Bonaventure

Quaestio IV. Utrum quidquid a nobis certitudinaliter cognoscitur cognoscatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis.

Supposito, quod rationes aeternae sint realiter indistinctae in divina arte sive cognitione, quaeritur, utrum sint rationes cognoscendi in omni certitudinali cognitione; hoc est quaerere, utrum quidquid certitudinaliter cognoscitur a nobis cognoscatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis¹. Et quod sic, videtur auctoritate multiplici.

1. Augustinus, de Magistro²: « De universis, quae intelligimus, non loquentem, qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem. Ille autem, qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est, Christus, incommutabilis Dei virtus et sapientia sempiterna, quam quidem omnis rationalis anima consulit ».

2. Item, idem de Vera Religione³: « Apparet, supra mentem nostram legem esse, quae veritas dicitur; nec iam illud ambigendum est, incommutabilem naturam, quae supra mentem humanam est, Deum esse. Nam haec est illa incommutabilis veritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur et ars omnipotentis artificis ».

3. Item, Augustinus, in secundo libro de Libero Arbitrio⁴: « Illa pulcritudo sapientiae et veritatis nec peragitur tempore nec migrat locis nec nocte intercipitur nec umbra intercluditur nec sensibus corporis subiacet; de toto mundo ad se conversis, qui diligunt eam, omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna, nullo loco est, nusquam deest, foris admonet, intus docet. Nullus de illa iudicat, nullus sine illa iudicat bene; ac per hoc manifestum est, eam mentibus nostris, quae ab ipsa una fiunt singulae sapientes et non de ipsa, sed per ipsam de ceteris iudicant, sine dubitatione esse potiorem ». — Si tu dicas, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod in veritate vel in rationibus, sed quod a rationibus videamus; contra: Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum⁵: « Si ambo videmus, verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus, verum esse quod dico; ubi, quaeso, id videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est incommutabili veritate ».

4. Item, octavo de Civitate Dei⁶ loquens de philosophis dicit: « Hi quos merito omnibus anteponimus lumen mentium esse dixerunt ad discenda omnia eundem ipsum Deum, a quo facta sunt omnia ».

5. Item, octavo de Trinitate, capitulo tertio⁷: « Cum animus nobis placet, ut eum omni luci corporeae praeferamus, non in se ipso nobis placet, sed in illa arte, qua factus est. Inde enim approbatur factus, unde videtur fuisse faciendus; haec est veritas et simplex bonum ».

6. Item, nono de Trinitate, capitulo sexto⁸: « Aliis omnino regulis, supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus, vel approbare, vel improbare convincimur, cum recte aliquid approbamus, vel improbamus ».

7. Item, eodem, capitulo septimo⁹: « In illa aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam, secundum quam sumus et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus ».

8. Item, libro decimoquarto de Trinitate, capitulo decimoquinto¹⁰: « Cum impii regulas vident, secundum quas quisque vivere debeat, ubi eas vident? Non in sua natura, cum constet, mentes eorum esse mutabiles, has vero regulas immutabiles; nec in habitu suae mentis, cum illae regulae sint iustitiae.

Ubi cernit, habendum esse quod ipse non habet? Ubi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius, quae veritas dicitur, unde omnis lex iusta describitur »? — Si dicas, quod retractavit; contra: Augustinus, libro primo Retractationum¹: « Credibile est, de quibusdam disciplinis vera respondere etiam imperitos earum, quando capere possunt lumen rationis aeternum, ubi haec incommutabilia vera conspiciunt, non quia prius scierunt et post obliti sunt, sicut Platoni visum est ». — Item²: « Natura intellectualis non solum connectitur intelligibilibus, verum etiam immutabilibus rebus, eo ordine facta, ut, cum se ad eas movet, quibus connexa est, vel ad se ipsam, in quantum eas videt, in tantum de eis vera respondeat ».

Ex his auctoritatibus Augustini manifeste patet, quod omnia sciuntur in rationibus aeternis.

9. Item, Ambrosius³: « Per me ipsum nihil video nisi vana, fluxa et caduca »: ergo si aliquid certitudinaliter video, video per aliquid, quod est supra me.

10. Item, Gregorius super illud Ioannis decimoquarto: Ille vos docebit omnia, dicit⁴: « Nisi idem Spiritus cordi adsit audientis, otiosus est sermo doctoris; nemo ergo docenti homini tribuat, quod ex ore docentis intelligit, quia, nisi intus sit qui doceat, doctoris lingua exterius in vacuum laborat ».

11. Item, idem ibidem⁵: « Ecce unam loquentis vocem omnes pariter auditis, nec tamen sensum auditae vocis omnes aequaliter perpenditis. Cum ergo vox dispar non sit, cur in cordibus vestris dispar est vocis intelligentia, nisi quia per hoc, quod vox loquentis communiter admonet, est magister interior, qui de vocis intelligentia quosdam specialiter docet »? Sed si intellectus noster sufficeret sibi ad intelligendum per lumen veritatis creatae, non indigeret superno doctore: cum igitur indigeat, patet etc.

12. Item, Anselmus in Proslogio, decimoquarto capitulo: « Quanta lux est, de qua micat omne verum, quod rationali menti lucet! Quam ampla est ista veritas, in qua est omne quod verum est, et extra quam non nisi nihil et falsum est »! Ergo si verum non videtur, nisi ubi est, nullum videtur nisi in veritate aeterna.

13. Item, Origenes⁶: « Humana natura, etsi non peccasset, suis propriis viribus lucere non posset ». Sed intelligere est quoddam lucere: ergo etiam si non peccasset, propriis viribus non posset intelligere, ergo indiget superiori agente.

14. Item, super illud Psalmi⁷: Manus tuae fecerunt me et plasmaverunt me, da mihi intellectum; Glossa: « Solus Deus dat intellectum; Deus enim per se ipsum, qui lux est, illuminat pias mentes ».

15. Item, Isaac, tractans illud Psalmi: In lumine tuo videbimus lumen, dicit⁸: « Sicut de sole exit unde sol videri possit, et tamen solem non deserit quod solem ostendit; ita in Deo lux, quae exit a Deo, mentem irradiat, ut prius ipsam coruscationem, sine qua non videret, videat et in ipsa cetera videat »: ergo omnia secundum hoc videntur in luce divina.

16. Item, Philosophus, sexto Ethicorum, capitulo tertio, secundum novam translationem⁹: « Omnes suspicamur, quod scimus non contingere aliter se habere; contingentia autem aliter, cum extra speculari fiant, latent si sunt, vel non. Ex necessitate ergo est scibile aeternum; ex necessitate enim entia

simpliciter omnia aeterna; aeterna autem ingenita et incorruptibilia »: ergo nullo modo potest esse cognitio certitudinalis, quin cadat ibi ratio aeternae veritatis. Hoc autem non est nisi in rationibus aeternis: ergo etc.

Item, hoc idem ostenditur rationibus, et primo rationibus sumtis ex verbis Augustini, secundo vero ex aliis rationibus. Innuit enim Augustinus in secundo libro de Libero Arbitrio¹ et de Vera Religione et de Magistro, sexto Musicae et octavo de Trinitate huiusmodi rationes.

17. Omne immutabile est superius mutabili²; sed illud quo certitudinaliter cognoscitur est immutabile, quia verum necessarium; sed mens nostra est mutabilis: ergo illud quo cognoscimus est supra mentes nostras. Sed quod est supra mentes nostras non est nisi Deus et veritas aeterna: ergo illud quo est cognitio est divina veritas et ratio sempiterna.

18. Item, omne iniudicabile est superius iudicabili; sed lex, qua iudicamus, est iniudicabilis, mens autem nostra est iudicabilis: ergo illud quo cognoscimus et iudicamus est supra mentem nostram. Hoc autem non est nisi veritas et ratio sempiterna: ergo etc.

19. Item, omne infallibile est superius fallibili; sed lux et veritas, qua cognoscimus certitudinaliter, est infallibilis, mens autem nostra falli potest: ergo lux illa et veritas est supra mentem nostram. Sed haec est lux et veritas aeterna: ergo etc.

20. Item, omne lumen certitudinale est incoarctabile, quia universis se ostendit et exhibet cognoscibile sub eadem certitudine; lumen autem incoarctabile necessario non est lumen creatum, sed increatum, quia omne creatum est limitatum et finitum et in diversis multiplicatur: ergo hoc lumen necesse est esse increatum. Sed hoc lumine certitudinaliter cognoscimus: ergo etc.

21. Item, omne necessarium est interminabile, quia nullo modo potest nec poterit³ aliter se habere; sed illud quo certitudinaliter scimus est verum necessarium: ergo interminabile. Sed omne tale est supra omne creatum, cum omnis creatura prodierit de non-esse ad esse, et quantum est de se, sit vertibilis in non-esse: ergo illud quo cognoscimus excedit omne verum creatum, ergo est verum increatum.

22. Item, omne creatum, quantum est de se, est comprehensibile; sed leges numerorum, figurarum et demonstrationum, cum augeantur in infinitum, secundum Philosophum⁴ sunt incomprehensibiles ab intellectu humano: ergo huiusmodi leges, cum ab humano intellectu videntur, necesse est quod videantur in aliquo, quod excedit omne creatum. Huiusmodi autem non est nisi Deus et ratio sempiterna: ergo etc.

23. Item, cum impius homo cognoscit iustitiam, aut cognoscit eam per sui praesentiam, aut per similitudinem acceptam ab extra, aut per aliquid, quod est supra; sed non per eius praesentiam, cum illa non sit praesens ei; non per speciem acceptam ab extra, cum non habeat similitudinem abstrahibilem per sensum: ergo necesse est, quod cognoscat illam per aliquid aliud, quod est supra intellectum suum; pari ratione et omnia alia cognoscibilia spiritualia, quae cognoscit. Ergo si impius cognoscit in rationibus aeternis, multo fortius alii. — Si dicas, quod cognoscit eam per effectum; obiicitur contra hoc⁵: quia quod nullo modo cognoscitur, nescitur, quid ab eo efficiatur — si enim nescio, quid sit homo, nunquam scio, quid fiat ab homine — ergo si prius non habetur notitia de iustitia, nunquam scietur, quod hoc vel illud fiat ab illa. Restat ergo, quod cognoscatur in ratione aeterna. — Similiter potest argui de qualibet forma intelligibili substantiali⁶, ac per hoc de omni cognitione certitudinali.

24. Item, sicut Deus est causa essendi, ita est ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi⁷; sed Deus sic est causa essendi, quod nihil potest ab aliqua causa effici, quin ipse se ipso et sua aeterna virtute moveat operantem: ergo nihil potest intelligi, quin ipse sua aeterna veritate immediate illustret intelligentem.

25. Item, nullum ens defectivum, quantum est de se, cognoscitur nisi per ens perfectum⁸; sed omne

verum creatum, quantum est de se, est tenebra et defectus: ergo nihil in intellectu cadit nisi per illud summum verum.

26. Item, nihil recte et certitudinaliter cognoscitur, nisi applicetur ad regulam, quae nullo modo potest obliquari; haec autem regula non est nisi illa¹, quae est essentialiter ipsa rectitudo, et haec non est nisi veritas et ratio aeterna: ergo nihil certitudinaliter cognoscitur, nisi applicetur ad regulam aeternam.

27. Item, cum duplex sit portio animae, superior et inferior, ratio inferior ortum habet a superiori, et non e converso; sed ratio superior dicitur, in quantum convertitur ad leges aeternas; inferior vero, in quantum versatur circa temporalia²: ergo per prius et naturaliter inest animae cognitio aeternalium quam temporalium: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid ab ipsa cognoscatur certitudinaliter, nisi ab illis aeternis rationibus adiuvetur.

Hae omnes rationes praedictae ex verbis Augustini eliciuntur in diversis voluminibus.

Item, hoc idem videtur et aliis rationibus.

28. Cognitio eiusdem sensibilis a diversis simul et semel non potest haberi nisi per aliquod commune³, et pari ratione cognitio eiusdem intelligibilis; sed aliquod unum verum nullo modo multiplicatum a diversis potest intelligi, sicut et enuntiari: ergo necesse est, quod per aliquod unum nullo modo multiplicatum intelligatur. Sed unum in diversis nullo modo multiplicatum non potest esse nisi Deus: ergo ratio intelligendi unumquodque est ipsa veritas, quae est Deus.

29. Item, sicut affectus se habet ad bonum, ita intellectus se habet ad verum, et sicut omne bonum a summa bonitate, ita omne verum a summa veritate; sed impossibile est, quod affectus noster directe feratur in bonum, quin aliquo modo attingat summam bonitatem: ergo impossibile est, quod intellectus noster certitudinaliter cognoscat aliquod verum, quin attingat aliquo modo summam veritatem⁴.

30. Item, verum non cognoscitur nisi veritate⁵, et non quacumque, sed veritate nota, et illa potissimum veritate, quae est maxime nota; sed haec veritas est illa quae non potest cogitari non esse; sed talis non est veritas creata, sed increata: ergo quidquid certitudinaliter cognoscitur scitur in veritate et ratione aeterna.

31. Item, anima nata est converti super intelligibile, quod est extra, et super intelligibile, quod est intra, et super intelligibile, quod est supra. Conversio autem ad intelligibile, quod est extra, est minime simplex; ad intelligibile vero, quod est intra, est magis simplex; ad intelligibile, quod est supra, est maxime simplex, quia illud est ei magis intimum quam ipsa sibi. Sed quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto prius⁶: ergo naturaliter est prior conversio animae super ipsam veritatem sibi intimam, quam super se ipsam vel vera extrinseca: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid cognoscat, nisi illa summa veritate praecognita.

32. Item, omne ens in potentia reducitur ad actum per aliquid actu existens in illo genere⁷; sed intellectus noster est in potentia, ut intellectus in puero: ergo ad hoc, quod fiat in actu intelligens, necesse est, quod per eum fiat, qui est actu omnia sciens. Sed hoc non est nisi aeterna sapientia: ergo etc. — Si tu dicas, quod ille est agens intellectus; tunc quaero: aut intellectus agens actu intelligebat illud quod iste addiscit, aut non; si non: ergo per illum non poterat fieri actu intelligens; si sic: ergo vel iste qui addiscit simul idem intelligit et ignorat, vel intellectus agens non est aliquid animae, sed supra animam: restat igitur, quod quidquid anima intelligens apprehendit per aliquid, quod est supra animam, apprehendat. Sed supra animam non est nisi Deus: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod intellectus agens non dicitur agens, quia actu intelligit, sed quia intelligere facit⁸; contra: omne intelligens est superius et melius non intelligente: ergo si intellectus agens non est intelligens; cum non possit facere aliquid melius et superius supra se, nunquam faciet se vel alium actu intelligentem: ergo si fit actu intelligens, necesse est, quod fiat per aliquid, quod est supra se. Hoc autem non est dare aliud quam aeternam rationem et veritatem: ergo etc.

33. Item, destructis omnibus creaturis, remanente solo spiritu rationali, remanet apud eum⁹ cognitio disciplinarum, utpote numerorum et figurarum; sed hoc non est propter verum esse, quod habeant apud ipsum, nec apud universum: ergo necesse est, quod propter esse, quod habent apud summum artificem.

34. Item, secundum omnes Sanctos Deus dicitur esse¹⁰ doctor omnis scientiae; aut igitur quia generaliter cooperatur omni intellectui, sicut et aliis creaturis, aut quia donum gratiae infundit, aut

quia intellectus in cognoscendo ipsum attingit. Si quia generaliter cooperatur: ergo ita diceretur docere sensum, sicut intellectum; quod absurdum est. Si quia donum gratiae infundit: ergo omnis cognitio erit gratuita vel infusa, nulla ergo acquisita, vel innata; quod absurdissimum est. Restat ergo, quod hoc dicitur, quia intellectus noster ad ipsum attingit tanquam ad lumen mentium et rationem cognoscendi omne verum.

Sed contra hoc obiicitur¹ primo auctoritate, deinde ratione; auctoritate sic.

1. Primae ad Timotheum ultimo² dicitur de Deo: Qui solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem, quem nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest. Sed omne illud, quo vel in quo cognoscimus, est cognoscenti accessibile: ergo illud, quo vel in quo cognoscimus, non potest esse lux rationis vel veritatis aeternae.

2. Item, Augustinus, primo de Trinitate³: « Mentis humanae acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per iustitiam fidei emundetur ». Ergo si lux veritatis aeternae esset ratio cognoscendi omnia vera, nulla anima verum cognosceret nisi purgata et sancta. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur.

3. Item, nono de Trinitate⁴: « Mens ergo ipsa, sicut corporearum rerum notitiam per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam »: ergo videtur, quod in cognoscendo non sit necesse, quod quidquid cognoscit cognoscat per rationes aeternas.

4. Item, Augustinus, duodecimo de Trinitate⁵: « Credendum est, mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subiecta, sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumiacent ». Ergo videtur, quod sicut ad cognoscendum sensibilia sufficit lux naturae corporeae creata, similiter ad intelligibilia sufficiat lux spiritualis creata eiusdem generis cum potentia cognitiva.

5. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus⁶: « Cum mens in contemplatione suspenditur, quidquid perfecte videt Deus non est »; sed ratio cognoscendi perfecte conspicitur in cognitione certitudinali: ergo huiusmodi ratio non est Deus nec aliquid in Deo: ergo etc.

6. Item, Dionysius, in Epistola ad Caium⁷: « Si quis Deum videns intellexit quod vidit, non ipsum vidit, sed quiddam eorum quae sunt entium et cognitorum; ipse autem est supra intellectum et substantiam stabilitus ». Ergo in cognoscendo mens nostra in praesenti vita non attingit verum increatum.

7. Item, Philosophus in tertio de Anima⁸ dicit, quod « nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore »; sed rationes illae aeternae omnino sunt supra tempus: ergo in intelligendo intellectus noster nullatenus ad illas rationes pertingit.

8. Item, ibidem⁹ dicit: « Sicut in omni natura est aliquid, quo est omnia facere, et aliquid, quo est omnia fieri; ita et circa intellectum intelligere oportet, quod est intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis »; sed haec sufficiunt ad perfectam cognitionem: ergo non est opus adminiculo rationis aeternae.

9. Item, experientia docet, quod « ex multis sensibus una fit memoria, ex multis memoriis unum experimentum, ex multis experimentis unum universale, quod est principium artis et scientiae¹⁰ », quia, amittentes unum sensum, amittimus scientiam illorum quae sunt circa illum sensum. Ergo cognitio certitudinalis in statu viae venit ab inferiori, cognitio autem in rationibus aeternis venit a superiori: ergo quamdiu sumus in statu viatorum, non competit nobis cognitio per lumen aeternarum rationum.

10. Item, cognitio imaginativa non indiget lumine superiori, immo sola virtus potentiae imaginativae sufficit ad aliquid imaginandum: ergo si intellectus¹¹ est potentior quam imaginatio, multo fortius per se sufficiet sine superiori lumine ad aliquid certitudinaliter cognoscendum.

11. Item, certitudinalis cognitio potest esse in sensu absque certitudine rationis sempiternae: ergo si potentior est intellectus quam sensus, multo fortius absque illo lumine poterit certitudinaliter cognoscere et intelligere.

12. Item, ad integram cognitionem non plus requiritur nisi cognoscens et cognoscibile abstractum et conversio huius super hoc; sed hoc totum potest esse per potentiam intellectus nostri sine ratione aeterna: ergo etc.

13. Item, in quaecumque potentia aliqua libere potest, non indiget adminiculo alieno; sed « intelligimus, quando volumus¹² »: ergo ad hoc, ut aliquid

certitudinaliter cognoscamus, non indigemus lumine aeternarum rationum.

14. Item, eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi¹: ergo si principia essendi propria et intrinseca ipsarum creaturarum non sunt nisi creata, quidquid cognoscitur scitur per rationes creatas: non ergo per rationes et lumina sempiterna.

15. Item, unicuique cognoscibili respondet propria ratio cognoscendi ad hoc, ut de ipso habeatur cognitio certitudinalis; sed rationes illae cognoscendi non percipiuntur distincte ab aliquo intellectu viatoris: ergo nihil in illis habet proprie et determinate cognosci.

16. Item, si quidquid certitudinaliter cognoscitur cognoscitur in ratione aeterna; sed « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis² »: ergo et rationes illae aeternae sunt nobis magis notae; quod manifeste falsum est, cum sint nobis maxime occultae.

17. Item, impossibile est aliquid videre in speculo, quin ipsum speculum videatur: ergo si quidquid certitudinaliter cognoscitur in illis rationibus aeternis videtur, necesse est, quod primum lumen et aeterna ratio videatur. Sed hoc est falsum et absurdum: ergo et primum.

18. Item, si rationibus illis aeternis cognoscitur quidquid certitudinaliter cognoscitur; sed rationes illae sunt aeque certae respectu contingentium, sicut respectu necessariorum, et respectu futurorum, sicut respectu praesentium: ergo ita haberemus certitudinalem cognitionem de contingentibus, sicut de necessariis, ita de futuris, sicut de praesentibus; quod falsum est: ergo et primum.

19. Item, si in rationibus aeternis cognoscimus; sed rationes aeternae sunt causae altissimae; sapientia autem est cognitio causarum altissimarum³: ergo quicumque aliquid certitudinaliter cognoscit est sapiens. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

20. Item, si cognitio patriae est cognitio per rationes aeternas, in quibus Beati vident quidquid vident: ergo si omnis cognitio certitudinalis esset per illas rationes aeternas, omnes certitudinaliter cognoscentes essent beati, et soli Beati certitudinaliter cognoscerent; sed hoc est falsum.

21. Item, si quidquid cognoscitur videtur in rationibus aeternis; cum speculum aeternarum rationum sit voluntarium, et quod cognoscitur in speculo voluntario cognoscitur per revelationem: ergo quidquid cognoscitur secundum hoc cognoscitur modo prophetico vel revelatione⁴.

22. Item, si quidquid cognoscitur cognoscitur rationibus aeternis; aut ergo velate, aut sine velamine. Si velate: ergo nihil clare cognoscitur; si sine velamine: ergo omnes vident Deum et exemplar aeternum absque omni aenigmate. Sed hoc est falsum secundum statum viae⁵: ergo etc.

Item obiicitur contra rationes Augustini sic:

23. Quia, si omnis veritas incommutabilis est supra animam ac per hoc aeterna et Deus; cum omnis veritas principii demonstrativi sit incommutabilis⁶, omnis talis veritas esset Deus: ergo nihil sciretur nisi Deus.

24. Item, si omnis veritas incommutabilis est veritas artis aeternae, et illa non est nisi una; omnis veritas incommutabilis non esset nisi una; sed circa quodlibet ens contingit⁷ reperire aliquam veritatem incommutabilem — sicut patet; haec enim est veritas incommutabilis: si Socrates currit, Socrates movetur — ergo secundum hoc omnia entia essent unum.

25. Item, si omne, quod est Deus, est adorandum latria, et omnis veritas principii incommutabilis est Deus: ergo omnis talis veritas debet adorari: ergo veritas huius propositionis: duo et tria sunt quinque, debet adorari.

26. Item, si omnis veritas incommutabilis est Deus: ergo quicumque clare videt aliquam veritatem incommutabilem clare videt Deum; sed daemones et damnati clare vident aliquas⁸ veritates incommutabiles: ergo clare vident Deum. Sed hoc est esse beatum: ergo damnati sunt beati; sed hoc nihil absurdius: ergo absurdissimum est, quod quidquid cognoscitur cognoscitur rationibus aeternis, si certitudinaliter cognoscitur.

Conclusio. Ad certitudinalem cognitionem intellectus etiam in viatore requiritur, ut aliquo modo attingatur ratio aeterna ut ratio regulans et motiva, non tamen ut sola et in sua claritate, sed simul cum propria ratione creata et ut in speculo et aenigmate cognita.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum dicitur, quod omne, quod cognoscitur certitudinaliter, cognoscitur in luce aeternarum rationum, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi: uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad certitudinalem cogni-

tionem concurrit lucis aeternae evidentia tanquam ratio cognoscendi tota et sola. — Et haec intelligentia est minus recta, pro eo quod secundum hoc nulla esset rerum cognitio nisi in Verbo; et tunc non differret cognitio viae a cognitione patriae, nec cognitio in Verbo a cognitione in proprio genere, nec cognitio scientiae a cognitione sapientiae, nec cognitio naturae a cognitione gratiae, nec cognitio rationis a cognitione revelationis; quae omnia cum sint falsa, nullo modo est ista via tenenda. — Ex hac enim sententia, quam quidam posuerunt, nihil certitudinaliter cognosci nisi in mundo archetypo et intelligibili, sicut fuerunt Academici primi, natus fuit error, ut dicit Augustinus contra Academicos libro secundo¹, quod nihil omnino contingeret scire, sicut posuerunt Academici novi, pro eo quod ille mundus intelligibilis est occultus mentibus humanis. Et ideo, volentes primam tenere sententiam et suam positionem, inciderunt in manifestum errorem; quia « modicus error in principio magnus est in fine² ».

Alio modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad cognitionem certitudinalem necessario concurrit ratio aeterna quantum ad suam influentiam, ita quod cognoscens in cognoscendo non ipsam rationem aeternam attingit, sed influentiam eius solum³. — Et hic quidem modus dicendi est insufficiens secundum verba beati Augustini, qui verbis expressis et rationibus ostendit, quod mens in certitudinali cognitione per incommutabiles et aeternas regulas habeat regulari, non tanquam per habitum suae mentis, sed tanquam per eas quae sunt supra se in veritate aeterna. Et ideo dicere, quod mens nostra in cognoscendo non extendat se ultra influentiam lucis increatae, est dicere, Augustinum deceptum fuisse, cum auctoritates ipsius exponendo non sit facile ad istum sensum trahere; et hoc valde absurdum est dicere de tanto Patre et Doctore maxime authentico inter omnes expositores sacrae Scripturae.

Praeterea, illa lucis influentia aut est generalis, quantum Deus influit in omnibus creaturis, aut est specialis, sicut Deus influit per gratiam. Si est generalis: ergo Deus non magis debet dici dator sapientiae quam fecundator terrae, nec magis ab eo diceretur esse scientia quam pecunia⁴; si specialis, cuiusmodi est in gratia: ergo secundum hoc omnis cognitio est infusa, et nulla est acquisita, vel innata; quae omnia sunt absurda.

Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam, scilicet quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte⁵ a nobis contuita secundum statum viae.

Et hoc est quod Augustinus insinuat decimo quarto de Trinitate, capitulo decimo quinto⁶: « Commemoratur impius, ut convertatur ad Dominum tanquam ad eam lucem, qua etiam, cum ab illo averteretur, quodam modo tangebatur. Nam hinc est, quod et impii cogitant aeternitatem et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum moribus ». Ubi et subdit⁷, quod hoc faciunt per regulas, quae « scriptae sunt in libro lucis illius, quae veritas dicitur ». — Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione aliquo modo attingat illas regulas et incommutabiles rationes, requirit necessario nobilitas cognitionis et dignitas cognoscentis⁸.

Nobilitas, inquam, cognitionis, quia cognitio certitudinalis esse non potest, nisi sit ex parte scibilis immutabilitas, et infallibilitas ex parte scientis. Veritas autem creata non est immutabilis simpliciter, sed ex suppositione⁹; similiter nec lux creaturae est omnino infallibilis ex propria virtute, cum utraque sit creata et prodierit de non-esse in esse. Si ergo ad plenam cognitionem fit recursus ad veritatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et ad lucem omnino infallibilem; necesse est, quod in huiusmodi cognitione recurratur ad artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, inquam, dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilitatem scibili. Unde cum res habeant esse in mente et in proprio genere et in aeterna arte, non sufficit ipsi animae ad certitudinalem scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se¹⁰, vel

secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utrobique sunt mutabiles, nisi aliquo modo attingat eas, in quantum sunt in arte aeterna.

Ipsum etiam requirit dignitas ex parte scientis. Cum enim spiritus rationalis habeat superiorem portionem rationis et inferiorem; sicut ad plenum iudicium rationis deliberativum in agendis non sufficit portio inferior sine superiori, sic et ad plenum rationis iudicium in speculandis¹. Haec autem portio superior est illa, in qua est imago Dei, quae et aeternis regulis inhaerescit et per eas quidquid definit certitudinaliter iudicat et definit; et hoc competit ei, in quantum est imago Dei.

Creatura enim comparatur ad Deum in ratione vestigii, imaginis et similitudinis. In quantum vestigium, comparatur ad Deum ut ad principium; in quantum imago, comparatur ad Deum ut ad obiectum; sed in quantum similitudo, comparatur ad Deum ut ad donum infusum. Et ideo omnis creatura est vestigium, quae est a Deo; omnis est imago, quae cognoscit Deum; omnis et sola est similitudo, in qua habitat Deus². Et secundum istum triplicem gradum comparationis triplex est gradus divinae cooperationis.

In opere, quod est a creatura per modum vestigii, cooperatur Deus per modum principii creativi; in opere vero, quod est a creatura per modum similitudinis, sicut est opus meritorium et Deo placitum, cooperatur Deus per modum doni infusi; in opere vero, quod est a creatura per modum imaginis, cooperatur Deus per modum rationis moventis³; et tale est opus certitudinalis cognitionis, quod quidem non est a ratione inferiori sine superiori.

Quoniam igitur certitudinalis cognitio competit spiritui rationali, in quantum est imago Dei, ideo in hac cognitione aeternas rationes attingit. Sed quia in statu viae non est adhuc plene deiformis, ideo non attingit eas clare et plene et distincte; sed secundum quod magis vel minus ad deiformitatem accedit, secundum hoc magis vel minus eas attingit, semper tamen aliquo modo, quia nunquam potest ab eo ratio imaginis separari. Unde quia in statu innocentiae erat imago sine deformitate culpae, nondum tamen habens plenam deiformitatem gloriae, ideo attingebat⁴ ex parte, sed non in aenigmate. In statu vero naturae lapsae caret deiformitate et habet deformitatem, ideo attingit eas ex parte et in aenigmate. In statu vero gloriae caret omni deformitate et habet plenam deiformitatem, ideo attingit eas plene et perspicue.

Rursus, quia non ex se tota est anima imago, ideo cum his attingit⁵ rerum similitudines abstractas a phantasmate tanquam proprias et distinctas cognoscendi rationes, sine quibus non sufficit sibi ad cognoscendum lumen rationis aeternae, quamdiu est in statu viae, nisi forte per specialem revelationem hunc statum transcenderet, sicut in his qui rapiuntur, et in aliquorum revelationibus Prophetarum.

Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt et Augustini auctoritates expresse asserunt, quod in omni certitudinali cognitione rationes illae cognoscendi a cognoscente attinguntur, licet aliter a viatore et aliter a comprehendente, aliter a sciente et aliter a sapiente, aliter a prophetante et aliter a communiter intelligente, sicut iam patuit et patebit in obiectorum solutionibus.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod lucem habitat inaccessibilem; dicendum, quod loquitur de illo accessu, qui est⁶ ad illam lucem in suae claritatis plenitudine et fulgore, quo modo non acceditur ad ipsam per potentiam creaturae, sed per deiformitatem gloriae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mentis humanae acies invalida in tam excellenti luce non figitur etc.; dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod cognoscat per aeternas rationes, non oportet, quod in illis figatur, nisi in quantum cognoscit sapientialiter. Aliter enim attingit illas rationes sapiens, et aliter sciens: sciens attingit illas ut moventes, sapiens vero ut quietantes; et ad hanc sapientiam nemo pervenit, « nisi primo per fidei iustitiam emundetur⁷ ».

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mens incorporearum rerum per se ipsam habet notitiam; dicendum, quod sicut in operibus creaturae non excluditur cooperatio Creatoris, sic in ratione cognoscendi creata non excluditur ratio cognoscendi increata, sed potius includitur in eadem⁸.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod videt in luce sui generis; dici potest, quod large dicitur lux sui generis omnis lux incorporea, sive creata sive increata; vel si intelligatur de luce creata, per hoc non excluditur lux increata; nec sequitur, quod non cognoscamus in veritate aeterna, sed quod non in illa sola, verum etiam in lumine veritatis creatae; et hoc quidem verum est nec obviat positioni praedictae⁹.

5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Gregorio et Dionysio, dicendum, quod neuter negat, quin illud lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum¹, a nostris mentibus attingatur, sed quod in hac vita nondum plene videtur.

7. 8. 9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Philosopho, quod intelligimus cum continuo et tempore, et quod habemus intellectum possibilem et agentem, et de experientia cognitionis humanae; dicendum, quod hoc ponit², ad nostram intelligentiam concurrere lumen et rationem veritatis creatae; sed tamen, ut in praecedentibus dictum est, non excluditur lux et ratio veritatis aeternae, quia possibile est, quod anima secundum inferiorem portionem attingat quae sunt infra, superiori nihilominus portione attingente quae sunt supra.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur de cognitione imaginativa³, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia illa non habet certitudinem, et ideo non recurrit ad immutabile.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sensu, dicendum, quod non est simile de certitudine sensus et intellectus. Certitudo enim sensus venit ex alligatione potentiae operantis per modum naturae circa aliquid determinatae. Certitudo autem intellectus non potest venire ex hac parte, cum sit potentia libera ad intelligendum omnia⁴; et ideo oportet, quod veniat per aliquid non habens alligationem, sed libertatem sine defectibilitate mutabilitatis et fallibilitatis; et talis est lux et ratio sempiternae veritatis: et ideo ad illam recurritur sicut ad fontem omnis certitudinis.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad cognitionem nihil plus requiritur nisi cognoscens et cognoscibile et conversio huius super hoc; dicendum, quod haec conversio includit iudicium; iudicium autem certum non fit nisi per legem certam et iniudicabilem, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione et in libro de Libero Arbitrio⁵, quod « nullus de veritate iudicat, et sine veritate nullus bene iudicat »; et ideo hic includitur ratio et veritas aeterna.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intelligimus, quando volumus, ergo non egemus adminiculo alieno; dicendum, quod adminiculum alienum est duplex: quoddam, quod semper est praesto, quoddam quod est absens et distans. Ratio illa non concludit de primo adminiculo, sed de secundo, sicut patet: quia, si lux corporalis semper esset praesens in oculo, sicut lux spiritualis est semper praesens in mente; videremus, quando vellemus, sicut intelligimus, quando volumus.

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem sunt principia essendi et cognoscendi; dicendum, quod sicut principia essendi intrinseca non sufficiunt sine illo primo principio extra, quod est Deus, ad esse, sic nec ad plenum cognoscere⁶. Unde licet illa principia sint aliquo modo ratio cognoscendi, non propter hoc excludunt illam rationem cognoscendi primam a nostra cognitione, sicut nec excludunt in actu essendi a creatione.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unicuique cognoscibili respondet propria ratio cognoscendi; dicendum, quod quia non omnino distincte⁷ videmus illas rationes in se, ideo non sunt tota ratio cognoscendi; sed requiritur cum illis lumen creatum principiorum et similitudines rerum cognitarum, ex quibus propria ratio cognoscendi habetur respectu cuiuslibet cogniti.

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis »; dicendum, quod, sicut iam patet, ratio aeterna non sola movet ad cognoscendum, sed cum veritate principiorum, non specialiter de se, sed generaliter in statu viae; et ideo non sequitur, quod ipsa sit nobis nota secundum se, sed prout relucet in suis⁸ principiis et in sua generalitate; et sic quodam modo est nobis certissima, quia intellectus noster nullo modo potest cogitare, ipsam non esse; quod quidem non potest dici de aliqua veritate creata.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur de speculo, dicendum, quod illud verum est de speculo, quod habet rationem repraesentandi proprie et distincte, et quod cum ratione repraesentandi habet rationem terminandi; sicut patet in isto speculo materiali, quod speciem visibilem distincte et proprie repraesentat et terminat visum. Hae autem conditiones competunt speculo aeterno respectu comprehensorum, sicut patet ex his quae dicta sunt prius⁹

18. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illae rationes sunt aeque certae respectu contingentium, sicut respectu necessariorum; dicendum, quod illa ratio bene concluderet, si rationes illae essent tota ratio cognoscendi, et si in illis videretur plenarie; nunc autem non est sic secundum statum praesentis temporis, quia cum illis indigemus similitudinibus propriis et rerum principiis determinate acceptis, quae quidem non reperiuntur in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis¹.

19. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi in illis rationibus cognoscimus, quod omnis cognoscens est sapiens; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia attingere rationes illas non facit sapientem, nisi quis in eis quiescat et sciat, se illas attingere, quod quidem spectat ad sapientem. Huiusmodi enim rationes attinguntur ab intellectibus scientium ut ductivae, sed ab intellectibus sapientium ut reductivae et quietativae. Et quia pauci sunt, qui isto modo illas attingant, ideo pauci sunt sapientes, licet multi scientes; pauci quidem sunt, qui illas rationes sciant se attingere; immo quod plus est, pauci sunt, qui velint hoc credere, quia difficile videtur intellectui ad aeterna contemplanda nondum elevato, quod ita habeat Deum praesentem et propinquum, cum tamen dicat Paulus Actuum decimo septimo², quod non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum.

20. Ad illud quod obiicitur de cognitione patriae, iam patet responsio, quia magna est differentia inter cognitionem, quae est ex parte et in aenigmate, ad eam, quae est perfecte³ et distincte, ut supra tactum est.

21. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod speculum aeternarum rationum est voluntarium etc.; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Romanos primo⁴, quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis: licet Deus sit simplex et uniformis, tamen lux illa aeterna et exemplar illud quaedam repraesentat quasi exterius et aperte, quaedam vero magis profunde et occulte. Prima sunt, quae fiunt secundum necessariam ordinationem artis divinae; secunda vero sunt, quae fiunt secundum dispositionem voluntatis occultae. Et quod dicitur speculum voluntarium, hoc non est respectu exemplatorum primo modo, sed secundo; et ideo in rationibus aeternis naturalia cognoscuntur naturali iudicatorio rationis⁵, supernaturalia vero et futura non nisi dono revelationis supernae; et ideo illa ratio non repugnat positioni praemissae.

22. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid cognoscitur in illis, aut cum velamine, aut sine velamine; dicendum, quod in statu viae non cognoscitur in rationibus illis aeternis sine velamine et aenigmate propter divinae imaginis obscurationem⁶. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod nihil certitudinaliter cognoscatur et clare, pro eo quod principia creata, quae aliquo modo sunt media cognoscendi, licet non sine illis rationibus, possunt perspicue et sine velamine a nostra mente videri. — Si tamen diceretur, quod nihil in hac vita scitur plenarie, non esset magnum inconveniens.

23. 24. 25. 26. Ad illud quod obiicitur contra rationes Augustini, quodsi veritas incommutabilis est Deus, quod tunc veritas principii demonstrativi esset Deus, et quod omnes veritates essent unum, et quod deberent adorari, et quod daemones viderent Deum; ad haec omnia dicendum, quod veritas incommutabilis dicitur dupliciter, scilicet simpliciter et ex suppositione. Cum autem dicitur, quod veritas incommutabilis est supra mentem et Deus, hoc intelligitur de veritate, quae est incommutabilis simpliciter. Cum autem dicitur de veritate principii demonstrativi, quod est incommutabilis; si veritas illa nominat quid creatum, constat, quod non est incommutabilis simpliciter, sed ex suppositione, quia omnis creatura incipit a non-esse et est vertibilis in non-esse. — Et si obiiciatur, quod illa veritas est simpliciter certa ipsi animae per se ipsam; dicendum, quod licet principium demonstrativum, secundum quod dicit quid complexum, sit creatum; veritas tamen significata per illud potest significari vel secundum quod est in materia, vel secundum quod est in anima, vel secundum quod est in arte divina, vel certe omnibus his modis simul. Veritas enim in signo exteriori signum est veritatis, quae est apud animam, quia « voces sunt notae earum passionum, quae sunt in anima⁷ »; anima autem secundum suum supremum habet respectum ad superiora, sicut secundum suum inferius ad haec inferiora, cum sit medium inter res creatas et Deum; et ideo veritas in anima habet respectum ad illam duplicem veritatem, sicut medium ad duo extrema, ita quod ab inferiori recipit certitudinem secundum quid, a superiori vero recipit certitudinem simpliciter. Et ideo huiusmodi

p.27 n. 2 (Vers. 1. — Cfr. III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1...) anchors Q. V's arg. 1 (Ecclesiastici primo). So `bon-qsc-q4` takes p. 27 n. 1 ONLY and FORWARDS nn. 2 seqq. to `bon-qsc-q5`.

...veritas ut incommutabilis simpliciter supra animam est, secundum quod¹ ostendunt rationes Augustini. Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt de veritate incommutabili ex suppositione, quam proprie considerat demonstrator, quae multiplicatur in diversis et non est adorabilis, et contuibilis est a daemonibus et damnatis. Nam illa veritas simpliciter incommutabilis perspicue videri non potest, nisi ab illis qui intrare possunt ad intimum silentium mentis, ad quod nullus peccator pervenit, sed ille solus, qui est summus amator aeternitatis.

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Question IV. Whether whatever is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal accounts themselves.

Supposing that the eternal accounts are really undistinguished in the divine art or cognition, it is asked whether they are the accounts of knowing in every certitudinal cognition; that is to ask whether whatever is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal accounts themselves¹. And that it is, seems to hold by authority, in many ways.

1. Augustine, On the Teacher²: « Concerning all the things that we understand, we consult not one speaking, who sounds forth outwardly, but the truth presiding inwardly over the mind itself. He, however, who is consulted, teaches; he who is said to dwell in the interior man, Christ, the unchangeable power of God and everlasting wisdom, whom indeed every rational soul consults ».

2. Again, the same, On True Religion³: « It appears that above our mind there is a law, which is called truth; nor is it now to be doubted that the unchangeable nature which is above the human mind is God. For this is that unchangeable truth which is rightly called the law of all the arts and the art of the almighty Artificer ».

3. Again, Augustine, in the second book On Free Choice⁴: « That beauty of wisdom and of truth is not carried through by time, nor does it migrate by places, nor is it cut off by night, nor shut out by shadow, nor is it subject to the senses of the body; to all who love it, turned to it from the whole world, it is nearest, to all everlasting; it is in no place, it is nowhere absent; outwardly it admonishes, inwardly it teaches. No one judges concerning it, no one judges well without it; and through this it is manifest that it is without doubt to be preferred to our minds, which are made severally wise by it alone and judge concerning other things not about it but through it ». — If you say that it does not follow from this that we see in the truth or in the accounts, but that we see from the accounts; on the contrary: Augustine in the twelfth of the Confessions⁵: « If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see it? Neither I in you, nor you in me, but both in that unchangeable truth which is above our minds ».

4. Again, in the eighth of On the City of God⁶, speaking of the philosophers, he says: « Those whom we deservedly set before all others said that the lumen^tr. of minds for learning all things is the same God himself, by whom all things were made ».

5. Again, in the eighth of On the Trinity, chapter three⁷: « When the mind pleases us, so that we prefer it to every bodily light, it does not please us in itself, but in that art by which it was made. For it is approved as made from that whence it is seen it ought to have been made; this is truth and simple good ».

6. Again, in the ninth of On the Trinity, chapter six⁸: « By altogether other rules, remaining unchangeably above our mind, we are convinced either to approve or to disapprove, when we rightly approve or disapprove of anything ».

7. Again, in the same, chapter seven⁹: « In that eternal truth, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the sight of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which we work anything, whether in ourselves or in bodies, by true and right reason ».

8. Again, in the fourteenth book On the Trinity, chapter fifteen¹⁰: « When the impious see the rules according to which each ought to live, where do they see them? Not in their own nature, since it is agreed that their minds are changeable, whereas these rules are unchangeable; nor in the habit of their mind, since those rules are rules of justice.

Where does he discern that he must have what he himself does not have? Where, then, are they written, except in the book of that light which is called truth, whence every just law is copied »? — If you say that he retracted it; on the contrary: Augustine, in the first book of the Retractations¹: « It is credible that even those unskilled in certain disciplines answer truly concerning them, when they are able to grasp the eternal lumen of reason, where they behold these unchangeable truths, not because they knew them before and afterwards forgot them, as it seemed to Plato ». — Again²: « The intellectual nature is connected not only with intelligible things but also with unchangeable ones, made in that order so that, when it moves itself to those things with which it is connected, or to itself, in so far as it sees them, so far does it answer truly concerning them ».

From these authorities of Augustine it plainly appears that all things are known in the eternal accounts.

9. Again, Ambrose³: « Through myself I see nothing but empty, flowing and falling things »: therefore if I see anything with certitude, I see it through something which is above me.

10. Again, Gregory, on that text of John fourteen: He will teach you all things, says⁴: « Unless the same Spirit is present to the heart of the hearer, the speech of the teacher is idle; let no one, therefore, attribute to the man teaching what he understands from the mouth of the teacher, because, unless he who teaches is within, the tongue of the teacher labours outwardly in vain ».

11. Again, the same in the same place⁵: « Behold, you all alike hear the one voice of the speaker, and yet you do not all equally weigh the sense of the voice you have heard. Since therefore the voice is not unequal, why is the intelligence of the voice unequal in your hearts, unless because, through the fact that the voice of the speaker admonishes in common, there is an interior master who teaches certain ones specially concerning the intelligence of the voice »? But if our understanding were sufficient to itself for understanding through the lumen of created truth, it would not need a supernal teacher: since therefore it does need one, it is plain, etc.

12. Again, Anselm in the Proslogion, chapter fourteen: « How great is the light from which every truth flashes that shines to the rational mind! How ample is that truth, in which is everything that is true, and outside which is nothing but nothing and the false »! Therefore if the true is not seen except where it is, none is seen except in the eternal truth.

13. Again, Origen⁶: « Human nature, even if it had not sinned, could not shine by its own powers ». But to understand is a kind of shining: therefore even if it had not sinned, it could not understand by its own powers, therefore it needs a higher agent.

14. Again, on that text of the Psalm⁷: Thy hands have made me and formed me, give me understanding; the Gloss: « God alone gives understanding; for God through himself, who is light, illumines pious minds ».

15. Again, Isaac, treating that text of the Psalm: In thy light we shall see light, says⁸: « Just as there goes forth from the sun that whereby the sun can be seen, and yet what shows the sun does not desert the sun; so in God the light which goes forth from God irradiates the mind, so that it may first see that very flashing, without which it would not see, and in it may see the rest »: therefore according to this all things are seen in the divine light.

16. Again, the Philosopher, in the sixth of the Ethics, chapter three, according to the new translation⁹: « We all suppose that what we know cannot be otherwise; but contingent things, when they come to be outside our contemplating, escape us as to whether they are or are not. From necessity, therefore, the knowable is eternal; for from necessity the beings

that are simply eternal are all ungenerated and incorruptible »: therefore in no way can there be certitudinal cognition without the account of eternal truth falling there. But this is only in the eternal accounts: therefore etc.

Again, this same thing is shown by reasons, and first by reasons taken from the words of Augustine, and secondly by other reasons. For Augustine intimates reasons of this kind in the second book On Free Choice¹ and On True Religion and On the Teacher, in the sixth of the Music and in the eighth of On the Trinity.

17. Every unchangeable thing is higher than the changeable²; but that by which something is known with certitude is unchangeable, because it is a necessary truth; but our mind is changeable: therefore that by which we know is above our minds. But what is above our minds is nothing other than God and eternal truth: therefore that by which cognition is is the divine truth and the everlasting account.

18. Again, everything unjudgeable is higher than the judgeable; but the law by which we judge is unjudgeable, whereas our mind is judgeable: therefore that by which we know and judge is above our mind. But this is nothing other than the everlasting truth and account: therefore etc.

19. Again, everything infallible is higher than the fallible; but the light and truth by which we know with certitude is infallible, whereas our mind can be deceived: therefore that light and truth is above our mind. But this is the eternal light and truth: therefore etc.

20. Again, every certitudinal lumen is uncontractible, because it shows itself to all and offers the knowable under the same certitude; but an uncontractible lumen is necessarily not a created but an uncreated lumen, because everything created is limited and finite and is multiplied in diverse things: therefore it is necessary that this lumen be uncreated. But by this lumen we know with certitude: therefore etc.

21. Again, everything necessary is unterminable, because in no way can it nor will it be able³ to be otherwise; but that by which we know with certitude is a necessary truth: therefore it is unterminable. But everything of this kind is above everything created, since every creature has come forth from non-being into being, and, so far as it is of itself, is turnable into non-being: therefore that by which we know exceeds every created truth, therefore it is an uncreated truth.

22. Again, everything created, so far as it is of itself, is comprehensible; but the laws of numbers, of figures and of demonstrations, since they are increased to infinity, are according to the Philosopher⁴ incomprehensible by the human understanding: therefore laws of this kind, since they are seen by the human understanding, must necessarily be seen in something which exceeds everything created. But there is nothing of this kind except God and the everlasting account: therefore etc.

23. Again, when an impious man knows justice, either he knows it through its presence, or through a likeness received from without, or through something which is above; but not through its presence, since that is not present to him; not through a species received from without, since it does not have a likeness abstractable through sense: therefore it is necessary that he know it through something else, which is above his understanding; and by parity of reason all the other spiritual knowables which he knows. Therefore if the impious man knows in the eternal accounts, much more do others. — If you say that he knows it through its effect; it is objected against this⁵: because what is in no way known is unknown as to what is effected by it — for if I do not know what a man is, I never know what is done by a man — therefore if a knowledge of justice is not had beforehand, it will never be known that this or that is done by it. It remains, therefore, that it is known in the eternal account. — Similarly one can argue concerning any substantial intelligible form⁶, and through this concerning every certitudinal cognition.

24. Again, just as God is the cause of being, so he is the account of understanding and the order of living⁷; but God is the cause of being in such a way that nothing can be effected by any cause without his moving the one operating by himself and by his eternal power: therefore nothing can be understood without his illumining the one understanding immediately by his eternal truth.

25. Again, no defective being, so far as it is of itself, is known except through a perfect being⁸; but every

created truth, so far as it is of itself, is darkness and defect: therefore nothing falls into the understanding except through that supreme truth.

26. Again, nothing is known rightly and with certitude unless it is applied to a rule which can in no way be bent; but this rule is none other than that¹ which is essentially rectitude itself, and this is none other than the eternal truth and account: therefore nothing is known with certitude unless it is applied to the eternal rule.

27. Again, since the soul has a twofold portion, higher and lower, the lower reason has its rise from the higher, and not conversely; but reason is called higher in so far as it is turned to the eternal laws, and lower in so far as it is occupied about temporal things²: therefore the cognition of eternal things is in the soul prior and by nature before the cognition of temporal things: therefore it is impossible that anything be known by it with certitude unless it is helped by those eternal accounts.

All these foregoing reasons are drawn out of the words of Augustine in diverse volumes.

Again, this same thing seems to hold by other reasons as well.

28. The cognition of the same sensible thing by diverse men at once and together cannot be had except through something common³, and by parity of reason the cognition of the same intelligible thing; but some one truth in no way multiplied can be understood by diverse men, just as it can also be uttered: therefore it is necessary that it be understood through some one thing in no way multiplied. But a one in diverse things in no way multiplied cannot be anything but God: therefore the account of understanding each thing is the very truth which is God.

29. Again, as the affection stands to the good, so the understanding stands to the true, and as every good is from the supreme goodness, so every truth is from the supreme truth; but it is impossible that our affection be borne directly into the good without in some way attaining the supreme goodness: therefore it is impossible that our understanding know any truth with certitude without in some way attaining the supreme truth⁴.

30. Again, the true is not known except by truth⁵, and not by any truth whatever, but by a known truth, and most of all by that truth which is most known; but this truth is that which cannot be thought not to be; but such is not a created truth, but an uncreated one: therefore whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal truth and account.

31. Again, the soul is born to be turned upon the intelligible which is outside, and upon the intelligible which is within, and upon the intelligible which is above. But the turning to the intelligible which is outside is least simple; the turning to the intelligible which is within is more simple; the turning to the intelligible which is above is most simple, because that is more inward to it than it is to itself. But the simpler a thing is, the prior it is⁶: therefore the soul's turning upon the very truth most inward to it is naturally prior to its turning upon itself or upon extrinsic truths: therefore it is impossible that it know anything unless that supreme truth is foreknown.

32. Again, every being in potency is reduced to act through something existing in act in that genus⁷; but our understanding is in potency, as is the understanding in a boy: therefore, in order that it become actually understanding, it is necessary that it be made so through him who is actually knowing all things. But this is none other than the eternal wisdom: therefore etc. — If you say that this is the agent intellect; then I ask: either the agent intellect actually understood what this man is learning, or not; if not: therefore through it he could not become actually understanding; if so: therefore either this man who is learning at once understands and is ignorant of the same thing, or the agent intellect is not something of the soul, but above the soul. It remains, therefore, that whatever the understanding soul apprehends, it apprehends through something which is above the soul. But above the soul there is nothing but God: therefore etc. — If you say that the agent intellect is not called agent because it actually understands, but because it makes to understand⁸; on the contrary: everything that understands is higher and better than what does not understand: therefore if the agent intellect does not understand; since it cannot make anything better and higher above itself, it will never make itself or another actually understanding: therefore if it becomes actually understanding, it is necessary that it become so through something which is above itself. But this cannot be granted to be anything other than the eternal account and truth: therefore etc.

33. Again, when all creatures have been destroyed, the rational spirit alone remaining, there remains with it⁹ the cognition of the disciplines, such as of numbers and figures; but this is not on account of the true being which they have with it, nor with the universe: therefore it is necessary that it be on account of the being which they have with the supreme Artificer.

34. Again, according to all the Saints God is said to be¹⁰ the teacher of all knowledge; either, therefore, because he cooperates generally with every understanding, as also with other creatures, or because he pours in the gift of grace, or

because the understanding in knowing attains him. If because he cooperates generally: therefore he would be said to teach the sense just as he teaches the understanding; which is absurd. If because he pours in the gift of grace: therefore every cognition will be gratuitous or infused, none therefore acquired, or innate; which is most absurd. It remains, therefore, that this is said because our understanding attains to him as to the lumen of minds and the account of knowing every truth.

But against this it is objected¹, first by authority, then by reason; by authority thus.

1. In the last chapter of the first to Timothy² it is said of God: Who alone hath immortality and inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can see. But everything by which or in which we know is accessible to the knower: therefore that by which or in which we know cannot be the light of the eternal account or truth.

2. Again, Augustine, in the first of On the Trinity³: « The weak edge of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light, unless it be cleansed by the justice of faith ». Therefore if the light of eternal truth were the account of knowing all truths, no soul would know a truth unless purged and holy. But this is false: therefore also that from which it follows.

3. Again, in the ninth of On the Trinity⁴: « The mind therefore itself, just as it gathers the knowledge of bodily things through the senses of the body, so gathers the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself »: therefore it seems that in knowing it is not necessary that whatever it knows it know through the eternal accounts.

4. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth of On the Trinity⁵: « It is to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind is so constituted that, being subject in a natural order to intelligible things, the Founder so disposing, it sees these things in a certain incorporeal light of its own kind, just as the eye of the flesh sees the things which lie about in this bodily light ». Therefore it seems that, just as a created light of bodily nature suffices for knowing sensible things, so likewise a created spiritual light of the same kind as the cognitive power suffices for intelligible things.

5. Again, Gregory in the Morals⁶: « When the mind is suspended in contemplation, whatever it sees perfectly is not God »; but the account of knowing is beheld perfectly in certitudinal cognition: therefore an account of this kind is not God nor anything in God: therefore etc.

6. Again, Dionysius, in the Letter to Caius⁷: « If anyone seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see him, but something of those things which are beings and known; but he himself is established above understanding and substance ». Therefore in knowing, our mind in the present life does not attain the uncreated truth.

7. Again, the Philosopher in the third On the Soul⁸ says that « our understanding is with the continuous and with time »; but those eternal accounts are altogether above time: therefore in understanding our understanding in no way reaches to those accounts.

8. Again, in the same place⁹ he says: « Just as in every nature there is something by which it is to make all things, and something by which it is to become all things; so also concerning the understanding it must be understood that there is an agent intellect and a possible intellect »; but these suffice for perfect cognition: therefore there is no need of the support of the eternal account.

9. Again, experience teaches that « from many sensations one memory comes to be, from many memories one experiment, from many experiments one universal, which is the principle of art and of knowledge¹⁰ », because, losing one sense, we lose the knowledge of those things which are about that sense. Therefore certitudinal cognition in the state of the way comes from below, whereas cognition in the eternal accounts comes from above: therefore as long as we are in the state of wayfarers, cognition through the lumen of the eternal accounts does not belong to us.

10. Again, imaginative cognition does not need a higher lumen; rather the power of the imaginative faculty alone suffices for imagining something: therefore if the understanding¹¹ is more powerful than the imagination, much more will it suffice of itself, without a higher lumen, for knowing something with certitude.

11. Again, certitudinal cognition can be in the sense without the certitude of the everlasting account: therefore if the understanding is more powerful than the sense, much more will it be able to know and understand with certitude without that lumen.

12. Again, for entire cognition nothing more is required than a knower and a knowable abstracted and the turning of the one upon the other; but all this can come about through the power of our understanding without the eternal account: therefore etc.

13. Again, in whatever power something can be done freely, it does not need outside support; but « we understand when we will¹² »: therefore in order that anything

be known by us with certitude, we do not need the lumen of the eternal accounts.

14. Again, the principles of being and of knowing are the same¹: therefore if the proper and intrinsic principles of being of creatures themselves are only created, whatever is known is known through created accounts: not, therefore, through everlasting accounts and lumina.

15. Again, to each knowable there corresponds its proper account of knowing, in order that certitudinal cognition may be had of it; but those accounts of knowing are not distinctly perceived by any wayfarer's understanding: therefore nothing has to be known in them properly and determinately.

16. Again, if whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal account; but « that on account of which each thing is, is itself more so² »: therefore those eternal accounts are also more known to us; which is manifestly false, since they are most hidden from us.

17. Again, it is impossible to see anything in a mirror without the mirror itself being seen: therefore if whatever is known with certitude is seen in those eternal accounts, it is necessary that the first lumen and eternal account be seen. But this is false and absurd: therefore also the first.

18. Again, if whatever is known with certitude is known by those eternal accounts; but those accounts are equally certain with respect to contingent things as with respect to necessary ones, and with respect to future things as with respect to present ones: therefore we would have certitudinal cognition of contingent things just as of necessary ones, and of future things just as of present ones; which is false: therefore also the first.

19. Again, if we know in the eternal accounts; but the eternal accounts are the highest causes; wisdom, however, is the cognition of the highest causes³: therefore whoever knows anything with certitude is wise. But this is false: therefore etc.

20. Again, if the cognition of the fatherland is cognition through the eternal accounts, in which the Blessed see whatever they see: therefore, if every certitudinal cognition were through those eternal accounts, all who know with certitude would be blessed, and only the Blessed would know with certitude; but this is false.

21. Again, if whatever is known is seen in the eternal accounts; since the mirror of the eternal accounts is voluntary, and what is known in a voluntary mirror is known through revelation: therefore whatever is known according to this is known in the prophetic mode or by revelation⁴.

22. Again, if whatever is known is known by the eternal accounts; then either veiled, or without a veil. If veiled: therefore nothing is known clearly; if without a veil: therefore all see God and the eternal exemplar without any enigma. But this is false according to the state of the way⁵: therefore etc.

Again, it is objected against the reasons of Augustine thus:

23. Because, if every unchangeable truth is above the soul and through this eternal and God; since every truth of a demonstrative principle is unchangeable⁶, every such truth would be God: therefore nothing would be known but God.

24. Again, if every unchangeable truth is the truth of the eternal art, and that is only one; every unchangeable truth would be only one; but about any being whatever it happens⁷ that some unchangeable truth is found — as is plain; for this is an unchangeable truth: if Socrates runs, Socrates is moved — therefore according to this all beings would be one.

25. Again, if everything which is God is to be adored with latria, and every unchangeable truth of a principle is God: therefore every such truth ought to be adored: therefore the truth of this proposition, two and three are five, ought to be adored.

26. Again, if every unchangeable truth is God: therefore whoever clearly sees any unchangeable truth clearly sees God; but demons and the damned clearly see some⁸ unchangeable truths: therefore they clearly see God. But this is to be blessed: therefore the damned are blessed; but nothing is more absurd than this: therefore it is most absurd that whatever is known is known by the eternal accounts, if it is known with certitude.

Conclusio. For the certitudinal cognition of the understanding, even in the wayfarer, it is required that the eternal account be in some way attained as a regulating and motive account, not however as the sole account and in its own clarity, but together with the proper created account, and as known in a mirror and in an enigma.

Respondeo: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, when it is said that everything which is known with certitude is known in the light of the eternal accounts, this can be understood in three ways: in one way, so that it be understood that for certitudinal cogni-

tion the evidence of the eternal light concurs as the whole and sole account of knowing. — And this understanding is less right, for the reason that according to it there would be no cognition of things except in the Word; and then the cognition of the way would not differ from the cognition of the fatherland, nor cognition in the Word from cognition in its proper genus, nor the cognition of knowledge from the cognition of wisdom, nor the cognition of nature from the cognition of grace, nor the cognition of reason from the cognition of revelation; and since all these are false, this way is in no way to be held. — For out of this opinion, which certain men laid down, that nothing is known with certitude except in the archetypal and intelligible world — as were the first Academics — there was born the error, as Augustine says in the second book Against the Academics¹, that it happens that nothing at all can be known, as the new Academics laid down, for the reason that that intelligible world is hidden from human minds. And therefore, wishing to hold the first opinion and their own position, they fell into a manifest error; because « a small error in the beginning is a great one in the end² ».

In another way, so that it be understood that for certitudinal cognition the eternal account necessarily concurs as regards its influence, in such a way that the knower in knowing does not attain the eternal account itself, but only its influence³. — And this way of speaking is indeed insufficient according to the words of blessed Augustine, who by express words and by reasons shows that the mind in certitudinal cognition has to be regulated by the unchangeable and eternal rules, not as by the habit of its own mind, but as by those which are above it in the eternal truth. And therefore to say that our mind in knowing does not extend itself beyond the influence of the uncreated light is to say that Augustine was deceived, since in expounding his authorities it is not easy to draw them to that sense; and this is very absurd to say of so great a Father and Doctor, the most authoritative among all the expositors of sacred Scripture.

Furthermore, that influence of light is either general, in the measure that God flows into all creatures, or it is special, as God flows in through grace. If it is general: therefore God ought no more to be called the giver of wisdom than the fructifier of the earth, nor would knowledge be said to be from him any more than money⁴; if special, of the kind that is in grace: therefore according to this every cognition is infused, and none is acquired or innate; all of which are absurd.

And therefore there is a third way of understanding, holding as it were a middle between the two ways, namely that for certitudinal cognition the eternal account is necessarily required as regulating and as a motive account, not indeed as the sole account and in its own entire clarity, but together with the created account, and as contuited by us in part⁵ according to the state of the way.

And this is what Augustine intimates in the fourteenth of On the Trinity, chapter fifteen⁶: « The impious man is reminded, that he may be turned to the Lord as to that light by which, even when he was turned away from it, he was in some way touched. For hence it is that even the impious think of eternity and rightly reprehend and rightly praise many things in the manners of men ». Where he also adds⁷ that they do this through the rules which « are written in the book of that light which is called truth ». — But that our mind in certitudinal cognition in some way attains those rules and unchangeable accounts is necessarily required by the nobility of the cognition and the dignity of the knower⁸.

The nobility, I say, of the cognition, because certitudinal cognition cannot be unless there is unchangeableness on the side of the knowable and infallibility on the side of the one knowing. But created truth is not unchangeable simply, but by supposition⁹; likewise neither is the light of a creature altogether infallible by its own power, since both are created and have come forth from non-being into being. If therefore for full cognition recourse is made to a truth altogether unchangeable and stable and to a light altogether infallible; it is necessary that in cognition of this kind recourse be had to the supernal art as to light and truth: to light, I say, giving infallibility to the one knowing, and to truth giving unchangeableness to the knowable. Whence, since things have being in the mind and in their proper genus and in the eternal art, the truth of things according to the being they have in themselves¹⁰ does not suffice for the soul for certitudinal knowledge, nor

according to the being they have in their proper genus, because in both cases they are changeable, unless it in some way attain them in so far as they are in the eternal art.

The dignity on the side of the knower requires the same. For since the rational spirit has a higher portion of reason and a lower one; just as for the full deliberative judgment of reason in things to be done the lower portion does not suffice without the higher, so also for the full judgment of reason in things to be speculated¹. But this higher portion is that in which the image of God is, which both cleaves to the eternal rules and through them judges and defines with certitude whatever it defines; and this belongs to it in so far as it is the image of God.

For a creature is compared to God under the account of vestige, of image and of likeness. In so far as it is a vestige, it is compared to God as to a principle; in so far as it is an image, it is compared to God as to an object; but in so far as it is a likeness, it is compared to God as to an infused gift. And therefore every creature is a vestige, which is from God; every one is an image, which knows God; every one, and only that one, is a likeness, in which God dwells². And according to this threefold degree of comparison there is a threefold degree of divine cooperation.

In a work which is from a creature after the mode of a vestige, God cooperates after the mode of a creative principle; but in a work which is from a creature after the mode of a likeness, as is a meritorious work pleasing to God, God cooperates after the mode of an infused gift; but in a work which is from a creature after the mode of an image, God cooperates after the mode of a moving account³; and such is the work of certitudinal cognition, which indeed is not from the lower reason without the higher.

Since therefore certitudinal cognition belongs to the rational spirit in so far as it is the image of God, therefore in this cognition it attains the eternal accounts. But because in the state of the way it is not yet fully deiform, therefore it does not attain them clearly and fully and distinctly; but according as it approaches more or less to deiformity, according to this it attains them more or less, always however in some way, because the account of image can never be separated from it. Whence, because in the state of innocence it was an image without the deformity of fault, not yet however having the full deiformity of glory, therefore it attained⁴ in part, but not in an enigma. But in the state of fallen nature it lacks deiformity and has deformity, therefore it attains them in part and in an enigma. But in the state of glory it lacks all deformity and has full deiformity, therefore it attains them fully and perspicuously.

Again, because the soul is not wholly of itself an image, therefore together with these it attains⁵ the likenesses of things abstracted from the phantasm as the proper and distinct accounts of knowing, without which the lumen of the eternal account does not suffice for it for knowing, as long as it is in the state of the way, unless perhaps by a special revelation it should transcend this state, as in those who are rapt, and in the revelations of some of the Prophets.

It is therefore to be conceded, as the reasons show and the authorities of Augustine expressly assert, that in every certitudinal cognition those accounts of knowing are attained by the knower, although otherwise by the wayfarer and otherwise by the comprehensor, otherwise by the knower and otherwise by the wise man, otherwise by the prophesier and otherwise by the one who understands in the common way, as has already appeared and will appear in the solutions of the objections.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that he inhabiteth light inaccessible; it is to be said that he speaks of that access which is⁶ to that light in the plenitude and splendour of its clarity, in which way it is not approached by the power of a creature, but by the deiformity of glory.

2. To that which is objected, that the weak edge of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light etc.; it is to be said that, in order that it know through the eternal accounts, it is not necessary that it be fixed in them, except in so far as it knows sapientially. For the wise man attains those accounts in one way, and the knower in another: the knower attains them as moving, but the wise man as quieting; and to this wisdom no one comes, « unless he be first cleansed by the justice of faith⁷ ».

3. To that which is objected, that the mind has the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself; it is to be said that, just as in the works of a creature the cooperation of the Creator is not excluded, so in a created account of knowing the uncreated account of knowing is not excluded, but rather is included in it⁸.

4. To that which is objected, that it sees in a light of its own kind; it can be said that broadly every incorporeal light, whether created or uncreated, is called a light of its own kind; or, if it is understood of created light, by this uncreated light is not excluded; nor does it follow that we do not know in the eternal truth, but that we do not know in that alone, but also in the lumen of created truth; and this indeed is true and does not stand against the position set out above⁹.

5. 6. To that which is objected from Gregory and Dionysius, it is to be said that neither denies that that true lumen which illumines every man coming into this world¹ is attained by our minds, but only that in this life it is not yet fully seen.

7. 8. 9. To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that we understand with the continuous and with time, and that we have a possible and an agent intellect, and concerning the experience of human cognition; it is to be said that he lays down² that the lumen and account of created truth concurs to our intelligence; but nevertheless, as was said in what precedes, the light and account of eternal truth is not excluded, because it is possible that the soul according to its lower portion attain the things which are below, the higher portion nonetheless attaining the things which are above.

10. To that which is objected concerning imaginative cognition³, it is to be said that it is not alike, because that cognition does not have certitude, and therefore does not run back to the unchangeable.

11. To that which is objected concerning the sense, it is to be said that it is not alike as regards the certitude of the sense and of the understanding. For the certitude of the sense comes from the binding of the operating power, determined after the mode of nature about some one thing. But the certitude of the understanding cannot come from this side, since it is a power free for understanding all things⁴; and therefore it must come through something not having a binding, but freedom without the defectibility of changeableness and fallibility; and such is the light and account of everlasting truth: and therefore recourse is had to it as to the fount of all certitude.

12. To that which is objected, that for cognition nothing more is required than a knower and a knowable and the turning of the one upon the other; it is to be said that this turning includes a judgment; but a certain judgment is not made except through a certain and unjudgeable law, according to what Augustine says in the book On True Religion and in the book On Free Choice⁵, that « no one judges concerning the truth, and without the truth no one judges well »; and therefore the eternal account and truth is included here.

13. To that which is objected, that we understand when we will, therefore we do not need outside support; it is to be said that outside support is twofold: one which is always at hand, another which is absent and distant. That reason does not conclude concerning the first support, but concerning the second, as is plain: because, if bodily light were always present in the eye, as spiritual light is always present in the mind, we would see when we willed, just as we understand when we will.

14. To that which is objected, that the principles of being and of knowing are the same; it is to be said that, just as the intrinsic principles of being do not suffice for being without that first principle outside, which is God, so neither do they suffice for full knowing⁶. Whence, although those principles are in some way the account of knowing, not on this account do they exclude that first account of knowing from our cognition, just as they do not exclude it in the act of being from creation.

15. To that which is objected, that to each knowable there corresponds a proper account of knowing; it is to be said that, because we do not see those accounts in themselves altogether distinctly⁷, therefore they are not the whole account of knowing; but there is required together with them the created lumen of principles and the likenesses of the things known, out of which the proper account of knowing is had with respect to each thing known.

16. To that which is objected, that « that on account of which each thing is, is itself more so »; it is to be said that, as is already plain, the eternal account does not alone move to knowing, but together with the truth of principles, and not specially of itself, but generally in the state of the way; and therefore it does not follow that it is known to us according to itself, but as it shines again in its own⁸ principles and in its generality; and thus in a certain way it is most certain to us, because our understanding can in no way think that it is not; which indeed cannot be said of any created truth.

17. To that which is objected concerning the mirror, it is to be said that that is true of a mirror which has the account of representing properly and distinctly, and which together with the account of representing has the account of terminating; as is plain in this material mirror, which represents the visible species distinctly and properly and terminates the sight. But these conditions belong to the eternal mirror with respect to comprehensors, as is plain from the things said before⁹

18. To that which is objected, that those accounts are equally certain with respect to contingent things as with respect to necessary ones; it is to be said that that reason would conclude well, if those accounts were the whole account of knowing, and if it were seen in them plenarily; but now it is not so according to the state of the present time, because together with them we need proper likenesses and the principles of things determinately received, which indeed are not found in contingent things, but only in necessary ones¹.

19. To that which is objected, that if we know in those accounts, then every knower is wise; it is to be said that it does not follow, because to attain those accounts does not make one wise, unless one rests in them and knows that he attains them, which indeed belongs to the wise man. For accounts of this kind are attained by the understandings of knowers as leading, but by the understandings of the wise as leading back and quieting. And because there are few who attain them in this way, therefore there are few wise men, although many knowers; few indeed there are who know that they attain those accounts; nay, what is more, there are few who are willing to believe this, because it seems difficult to an understanding not yet raised to the contemplation of eternal things that it should have God so present and so near, though Paul says in the seventeenth of Acts², that he is not far from every one of us.

20. To that which is objected concerning the cognition of the fatherland, the response is already plain, because there is a great difference between the cognition which is in part and in an enigma and that which is perfectly³ and distinctly, as was touched on above.

21. To that which is objected, that the mirror of the eternal accounts is voluntary etc.; it is to be said that, as the Apostle says in the first to the Romans⁴, that which is known of God is manifest in them: although God is simple and uniform, nevertheless that eternal light and that exemplar represents certain things as it were outwardly and openly, and certain things more deeply and hiddenly. The first are those which come to be according to the necessary ordination of the divine art; the second are those which come to be according to the disposition of the hidden will. And when the mirror is called voluntary, this is not with respect to the things exemplified in the first way, but in the second; and therefore in the eternal accounts natural things are known by the natural judicatory of reason⁵, but supernatural and future things only by the gift of supernal revelation; and therefore that reason does not conflict with the position set out above.

22. To that which is objected, that whatever is known in them is known either with a veil or without a veil; it is to be said that in the state of the way it is not known in those eternal accounts without a veil and an enigma, on account of the obscuring of the divine image⁶. From this, however, it does not follow that nothing is known with certitude and clearly, for the reason that created principles, which are in some way the media of knowing, though not without those accounts, can be seen by our mind perspicuously and without a veil. — If nevertheless it were said that nothing in this life is known plenarily, it would be no great inconvenience.

23. 24. 25. 26. To that which is objected against the reasons of Augustine, that if unchangeable truth is God, then the truth of a demonstrative principle would be God, and all truths would be one, and they would have to be adored, and demons would see God; to all these it is to be said that unchangeable truth is spoken of in two ways, namely simply and by supposition. When, however, it is said that unchangeable truth is above the mind and is God, this is understood of the truth which is unchangeable simply. When, however, it is said of the truth of a demonstrative principle that it is unchangeable; if that truth names something created, it is agreed that it is not unchangeable simply, but by supposition, because every creature begins from non-being and is turnable into non-being. — And if it be objected that that truth is simply certain to the soul itself through itself; it is to be said that, although a demonstrative principle, according as it says something complex, is created; nevertheless the truth signified through it can be signified either according as it is in matter, or according as it is in the soul, or according as it is in the divine art, or indeed in all these ways at once. For truth in an exterior sign is a sign of the truth which is with the soul, because « words are the marks of those passions which are in the soul⁷ »; but the soul according to its supreme part has a respect to higher things, just as according to its lower part to these lower things, since it is a middle between created things and God; and therefore truth in the soul has a respect to that twofold truth, as a middle to two extremes, in such a way that from the lower it receives certitude in a certain respect, but from the higher it receives certitude simply. And therefore truth of this kind,

as unchangeable simply, is above the soul, according as¹ the reasons of Augustine show. But the reasons to the opposite proceed concerning truth unchangeable by supposition, which the demonstrator properly considers, which is multiplied in diverse things and is not adorable, and is contuitable by demons and by the damned. For that truth which is simply unchangeable cannot be seen perspicuously except by those who can enter into the innermost silence of the mind, to which no sinner comes, but he alone who is the supreme lover of eternity.

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