Quaest. 7, Art. 2
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio VII: Utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa necessitate
Articulus II. Utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas.
Deinde quaeritur, utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur.
1. Augustinus ad Orosium7: « Pater nec necessitate nec voluntate genuit Filium »; sed quod repugnat generationi repugnat trinitati; necessitas est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
2. Item, nobilius est agens, quod dominatur actioni suae, quam quod non dominatur1; sed in Trinitate non potest esse productio nisi nobilissimo modo; quod autem necessario producit suae actioni non potest dominari: ergo nec in divinis potest necessario produci.
3. Item, nobilior est communicatio, quae est ex benignitate, quam quae est ex necessitate: aut ergo in divinis non est communicatio aliqua ipsius naturae, aut non est ex necessitate2; sed non potest esse trinitas sine communicatione: ergo etc.
4. Item, omne necessarium est absolutum; quod enim habet respectum ad aliquid a se distinctum non potest omnino esse necessarium, et hoc vult Avicenna3; sed trinitatem esse sine respectu et relatione est impossibile: ergo similiter impossibile est, quod stet cum necessitate.
5. Item, nihil, quod est ab alio, potest esse necessarium in summo; quia esse eius4 et manere non habet nisi aliunde, et ita non est necessarium in se; sed trinitas non potest esse, quin aliqua persona sit ibi non a se: ergo non stat cum summa necessitate.
6. Item, nihil est summe verum, quod potest cogitari non esse5: ergo similiter nihil est summe necessarium, quod potest credi non esse; necessarium enim praesupponit verum; sed trinitas absque dubio potest cogitari non esse: ergo etc.
7. Item, quod repugnat evidentiae repugnat certitudini, et quod repugnat certitudini repugnat necessitati6; sed trinitas in unitate repugnat evidentiae, quia hoc nullo modo videtur intelligibile: ergo repugnat necessitati summae.
8. Item, nihil omnino necessarium est perfecte laudabile7: ergo si persona Patris necessario producit personam Filii et Spiritus sancti, non est laudabilis in aliquo praedictorum; sed nihil est in Deo laudabilius: ergo nulla laus debetur Deo. Sed hoc est impium dicere: ergo etc.
9. Item, nihil est omnino necessarium, quod est simpliciter voluntarium; productio personarum in divinis est simpliciter per voluntatem: non ergo per necessitatem. Maior probatur, quia necessaria naturaliter insunt, et contra voluntatem natura habet dividi. Minor probatur: quia illud est maxime delectabile, acceptabile et iucundum: ergo maxime voluntarium.
Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Omne necessarium immutabile, et e converso; sed trinitas stat cum summa immutabilitate, sicut patet de proximo8: ergo etc.
2. Item, omne, quod est summe unum, est omnino necessarium, et e converso; sed simul stant trinitas et summa unitas9: ergo etc.
3. Item, maioris colligantiae est productio personae unius ab alia quam splendoris et lucis; sed haec sunt necessaria: ergo etc.
4. Item, Omnipotenti summum posse abesse est impossibile, et adesse est necessarium; sed summum posse est in productione personarum: ergo etc.
5. Item, omnis actus, qui habet Deum pro principio et termino, est undique necessarius; sed productio personae a persona est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
6. Item, omne, quod est indifferens a summo necessario, est omnino necessarium; sed trinitas tota est divina essentia: ergo etc.
Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.
Divinum esse necessarium et liberalissimum stat simul cum trinitate personarum.
Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod et divinum esse est necessarium, et nihilominus liberalissimum; et ipsa beata Trinitas stat simul cum necessitate et voluntate, si accipiantur secundum modum convenientem. Sicut enim tactum est10 de necessitate, non omnis necessitas competit divino esse nec etiam Trinitati beatae, sed immutabilitatis et independentiae; simimiliter neque omnis modus volendi. Est enim voluntas accedens, id est de novo adveniens; et haec non est in Deo, nec respectu sui nec respectu creati, propter Dei immutabilitatem et necessitatem. Est iterum voluntas antecedens; et haec est in Deo, sed non respectu sui, sed respectu creati, quod antecedit natura et aeternitate. Est tertio voluntas concomitans et acceptans; et haec est in Deo respectu sui et respectu creati; approbat enim et acceptat voluntas divina omne bonum, sive creatum sive increatum, sive contingens sive necessarium.
Tripliciter ergo dicta necessitate et voluntate, tertius modus utriusque competit Trinitati summae,
scilicet voluntas acceptans et necessitas immutabilitatis: voluntas, inquam, acceptans propter summam caritatem in producente et summam bonitatem in producto, quae duo necessario claudunt in se voluntatem complacentiae; necessitas vero incommutabilitatis est propter indifferentiam essentiae et independentiam personae. Quia enim in tribus personis est essentia omnino indifferens, ideo una quidditas sive entitas, una veritas, ac per hoc una necessitas. Cum enim prima persona sit a se ipsa, omnino est necessaria, ac per hoc secunda et tertia. — Rursus, quia in tribus personis indifferens est essentia, relatio distinctiva trinitatis non dicit respectum ad aliquid extra; et ideo nulla est ibi dependentia unius personae ad alteram, aequaliter ergo sunt fixae et per se stantes; et ideo si una est necessaria, et omnes. — Stant igitur simul haec tria, sicut ostensum est iam, scilicet trinitas, necessitas et voluntas; nec est in eis aliqua repugnantia, sed summa consonantia, sicut simul consonant summa unitas, veritas et bonitas.
Summa enim unitas est, quae est in pluribus indivisa, et haec ponit trinitatem; summa veritas, quae est infallibilis et certissima, et haec ponit necessitatem; summa bonitas, quae est amabilis et amativa, et haec ponit voluntatem. Summa igitur unitas, veritas et bonitas necessario exigit, quod simul stent trinitas, necessitas et voluntas. — Quoniam igitur in Deo trino simul est necessitas cum voluntate, et voluntas cum necessitate; hinc est, quod ipsum est summe bonum per essentiam. Quia in eo est summa iucunditas per voluntatem et summa securitas per necessitatem et summa felicitas per utrumque; hinc etiam est, quod ipsum est summe beatificativum per influentiam: quia affectus noster non quiescit nisi in summe amabili vacando1, et intellectus non nisi in summe infallibili et certo; ac per hoc in eo solo beatificari possumus, quod simul est necessarium et voluntarium, quod solum natum est sapidissime amari, certissime cognosci et securissime possideri. — Quoniam igitur beatissima Trinitas non tantum est beata, verum etiam beatificativa; hinc est, quod ipsa necessitati nobilissimae summe consonat et in nullo repugnat; similiter et voluntati liberalissimae. — Unde et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Augustini et Hilarii2, dicendum, quod utraque illarum auctoritatum intelligitur de necessitate quantum ad primum et secundum modum, non quantum ad tertium, sicut ex praedictis apparet.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilius est agens, quod dominatur actioni suae; dicendum, quod illud est verum de actione, quae se habet per differentiam ab agente; de ea actione autem, quae propter summam simplicitatem omnino est indifferens ab agente, nec habet nec habere potest praedicta propositio veritatem; nihil enim potest dominari sibi. Quoniam ergo productio in divinis personis est per simplicitatem summam, in qua non potest differre producens et productio sua secundum differentiam realem; ideo in huiusmodi nullum locum habet allegatio propositionis praedictae.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilior est communicatio, quae est ex benignitate quam ex necessitate; dicendum, quod illud est verum de illa necessitate, quae benignitatem excludit; talis autem non est necessitas, quae ponitur in divinis; intelligitur etiam de communicatione, quae est doni per essentiam differentis; talis autem non est in emanatione3 divinarum personarum: et ideo illa ratio non concludit, pro eo quod in se ipsa duplicem includit defectum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne necessarium est absolutum; dicendum, quod absolutio perfecta non excludit relationem intrinsecam, pro eo quod illa, cum sit ad indifferens per essentiam, nullam dependentiam ponit, ac per hoc nec repugnat necessitati; et talis relatio est in divinis personis. Sed si excludit relationem, hoc est per respectum ad extra et ad rem essentialiter differentem. Unde licet Deus per aliqua nomina significetur ut habens respectum ad res, ille respectus ex parte Dei non ponitur nisi secundum rationem intelligendi, cui verus respondet respectus ex parte entis creati4; et de hoc respectu ratio praemissa procedit.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil, quod est ab alio, potest esse necessarium in summo; dicendum quod illud veritatem habet, quando est ab alio essentialiter differente, et aliud habet esse, quam quod5 sit ipsum esse dantis; tunc enim non potest habere plenam rationem necessitatis, pro eo quod pendet ab alio esse et alia natura essentialiter differente. Non sic autem est de divinis personis, quia persona producta non differt per essentiam a
producente nec habet aliud esse. Unde cum unum habeat esse et eandem essentiam et unius essentialiter veritatem; hinc est, quod nullam ex hoc sortitur dependentiam, sed omnino eandem habet is qui producitur cum eo qui producit permanendi firmam necessitatem et necessariam firmitatem.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est summe necessarium, quod potest cogitari non esse; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet, cum illud necessarium apparet, ut est, non autem quando latet. Unde licet beatissima Trinitas nunc et credi et cogitari possit non esse, quia nondum nobis apparet, sicut est; cum tamen apparuerit, sicut est1, tunc nullatenus cogitari poterit non esse. Quod ergo nunc vel creditur vel cogitatur non esse; hoc est non propter defectum suae certitudinis et veritatis in se ipso, cum sit ens semper et ubique et summe; sed propter defectum luminis ex parte nostra.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod repugnat evidentiae repugnat certitudini; dicendum, quod est certitudo ex parte rei et ex parte nostra; similiter et evidentia. Cum ergo dicitur: quod repugnat evidentiae et certitudini repugnat necessitati; hoc verum de certitudine et evidentia ex parte rei, non autem est verum de certitudine et evidentia ex parte nostra, quia, sicut prius tactum est, idem potest esse et in se certissimum et nobis occultum. — Praeterea, quamvis trinitas videatur certitudini repugnare, plurimum tamen consonat, quia Pater Verbo suo se declarat, Pater etiam et Filius se nobis per Spiritum sanctum certissime manifestant2. Unde quamvis ratio phantastica fugiat trinitatis intellectum, ratio tamen illustrata videt, quod sola trinitas ut trinitas est plenissima ratio cognoscendi omne verum, per quam fit, ut omne verum cognitum memoriter teneatur, retentum memoriter intelligatur clarius, et intellectum placeat et ametur.
8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino necessarium est perfecte laudabile; dicendum, quod duplex est laus: una, in qua laudato accrescit aliquid honoris et dignitatis, et ista laus attenditur secundum progressum a statu imperfecto ad perfectum; et haec proprie competit viatoribus, qui cum possint transgredi et non transgrediuntur, merito laudantur divinitus et etiam praemiantur3. Est et alia laus, qua ipsum bonum, quia bonum, dicitur commendabile; et haec magis competit bono per essentiam quam per participationem, ac per hoc magis bono incommutabili quam variabili, et necessario quam contingenti; et hac laude laudatur Deus Pater in productione Filii, et Pater et Filius in productione Spiritus sancti in mutua dilectione sui et diffusione omnis boni respectu cuiuscumque creati.
9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil simpliciter voluntarium est omnino necessarium, plana est responsio ex his quae praetacta sunt in principali solutione; et ideo in his diutius non est morandum.
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Article II. Whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together.
Next it is asked whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together. And that they are incompossible, it seems.
1. Augustine to Orosius7: « The Father begot the Son neither by necessity nor by will »; but what is repugnant to generation is repugnant to trinity; necessity is of this kind: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, an agent which has dominion over its action is nobler than one which has not1; but in the Trinity there can be no production except in the noblest mode; but what produces necessarily cannot have dominion over its action: therefore neither can there be necessary production in divine things.
3. Likewise, a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one which is from necessity: either, then, there is in divine things no communication of the nature itself, or it is not from necessity2; but there cannot be trinity without communication: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, everything necessary is absolute; for what has a respect to something distinct from itself cannot be altogether necessary, and this is what Avicenna means3; but it is impossible for trinity to be without respect and relation: therefore likewise it is impossible that it stand with necessity.
5. Likewise, nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree; because it has its being4 and its remaining only from elsewhere, and so it is not necessary in itself; but there cannot be trinity without some person there being not from itself: therefore it does not stand with supreme necessity.
6. Likewise, nothing is supremely true which can be thought not to be5: therefore likewise nothing is supremely necessary which can be believed not to be; for the necessary presupposes the true; but trinity can without doubt be thought not to be: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, and what is repugnant to certitude is repugnant to necessity6; but trinity in unity is repugnant to evidence, because it seems in no way intelligible: therefore it is repugnant to supreme necessity.
8. Likewise, nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy7: therefore if the person of the Father necessarily produces the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, he is not praiseworthy in any of the aforesaid; but nothing in God is more praiseworthy: therefore no praise is owed to God. But it is impious to say this: therefore etc.
9. Likewise, nothing is altogether necessary which is simply voluntary; the production of the persons in divine things is simply through will: therefore not through necessity. The major is proved, because necessary things are present by nature, and nature is divided against will. The minor is proved: because that is supremely delightful, acceptable and pleasing: therefore supremely voluntary.
Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Everything necessary is immutable, and conversely; but trinity stands with supreme immutability, as is clear from what immediately precedes8: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, everything which is supremely one is altogether necessary, and conversely; but trinity and supreme unity stand together9: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the production of one person from another is of a greater binding-together than that of splendour and light; but these are necessary: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, for the Omnipotent, that the highest being able be absent is impossible, and that it be present is necessary; but the highest being able is in the production of the persons: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, every act which has God for its principle and term is necessary on every side; but the production of a person from a person is of this kind: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, everything which is indifferent from the supremely necessary is altogether necessary; but the whole trinity is the divine essence: therefore etc.
Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.
The divine being, necessary and most liberal, stands together with the trinity of persons.
Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the divine being is both necessary and nonetheless most liberal; and the blessed Trinity itself stands together with necessity and with will, if they are taken according to the fitting mode. For just as was touched on10 concerning necessity, not every necessity belongs to the divine being, nor yet to the blessed Trinity, but that of immutability and independence; similarly, neither does every mode of willing. For there is a will that is accedent, that is, supervening anew; and this is not in God, neither with respect to himself nor with respect to the created, on account of God's immutability and necessity. There is again a will that is antecedent; and this is in God, not with respect to himself, but with respect to the created, which it precedes in nature and in eternity. There is, thirdly, a will that is concomitant and accepting; and this is in God with respect to himself and with respect to the created; for the divine will approves and accepts every good, whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary.
Necessity and will being therefore spoken of in three ways, the third mode of each belongs to the supreme Trinity,
namely accepting will and the necessity of immutability: will, I say, accepting, on account of the supreme charity in the one producing and the supreme goodness in the one produced, which two necessarily enclose in themselves the will of complacency; and the necessity of unchangeableness on account of the indifference of the essence and the independence of the person. For because in the three persons the essence is altogether indifferent, therefore there is one quiddity or entity, one truth, and on this account one necessity. For since the first person is from itself, it is altogether necessary, and on this account the second and the third. — Again, because in the three persons the essence is indifferent, the relation distinctive of the trinity does not signify a respect to anything outside; and therefore there is there no dependence of one person on another; equally, therefore, they are fixed and standing through themselves; and therefore if one is necessary, so are all. — These three therefore stand together, as has now been shown, namely trinity, necessity and will; nor is there in them any repugnance, but a supreme consonance, just as supreme unity, truth and goodness are consonant together.
For supreme unity is that which is undivided in many, and this posits trinity; supreme truth, which is infallible and most certain, and this posits necessity; supreme goodness, which is lovable and loving, and this posits will. Supreme unity, truth and goodness therefore necessarily require that trinity, necessity and will stand together. — Since, then, in the triune God there is necessity together with will, and will together with necessity, hence it is that he is the supreme good by essence. Because in him is supreme delight through will and supreme security through necessity and supreme felicity through both, hence also it is that he is supremely beatifying by influence: because our affection does not rest except by keeping leisuretr. in the supremely lovable1, and the understanding not except in the supremely infallible and certain; and on this account we can be beatified in that alone which is at once necessary and voluntary, which alone is apt by nature to be loved most savourily, known most certainly and possessed most securely. — Since, then, the most blessed Trinity is not only blessed but also beatifying, hence it is that it is supremely consonant with the noblest necessity and in nothing repugnant to it; and likewise with the most liberal will. — Whence also the reasons brought forward for this side are to be conceded.
1. To what is first objected to the contrary from the authority of Augustine and of Hilary2, it must be said that each of those authorities is understood of necessity as to the first and second mode, not as to the third, as is clear from what has been said.
2. To the objection that an agent which has dominion over its action is nobler, it must be said that this is true of an action which stands by way of difference from the agent; but of that action which, on account of supreme simplicity, is altogether indifferent from the agent, the aforesaid proposition neither has nor can have truth; for nothing can have dominion over itself. Since, then, production in the divine persons is through supreme simplicity, in which the producer and his production cannot differ by a real difference, therefore in things of this kind the allegation of the aforesaid proposition has no place.
3. To the objection that a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one from necessity, it must be said that this is true of that necessity which excludes benignity; but such is not the necessity which is posited in divine things; it is understood also of a communication which is of a gift differing in essence; but such is not in the emanation3 of the divine persons: and therefore that reason does not conclude, since in itself it includes a twofold defect.
4. To the objection that everything necessary is absolute, it must be said that perfect absoluteness does not exclude intrinsic relation, since that relation, being to what is indifferent in essence, posits no dependence, and on this account is not repugnant to necessity; and such relation is in the divine persons. But if it excludes relation, this is by respect to what is outside and to a thing essentially differing. Whence, although God is signified by certain names as having a respect to things, that respect is not posited on the part of God except according to the reason of understanding, to which there answers a true respect on the part of the created being4; and of this respect the premised reason proceeds.
5. To the objection that nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree, it must be said that this has truth when it is from another essentially differing, and has a being other than5 the very being of the giver; for then it cannot have the full reason of necessity, since it depends on another being and another nature essentially differing. But it is not so with the divine persons, because the person produced does not differ in essence from the
producer, nor has it another being. Whence, since they have one being and the same essence and the truth of one thing essentially, hence it is that it acquires from this no dependence, but the one who is produced has altogether the same firm necessity of remaining, and necessary firmness, with the one who produces.
6. To the objection that nothing is supremely necessary which can be thought not to be, it must be said that this has truth when that necessary thing appears as it is, but not when it lies hidden. Whence, although the most blessed Trinity can now be both believed and thought not to be, because it does not yet appear to us as it is, yet when it shall have appeared as it is1, then it will in no way be able to be thought not to be. That it is now either believed or thought not to be, therefore, is not on account of a defect of its certitude and truth in itself, since it is being always and everywhere and supremely, but on account of a defect of lumentr. on our part.
7. To the objection that what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, it must be said that there is certitude on the part of the thing and on our part; and similarly evidence. When, therefore, it is said: what is repugnant to evidence and certitude is repugnant to necessity, this is true of certitude and evidence on the part of the thing, but it is not true of certitude and evidence on our part, because, as was touched on before, the same thing can be both most certain in itself and hidden to us. — Moreover, although trinity seems to be repugnant to certitude, yet it is very greatly consonant with it, because the Father declares himself by his Word, and the Father and the Son manifest themselves to us most certainly through the Holy Spirit2. Whence, although phantastic reason flees the understanding of the trinity, yet illumined reason sees that trinity alone, as trinity, is the fullest reason of knowing every truth, through which it comes about that every truth known is held in memory, that what is retained in memory is understood more clearly, and that what is understood pleases and is loved.
8. To the objection that nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy, it must be said that praise is twofold: one, in which something of honour and dignity accrues to the one praised, and this praise is reckoned according to progress from an imperfect state to a perfect one; and this belongs properly to wayfarers, who, since they could transgress and do not transgress, are deservedly praised by God and also rewarded3. There is also another praise, by which the good itself, because it is good, is called commendable; and this belongs more to a good by essence than to one by participation, and on this account more to an unchangeable good than to a variable one, and to a necessary than to a contingent; and with this praise God the Father is praised in the production of the Son, and the Father and the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit, in their mutual love of each other and the diffusion of every good with respect to whatever is created.
9. To the objection that nothing simply voluntary is altogether necessary, the answer is plain from what was touched on beforehand in the principal solution; and therefore there is no need to dwell on these things longer.
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- 7Sive Quaest. 65 dialog. (inter opera August.) q. 7. — Eadem quaestio solvitur I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. et 2.Or the Dialogue of Sixty-five Questions (among the works of Augustine), q. 7. — The same question is solved in I Sentences, d. 6, q. 1 and 2.
- 1Vide quaest. praeced. solut. ad 5. — Nemesius, episc. Emesenus in libro de Natura hominis, c. 41. ait: Si autem [quis] sit dominus actionum, omnino liberam habebit agendi voluntatem. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2.See the preceding question, reply to 5. — Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, in the book On the Nature of Man, c. 41, says: But if [someone] is lord of his actions, he will have an altogether free will of acting. Compare tome II, p. 592, note 2.
- 2Hilar. III. de Trin. n. 3. docet, Patrem Filio impertivisse « omne, quod Deus est per caritatem ».Hilary, III On the Trinity, n. 3, teaches that the Father imparted to the Son « all that God is, through charity ».
- 3Metaph. tr. 1. c. 7. et tr. 8. c. 4. seq. — Minorem docet Boeth. de Trin. c. 6. his verbis: Substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem.Metaphysics, tr. 1, c. 7, and tr. 8, c. 4 ff. — Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 6, teaches the minor in these words: Substance contains the unity, relation multiplies the trinity.
- 4Congruentius suum.Suum ("its own") would be more fitting.
- 5Vide supra q. 1. a. 1. — Quod necessarium supponat verum, explicatur infra in corp., in quantum scil. verum idem est ac ens.See above, q. 1, a. 1. — That the necessary supposes the true is explained below in the body [of the article], inasmuch, namely, as the true is the same as being.
- 6Certitudo siquidem est determinatio ad unum, sicut e contrario dubitatio respicit plura. « Quandocumque enim, ut ait Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.), ad utraque ratiocinantibus nobis similiter videntur omnia secundum utrumque fieri, dubitabimus, utrum agamus ».For certitude is determination to one, just as, on the contrary, doubt regards many. « For whenever, as Aristotle says, VI Topics, c. 3 (c. 6), as we reason on both sides, everything seems to us to come about alike according to each, we shall doubt which we are to do ».
- 7Aristot., II. Eudem. c. 7. (c. 6.): Vituperantur autem laudanturque non quae a necessitate vel natura vel fortuna insunt, sed quorum ipsi causa sumus. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 113, nota 8. — Post laudabilius supple: quam istae productiones.Aristotle, II Eudemian Ethics, c. 7 (c. 6): Now those things are blamed and praised which are present not from necessity or nature or fortune, but of which we ourselves are the cause. Compare tome II, p. 113, note 8. — After laudabilius ("more praiseworthy") supply: than these productions.
- 8Supra q. 6. a. 2.Above, q. 6, a. 2.
- 9Ut ostensum est supra q. 2. a. 2.As was shown above, q. 2, a. 2.
- 10Quaest. praeced.The preceding question.
- 1August., XXII. de Civ. Dei. c. 30. n. 5: Ibi [in aeterna felicitate] vacabimus et videbimus; videbimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine. — D potius legi deberet vetando. Fortasse originale habuit amabili et amativo, ut supra, cum quoad intellectum repetat eadem adiectiva.Augustine, XXII The City of God, c. 30, n. 5: There [in eternal felicity] we shall keep leisure and we shall see; we shall see and we shall love, we shall love and we shall praise. Behold what shall be in the end without end. — D should rather be read vetando ("forbidding"). Perhaps the original had amabili et amativo ("lovable and loving"), as above, since with regard to the understanding it repeats the same adjectives.
- 2Superius in obiectionibus desideratur arg. ex auctoritate Hilarii, quod suppleri potest ex I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. arg. 2. ad oppos., ubi S. Bonav. refert: Item, Hilarius in libro de Synodis [η. 58. XXV.]: « Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium »: ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis; nec necessitas alia, ut videtur: ergo etc.Above, among the objections, the argument from the authority of Hilary is lacking, which can be supplied from I Sentences, d. 6, q. 1, arg. 2 to the opposite, where St. Bonaventure reports: Likewise, Hilary in the book On the Synods [n. 58, XXV]: « Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son »: therefore there was there no natural necessity; nor any other necessity, as it seems: therefore etc.
- 3Cod. D perperam enumeratione.Codex D wrongly has enumeratione ("enumeration").
- 4Cfr. supra q. 3. a. 1. et a. 2. ad 16. — Superius post pro eo quod illa D incongrue omittit cum.Compare above, q. 3, a. 1, and a. 2, reply to 16. — Above, after pro eo quod illa ("since that"), D unfittingly omits cum ("being").
- 5Cum cod. hic corruptus appareat, supplevimus quam ante quod, et superius pro essentialiter et differenter substituimus essentialiter differente, sicut paulo inferius idem habet.Since the codex appears corrupt here, we have supplied quam ("than") before quod, and above, for essentialiter et differenter ("essentially and differently"), we have substituted essentialiter differente ("essentially differing"), as the same codex has a little below.
- 1Respicitur I. Ioan. 3, 2: Scimus, quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus; quoniam videbimus eum, sicuti est. — De seqq. cfr. supra q. 1. a. 1.The reference is to I John 3:2: We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; because we shall see him as he is. — On what follows, compare above, q. 1, a. 1.
- 2Cfr. Ioan. 16, 13. seqq. et 17, 1. seqq. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 4. in corp. Superius pag. 19, nota 7., teste Augustino, Plato posuit, quod in Deo « inveniatur et causa subsistendi et ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi ».Compare John 16:13 ff. and 17:1 ff. See also I Sentences, d. 15, p. I, q. 4, in the body. Above, p. 19, note 7, on the witness of Augustine, Plato held that in God « there is found both the cause of subsisting and the reason of understanding and the order of living ».
- 3Eccli. 31, 9. seqq.: Quis est hic et laudabimus eum?... Qui probatus est in illo et perfectus est erit illi gloria aeterna; qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus etc. — August. Enarrat. in Ps. 134, 3: Laudate Dominum, quia bonus Dominus, n. 3. ait: Breviter uno verbo explicata est laus Domini Dei nostri: Bonus Dominus. Sed bonus, non ut sunt bona quae fecit... Omnia enim bona ipse fecit, ipse est bonus, quem nemo fecit. Ille bono suo bonus est, non aliunde participato bono; ille se ipso bono bonus est, non adhaerendo alteri bono etc. — Inferius supplevimus incommutabili, pro quo in ipso codice existit lacuna; subinde substituimus quam variabili pro et variabili.Ecclesiasticus 31:9 ff.: Who is he, and we will praise him?... He that hath been tried thereby and made perfect shall have glory everlasting; he that could have transgressed and hath not transgressed, etc. — Augustine, Expositions on the Psalms, on Ps. 134:3, Praise the Lord, for the Lord is good, n. 3, says: Briefly, in one word, the praise of the Lord our God has been set forth: The Lord is good. But good, not as the good things are good which he made... For he himself made all good things, he himself is good, whom no one made. He is good by his own good, not by a good participated from elsewhere; he is good by himself as good, not by adhering to another good, etc. — Below we have supplied incommutabili ("unchangeable"), for which there is a gap in the codex itself; next we have substituted quam variabili ("than a variable one") for et variabili ("and a variable one").
- tr.Translator’s note: this is the one clause in these questions where both Latin families stand in a single breath — non quiescit nisi … vacando — so the English has to keep them apart: quies takes "rest", vacare takes "leisure", here "by keeping leisure". The point is that our affection comes to rest not by ceasing but by being wholly free for what is supremely lovable, and one English word for both would reduce the clause to saying that it rests by resting. The word itself is not textually secure: Quaracchi prints vacando, but its own note on this passage holds that the sole witness should rather be read vetando, and suspects that the original ran differently again. The English renders the text as printed, and the standing rule holds whichever way the reading falls — no vaca- word is rendered "rest" in this translation.
- tr.Translator’s note: lumen is left as it stands throughout this translation, against lux rendered "light", because Bonaventure uses the two for things English covers with one word: lux is light at its source, lumen the light given off and received. That distinction is the whole of this reply. The failing is not in the divine truth, which is certain and true in itself, but at the receiving end — defectus luminis ex parte nostra. "A defect of light" would leave a reader unable to tell which end is deficient, which is exactly what the reply is settling.