound to, the greater the dangers in which he is placed; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal; but here the other things are not equal, because in the emission of the vow helping grace is added, the opportunity of sinning is lessened, and the force impelling into danger is weakened; because the more one withdraws from worldly things and draws near to Christ, the less he is entangled in the snares of worldly dangers, and through this is the more freely and securely lifted up to heavenly things.
15. To that which is objected, that the evangelical law removes the oath; it must be said that the case is not alike: because an oath is of itself close to evil and is of slight usefulness5; but the vow of perfection is closest to the good and the best, and through this of the greatest usefulness; and therefore it ought not to be forbidden by the law of the Gospel, but rather counselled.
16. To that which is objected, that it is imperfect, because it is done at another's command, just as a sin is less which is done at another's suggestion; it must be said that the case is not alike: because an impulsion to sin lessens the account of the sin, because it diminishes the account of the voluntary6; but a command in respect of a good does not diminish the account of the voluntary, since a command can be made out of pure charity and will; whence, the liberty of the will being safe, it contributes to the complement of the will, and through this to the summit of the merit of the perfect.
17. To that which is objected, that the more immediately one is moved into God, the more perfectly one is moved; it must be said that this holds true in those who are so fully joined to God that they need no leading medium7, as are the Blessed in the fatherland. But in those who are in the state of the way and need to ascend by degrees it does not hold true; rather they climb better, and not inordinately8, when they come by the mediating degrees of creatures from the lowest up to the highest — for which reason we also pray not only to God but also to the Saints, that through them we may be led into God — thus also God willed that man be placed under man, so that through the ministry of a man he might be led back into him, and the merit of obedience be increased.
18. To that which is objected concerning the anchorites, it must be said that anchorites were chosen through obedience; and this indeed was not granted except to those already so tested in the observance of regular obedience that they were believed to be, without doubt, fit for the immediate rule of the Holy Spirit governing them within1; to which they could by no means have come, unless they had first bound themselves by voluntary subjection to obeying a man.
19. To that which is objected, that through this the way of health is closed off to the weak; it must be said that this is false; but of the many ways in which one can wander and even go astray, some more certain and better one is chosen, as a shorter way and a more efficacious medicine.
20. To that which is objected, that to subject oneself to several is of greater perfection; it must be said that this is true in the way of reverence and of the condescension of kindness and the showing of honour, but it is not true in the way of the vow of obedience and of regular profession, because according to this determinate men must be subjected to determinate persons, so that in all things confusion may be avoided and the rectitude of order preserved.
- 2Cfr. Gal. 4, 22. seqq.Compare Gal. 4:22 ff.
- 3Libr. I. c. 5: An non intelligis, quia quaecumque alia persona [quam persona divina] hominem a morte aeterna redimeret, eius servus idem homo recte iudicaretur? Quod si esset, nullatenus restauraturus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non peccasset; cum ipse, qui non nisi Dei servus et aequalis Angelis bonis per omnia futurus erat, servus esset eius, qui Deus non esset, et cuius Angeli servi non essent.Book I, c. 5: Do you not understand that, if any other person [than a divine person] were to redeem man from eternal death, that same man would rightly be judged the servant of that person? And if this were so, he would in no way be restored to that dignity which he was to have had, if he had not sinned; since he who was to be the servant of none but God and equal to the good Angels in all things would be the servant of one who was not God, and whose servants the Angels were not.
- 4Haec sententia ab aliis, v. g. Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 8. c. 2. q. 2, Augustino attribuitur, et, ut videtur, elicitur ex illis August. verbis: «Tales enim servos suos meliores esse Deus iudicavit, si ei servirent liberaliter» (de Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27.); de quo cfr. III. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 3. et 4. ad oppos. Ambros., Serm. 13. n. 3. et Serm. 14. n. 24. in Ps. 118. docet, quod «Dominus operationes servulorum spontaneas probat potius quam coactas»; et in Serm. 41. (inter Serm. hactenus Ambrosio ascriptos) n. 1. ait: Et cum utique acceptius voluntarium obsequium esse soleat, quam coactum, et servitium plus placeat, non quod imperio exigitur, sed quod sponte defertur, cur ergo etc. De Gregor. cfr. XV. Moral. c. 18. n. 22.This opinion is by others — for example by William of Auxerre, Summa, part III, tr. 8, c. 2, q. 2 — attributed to Augustine, and, as it seems, is drawn out of those words of Augustine: «For God judged that his servants were better if they served him liberally» (On True Religion, c. 14, n. 27); on which compare III Sent. d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, arguments 3 and 4 to the contrary. Ambrose, Sermon 13, n. 3, and Sermon 14, n. 24, on Ps. 118, teaches that «the Lord approves the spontaneous works of his little servants rather than the coerced ones»; and in Sermon 41 (among the sermons hitherto ascribed to Ambrose), n. 1, he says: And since a voluntary service is wont to be more acceptable than a coerced one, and that servitude pleases more which is not exacted by command but offered of its own accord, why then etc. Concerning Gregory, compare Morals XV, c. 18, n. 22.
- 5Matth. 11, 30: Iugum enim meum suave est et onus meum leve.Matt. 11:30: For my yoke is sweet and my burden light.
- 6Supplevimus se, vel substituendum astringitur.We have supplied se ["himself"]; or astringitur ["is bound"] is to be substituted.
- 7Vers. 40: Perfectus autem omnis erit etc.Verse 40: But every one shall be perfect etc.
- 8D subdere.D reads subdere ["to place under"].
- 1Matth. 5, 34: Ego autem dico vobis, non iurare omnino etc. Cfr. Iac. 5, 12, et III. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. seq.Matt. 5:34: But I say to you not to swear at all etc. Compare Jas. 5:12, and III Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 f.
- 2Cfr. II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 2. fundam. 2. et q. 3. arg. 2. pro parte negativa.Compare II Sent. d. 21, a. 3, q. 2, fundamentum 2, and q. 3, argument 2, for the negative side.
- 3Cap. 1, in quo anachoritae laudantur propter fervorem etc. Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 3. ad 12. Cassian., Collat. 18. c. 4. ait: Tria sunt in Aegypto genera monachorum [coenobitae, anachoretae, sarabaitae], quorum duo sunt optima, tertium tepidum atque omnimodis evitandum.Chapter 1, in which the anchorites are praised for their fervour etc. Compare above, q. 2, a. 3, reply to 12. Cassian, Conference 18, c. 4, says: There are in Egypt three kinds of monks [cenobites, anchorites, sarabaites], of which two are the best, the third lukewarm and in every way to be avoided.
- 4D alligat.D reads alligat ["ties fast"].
- 5Vers. 15: Sic enim decet etc. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria apud Lyranum, est secundum Bernard., Serm. in Octava Epiphan. n. 4. In textu originali Glossae plura interseruntur, et pro et hoc substituitur et hunc, quod etiam infra in corp. quaest. ponitur in eadem Glossa. — Superius pro obiicitur A dicitur.Verse 15: For so it becometh etc. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one in Lyra, is according to Bernard, Sermon on the Octave of the Epiphany, n. 4. In the original text of the Gloss several things are inserted, and for et hoc there is substituted et hunc, which is also put below, in the body of the question, in the same Gloss. — Above, for obiicitur A reads dicitur.
- 6Vers. 13: Subiecti igitur estote etc.Verse 13: Be ye therefore subject etc.
- 7Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 32. n. 1: Et fortasse laboriosum non est homini relinquere sua, sed valde laboriosum est relinquere semetipsum. Minus quippe est abnegare quod habet, valde autem multum est abnegare quod est.Homilies on the Gospels, book II, homily 32, n. 1: And perhaps it is not laborious for a man to leave his own things, but it is very laborious to leave his very self. For it is less to abnegate what one has, but it is very much to abnegate what one is.
- 8Potius Eadmerus in libro de Similitudinibus S. Anselmi, c. 8: Sicut propria voluntas Dei fons est et origo totius boni, ita propria voluntas hominis totius est exordium mali.Rather Eadmer, in the book On the Likenesses of St. Anselm, c. 8: As God's own will is the fount and origin of all good, so man's own will is the beginning of all evil.
- 9Haec definitio habetur in libro, cui titulus: Tractatus de statu virtutum (inter opera Bernardi), p. II. n. 20. Vide tom. II. pag. 1013, nota 2, ubi etiam verba Hugonis sunt allata. — In hoc arg. desinit A. Sequentia ex solo D sumta sunt.This definition is found in the book entitled Treatise on the State of the Virtues (among the works of Bernard), part II, n. 20. See tom. II, p. 1013, note 2, where the words of Hugh are also adduced. — A breaks off in this argument. What follows is taken from D alone.
- 10Num. 9: At parum est esse subiectum Deo... propter Deum; sive abbati tanquam praecellenti, sive prioribus tanquam ab eo constitutis. Ego plus dico, subdere paribus, subdere et minoribus; sic enim decet nos, inquit [Matth. 3, 15.], omnem implere iustitiam.N. 9: But it is little to be subject to God... for God's sake; whether to the abbot as to one pre-eminent, or to the priors as to those appointed by him. I say more: place thyself under equals, place thyself under lesser men too; for so it becometh us, he says [Matt. 3:15], to fulfil all justice.
- 1Deficit in D, sed supplendum esse duximus.It is wanting in D, but we have judged that it should be supplied.
- 2Substituimus, contextu requirente, sua pro se. Cfr. Gregor., XXXV. Moral. c. 14. n. 28.We have substituted, as the context requires, sua ["his own things"] for se ["himself"]. Compare Gregory, Morals XXXV, c. 14, n. 28.
- 3Vers. 51.Verse 51.
- 4Epist. I. Ioan. 2, 16. Vulgata omittit aut et substituit bis et pro vel.I John 2:16. The Vulgate omits aut ["or"] and twice substitutes et ["and"] for vel ["or"].
- 5Gregor., XXXIV. Moral. c. 21. n. 40: Leviathan vero iste, eius [Dei] celsitudinis culmen aspiciens, ius perversae libertatis appetiit, ut et praeesset ceteris et nulli subesset. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 149, nota 7.Gregory, Morals XXXIV, c. 21, n. 40: But that Leviathan, looking upon the summit of his [God's] loftiness, sought the right of a perverse liberty, that he might both be over the rest and be under none. Compare tom. II, p. 149, note 7.
- 6Cfr. II. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. et dub. 2.Compare II Sent. d. 10, a. 1, q. 2, and doubt 2.
- 7August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 1: Pax hominum [est] ordinata concordia. Pax domus ordinata imperandi atque obediendi concordia cohabitantium.Augustine, On the City of God XIX, c. 13, n. 1: The peace of men [is] an ordered concord. The peace of a household is the ordered concord of those dwelling together in commanding and obeying.
- 8Vers. 20. — De definitione iustitiae infra posita cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 1. Cicero, II. Rhet. c. 54. eam definit: Iustitia est habitus animi, communi utilitate conservata, suam cuique tribuens dignitatem.Verse 20. — On the definition of justice set down below, compare tom. III, p. 728, note 1. Cicero, Rhetoric II [On Invention II], c. 54, defines it: Justice is a habit of mind which, the common utility being preserved, assigns to each his own worth.
- 9Respicitur I. Cor. 9, 27: Sed castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo. Et II. Cor. 10, 5: In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.Reference is made to I Cor. 9:27: But I chastise my body and bring it into subjection. And II Cor. 10:5: Bringing into captivity all understanding unto the obedience of Christ.
- 10Num. 8. Post voluntas textus originalis addit hoc enim resistere est veritati, hoc pugnare contra Deum.N. 8. After voluntas ["will"] the original text adds for this is to resist truth, this is to fight against God.
- 1Vers. 15. — De Glossa ordinaria apud Lyranum vide supra pag. 184, nota 5.Verse 15. — On the ordinary Gloss in Lyra see above, p. 184, note 5.
- 2Substituimus eius pro enim, quod D perperam exhibet.We have substituted eius ["of him"] for enim ["for"], which D wrongly exhibits.
- 3Serm. 42. n. 8. Respicitur Phil. 2, 7; Hebr. 2, 9; Luc. 2, 51; Matth. 3, 13. seqq. et 16, 21.Sermon 42, n. 8. Reference is made to Phil. 2:7; Heb. 2:9; Luke 2:51; Matt. 3:13 ff. and 16:21.
- 4Iustinian., Instit. imper. lib. I. tit. 6. lege Non tamen, § Cum ergo, dicit, quod «libertas inaestimabilis res sit». — Post bonum D addit quaeque.Justinian, Imperial Institutes, book I, title 6, in the law Non tamen, § Cum ergo, says that «liberty is a thing beyond estimation». — After bonum ["good"] D adds quaeque.
- 5Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6.): Cuius autem nihil est extra, id est perfectum et totum; sic enim definimus totum, cuius nihil abest. Ibid. VII. text. 18. (c. 3.): Virtus enim perfectio quaedam est; unumquodque enim tunc maxime perfectum est, cum adeptum est propriam virtutem. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 21. et 31. (IV. c. 16. et 26.). — D incongrue propriae virtuti attingit.Aristotle, Physics III, text 63 (c. 6): But that outside of which there is nothing, that is perfect and whole; for so we define the whole, from which nothing is absent. Ibid. VII, text 18 (c. 3): For virtue is a certain perfection; for each thing is then most of all perfect, when it has attained its own virtue. Compare Metaphysics V, texts 21 and 31 (IV, cc. 16 and 26). — D incongruously reads propriae virtuti attingit.
- 6Vers. 23. Vulgata post crucem suam addit quotidie.Verse 23. The Vulgate after crucem suam ["his cross"] adds quotidie ["daily"].
- 7Epist. I. Ioan. 2, 16: Omne, quod est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis est etc. — Inferius supplevimus obedientia, quod in D desideratur.I John 2:16: All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh etc. — Below we have supplied obedientia ["obedience"], which is wanting in D.
- 8Cfr. III. Sent. d. 40. q. 1. et 3.Compare III Sent. d. 40, q. 1 and 3.
- 9Vide I. Cor. 7, 21. seq. et 12, 13.See I Cor. 7:21 f. and 12:13.
- 1Potius Eadmerus, de Similitudinibus S. Anselmi, c. 84.Rather Eadmer, On the Likenesses of St. Anselm, c. 84.
- 2De duplici hoc exemplo currus et pennarum, quod affert Bernard. ex August., cfr. tom. III. pag. 892, nota 2. — D incongrue prosequitur ita: sic et obedientia desuper ponit hominem simili, pondus superbiae, arrogantiae, quod etc.On this twofold example of the cart and the feathers, which Bernard brings from Augustine, compare tom. III, p. 892, note 2. — D incongruously continues thus: sic et obedientia desuper ponit hominem simili, pondus superbiae, arrogantiae, quod etc.
- 3Ioan. 1, 17. Cfr. de hac solut. III. Sent. d. 40. q. 3. — Inferius allegatur sententia Aristot. de virtute, de qua vide supra pag. 139, nota 4.John 1:17. On this solution compare III Sent. d. 40, q. 3. — Below there is adduced Aristotle's opinion on virtue, on which see above, p. 139, note 4.
- 4D vere, et inferius quod voto pro quod votum.D reads vere ["truly"], and below quod voto for quod votum.
- 5Cfr. Ioan. 20, 4. seqq.; Act. 12, 5. et 15, 7.Compare John 20:4 ff.; Acts 12:5 and 15:7.
- 6Vers. 5, ubi etiam seq. locus habetur; tertius est Phil. 4, 13.Verse 5, where the following passage is also found; the third is Phil. 4:13.
- 1Vers. 12: Non quod iam acceperim, aut iam perfectus sim.Verse 12: Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect.
- 2Respicitur definitio superbiae supra pag. 118, nota 8. ex August. allata. — De peccato luciferi et aliorum angelorum cfr. II. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. et 2. — Superius D in viro pro viro.Reference is made to the definition of pride adduced above, p. 118, note 8, from Augustine. — On the sin of Lucifer and of the other angels compare II Sent. d. 5, a. 1 and 2. — Above, D reads in viro for viro.
- 3In regula c. 68. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 1012, nota 7.In the Rule, c. 68. Compare tom. II, p. 1012, note 7.
- 4S. Franciscus in regula sua c. 10. ait: Firmiter praecipio eis, ut obediant suis ministris in omnibus, quae promiserunt Domino observare, et non sunt contraria animae suae et regulae nostrae. Bernard., de Praecepto et dispens. c. 5. n. 11: Quamobrem quisque professus in quovis genere salutiferae vitae nec ultra obedientiae leges cogendus, nec citra est inhibendus, quam sua ipsius videtur complecti professio. Quanto minus contra?... Vota mea nec augeat [praelatus] sine mea voluntate, nec minuat sine certa necessitate; necessitas quippe non habet legem etc.St. Francis in his Rule, c. 10, says: I firmly command them to obey their ministers in all things which they have promised the Lord to observe, and which are not contrary to their own soul and to our Rule. Bernard, On Precept and Dispensation, c. 5, n. 11: Wherefore each one professed in any kind of salvation-bearing life is neither to be compelled beyond the laws of obedience, nor to be restrained short of them, further than his own profession seems to embrace. How much less against them?... Let him [the prelate] neither increase my vows without my will, nor lessen them without a certain necessity; for necessity has no law, etc.
- 5Cfr. III. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1.Compare III Sent. d. 39, a. 2, q. 1.
- 6August., de Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27: Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium.Augustine, On True Religion, c. 14, n. 27: But now sin is so far a voluntary evil that it is in no way a sin, if it is not voluntary.
- 7De hoc medio aliisque cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, ad 7.On this medium and others compare II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, reply to 7.
- 8D perperam non ordinate.D wrongly reads non ordinate.
- 1Isidor., II. de Eccles. Officiis, c. 16. agit de generibus monachorum. Sub n. 4. tertium genus eorum, scil. anachoretarum, describit et iuxta antiquiorem ed. [in ed. Migne haec propositio omittitur] addit: Sed isti, examinatione coenobiorum probati in omnibus disciplinis monasterii per triginta [iuxta alios viginti] annos, ad hanc contemplationem per obedientiam eliguntur. Cfr. S. Benedicti regula commentata, c. 1. [Migne, Patrol. lat. tom. 66. col. 250. seq.], ubi inter alia etiam haec Isidori verba et canon VI. Synodi allegatur. — Superius post per obedientiam ex cit. loco Isidori supplevimus eligebantur, cum in codice aliquo verbum manifeste exciderit.Isidore, On the Ecclesiastical Offices II, c. 16, treats of the kinds of monks. Under n. 4 he describes the third kind of them, namely of the anchorites, and, according to the older edition [in the Migne edition this sentence is omitted], adds: But these, tested by the examination of the cenobitic houses in all the disciplines of the monastery through thirty [according to others twenty] years, are chosen through obedience for this contemplation. Compare the Rule of St. Benedict with commentary, c. 1 [Migne, Patrologia latina, tom. 66, col. 250 f.], where among other things these words of Isidore too and the canon of the Sixth Synod are adduced. — Above, after per obedientiam, we have supplied from the cited passage of Isidore the word eligebantur ["were chosen"], since in some codex the word has manifestly dropped out. ---