Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

COLLATIO IV.

De visione prima, quae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae, tractatio prima.

Summarium

Introductio; de novem scientiis philosophorum; lux animae veritas, 1. — Tres radii primi huius lucis, scilicet veritas rerum, signorum, morum, 2. — Triplicis huius veritatis triplex consideratio confirmat hanc divisionem, 3-5. — Pars I. De primo radio intelligentiae per naturam inditae, qui versatur circa veritatem rerum. Mundus consideratur tripliciter: a philosopho quoad rerum essentiam, a mathematico quoad figuram, a naturali quoad naturam, 6. — Consideratio philosophi fit sex modis; unde sex lumina, 7. — De singulis in specie, 8-13. — Consideratio mathematici; ipsa dividitur secundum sex obiecta in sex scientias, 14. 15. — Hae disponunt ad theologiam, 16. — Consideratio naturalis; libri Aristotelis de scientia naturali, 17. — Pars II. De secundo radio eiusdem intelligentiae, qui versatur circa veritatem signorum seu vocum. Dividitur in grammaticam, logicam et rhetoricam, 18. — De obiecto et divisione grammaticae, 19. — De obiecto et divisione logicae, 20. — De obiecto et divisione rhetoricae, 21-25.

1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris¹ etc. In omnibus operibus sex dierum praeterquam secundae dictum est: Vidit Deus, quod esset bonum; et in fine² dicit: Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Videre dicitur Deus, quia videre nos facit. Prima visio animae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae. Unde dicit Psalmus³: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine. Et hic possent explicari omnes difficultates philosophiae. Philosophi dederunt novem scientias et polliciti sunt dare decimam, scilicet contemplationem. Sed multi philosophi, dum se voluerunt dividere a tenebris erroris, magnis erroribus se immiscuerunt; dicentes enim, se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt⁴; superbientes de sua scientia, luciferiani facti. Apud Aegyptios densissimae tenebrae erant, sed Sanctis tuis maxima erat lux. Omnes, qui fuerunt in lege naturae, ut Patriarchae, Prophetae, philosophi, filii lucis fuerunt. — Lux animae veritas est; haec lux nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat: quia, si veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse: ergo aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, verum est, veritatem esse: ergo si veritas non est, veritas est. Super omnia enim praevalet veritas, ut dicitur in Esdra⁵.

2. Emittit autem haec lux tres radios primos; unde in Ecclesiastico⁶: Tripliciter sol exurens montes. Est enim veritas rerum, veritas signorum seu vocum et veritas morum. Veritas rerum est indivisio entis et esse, veritas sermonum est adaequatio vocis et intellectus, veritas morum est rectitudo vivendi. Et istae sunt tres partes philosophiae, quas philosophi non invenerunt, ut essent; sed quia iam secundum veritatem essent, in anima adverterunt, secundum Augustinum⁷.

3. Haec triplex veritas consideratur ex parte principii originantis, ex parte subiecti suscipientis et ex parte obiecti terminantis. Respicit autem originans principium in ratione triplicis causae: originantis, exemplantis et terminantis; nam ex ipso, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia⁸. Ergo veritas indicat, quod mens nostra fertur naturali inclinatione ad Veritatem, secundum quod est «causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi»: secundum causam essendi, veritas rerum; secundum rationem intelligendi, veritas vocum; secundum ordinem vivendi, veritas morum.

4. Ex parte autem animae omnis irradiatio veritatis super intelligentiam nostram fit tripliciter: aut fit super ipsam absolute, et sic pertinet ad notitiam rerum speculandarum; aut in comparatione ad interpretativam, et sic est veritas vocum; aut in comparatione ad affectivam et motivam, et sic est veritas operabilium.

5. Ex parte obiecti sic. Omne, quod est, aut est a natura, aut a ratione, aut a voluntate. Secundum primam est notitia, quae est de rebus, secundo modo de sermonibus, tertio modo de moribus. — Ergo secundum principium, subiectum et obiectum est triplex radius veritatis in anima, per quem anima possit elevari ad perpetua, et etiam ad causam omnium; sed si addatur condimentum fidei, tunc facilius; ut causa essendi attribuatur Patri, ratio intelligendi Filio, ordo vivendi Spiritui sancto.

6. Visio ergo intelligentiae per naturam inditae, ut convertitur ad res, est veritas. Vult autem anima totum mundum describi in se⁹. Mundus consideratur tripliciter: quantum ad essentiam, figuram

et naturam. Iste autem radius dirigit ad quidditatum differentias occultas considerandas, ad figurarum proportiones manifestas, ad naturarum proprietates ex utroque permixtas. Naturalis permixta est consideratio, quia modo de causis, quae sunt occultae, ut quare ignis calidus, quare haec herba calida, quia hoc habent a specie sua, quae occulta est; modo de qualitate, item de quantitate et influentia corporum, quae aliquando patent, aliquando latent.

7. Secundum quidditatum differentias occultas fit divisio sex modis ad praesens: in substantiam et accidens, in universale et particulare, in potentiam et actum, in unum et multa, in simplex et compositum, in causam et in causatum. Haec sunt sex lumina, quae disponunt animam ad sciendum et bene sentiendum.

8. Divisio substantiae et accidentis patet¹; sed quaedam sunt, quae reducuntur ad ista, et in his est maximus error. Dicit ille: creatio non est. Quare? Quia impossibile est, accidens praecedere substantiam; creatio autem accidens est: ergo etc. Dico, quod creatio, quae est passio, accidens non est, quia relatio creaturae ad Creatorem non est accidentalis, sed essentialis. Similiter, potentia materiae non est accidens materiae, sed essentialis, quia «hoc ipso, quod est, ad alterum est»². Similiter differentiae ad genus reducuntur, ut merae privationes ad suos habitus.

9. Secunda divisio est in universale et particulare; et circa hoc est magnus error. Aliqui dicunt, quod universale nihil est nisi in anima; Plato posuit, quod esset solum in Deo; alii, quod solum in anima³. Isti nimis abstrahunt. — Dico ergo, quod est universale unum ad multa, unum in multis, unum praeter multa. Unum ad multa est in potentia materiae, quod non est completum; unum in multis, ut natura communis in suis particularibus; et unum praeter multa in anima. Unum autem ad multa et unum in multis et unum praeter multa in arte aeterna sunt; per illam enim artem et rationem consistit in re. Planum est enim, quod duo homines assimilantur, et non homo et asinus: ergo necesse est, ut illa similitudo fundetur et stabiliatur in aliqua forma stabili, non quae est in altero, quia illa est particularis: ergo in aliqua universali⁴. Ratio autem universalis non est tota in anima, sed in re secundum processum generis ad speciem, ut, communicamus primo in substantia ut in generalissimo, deinde in aliis usque ad formam hominis ultimatam.

10. Tertia divisio est potentiae et actus⁵; et hic sunt multi errores. Dicunt quidam, quod actus nihil addit super potentiam nisi modum essendi secundum completum et incompletum. Non loquimur hic de potentia pure passiva, sed de illa quae procedit ad actum. Necesse est enim, cum in omni creatura potentia activa sit coniuncta potentiae passivae, quod illae duae potentiae fundentur super diversa principia rei⁶. De potentia, quae est ratio seminalis, haec est vis: quia potentia talis super actum aliquando addit partem essendi, vel essentiae, ut, super rationem corporis addit animatum secundum rem, pro eo quod animatio aliquid est, ordinatum tamen ad sensibile; et super animatum addit sen-

sibile, et sic usque ad hominem. Sic similiter de potentiis animae, quod sicut tetragonus addit unum angulum ad trigonum, et pentagonus ad tetragonum; sic sensitivum ad vegetativum, et rationale ad sensitivum¹. — Aliquando autem addit solum modum essendi, ut, si de uno in potentia fiat unum in actu, addit solum modum essendi, quia unum non coniungitur materiae simpliciter, sed materiae habenti vitam in potentia radicali. — Unde insanum est dicere, quod ultima forma addatur materiae primae sine aliquo, quod sit dispositio vel in potentia ad illam, vel nulla forma interiecta.

11. Quarta divisio est in unum et multa, et de illa multi sunt errores. Quidam dixerunt, quod omnia sint unum; ut, sicut una est materia, ita una forma radicalis, et postmodum multiplicatur secundum modum essendi et variatur². Et hoc nihil aliud est dicere, quam quod illa propositio: homo est asinus, sit vera per se, falsa per accidens. Unde intellige, quod rationale et irrationale non solum differunt per accidens, sed etiam essentialiter.

12. Quinta divisio est in simplex et compositum; et hic etiam sunt multi errores, ut dicere, quod aliqua creatura sit simplex; quia tunc esset purus actus, quod est solius Dei; et attribuere quod est Dei creaturae periculosum est. Minus ergo est periculosum dicere, quod Angelus sit compositus, etiam si verum non sit, quam quod sit simplex; quia hoc ego attribuo Angelo, nolens ei attribuere quod est Dei, propter pietatem, quam habeo ad reverentiam Dei. Sed secundum veritatem sic videtur, quia dicit Boethius³: «Forma subiectum esse non potest»: ergo Angelo nihil accideret tunc, nec laetitia nec tristitia.

13. Sexta divisio est in causam et causatum; et hic sunt multi errores. Quidam enim dicunt, mundum ab aeterno fuisse. In hoc conveniunt sapientes, quod non possit aliquid fieri de nihilo⁴ et sic ab aeterno; quia necesse est, quod sicut, quando res cedit in nihilum, esse desinit; sic, quando fit de nihilo, incipit esse. Sed aliqui videntur posuisse materiam ingenitam; et sic sequitur, quod Deus nihil facit: quia materiam non facit, quia ingenita; nec formam, quia aut fit de aliquo, aut de nihilo; non de materia, quia essentia formae non potest fieri de essentia materiae; nec de nihilo, ut supponunt, eo quod Deus nihil potest facere de nihilo. Sed absit, quod potentia Dei fulciatur fundamento materiae. — Haec igitur sunt fundamenta fidei, quae omnia examinat.

14. Secunda irradiatio intelligentiae per naturam inditae est ad considerandas quantitatum proportiones manifestas; et istae sunt valde manifestae, quia offerunt se sensui; et libenter homo negotiatur circa ista, quia cadunt in imaginatione; et imaginatio est fortis in nobis, et ratio obscuratur: et ideo homo multum in his detinetur. Ista scientia certissima est⁵, quia ad oculum patet. Unde omnes aliae scientiae praeter istam quasi sunt occultae.

15. Haec consideratio mathematica est circa sex: aut circa numeros in sua puritate, et sic est arithmetica; aut circa numeros, ut considerantur in sonis, et sic musica; aut in quantitate continua et circa proportiones dimensivas generaliter, et sic geometria; aut per additionem de linea visuali, et sic perspectiva; aut secundum quantitatem utramque et secundum discretiones numerales et substantiales, vel continuas et discretas, et sic astrologia, et illa est duplex: una de corporibus regulatis per motum, et sic astronomia; alia de influentia, et haec partim est secura et partim periculosa, et haec est astrologia. Periculosa est propter iudicia, quae sequuntur; et ab hac fluit geomantia, vel nigromantia et ceterae species divinationis⁶.

16. Hae scientiae disponunt ad intelligentiam Scripturae, ut patet de numeris perfecto, diminuto, excrescente; ut patet de perfectione senarii, qui de se perfectus est. «Non enim, ut dicit Augustinus⁷, senarius ideo perfectus est, quia in eo numero Deus fecit mundum; sed ideo fecit mundum in illo numero, quia perfectus est». Similiter de duobus numeris cubicis primis, scilicet 8 et 27, quia bis duo bis sunt 8; ter tria ter sunt 27, qui ligari non

possunt minus quam per duos numeros, scilicet 12 et 18. Sic enim se habent 12 ad 18, ut 18 ad 27, quia in sexquialtera proportione, quae tenet totum et eius medietatem. — Similiter patet de triangulo, quomodo ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis. Certum est enim, quod quantus est Filius, tantus est Pater; et quantus est Pater, tantus est Spiritus sanctus et Filius. Et inde triangulum considera, quod quilibet angulus totam superficiem includit. — Similiter in perspectiva de radio directo, qui fortior est, sicut, si tu proiicias lapidem directe deorsum, magnum sonum facit; si autem ex obliquo, non tantum. Reflexus radius est a corpore terso et polito virtute tersionis, et ibi accipit speciem; radius fractus est in introitu alterius perspicui¹.

17. Tertia irradiatio intelligentiae per naturam inditae est ad investigandum naturarum permixtas proprietates, scilicet partim occultas et partim manifestas. Philosophus enim considerat omnia per motum; considerat enim de motu, de principiis motus et causis, ut locus et tempus²; considerat autem naturas corporum caelestium, sive corpora aetheralia, meteoricalia; elementaria, vegetabilia, sensibilia, rationabilia. — Caelestia, in libro de Caelo et mundo, ubi reducit omnem motum ad motum perfectum, scilicet localem³; iste autem localis est triplex: aut circa medium, ubi non est contrarietas, et sic circularis; aut a medio, et sic est levium motus; aut ad medium, et sic motus gravium, sive motus rectus. Meteorica, ut in libro Meteororum, ubi dicit de impressionibus et mineralibus. — Si de elementaribus, sic in libro de Generatione et corruptione. Si de vegetabilibus, sic in libro de Plantis, ubi sunt mirabiles considerationes. — Si autem de sensibilibus, sic in libro de Animalibus, quem totum non habemus; aut de rationalibus, ut in libro de Anima cum suis appendicibus, scilicet de Sensu et sensato, et de Memoria et reminiscentia, de Spiritu et anima⁴, de Somno et vigilia, de Morte et vita.

18. Secundus radius veritatis informat ad considerationem locutionum, argumentationum, persuasionum rationalium, ut homo habeat artem per eum ad locutiones congrue indicantes mentis conceptus, ad argumentationes trahentes omnis mentis assensus, ad persuasiones inclinantes mentis affectus. Ratio enim cogitat facere quidquid in se est in alio, et quidquid est in alio facere in se; hoc autem non fit nisi per sermonem⁵. Quidquid ergo est in anima aut est per modum conceptus, aut per modum assensus, aut per modum affectus. Ad indicandum conceptum est grammatica; ad inducendum assensum est logica; ad inclinandum affectum rhetorica.

19. Secundum grammaticum omnis pars orationis significat mentis conceptum. Habet enim partem significantem substantiam et qualitatem, et sic est nomen; habet partem significantem modum, et sic est verbum, quod dicit inclinationes, scilicet indicativus, ut in rationali; imperativus, ut in irascibili; optativus, ut in concupiscibili; subiunctivus, partem utramque; infinitivus, quasi materialis. Et ad has differentias omnes reducuntur secundum Priscianum⁶. — Similiter determinat de littera, syllaba, dictione, oratione. Quia enim varii sunt modi significandi et terminandi secundum diversas linguas — ut terminatum in a, feminini generis ut in pluribus, in us, masculini generis, et sic de aliis — de littera determinat; sed ad hanc non potest descendere nisi per syllabam. — Ultimo considerat de connexione dictionum. Determinat similiter de prosodia et dyasynthetica. Exprimit autem omnia per octo partes orationis. Ad litteram ergo descendit per syllabam, sed postea de prosodia et metrica, et huiusmodi referuntur ad primum. Considerat similiter modos et accidentia, ut quod nominativus construatur cum verbo singularis numeri, ut non dicatur: homo currunt, quia ab una substantia non egreditur nisi actus unus; similiter, ut post verbum transitivum non ponatur nominativus, sed accusativus, qui dicit terminum, non principium actus, ut nominativus. — Unde grammatica a rebus naturam trahit, nec potest esse bonus grammaticus, nisi sciat res.

20. Alia directio est, quae illustrat ad argumentationes inducentes mentis assensum, quod fit per solidam argumentationem, ut, «quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, necessario inter se sunt eadem»⁷. Haec argumentatio habet formam generalem et specialem in materia necessaria, solida; et ideo est prima analysis et secunda analysis de syllogismo simpliciter. De syllogismo necessario, id est resolutorio in causam inferendi, ut in prima ana-

lysi, id est resolutione, et in secunda analysi, id est resolutione in causam inferendi et essendi. — Et quia semper non potest esse inductio per necessariam argumentationem, ideo inveniuntur loci et habitudo localis, quae procedit per probabilia, ut loci topici; et quia in his cadit deceptio, adduntur loci sophistici, ut sciat homo dissolvere. Unde dissolvens non est sophisticus, sed verus respondens. Et quia isti modi trahunt originem a natura rerum — ut patet: fumus est: ergo ignis fuit; locus ab effectu¹ — ideo adduntur decem praedicamenta, adduntur etiam enuntiationes.

21. Tertia irradiatio est, qua mens illustratur ad persuadendum vel inclinandum animum; hoc fit per rhetoricam². Unde rhetor oportet quod provideat civili utilitati, ubi potest esse periculum propter dissensionem animorum. Procedit autem secundum tria attributa et triplex genus causae, scilicet demonstrativum et deliberativum et iudiciale.

22. Demonstrativum personae, ut ad laudem, vel vituperium: ergo vel est laus quantum ad bona animae, quae sunt tria, scilicet virtus, scientia, veritas; vel est laus quantum ad corpus, scilicet pulcritudo, fortitudo etc.; vel de bonis fortunae, ut divitiae, parentela, patria.

23. Deliberativum est respectu rei faciendae, et tunc persuadetur, si adest securitas, utilitas, honestas; vel persuadetur non fieri, si sequitur damnum, periculum, inhonestas.

24. Genus iudiciale respondet rei factae, quae habet constitutionem, coniecturam, dubitationem legitimam. Iuridicialis³ constitutio est: «Fecisti? Non feci»; quae apud alios litis contestatio vocatur. Coniecturalis, cum aliquid adducitur ad probandum. Legitima dubitatio iuridicialis est descriptio iuridicialis, quando factum conceditur; sed defendit se, quod non sit reus, vel quia potuit facere de mandato domini, vel quia debuit.

25. Ad hoc autem, quod sit potens orator, necesse est, ut habeat exordium ad captandam benevolentiam non nimis prolixum, non obscurum, non exquisitum; quod habeat narrationem, ut factum narret; postea, ut negotium dividat; et caveat multitudinem partium. Postea partem suam confirmet per rationes; postea adversarium confutet et rationes eius ostendat frivolas; postea concludat. Item, necesse est, ut habeat inventionem, dispositionem, elocutionem, memoriam et pronuntiationem.

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COLLATION IV.

On the first vision, which is that of the understanding implanted by nature: the first treatment.

Summarium

Introduction; on the nine sciences of the philosophers; the light of the soul is truth, 1. — The three first rays of this light, namely the truth of things, of signs, of morals, 2. — A threefold consideration of this threefold truth confirms this division, 3–5. — Part I. On the first ray of the understanding implanted by nature, which is occupied about the truth of things. The world is considered in three ways: by the philosopher as to the essence of things, by the mathematician as to figure, by the natural philosopher as to nature, 6. — The philosopher's consideration proceeds in six modes; hence six lights, 7. — On each in particular, 8–13. — The mathematician's consideration; it is divided according to six objects into six sciences, 14, 15. — These dispose to theology, 16. — The natural philosopher's consideration; the books of Aristotle on natural science, 17. — Part II. On the second ray of the same understanding, which is occupied about the truth of signs or words. It is divided into grammar, logic and rhetoric, 18. — On the object and division of grammar, 19. — On the object and division of logic, 20. — On the object and division of rhetoric, 21–25.

1. God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness¹, etc. In all the works of the six days, except the second, it is said: God saw that it was good; and at the end² he says: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. God is said to see, because he makes us see. The first vision of the soul is that of the understanding implanted by nature. Whence the Psalm says³: The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. And here all the difficulties of philosophy could be explained. The philosophers gave nine sciences and promised to give a tenth, namely contemplation. But many philosophers, while they wished to separate themselves from the darkness of error, entangled themselves in great errors; for saying that they were wise, they became fools⁴; growing proud of their knowledge, they became luciferian. Among the Egyptians there was thickest darkness, but thy saints had very great light. All who lived under the law of nature — Patriarchs, Prophets, philosophers — were sons of light. — The light of the soul is truth; this light knows no setting. For it shines upon the soul so strongly that it cannot even be thought not to be, nor be so expressed without a man contradicting himself: because if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth: therefore something is true; and if something is true, it is true that truth is: therefore if there is no truth, there is truth. For truth prevaileth above all things, as is said in Esdras⁵.

2. Now this light sends forth three first rays; whence in Ecclesiasticus⁶: Threefold the sun burning the mountains. For there is the truth of things, the truth of signs or of words, and the truth of morals. The truth of things is the indivision of the being and its to-be; the truth of speech is the adequation of the word and the understanding; the truth of morals is rectitude of living. And these are the three parts of philosophy, which the philosophers did not invent so that they should be, but which, since they already were according to truth, they observed in the soul, according to Augustine⁷.

3. This threefold truth is considered on the side of the originating principle, on the side of the receiving subject, and on the side of the terminating object. Now the originating principle is regarded under the account of a threefold cause: originating, exemplating and terminating; for of him, and by him, and in him are all things⁸. Therefore truth shows that our mind is borne by a natural inclination toward Truth, according as it is «the cause of being, the ground of understanding and the order of living»: according to the cause of being, the truth of things; according to the ground of understanding, the truth of words; according to the order of living, the truth of morals.

4. But on the side of the soul, every irradiation of truth upon our understanding comes about in three ways: either it falls upon it absolutely, and so pertains to the knowledge of things to be speculated; or in comparison to the interpretative power, and so it is the truth of words; or in comparison to the affective and motive power, and so it is the truth of things to be done.

5. On the side of the object, thus. Everything that is, is either from nature, or from reason, or from will. According to the first there is the knowledge which is of things; in the second mode, of discourse; in the third mode, of morals. — Therefore according to principle, subject and object there is a threefold ray of truth in the soul, by which the soul may be lifted up to things everlasting, and even to the cause of all; but if the seasoning of faith be added, then more easily; so that the cause of being is attributed to the Father, the ground of understanding to the Son, the order of living to the Holy Spirit.

6. The vision, then, of the understanding implanted by nature, as it is turned to things, is truth. And the soul wills that the whole world be described in it⁹. The world is considered in three ways: as to essence, figure

and nature. And this ray directs one to considering the hidden differences of quiddities, the manifest proportions of figures, the properties of natures mixed of both. The natural philosopher's consideration is mixed, because now it is of causes, which are hidden — as why fire is hot, why this herb is hot, because they have this from their own species, which is hidden; now of quality, and likewise of quantity and of the influence of bodies, which sometimes lie open and sometimes lie hidden.

7. According to the hidden differences of quiddities the division is made, for the present, in six modes: into substance and accident, into universal and particular, into potency and act, into one and many, into simple and composite, into cause and caused. These are the six lights which dispose the soul to knowing and to right judgement.

8. The division of substance and accident is clear¹; but there are certain things which are reduced to these, and in them is the greatest error. That man says: creation is not. Why? Because it is impossible that an accident precede substance; but creation is an accident: therefore, etc. I say that creation, which is a being-acted-upon, is not an accident, because the relation of the creature to the Creator is not accidental but essential. Likewise the potency of matter is not an accident of matter but essential, because «by the very fact that it is, it is toward another»². Likewise the differences are reduced to the genus, as mere privations to their habits.

9. The second division is into universal and particular; and about this there is a great error. Some say that the universal is nothing except in the soul; Plato held that it was only in God; others, that it is only in the soul³. These abstract too much. — I say therefore that there is a universal one toward many, one in many, one beside many. The one toward many is in the potency of matter, which is not complete; the one in many, as a common nature in its particulars; and the one beside many, in the soul. But the one toward many and the one in many and the one beside many are in the eternal art; for it is through that art and ground that it subsists in the thing. For it is plain that two men are alike, and not a man and an ass: therefore it is necessary that that likeness be founded and made stable in some stable form, not one which is in the other, since that is particular: therefore in some universal⁴. But the account of the universal is not wholly in the soul, but in the thing according to the procession of the genus to the species, as: we share first in substance as in the most general, then in the rest, down to the last form of man.

10. The third division is of potency and act⁵; and here are many errors. Some say that act adds nothing over potency except a mode of being according to complete and incomplete. We are not speaking here of a purely passive potency, but of that which proceeds to act. For it is necessary, since in every creature an active potency is joined to a passive one, that those two potencies be founded upon different principles of the thing⁶. Of the potency which is the seminal ground, this is the force: that such a potency sometimes adds to act a part of being, or of the essence — as, over the account of body it adds the ensouled really, in that ensouling is something, ordered however to the sensitive; and over the ensouled it adds the sen-

sitive, and so on up to man. So likewise of the powers of the soul: that as the tetragon adds one angle to the trigon, and the pentagon to the tetragon, so the sensitive to the vegetative, and the rational to the sensitive¹. — But sometimes it adds only a mode of being: as, if from one in potency there comes to be one in act, it adds only a mode of being, because the one is not joined to matter simply, but to matter having life in a radical potency. — Whence it is madness to say that the last form is added to prime matter without anything that is a disposition or a potency toward it, or with no form interposed.

11. The fourth division is into one and many, and about it there are many errors. Some have said that all things are one; that as there is one matter, so there is one radical form, and afterwards it is multiplied according to the mode of being and varied². And this is nothing else than to say that the proposition a man is an ass is true of itself and false by accident. Whence understand that rational and irrational differ not only by accident but also essentially.

12. The fifth division is into simple and composite; and here too there are many errors, as to say that some creature is simple — because then it would be pure act, which belongs to God alone; and to attribute to a creature what is God's is dangerous. It is therefore less dangerous to say that an Angel is composite, even if it be not true, than that it is simple; because I attribute this to the Angel unwilling to attribute to it what is God's, out of the piety I have toward the reverence of God. But according to truth it seems thus, because Boethius says³: «A form cannot be a subject»: therefore nothing would then happen to an Angel, neither gladness nor sorrow.

13. The sixth division is into cause and caused; and here are many errors. For some say that the world was from eternity. In this the wise agree, that nothing can come to be from nothing⁴ and thus from eternity; because it is necessary that, just as when a thing passes into nothing it ceases to be, so when it comes to be from nothing it begins to be. But some seem to have held matter to be unbegotten; and so it follows that God makes nothing: because he does not make matter, since it is unbegotten; nor form, since it comes to be either from something or from nothing; not from matter, because the essence of the form cannot come to be from the essence of matter; nor from nothing, as they suppose, since God can make nothing from nothing. But far be it that the power of God should be propped on the foundation of matter. — These, then, are the foundations of faith, which examines them all.

14. The second irradiation of the understanding implanted by nature is toward considering the manifest proportions of quantities; and these are very manifest, because they offer themselves to sense; and a man gladly busies himself about them, because they fall under imagination; and imagination is strong in us, and reason is darkened: and therefore a man is much detained in them. This science is most certain⁵, because it is clear to the eye. Whence all the other sciences besides this are as it were hidden.

15. This mathematical consideration is about six things: either about numbers in their purity, and so it is arithmetic; or about numbers as they are considered in sounds, and so music; or in continuous quantity and about dimensive proportions generally, and so geometry; or by an addition concerning the visual line, and so perspective; or according to both quantities and according to numerical and substantial distinctions, or continuous and discrete, and so astrology — and that is twofold: one about bodies regulated by motion, and so astronomy; the other about influence, and this is partly safe and partly dangerous, and this is astrology. It is dangerous on account of the judgements which follow; and from it flows geomancy, or necromancy and the other kinds of divination⁶.

16. These sciences dispose one to the understanding of Scripture, as is clear from the perfect, deficient and excessive numbers; as is clear from the perfection of the number six, which is of itself perfect. «For not», as Augustine says⁷, «is the number six perfect because in that number God made the world; but he therefore made the world in that number, because it is perfect». Likewise of the two first cubic numbers, namely 8 and 27, because twice two twice is 8; three times three three times is 27, which cannot be

bound by fewer than two numbers, namely 12 and 18. For 12 is to 18 as 18 is to 27, being in the sesquialter proportion, which holds the whole and its half. — Likewise it is clear from the triangle how it leads into the knowledge of the Trinity. For it is certain that as great as the Son is, so great is the Father; and as great as the Father is, so great is the Holy Spirit and the Son. And thence consider the triangle, that any angle includes the whole surface. — Likewise in perspective, of the direct ray, which is stronger: as, if thou cast a stone straight downward, it makes a great sound; but if obliquely, not so much. The reflected ray is from a body wiped and polished by the power of the wiping, and there it takes on the species; the refracted ray is at the entry into another transparent body¹.

17. The third irradiation of the understanding implanted by nature is toward investigating the mixed properties of natures, that is, partly hidden and partly manifest. For the philosopher considers all things through motion; he considers motion, the principles and causes of motion, such as place and time²; and he considers the natures of the heavenly bodies, that is, ethereal, meteoric bodies; elemental, vegetable, sensible, rational. — Heavenly things, in the book On the Heavens and the World, where he reduces all motion to the perfect motion, namely local³; and that local motion is threefold: either about the middle, where there is no contrariety, and so circular; or from the middle, and so it is the motion of light things; or to the middle, and so the motion of heavy things, that is, straight motion. Meteoric things, as in the book of the Meteorology, where he speaks of impressions and minerals. — If of elemental things, so in the book On Generation and Corruption. If of vegetable things, so in the book On Plants, where there are wonderful considerations. — But if of sensible things, so in the book On Animals, which we do not have entire; or of rational things, as in the book On the Soul with its appendices, namely On Sense and the Sensed, and On Memory and Recollection, On the Spirit and the Soul⁴, On Sleep and Waking, On Death and Life.

18. The second ray of truth forms one toward the consideration of utterances, argumentations, persuasions of reason, so that a man may have through it an art toward utterances congruously indicating the mind's conceptions, toward argumentations drawing all the mind's assents, toward persuasions inclining the mind's affections. For reason thinks to make in another whatever is in itself, and to make in itself whatever is in another; and this comes about only through speech⁵. Whatever therefore is in the soul is either by way of conception, or by way of assent, or by way of affection. For indicating the conception there is grammar; for inducing assent there is logic; for inclining the affection, rhetoric.

19. According to the grammarian every part of speech signifies a conception of the mind. For it has a part signifying substance and quality, and so it is the noun; it has a part signifying mode, and so it is the verb, which states inclinations, namely the indicative, as in the rational power; the imperative, as in the irascible; the optative, as in the concupiscible; the subjunctive, as in both; the infinitive, as it were material. And to these differences all are reduced, according to Priscian⁶. — Likewise he determines about the letter, the syllable, the word, the sentence. For since the modes of signifying and of terminating are various according to the various languages — as a word ending in a is of the feminine gender for the most part, in us of the masculine, and so of the rest — he determines about the letter; but to this he cannot descend except through the syllable. — Last he considers the connexion of words. He determines likewise about prosody and syntax. And he expresses everything through the eight parts of speech. To the letter, then, he descends through the syllable; but afterwards what concerns prosody and metre and the like is referred back to the first. He considers likewise the moods and accidents: as that the nominative be construed with a verb of singular number, so that one does not say a man run, because from one substance there goes forth but one act; likewise, that after a transitive verb the nominative be not put, but the accusative, which states the term and not the principle of the act, as the nominative does. — Whence grammar draws its nature from things, nor can a man be a good grammarian unless he knows things.

20. Another direction is that which enlightens toward argumentations inducing the mind's assent, which comes about through solid argumentation, as: «whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are necessarily the same as one another»⁷. This argumentation has a general and a special form in necessary, solid matter; and therefore there is the first analysis and the second analysis concerning the syllogism simply. Of the necessary syllogism, that is, the one resolving into the cause of inferring, as in the first ana-

lysis, that is, resolution; and in the second analysis, that is, resolution into the cause of inferring and of being. — And because there cannot always be an induction by necessary argumentation, therefore topics and topical relation are found, which proceeds by probabilities, as the topical places; and because deception falls in these, the sophistical places are added, so that a man may know how to unravel them. Whence he who unravels is not a sophist, but a true respondent. And because these modes draw their origin from the nature of things — as is clear: there is smoke: therefore there has been fire; the topic from effect¹ — therefore the ten categories are added, and the enunciations also.

21. The third irradiation is that by which the mind is enlightened toward persuading or inclining the mind; this is done through rhetoric². Whence the rhetorician must provide for civil usefulness, where there can be danger through dissension of minds. And it proceeds according to three attributes and a threefold kind of cause, namely the demonstrative, the deliberative and the judicial.

22. The demonstrative is of a person, as toward praise or blame: therefore either the praise is as to the goods of the soul, which are three, namely virtue, knowledge, truth; or the praise is as to the body, namely beauty, strength, etc.; or of the goods of fortune, as riches, kindred, country.

23. The deliberative is in respect of a thing to be done, and then persuasion is used if there is safety, usefulness, honourableness; or one is persuaded that it not be done, if loss, danger, dishonour follow.

24. The judicial kind answers to a thing done, which has its constitution, its conjecture, its lawful doubt. The juridical³ constitution is: «Didst thou do it? I did not»; which by others is called the joining of issue. The conjectural is when something is brought forward for proof. The lawful doubt of the juridical kind is the juridical description, when the deed is granted, but he defends himself as not guilty, either because he could do it by his master's command, or because he ought.

25. But for a man to be a powerful orator it is necessary that he have an exordium for winning goodwill, not too long, not obscure, not far-fetched; that he have a narration, so that he may narrate the deed; then that he divide the matter, and let him beware of a multitude of parts. Then let him confirm his own side by reasons; then let him confute the adversary and show his reasons frivolous; then let him conclude. Likewise it is necessary that he have invention, disposition, elocution, memory and delivery.

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