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Quaest. 7, Art. 1

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio VII: Utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio VII. Utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate.

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primum est, utrum esse divinum sit summe necessarium.

Secundum est, utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas5.

Articulus I. Utrum esse divinum sit summe necessarium.

Quaeritur ergo, utrum esse divinum sit summe necessarium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Omne immutabile et aeternum est summe necessarium6; sed divinum esse est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

2. Item, necesse est, omne, quod est nobilitatis et perfectionis, poni in Deo in summo; sed constans est, quod7 necessitas est magis quam scientia: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne, quod ita est, quod non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse, est necessarium in summo; sed divinum esse est huiusmodi8: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne, quod habet esse a se et per se et secundum se, est omnino necessarium; sed tale est esse divinum, cum sit primum: ergo etc.

5. Item, impossibile est, necessitatem esse in effectu nisi per causam: ergo si in Deo non est

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necessitas, in nullo est necessitas: ergo nihil est necessarium. Sed si nihil est necessarium, nihil est impossibile: ergo omnia sunt possibilia: ergo aliquid simul esse et non esse est possibile. Sed hoc est absurdum1: ergo etc.

6. Item, impossibile est, necessitatem esse in composito nisi per necessitatem existentem in simplici; ergo si simplicissimum caret necessitate, impossibile est, quod in aliqua complexione vel compositione sit ponere necessitatem. Sed hoc est absurdum, quod nulla argumentatio necessaria sit2: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Omne necessarium est determinatum ad sic et non aliter se habendum; omne determinatum ad aliquid est finitum3; sed divinum esse est infinitum: ergo etc.

2. Item, nihil, quod est indifferens ad opposita, est necessarium; sed divinum posse, velle et agere est indifferens ad opposita: ergo non4 est necessarium. Sed divinum posse, velle et agere est divinum esse: ergo divinum esse non est necessarium.

3. Item, nulli immutabili potest attribui aliquid mutabile, ergo nulli summe necessario potest attribui aliquid contingens; sed Deo attribuitur aliquid contingens: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut impossibilitas repugnat potentiae, ita necessitas voluntati; sed divina potentia tanta est, quod omnia sunt ei possibilia, nec ponitur aliquo modo impossibilitas in Deo5: ergo cum velle Dei sit perfectissimum, videtur, quod non patiatur necessitatem in esse divino.

5. Item, si causa est necessaria, et effectus6; sed Deus est causa omnium prima et summa et immediata: ergo si in Deo est necessitas, omnia sunt necessaria.

6. Item, quanto aliquid contingentius, tanto est indifferentius, et quanto indifferentius, tanto communius, et quanto communius, tanto simplicius7: ergo a primo, quanto aliquid contingentius, tanto simplicius: ergo simplicissimum est contingentissimum, non ergo necessarium.

7. Item, omne necessarium scibile, sicut omne probabile opinabile8; sed omne scibile vel est principium demonstrationis, vel demonstratum; divinum autem esse neutrum est: ergo etc.

8. Item, quanto aliquid magis est necessarium, tanto est magis certum, et quanto magis certum, tanto magis notum9; sed divinum esse est maxime occultum: ergo etc.

9. Item, sicut frustra movetur quis, quia appetit impossibile10, ita, quia timet necessarium: ergo si divina Maiestas est necessitas, ergo nullo modo est timenda. Sed hoc est falsum et absurdum: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

Divinum esse est necessarium perfectissima necessitate immutabilitatis.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod triplex est necessitas: quaedam omnino extrinseca, quaedam partim intrinseca et partim extrinseca, et quaedam omnino intrinseca. Necessitas omnino extrinseca est illa, quae ortum habet a principio, quod est extra, nihil cooperante passo11; et haec dupliciter habet esse: vel respectu operum naturalium, vel respectu voluntariorum; et sic duplex est necessitas, scilicet coactionis et violentiae. — Necessitas vero partim intra, partim extra est quae aliquo modo est a principio intrinseco, respiciente aliquid extra vel per modum principii moventis, vel per modum termini quiescentis; et sic est necessitas dupliciter dicta, scilicet inevitabilitatis et indigentiae. — Quaedam vero est necessitas omnino intrinseca, quae inest rei ex propria natura; et haec est necessitas immutabilitatis et independentiae; et talis necessitas secundum quid reperitur in creatura, simpliciter autem non potest reperiri nisi in creatrice essentia. Ipsa enim sola est, quae non admittit aliquam dependentiam; cetera vero, cum sint creata, necessario dependent ab ipsa.

Haec autem necessitas necessario ponitur in esse divino, quia est in se ipso et a se ipso. Quia autem in12 se ipso, ideo caret componente principio, aut sustentante; ideo nec potest mutari nec deficere.

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Quia autem a se ipso, ideo caret producente et creante; ideo nec potest dependere nec incipere; ac per hoc summam et perfectissimam habet necessitatem, quae excludit omnem mutabilitatem et dependentiam, inevitabilitatem et indigentiam, coactionem et violentiam, quae necessitatem dicunt diminutam; et econtra ponit summam permanentiam et stabilitatem, summam sufficientiam et libertatem. Quia enim est se ipsa, ideo est permanens et stabilissima; quia vero sui gratia, ideo liberalis et sufficientissima; quia vero est se ipsa et sui gratia, ideo est alpha et omega1; et ideo cetera sunt ab ipsa, et cetera propter ipsam, sive necessaria sive contingentia. Sicut enim omnia mobilia manant ab uno immobili primo et ad illud reducuntur; sic omnia contingentia a necessario fluunt et in illud reducuntur2. Est igitur necessitas divini esse omnis esse, vivere et intelligere origo et complementum; et omnia clamant, primum principium esse necessarium, sive sint necessaria sive contingentia. — Et ideo rationes concedendae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne determinatum ad aliquid est finitum; dicendum, quod est determinatio duplex, scilicet per arctationem, cuiusmodi est illa, quae fit per additionem unius super alterum, sicut additur dispositio super potentiam materiae incompletam; et est determinatio per completionem, sicut summe bonum est ad bonum agendum, quia non potest deficere in faciendo malum. Primo modo determinatio repugnat infinitati secundo vero modo non repugnat3; et haec quidem determinatio convenit necessitati, secundum quod est in Deo, et non primo modo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil indifferens ad opposita est necessarium; dicendum, quod divinum posse et velle et agere dicitur indifferens ad opposita non ratione sui in se ipso, sed ratione indifferentiae in effectu producendo. Unde indifferentia illa non ponit aliquam vertibilitatem in divino posse; sed ponit potestatem unam et simplicissimam, super omnia opposita omnipotentem, ita quod ad nullum illorum restringi potest4; et hoc magis necessitati consonat, quam repugnet.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulli summe necessario potest attribui aliquid contingens; dicendum, quod cum aliquid contingenter praedicatur de Deo, ibi in praedicato illo clauditur et principale significatum et connotatum; et quantum ad principale significatum non est aliud quod Deus, quantum autem ad connotatum est effectus; et ratione primi, cui competit praedicatio, necessario inest; ratione vero secundi dicitur inesse contingenter, ac per hoc non ponitur contingentia esse in Deo, sed potius a Deo. In huiusmodi praedicationibus divinum esse intra se nullam praedicationem recipit, quae non includat completissimam necessitatem. — Quod autem dicitur totum illud dictum contingens, scilicet Deum salvare Petrum; hoc est, quia talis est natura totius copulati, quod fit in eo denominatio a minus nobili, ut dicatur falsa propositio copulativa, cuius altera pars falsa, et contingens, cuius altera pars est contingens. Et ratio huius est, quia facilius est rem destrui quam construi5; et habitus impermixtus debet esse privationi et eius denominatio; denominatio autem privationis se habet contrario modo, quia de necessitate intellectus positionis et habitus aliquo modo in eius clauditur intellectu.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necessitas repugnat voluntati, ut impossibilitas potestati; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet de illa necessitate, quae est ab extra, cuiusmodi est necessitas violentiae et coactionis; de illa autem necessitate, quae est intrinseca, cuiusmodi est necessitas immutabilitatis, veritatem non habet, sicut ex praecedentibus apparet.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si causa necessaria, et effectus; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus quinto de Civitate Dei6, causarum aliae sunt tantum factae; aliae vero facientes et factae; tertiae vero sunt facientes tantum. Causas autem tantum factas vocat causas naturales, quae determinatae sunt ad unum cursum; causas vero facientes et factas, liberum arbitrium et voluntatem; causas vero factivas tantum, ipsam divinam providentiam. Dicit autem, causas naturales factas esse, non facientes, non quia nihil faciant, sed quia sic faciunt, secundum quod est eis inditum, non habendo dominium super actum suum, quemadmodum habet liberum arbitrium, et tales sunt unigeneae suis partibus et conformes; et in huiusmodi praedicta propositio veritatem habet. De causa vero faciente, quae quidem potens est efficere et non efficere per eandem vim propter dominium super actionem et

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effectum consequentem, non habet veritatem. Sicut enim talis causa non mutatur propter effectuum mutabilitatem et differentiam, sic etiam nec contingens esse ponitur propter contingentiam in suis effectibus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid indifferentius, tanto communius; dicendum, quod est communitas duplex, scilicet per abstractionem, et per indenominationem. Cum ergo dicitur, quod quanto aliquid indifferentius, tanto communius; hoc intelligitur de communitate per indenominationem, per quem modum dicimus, quod contrariorum unicum est subiectum; quod maxime verum est in his quorum alterum non habet circa subiectum determinatam causam1. Cum autem adiungit, quod quanto aliquid communius, tanto simplicius; illud intelligitur de communitate per abstractionem; unde ex hoc non concluditur, quod contingentia ponant simplicitatem; quin potius includunt mutabilitatem, quae excludit summam simplicitatem; propter quod summa simplicitas non potest nisi in summe necessario reperiri. Quia ergo divinum esse est simplicissimum; ideo necesse est, ipsum esse non contingens, sed necessarium.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne necessarium est scibile, et omne scibile est principium demonstrationis, vel per demonstrationem conclusum; dicendum, quod est necessarium in genere, et est necessarium extra genus; et hoc quidem est dupliciter: vel extra genus determinatum, vel extra omne genus simpliciter2. Necessarium ergo extra omne genus simpliciter, hoc est in solo Deo, qui est supra et extra omne genus entis, quia in genere esse non potest, nec per se nec per appropriationem; et tale necessarium omnem demonstrationem antecedit et supergreditur, quia nullam definitionem prorsus habere potest3. — Quod ergo dicitur: omne necessarium est principium demonstrationis, vel demonstratum; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de necessario, quod est determinati generis, vel quod ad determinatum genus potest appropriari, sicut sunt communes animi conceptiones, quae, in quantum appropriantur, demonstrationem ingrediuntur. Unde ratio illa non concludit, quod divinum esse est necessarium ad genus determinatum coarctatum.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto magis necessarium, tanto magis certum; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse certius altero seu notius dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel quoad nos4. Prima igitur propositio veritatem habet, secundum quod intelligitur de maiori certitudine simpliciter, non autem, secundum quod intelligitur de certitudine quoad nos, pro eo quod illa quae sunt certissima et luculentissima in se ipsis obscura nobis videntur propter defectum ex parte intellectus creati; et ideo Philosophus5 dicit, quod « sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem, sic oculus noster ad manifestissima naturae ». Nihilominus tamen, licet divinum esse secundum plenitudinem suae claritatis sit nobis occultum, quamdiu sumus in statu viatorum, certissimum nobis est et indubitabile, Deum esse, secundum quod ex praecedentibus quaestionibus6 manifeste apparet.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necessarium non est timendum, sicut nec impossibile appetendum; dicendum, quod necessarium in eventu vel in effectu formidandum non est, quia nihil prodest formido, ubi necesse est sic evenire; necessarium autem secundum statum intrinsecum, quod potest sine sui mutatione retribuere sempiternam gloriam, vel sempiternum supplicium; hoc, inquam, est maxime formidandum et propter acquirendam gratiam et propter declinandam poenam, quia tale necessarium voluntatis liberalitatem et aequitatis iustitiam non excludit, secundum quod in sequenti quaestione melius apparebit.

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English Translation
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Question VII. Whether trinity can stand with supreme necessity.

Next it is asked whether trinity can stand with supreme necessity. And concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is supremely necessary.

The second is whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together5.

Article I. Whether the divine being is supremely necessary.

It is asked, then, whether the divine being is supremely necessary. And that it is, it seems.

1. Everything immutable and eternal is supremely necessary6; but the divine being is of this kind: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is necessary that everything which belongs to nobility and perfection be posited in God in the highest degree; but it is certain that7 necessity is more than knowledge: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is such that it cannot not be, nor be thought not to be, is necessary in the highest degree; but the divine being is of this kind8: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything which has being from itself and through itself and according to itself is altogether necessary; but such is the divine being, since it is first: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that necessity be in an effect except through a cause: therefore if in God there is not

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necessity, in nothing is there necessity: therefore nothing is necessary. But if nothing is necessary, nothing is impossible: therefore all things are possible: therefore it is possible for something at once to be and not to be. But this is absurd1: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is impossible that there be necessity in the composite except through a necessity existing in the simple; therefore if the most simple lacks necessity, it is impossible that necessity be posited in any combination or composition. But this is absurd, that no argumentation should be necessary2: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Everything necessary is determined to being disposed thus and not otherwise; everything determined to something is finite3; but the divine being is infinite: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, nothing that is indifferent to opposites is necessary; but the divine being able, willing and acting is indifferent to opposites: therefore it is not4 necessary. But the divine being able, willing and acting is the divine being: therefore the divine being is not necessary.

3. Likewise, to nothing immutable can anything mutable be attributed, therefore to nothing supremely necessary can anything contingent be attributed; but something contingent is attributed to God: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as impossibility is repugnant to power, so necessity is to will; but the divine power is so great that all things are possible to it, nor is impossibility posited in God in any mode5: therefore since the willing of God is most perfect, it seems that it does not suffer necessity in the divine being.

5. Likewise, if the cause is necessary, the effect is also6; but God is the first and highest and immediate cause of all things: therefore if there is necessity in God, all things are necessary.

6. Likewise, the more contingent a thing is, the more indifferent it is, and the more indifferent, the more common, and the more common, the more simple7: therefore from the first, the more contingent a thing is, the more simple: therefore the most simple is the most contingent, and therefore not necessary.

7. Likewise, everything necessary is knowable, just as everything probable is matter of opinion8; but everything knowable is either a principle of demonstration or something demonstrated; but the divine being is neither: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the more necessary a thing is, the more certain it is, and the more certain, the more known9; but the divine being is supremely hidden: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, just as one is moved in vain because he desires the impossible10, so too because he fears the necessary: therefore if the divine Majesty is necessity, then it is in no way to be feared. But this is false and absurd: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

The divine being is necessary with the most perfect necessity of immutability.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that necessity is threefold: one wholly extrinsic, one partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, and one wholly intrinsic. Necessity wholly extrinsic is that which has its origin from a principle which is outside, the patient cooperating in nothing11; and this has being in two ways: either with respect to natural works, or with respect to voluntary ones; and thus necessity is twofold, namely of coercion and of violence. — But necessity partly within, partly without is that which is in some way from an intrinsic principle regarding something outside, either by way of a moving principle, or by way of a resting term; and thus necessity is spoken of in two ways, namely of inevitability and of need. — But there is a necessity wholly intrinsic, which is in the thing from its own nature; and this is the necessity of immutability and of independence; and such necessity is found in a certain respect in the creature, but simply it cannot be found except in the creating essence. For it alone is that which admits no dependence; but the rest, since they are created, necessarily depend on it.

Now this necessity is necessarily posited in the divine being, because it is in itself and from itself. And because it is in12 itself, it therefore lacks a composing principle, or a sustaining one; therefore it can neither be changed nor fail.

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And because it is from itself, it therefore lacks anything producing and creating it; therefore it can neither depend nor begin; and on this account it has the highest and most perfect necessity, which excludes all mutability and dependence, inevitability and need, coercion and violence, which speak of a diminished necessity; and on the contrary it posits the highest permanence and stability, the highest sufficiency and freedom. For because it is itself, it is therefore permanent and most stable; but because it is for its own sake, it is therefore liberal and most sufficient; and because it is itself and for its own sake, it is therefore the alpha and omega1; and therefore the rest are from it, and the rest are for its sake, whether necessary or contingent. For just as all mobile things flow forth from one immobile first and are led back to it; so all contingent things flow from the necessary and are led back to it2. The necessity of the divine being, therefore, is the origin and completion of all being, living and understanding; and all things cry out that the first principle is necessary, whether they be necessary or contingent. — And therefore the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

1. To the objection that everything determined to something is finite, it must be said that determination is twofold, namely by restriction, of which kind is that which comes about by the addition of one thing upon another, as a disposition is added upon the incomplete potency of matter; and there is determination by completion, as the supreme good is determined to doing good, because it cannot fail by doing evil. In the first mode determination is repugnant to infinity but in the second mode it is not repugnant3; and it is this determination that befits necessity as it is in God, and not the first mode.

2. To the objection that nothing indifferent to opposites is necessary, it must be said that the divine being able and willing and acting is called indifferent to opposites not by reason of itself in itself, but by reason of an indifference in the effect to be produced. Whence that indifference does not posit any vertibility in the divine being able; but it posits one most simple power, omnipotent over all opposites, such that it cannot be restricted to any one of them4; and this is more consonant with necessity than repugnant to it.

3. To the objection that nothing contingent can be attributed to what is supremely necessary, it must be said that when something is predicated contingently of God, there is enclosed in that predicate both the principal significate and the connoted; and as regards the principal significate it is nothing other than God, but as regards the connoted it is an effect; and by reason of the first, to which the predication belongs, it is in Him necessarily; but by reason of the second it is said to be in Him contingently, and on this account contingency is not posited to be in God, but rather from God. In predications of this kind the divine being receives within itself no predication that does not include the most complete necessity. — But that the whole dictum is called contingent, namely that God saves Peter, this is because the nature of the whole conjunction is such that the denomination in it comes from the less noble part, so that a copulative proposition is called false when one of its parts is false, and contingent when one of its parts is contingent. And the reason for this is that it is easier for a thing to be destroyed than to be constructed5; and a habit ought to be unmixed with privation, and so ought its denomination; but the denomination of privation holds in the contrary way, because of necessity the understanding of position and of habit is in some way enclosed in its understanding.

4. To the objection that necessity is repugnant to will, as impossibility is to power, it must be said that this holds true of that necessity which is from outside, of which kind is the necessity of violence and of coercion; but of that necessity which is intrinsic, of which kind is the necessity of immutability, it does not hold true, as is clear from what has gone before.

5. To the objection that if the cause is necessary, the effect is also, it must be said that, as Augustine says in the fifth book of The City of God6, of causes some are only made; others are making and made; and the third are making only. The causes only made he calls natural causes, which are determined to a single course; the causes making and made, free choice and will; the causes productive only, the divine providence itself. And he says that natural causes are made, not making, not because they do nothing, but because they so act, according to what is implanted in them, not having dominion over their act, as free choice has, and such causes are of one kind with their parts and conformed to them; and in these the aforesaid proposition holds true. But of a making cause, which is able to effect and not to effect by the same power on account of its dominion over its action and

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the consequent effect, it does not hold true. For just as such a cause is not changed on account of the mutability and difference of its effects, so neither is it posited to be contingent on account of the contingency in its effects.

6. To the objection that the more indifferent a thing is, the more common it is, it must be said that commonness is twofold, namely by abstraction, and by non-denomination. When therefore it is said that the more indifferent a thing is, the more common it is, this is understood of commonness by non-denomination, in which mode we say that there is a single subject of contraries; which is most true in those of which neither has a determinate cause in regard to the subject1. But when it adds that the more common a thing is, the more simple it is, that is understood of commonness by abstraction; whence from this it is not concluded that contingent things posit simplicity; rather they include mutability, which excludes supreme simplicity; on account of which supreme simplicity cannot be found except in what is supremely necessary. Since therefore the divine being is most simple, it is therefore necessary that it be not contingent, but necessary.

7. To the objection that everything necessary is knowable, and everything knowable is a principle of demonstration or concluded through demonstration, it must be said that there is the necessary in a genus, and there is the necessary outside a genus; and this in two ways: either outside a determinate genus, or outside every genus simply2. The necessary outside every genus simply, then, is in God alone, who is above and outside every genus of being, because He cannot be in a genus, neither through Himself nor by appropriation; and such a necessary precedes and surpasses all demonstration, because it can have no definition whatever3. — As to what is said, then, that everything necessary is a principle of demonstration or something demonstrated, it must be said that this is understood of the necessary which is of a determinate genus, or which can be appropriated to a determinate genus, as are the common conceptions of the mind, which, inasmuch as they are appropriated, enter into demonstration. Whence that reasoning does not conclude that the divine being is necessary as restricted to a determinate genus.

8. To the objection that the more necessary a thing is, the more certain it is, it must be said that a thing is said to be more certain or more known than another in two ways: either simply, or as regards us4. The first proposition, then, holds true inasmuch as it is understood of greater certitude simply, but not inasmuch as it is understood of certitude as regards us, for the reason that the things which are most certain and most lucid in themselves seem obscure to us on account of a defect on the part of the created understanding; and therefore the Philosopher5 says that "as the eye of the owl is to the light, so is our eye to the most manifest things of nature." Nevertheless, although the divine being in the fullness of its clarity is hidden from us so long as we are in the state of wayfarers, it is most certain and indubitable to us that God is, as is manifestly clear from the preceding questions6.

9. To the objection that the necessary is not to be feared, just as neither is the impossible to be desired, it must be said that the necessary in the event or in the effect is not to be dreaded, because dread profits nothing where it is necessary that things so come about; but the necessary according to an intrinsic state, which can without change of itself render everlasting glory or everlasting punishment — this, I say, is most to be dreaded, both for acquiring grace and for avoiding punishment, because such a necessary does not exclude the liberality of will and the justice of equity, as will appear better in the following question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 5
    Haec secunda pars: Secundum est... necessitas, deficiens in D, a nobis pro more auctoris suppleta est.
    This second part, The second is... necessity, lacking in D, has been supplied by us according to the author's custom.
  2. 6
    Vide supra q. 5. a. 1. et q. 6. a. 1.
    See above, q. 5, a. 1 and q. 6, a. 1.
  3. 7
    Cod. quia. — Defectus esse videtur in cod.
    The codex has quia ("because"). — There seems to be a defect in the codex.
  4. 8
    Ut ostensum est supra q. 1. a. 1, ubi etiam principia seqq. argg. insinuantur.
    As was shown above, q. 1, a. 1, where the principles of the following arguments are also intimated.
  5. 1
    Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 9. seqq. (III. c. 3.), qui ibid. IX text. 17. (VIII. c. 8.) ait: Si enim ipsa [necessaria] non essent, nihil esset. — Superius post in Deo, contextu exigente, supplevimus non.
    Compare Aristotle, IV Metaphysics, text 9 ff. (III, c. 3), who in the same work, IX, text 17 (VIII, c. 8), says: "For if these [necessary things] were not, nothing would be." — Above, after in Deo ("in God"), the context requiring it, we have supplied non ("not").
  6. 2
    Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 3. seqq.
    See Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 3 ff.
  7. 3
    Cod. omittit est post necessarium, pro omne ponit esse ante determinatum, et iterum omittit finitum. Respectu habito ad solutionem huius arg., sic completius illud formavimus. — Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.): Quod non contingit aliter se habere necesse dicimus ita se habere. Ibid. IX. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.) potentiae irrationales dicuntur esse determinatae ad unum, sive unius tantum factivae, potentiae rationales vero indifferentes ad plura sive contraria.
    The codex omits est after necessarium, puts esse for omne before determinatum, and again omits finitum. With regard had to the solution of this argument, we have formed it more completely thus. — Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 6 (IV, c. 5): "What cannot be otherwise, we say is necessarily so." In the same work, IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5), irrational powers are said to be determined to one thing, or productive of one thing only, but rational powers indifferent to many things or to contraries.
  8. 4
    Perperam omittit D non.
    D wrongly omits non ("not").
  9. 5
    Vide Luc. 1, 37.
    See Luke 1:37.
  10. 6
    Cfr. supra pag. 61, nota 1, et Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 7. (X. c. 8.). — De minori vide supra pag. 98, nota 11. verba August.
    Compare above, p. 61, note 1, and Aristotle, XI Metaphysics, c. 7 (X, c. 8). — On the minor, see above, p. 98, note 11, the words of Augustine.
  11. 7
    Vide supra pag. 20, nota 6.
    See above, p. 20, note 6.
  12. 8
    Secundum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.); minor ibid. et c. 2. seqq. insinuatur.
    According to Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 26 (c. 33); the minor is intimated in the same place and in c. 2 ff.
  13. 9
    Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2; I. Phys text. 2. seqq. et IV. Metaph. test. 8. seqq. (III. c. 3.).
    Compare Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 2; I Physics, text 2 ff.; and IV Metaphysics, text 8 ff. (III, c. 3).
  14. 10
    Aristot., II. Rhet. c. 3. (c. 2.): Nemo vero expetit ea quae a se fieri non posse videntur. Cfr. ibid. c. 23. (c. 19.). et V. Polit. c. 11. (c. 9.): Nemo enim sibi impossibilia aggreditur.
    Aristotle, II Rhetoric, c. 3 (c. 2): "No one seeks the things which seem impossible for him to bring about." Compare the same work, c. 23 (c. 19), and V Politics, c. 11 (c. 9): "For no one undertakes things impossible for himself."
  15. 11
    Ita describit Aristot. III. Ethic. c. 1. violentum (cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. et 5.). — De diversis acceptionibus necessitatis vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.). De necessitate indigentiae cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 22.
    So Aristotle describes the violent in III Ethics, c. 1 (compare II Sentences, d. 25, p. II, q. 4 and 5). — On the various senses of necessity, see Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 6 (IV, c. 5). On the necessity of need, compare Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 22.
  16. 12
    D hic male omittit in, quod primo loco posuit.
    D here wrongly omits in, which it had put in the first place.
  17. 1
    Apoc. 1, 8. — Superius respicitur Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi illum hominem vocat liberum, « qui est sui ipsius et non alterius gratia » (cfr. tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2.).
    Apocalypse 1:8. — Above, Aristotle is in view, I Metaphysics, c. 3 (c. 2), where he calls that man free "who is for his own sake and not for another's" (compare vol. II, p. 592, note 2).
  18. 2
    Vide supra q. 1. a. 1. fundam. 13. et 20. (Pro immobili primo D mobili primo). — Lib. de Causis, propos. 18: Res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum, et res vivae omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam.
    See above, q. 1, a. 1, fundamenta 13 and 20. (For immobili primo D has mobili primo.) — Book of Causes, proposition 18: "All things have essence through the first being, and all living things are moved through their essence on account of the first life, and all intelligible things have knowledge on account of the first intelligence."
  19. 3
    Cfr. supra q. 3. a. 1. ad 4. et q. 4. a. 1.
    Compare above, q. 3, a. 1, reply to 4, and q. 4, a. 1.
  20. 4
    Vide supra q. 6. a. 1. ad 11. seqq.
    See above, q. 6, a. 1, reply to 11 ff.
  21. 5
    Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Quemadmodum in aliis corrumpere quam facere facilius, sic et in his destruere quam construere. Cfr. II. Ethic. c. 6. et Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31. De habitu et privatione cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 1. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 6. (c. 31.) docet, quod inesse appareat « facere in non-facere et omnino in negatione affirmatio ». — Similis solut. habetur supra q. 6. a. 1. ad 3. 4.
    Aristotle, VII Topics, c. 3 (c. 4): "Just as in other things it is easier to corrupt than to make, so also in these it is easier to destroy than to construct." Compare II Ethics, c. 6, and Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 31. On habit and privation, compare above, p. 47, note 1. Aristotle, II Sophistical Refutations, c. 6 (c. 31), teaches that "doing is seen to be present in not-doing, and in general affirmation in negation." — A similar solution is had above, q. 6, a. 1, replies to 3 and 4.
  22. 6
    Cap. 9. n. 4: Causa itaque rerum, quae facit nec fit, Deus est. Aliae vero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales. Corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam faciunt, non sunt inter causas efficientes annumerandae, quoniam hoc possunt, quod ex ipsis faciunt spirituum voluntates. — De fine solut. cfr. supra q. 2. a. 1. ad 8. et 9. ac q. 6. a. 1. ad 11. seqq.
    Chapter 9, n. 4: "The cause of things, then, which makes and is not made, is God. But other causes both make and are made, as are all created spirits, above all the rational ones. But bodily causes, which are made rather than make, are not to be numbered among efficient causes, since they can do only what the wills of spirits do out of them." — On the end of the solution, compare above, q. 2, a. 1, replies to 8 and 9, and q. 6, a. 1, reply to 11 ff.
  23. 1
    Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, docet, alterum oppositorum non necessario eidem susceptibili [i. e. subiecto] inesse, nisi unum insit naturaliter, ut igni calidum esse. Lib. II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.): Idem contrariorum susceptivum. — De seq. propos. cfr. supra pag. 7, nota 9.
    Aristotle, Categories, c. On Opposites, teaches that one of two opposites is not necessarily present in the same receptive thing [that is, subject], unless one is present by nature, as being hot is in fire. Book II Topics, c. 3 (c. 7): "The same thing is receptive of contraries." — On the following proposition, compare above, p. 7, note 9.
  24. 2
    Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.), agens de perfecto, utitur distinctione: in aliquo genere et in unoquoque genere. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4.
    Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 21 (IV, c. 16), treating of the perfect, uses the distinction: in some genus and in each genus. Compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 4.
  25. 3
    Vide supra pag. 77, nota 2. — De communibus animi conceptionibus cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 6. et Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7. In fine solutionis post divinum esse expunximus, contextu suffragante, non.
    See above, p. 77, note 2. — On the common conceptions of the mind, compare above, p. 79, note 6, and Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 7. At the end of the solution, after divinum esse ("the divine being"), we have struck out non ("not"), the context supporting it.
  26. 4
    Hac distinctione utitur Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. et I. Phys. text. 2. seqq.
    Aristotle uses this distinction, I Posterior Analytics, c. 2, and I Physics, text 2 ff.
  27. 5
    Libr. II. Metaph. text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.).
    Book II Metaphysics, text 1 (the shorter I, c. 1).
  28. 6
    Quaest. 1. a. 1. — Ex hoc loco colligi potest, hanc quaestionem esse aeque genuinam, ac citata quaestio, quam Petrus Ioannis Olivi S. Bonaventurae expressis verbis tribuit.
    Question 1, a. 1. — From this place it can be gathered that this question is as genuine as the question cited, which Peter John Olivi attributes to St. Bonaventure in express words.
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