Quaest. 5, Art. 1

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Quaest. 5, Art. 1

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio V: Utrum personarum trinitas simul stet cum summa aeternitate

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio V. Utrum personarum trinitas simul stet cum summa aeternitate.

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum personarum trinitas stet cum summa aeternitate. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum divinum esse sit aeternum.

Secundum est, utrum simul stent trinitas et aeternitas.

Articulus I. Utrum divinum esse sit aeternum.

Circa primum sic proceditur. Et quod divinum esse sit aeternum:

1. Convincit Scripturae auctoritas, Exodi decimo quinto⁴: Dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra; et ad Romanos primo: Sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas.

2. Convincit etiam hoc fidei veritas: «Aeternus, inquit, Pater, in Symbolo Athanasiano, aeternus Filius, aeternus Spiritus sanctus».

3. Item, hoc ipsum concludit rationis necessitas. Arguit enim Richardus⁵ sic: Omne, quod est a se ipso, est aeternum; sed divinum esse, cum sit

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primum, est a se ipso: ergo etc. Maior manifesta est; quia, si non esset aeternum, aliquando non fuisset, et tunc nec sibi nec aliis aliquando esse dedisset, ac per hoc nunquam esset. Minor vero patens est per se ipsam.

4. Item, omne illud, quod est suum esse, est aeternum; esse enim non potest non esse, ergo nec incipere nec desinere, igitur caret principio et fine: si ergo Deus, cum sit simplicissimum, est suum esse, immo simpliciter est esse¹; ergo est omnino aeternum.

5. Item, omne illud, quod est ipsa veritas, est aeternum; sed divinum esse est ipsa veritas: ergo etc. Minor patet; maiorem probat Augustinus in Soliloquiis²: Veritas enim nec cogitari nec enuntiari potest non esse; immo sequitur, si nulla veritas est, aliquam veritatem esse, quia, si nulla veritas est, verum est, nullam veritatem esse, vel non esse: ergo esse non potest aliquatenus removeri a veritate: ergo semper fuit, est et erit.

6. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa infinitas, est aeternum; nam si coepisset, esset durationis finitae; sed divinum esse est infinitum³: ergo necesse est, ipsum esse aeternum, alioquin, si caret aeternitate, caret et immensitate.

7. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa immortalitas, est aeternum; «quod enim a versione incipit in versionem tendit⁴»; sed in divino esse est summa immortalitas, cum sit ipsa vita per essentiam sive ipsum vivere: ergo necesse est, divinum esse habere aeternitatem.

8. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa felicitas, est aeternum; sed divinum esse est huiusmodi, cum sit perfectissimum: ergo etc. Maior probatur, quia maior est felicitas, quae caret principio et fine, quam quae sumsit exordium aliunde: si ergo divinum esse est felicissimum, sequitur necessario, quod sit aeternum. Et iterum, omnis felicitas dicit absentiam finis⁵: ergo perfectissima dicit carentiam omnis principii.

9. Item, omne illud, in quo est summa simplicitas, est aeternum; divinum esse est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Minor est manifesta; maior probatur: quia in quocumque est summa simplicitas, non differt primum, medium et ultimum, et nihil tale habet praeteritum et futurum, sed tantum praesens mansivum; sed omne tale aeternum⁶: ergo etc.

10. Item, cum ens dividatur in aeternum et aeviternum et temporale, nobilius est aeviternum quam temporale, et aeternum nobilius utroque⁷; sed semper quod nobilius est attribuendum est enti nobilissimo: ergo summa aeternitas est attribuenda Deo.

11. Item, omne fluens reducitur ad permanens: ergo duratio fluens reducitur ad durationem permanentem, igitur praesens transiens in praeteritum reducitur ad praesens semper manens; sed tale praesens non est in re defectiva: ergo necesse est, quod sit in creatrice essentia; necesse est igitur, esse divinum esse aeternum⁸.

12. Item, verum de futuro fuit verum sine initio, verum de praeterito est verum sine termino; sed futurum et praeteritum necessario reducuntur ad praesens: ergo necesse est ponere verum semper praesens sine fine et sine principio. Hoc autem est aeternum nec potest poni in alio quam circa primum principium: ergo necessario divinum esse est aeternum⁹.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Aeternitas est mensura¹⁰; sed nihil immensum habet mensuram; si enim habet mensuram, non est immensum: ergo etc.

2. Item, mensura aequatur mensurato; sed nihil potest aequari esse divino: ergo non est in Deo aeternitatis duratio.

3. Item, aeternitas est carentia finis et principii¹¹; sed nihil caret eo quod est: si ergo Deus est principium et finis omnium, ergo divinum esse non habet carentiam horum: igitur non potest esse aeternum.

4. Item, carentia complementi sonat in defectum; principium et finis dicunt completionem: ergo in Deo

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non est ponere horum privationem; sed aeternitas dicit horum privationem: ergo non debet poni circa divinum esse.

5. Item, aeternitas est carentia praeteriti et futuri; sed Deus vere fuit et est et erit: ergo divinum esse non habet rationem aeterni.

6. Item, sit A tempus praeteritum, B futurum; verum est dicere, quod Deus fuit in A et erit in B, et falsum e converso: ergo A vere praeteriit apud Deum, et B vere est futurum: ergo divinum esse habet praeteritum et futurum: ergo non est aeternum.

7. Item, ubi est aeternitas, ibi est interminabilitas, quia secundum Boethium¹ «aeternitas est interminabilis vitae possessio»; ubi interminabilitas, ibi circularitas; sed circulare est posterius recto, nihil autem nisi simpliciter primum est attribuendum esse divino: ergo nec aeternitatis duratio.

8. Item, secundum rationem intelligendi et ordinem naturae circumferentia est posterior centro; sed quod est circumferentia ad centrum, hoc est aeternitas ad tempus: ergo multo fortius tempus attribuendum est Deo quam aeternitas: ergo si inconveniens est Deo attribuere temporalitatem, ergo et aeternitatem.

9. Item, ubi aeternitas, et totalitas; quod patet per rationem Boethii²: «Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae possessio tota simul»; ubi autem totalitas, ibi partibilitas et divisibilitas; sed in Deo hoc non potest esse, cum sit summa simplicitas: ergo etc.

10. Item, nusquam est reperire continuitatem extensionis sine partibilitate: ergo nusquam continuationem durationis contingit reperire sine vera totalitate, ergo et divisibilitate; unde ens impartibile non habet rationem durationis nec dicitur totum simul: ergo etc.

11. Item, ubi aeternitas, ibi simultas, per definitionem³; sed ubi simultas, ibi distinctio, quia simultas dicit relationem, et relatio dicit distinctionem; sed divinum esse est omnino indistinctum: non ergo est aeternum.

12. Item, si in divino esse est omnimoda simultas, ergo simul sunt esse, fuisse et fore; sed in his quae simul sunt quod comitatur unum illorum, et alterum: si ergo aeviternum semper comitatur divinum fore, ergo pari ratione et suum fuisse: ergo sicut caret fine, ita et principio. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo impossibile est in Deo ponere perfectam aeternitatis durationem: non est igitur ponere, quod divinum esse sit aeternum.

13. Item, aut aeternitas addit aliquid supra nunc aeternitatis, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo quod coëxistit cum nunc⁴ aeternitatis est aeternum; sed nunc temporis coëxistit cum nunc aeternitatis: ergo coëxistit cum tota aeternitate, ergo est aeternum. Si aliquid: ergo aeternitas est composita: ergo non competit Deo.

14. Item, licet punctus sit principium et medium et terminus extensionis, tamen impossibile est, intra punctum intelligi extensionem: ergo pari ratione nec intra nunc durationem⁵: ergo si aeternitas dicit durationem, dicit aliquid extra nunc aeternitatis: ergo repugnat summae simplicitati: ergo impossibile est, quod sit circa Dei esse simplicissimum.

15. Item, eadem mensura mensuratur divinum esse et divinum posse, scire et velle seu praescire; sed divinum praescire non mensuratur aeternitate, cum Deus desinat praescire aliqua: ergo nec divinum esse est per aeternitatem mensurabile.

16. Item, eadem mensura mensuratur divinum esse et operari, quia idem est in Deo substantia, virtus et operatio⁶: si ergo divinum esse mensuratur aeternitate, ergo et divinum creare: ergo Deus ab aeterno et aeternaliter creat, ac per hoc creatura aeternaliter creatur; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur.

17. Item, omnis veritas mensuratur tempore, vel aevo, vel aeternitate⁷; sed mundum esse creandum, fuit verum in Deo ante mundi constitutionem; aut ergo mensuratur aeternitate, aut tempore; non tempore, quia tempus tunc non erat: ergo aeternitate. Sed hoc verum desiit esse verum: ergo videtur, quod aeternitas habeat terminum; sed divinum esse est interminatum: ergo non potest poni aeternitas circa esse divinum.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

Divinum esse est aeternum, quia est simplex simul et infinitum.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod divinum esse est aeternum, eo ipso quod simplex et infinitum. — Quia enim infinitum est, ideo caret principio et fine; nam si alterum horum haberet, utique ex illa parte haberet terminationem et limitationem, et ita non esset immensitatis summae. Quia vero simplex est, caret priori et posteriori, quae necessario inducunt diversitatem et aliquam compositionem. Summa igitur simplicitas ponit omnimodam simultatem; summa vero immensitas omnimodam interminabilitatem; quae duo simul iuncta constituunt aeternitatem. Ni-

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hil enim aliud est aeternitas nisi «vitae possessio interminabilis et tota simul»; et quia in nullo alio est simul haec duo reperire, scilicet immensitatem et simplicitatem, nisi in solo Deo: ideo aeternitatis conditio non potest communicari alicui alii a Deo. — Rursus, quia haec duo sunt supra nostram imaginationem et aestimationem; ideo aeternitatis duratio a nullo sane potest intelligi, nisi omni imaginatione postposita. Haec igitur duo simul iungantur, ut intelligatur divini esse duratio infinitissima et simplicissima, ac per hoc permanentia vera, carens inchoatione et interpolatione sive dilatione et divisione sive terminatione, et prorsus carens omnino omni successione. Et huiusmodi ratio per duas conditiones praedictas simul iunctas necessario syllogizat, quamvis imaginationi nostrae videatur contraria.

Potest autem huic simile in Deo reperiri. Sicut enim Deus simplex et immensus est totus in locis distantibus, quae loca etsi ad invicem distent, tamen existens hic et ibi non distat a se propter summam unitatem et simplicitatem; sic divinum esse, quod est aeternum, etsi sit in diversis temporibus propter immensitatem; licet illa tempora habeant distantiam et dilationem, ipsum tamen est indistans a se propter summam simplicitatem. Et sicut divina incircumscriptibilitas habet omnia loca sibi praesentia, et ipsa non distenditur per illa, licet illa vere sint distensa; sic divina aeternitas habet sibi omnia tempora praesentia, nec tamen ipsa succedit cum illis, licet illa vere succedant.

In creaturis vero, licet non possit omnino simile inveniri propter eius defectum, invenitur tamen aliquod cum aliquo defectu, quod quidem, illo defectu per intellectum circumscripto, manuducit ad intelligendam aeternitatem in esse divino. Hoc autem adverti aliquo modo potest et in imagine et in vestigio. In anima namque, quae est Dei imago, est memoria praeteritorum, intelligentia praesentium et praevidentia futurorum¹; et haec quidem simul sunt in anima, ita quod in anima, quae est substantia spiritualis, simul colliguntur et coniunguntur quae per diversa tempora succedunt; quia tamen ipsa limitata est et aliquid accipit a re extra, deficit ab illa simultate perfecta. Deus autem nihil prorsus accipit nec aliquo modo habet limitari; et ideo omnia sibi ut praesentia necessarium est intelligi, et hoc sine principio et fine²; et hoc est intelligere aeternitatem.

In tempore vero, quod est aeternitatis vestigium, est praesens, praeteritum et futurum, ita quod illud quod fuit futurum postea fit praesens et demum praeteritum, quia radicatur super esse mutabile et fluidum sive super ipsum motum. Si igitur praesens intelligatur radicari super esse immutabile et fixum, quod nec habet initium nec terminum, illud intelligetur aeternum. — Et sic, si quis recta consideratione a creaturis conscendat in Creatorem, auferendo quod est incompletionis et tenendo quod est complementi; venire poterit aliqualiter ad intelligendam aeternitatem esse divini, non tamen perfecte, quamdiu sumus in carne; quia dum hic vivimus, «nostrum intelligere non est sine continuo et tempore³», ac per hoc valde elongatur ab aeternitate, nisi forte per donum speciale altius sublevetur; ut enim dicit Augustinus, «cum aliquid aeternum mente capimus, in hoc mundo non sumus». — Patet igitur, divinum esse utique esse aeternum, et quae sit huius ratio necessaria, et qualiter capere possit consideratio nostra. Et rationes probantes, quod aeternitas sit in divino esse, sunt concedendae.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod aeternitas est mensura; dicendum, quod licet aeternitas secundum rationem intelligendi dicat⁴ sub ratione mensurae, secundum rem et veritatem nihil aliud dicit quam esse divinae substantiae; et sicut illud esse est immensum, sic et aeternitas est immensa; et ideo dicitur sibi aequari, non per conterminationem, quia immensum non habet terminum, sed per mutui excessus privationem. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur primo et secundo de ratione mensurae: quia rationes illae procedunt de mensura, quae differt a re mensurata, quae terminatur et terminat, ac per hoc non est nisi circa rem finitam; quae omnia deficiunt circa aeternitatem divinam, nec tamen falso dicitur mensura secundum rationem intelligendi, pro eo quod significat divinum esse per modum durationis, quae quidem duratio, etsi omnem creaturam in infinitum excedat, respectu tamen ipsius esse divini nec exceditur nec excedit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est carentia principii et finis; dicendum, quod principium et finis, secundum quod accipitur in ratione aeternitatis, idem sunt quod terminus initialis et finalis in duratione rei; et hi quidem termini non sunt nisi circa rem, quae incipit esse et desinit. Cum ergo dico, quod Deus est principium et finis, aequivocatur ibi ratio principii et finis. Unde duplex est defectus illius rationis: tum quia Deus est principium et finis respectu rerum extra, tum quia est principium et finis secundum rationem causandi. Cum autem dicitur, quod aeternitas est carentia

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principii et finis, accipitur principium et finis ut intra et secundum rationem durandi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod carentia horum, scilicet principii et finis, sonat in defectum, cum ipsa dicant complementum etc.; dicendum, quod principium et finis, secundum quod dicunt terminum, etsi videantur dicere complementum, dicunt tamen limitationem cum defectu; et ideo e contrario, licet horum carentia videatur esse privatio secundum rationem intelligendi, est tamen vera positio ex parte rei; duratio enim, quae caret principio et fine, ita vera est, quod nihil habet de non-entitate.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est carentia praeteriti et futuri; dicendum, quod praeteritum et futurum dupliciter attribuitur alicui: vel ita, quod sit per modum dispositionis rei intellectae, vel ipsius intelligentis. Similiter, cum aliquid dicitur fuisse in praeterito, vel in futuro fore; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: vel per modum quandoitatis et inhaerentiae vel per modum simultatis et coëxistentiae. Cum ergo dicitur, quod aeternitas est carentia praeteriti et futuri; dicendum, quod illud est verum, secundum quod praeteritum et futurum dicunt dispositionem rei, quae dicitur praeteriisse, ita quod illam mensurando reliquit in ea affectionem seu dispositionem quandam, quae dicitur quando, iuxta quod alibi¹ dicitur, quod «quando est in omni eo, quod coepit esse». Cum autem dicitur Deus fuisse et fore, praeteritum non est ibi dispositio rei intellectae, sed intelligentis; nec hoc dicitur per commensurationem, quandoitatem et inhaerentiam, sed per durationem, simultatem quandam et coëxistentiam. Unde omnes illae locutiones habent quandam improprietatem; balbutimus autem aeternitatem per varia tempora, quia intellectus noster non conscendit ad intelligenda aeterna, nisi manuducatur per tempora, quamdiu sumus in via.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non dicitur fuisse in tempore futuro, nec futurus esse in tempore praeterito; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter hoc, quod aliqua successio seu variatio sit in esse divino, sed propter connotationem coëxistentiae in tempore praeterito seu futuro, in quo tanta est variatio, ut nec praeteritum possit dici futurum, nec futurum possit dici praeteritum. Unde cum non dicatur futurus in praeterito nec praeteritus in futuro, hoc non est, quia fuisse et fore dicant aliud esse, vel alium modum essendi circa esse divinum, sed solum circa esse creatum.

7. 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est interminabilitas; dicendum, quod non accipit totam rationem aeternitatis, quia non tantum dicit interminabilitatem, sed etiam simultatem; et sicut per modum interminabilitatis dicit circumferentiam quandam intelligibilem², carentem principio et fine; sic per modum simultatis simplicitatem et indivisionem dicit ad modum centri; et haec duo circa divinum esse simul ponuntur, quia simul est simplex et infinitum, et ideo circularitas in aeternitate intelligitur; nec ponit posterioritatem respectu recti nec etiam respectu centri. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de tempore, quod tenet rationem centri respectu aeternitatis interminabilis. Sicut enim praecedens ratio, ita et haec procedit ex insufficienti: quia considerat aeternitatem, in quantum est mensura esse immensi tantum, cum simul debeat hoc intelligi, quod³ ipsa sit mensura simplicis et indivisibilis, quod nequaquam in mensura temporis potest reperiri.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi aeternitas, ibi totalitas; dicendum, quod totalitas, quae ponitur in aeternitate, non attenditur secundum quantitatem molis, sed secundum quantitatem virtutis, in qua simul stat ratio magnitudinis et immensitatis cum perfectione simplicitatis; et ideo non sequitur, quod ubi est totalitas, ibi divisibilitas; non enim habet esse verum nisi de hoc toto, quod est vere quantum, in quo, quia totalitas dicit veram quantitatem, necessario ponit partem et partem. — Vel posset dici, quod totum simul dicitur ibi potius secundum rationem perfectionis quam secundum rationem distributionis in partes alicuius totius integralis⁴.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nusquam est reperire continuitatem extensionis sine partibilitate; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia extensio semper dicit partem extra partem, ac per hoc corporeitatem, quantitatem et partibilitatem⁵; duratio autem dicit esse non intercisum, quod quidem non solum reperitur in compositis, verum etiam in simplicibus.

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11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas dicit simultatem; dicendum, quod simultas non dicitur ibi per positionem condurationis et coëxistentiae diversorum durabilium, sed potius per privationem successionis in continuitate rei durantis; unde tota simul dicitur aeternitas, quia in ea nihil alteri prorsus succedit, non propter hoc, quod in ea diversa et varia simul existant. Unde simultas nihil aliud dicit quam praesentialitatem summam et simplicem et indivisam, et haec nullam dicit diversitatem intrinsecam¹.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi idem est in Deo esse, fore et fuisse, quod creatura, sicut commetitur se suo modo divino fore, sic et divino fuisse; dicendum, quod non est simile, nec unum ex altero inferri debet. Et ratio huius est, quia, licet in Deo idem sit carere principio et carere fine, in creatura tamen multum differt. Nam creaturae, cum sit de nihilo, essentiale est habere principium et inceptionem; non habere autem finem et terminationem non repugnat naturae creatae; nec eius oppositum est sibi essentiale, pro eo quod appetitus creaturae est ad contraria². Et propter hoc non sequitur, quodsi possit assimilari Deo secundum id quod est fore, quod similiter secundum id quod est fuisse. Sicut enim non sequitur: idem est in Deo iustitia et immensitas; sed creatura potest assimilari Deo secundum quod iustus: ergo secundum quod immensus; sic etiam non concludit nec infert modus argumentandi praedictus.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas aut addit aliquid supra nunc aeternitatis, aut nihil; dicendum, quod cum in aeternitate sit simultas et interminabilitas, sive simplicitas et immensitas; nunc aeternitatis nominat illam durationem quantum ad simplicem simultatem, aeternitas vero quantum ad interminabilem immensitatem. Sicut ergo immensitas interminabilis supra indivisibilitatem divinae simplicitatis et simultatis secundum rem nihil quidem addit, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi; sic et aeternitas supra nunc aeternitatis. Et sicut non sequitur, quod creatura capit Deum simplicissimum: ergo capit Deum ut immensum; sic non sequitur, quodsi aliquid coëxistit cum nunc aeternitatis, quod coëxistat cum aeternitate interminabili. His enim, quae in Deo idem sunt, correspondent in creatura varia et diversa, sicut patet in bonitate et sapientia, in iustitia et misericordia, secundum quod praetactum est supra³.

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod licet punctus sit principium et medium et terminus extensionis, impossibile est intra ipsum intelligere extensionem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, licet punctus sit principium extensionis, non tamen est tota extensionis essentia nec etiam pars constitutiva; nunc autem est tota essentia durationis, non solum in aeternis et aeviternis, verum etiam in duratione temporis. Et ratio huius est: quia extensio habet omnes partes simul, et quia «punctus est substantia posita⁴», unde necessario dicit situm in materia; et ideo, cum sit indivisibile, non potest esse totius divisibilis essentia nec pars constitutiva, cum quaelibet pars continui sit continua. Secus autem est de duratione, quia de ipsa nunquam est nisi praesens et indivisibile, etiam in duratione successiva. Et ideo non est mirum, si in nunc claudi potest essentia durationis et potissime illius, in qua non differt essentia et esse, sicut est in aeternitate.

15. 16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem mensura mensuratur divinum esse et posse et scire et praescire; dicendum, quod verum est ratione principalis significati, non autem est verum ratione connotati. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de creatione; nam actus intrinsecus est aeternus, sicut et substantia; effectus vero temporalis, quia creatura⁵.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mundum esse futurum fuit verum ante mundi constitutionem; dicendum, quod illa propositio, licet sit una, implicat tamen in se duplicem veritatem. Si enim dicatur mundus esse futurus, antequam mundus fieret; hoc non est verum, nisi quia mundus aliquo modo habet esse in sua causa; et quantum ad hoc illud dictum est verum veritate aeterna. Rursus, ad hoc non sufficit, quod mundus habeat esse solum in causa, immo oportet ad hoc, quod propositio sit vera, quod aliquando habeat esse extra; et quia illud esse nondum, antequam mundus fieret, erat creatum, sed creandum: hinc est, quod quantum ad hoc non erat verum veritate creata, sed creanda. Et quia, cum res incipit esse creata, tunc desinit esse creanda: hinc est, quod propositio illa, quae significabat sententiam veram ab aeterno, desinit esse vera, non propter terminationem in aeternitate, sed propter inchoationem in tempore, quia cum aeterno intelligi dabat aliquod temporale⁶. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad praehabitam quaestionem.

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English Translation

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Question V. Whether the trinity of persons stands together with supreme eternity.

Next it is asked whether the trinity of persons stands together with supreme eternity. And concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is eternal.

The second is whether trinity and eternity stand together.

Article I. Whether the divine being is eternal.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus. And that the divine being is eternal:

1. The authority of Scripture proves it, Exodus, chapter 15⁴: The Lord shall reign for ever and ever; and to the Romans, chapter 1: His eternal power also and divinity.

2. The truth of faith also proves this: "Eternal," it says, in the Athanasian Creed, "is the Father, eternal the Son, eternal the Holy Spirit."

3. Likewise, the necessity of reason concludes this same thing. For Richard⁵ argues thus: Everything which is from itself is eternal; but the divine being, since it is

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first, is from itself: therefore etc. The major is manifest; because, if it were not eternal, at some time it would not have been, and then it would at some time have given being neither to itself nor to others, and thereby would never be. But the minor is evident through itself.

4. Likewise, everything which is its own being is eternal; for being cannot not be, therefore it can neither begin nor cease, and so it lacks beginning and end: if therefore God, since He is most simple, is His own being, nay rather is being simply¹; therefore He is altogether eternal.

5. Likewise, everything which is truth itself is eternal; but the divine being is truth itself: therefore etc. The minor is plain; the major Augustine proves in the Soliloquies²: For truth can neither be thought nor stated not to be; nay rather it follows that, if there is no truth, there is some truth, because, if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth, or that there is not: therefore being cannot in any way be removed from truth: therefore it always was, is and will be.

6. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme infinity is eternal; for if it had begun, it would be of finite duration; but the divine being is infinite³: therefore it is necessary that it be eternal, otherwise, if it lacks eternity, it lacks immensity also.

7. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme immortality is eternal; "for what begins from a turning tends toward a turning⁴"; but in the divine being there is supreme immortality, since it is life itself by essence, or living itself: therefore it is necessary that the divine being have eternity.

8. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme happiness is eternal; but the divine being is of this kind, since it is most perfect: therefore etc. The major is proved, because that happiness is greater which lacks beginning and end than that which took its start from elsewhere: if therefore the divine being is most happy, it follows necessarily that it is eternal. And again, all happiness bespeaks the absence of an end⁵: therefore the most perfect bespeaks the lack of all beginning.

9. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme simplicity is eternal; the divine being is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is manifest; the major is proved: because in whatever there is supreme simplicity, first, middle and last do not differ, and nothing of that sort has past and future, but only an abiding present; but everything of that sort is eternal⁶: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, since being is divided into the eternal and the aeviternal and the temporal, the aeviternal is nobler than the temporal, and the eternal nobler than both⁷; but always what is nobler is to be attributed to the noblest being: therefore supreme eternity is to be attributed to God.

11. Likewise, everything flowing is reduced to something permanent: therefore a flowing duration is reduced to a permanent duration, and so a present passing into the past is reduced to a present always abiding; but such a present is not in a defective thing: therefore it is necessary that it be in the creating essence; it is necessary therefore that the divine being be eternal⁸.

12. Likewise, the truth about the future was true without a beginning, the truth about the past is true without a term; but future and past are necessarily reduced to the present: therefore it is necessary to posit a truth always present without end and without beginning. But this is eternal, nor can it be posited in anything other than about the first principle: therefore necessarily the divine being is eternal⁹.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Eternity is a measure¹⁰; but nothing immense has a measure; for if it has a measure, it is not immense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a measure is equalled to the thing measured; but nothing can be equalled to the divine being: therefore there is not in God the duration of eternity.

3. Likewise, eternity is the lack of end and beginning¹¹; but nothing lacks that which it is: if therefore God is the beginning and end of all things, therefore the divine being does not have the lack of these: therefore it cannot be eternal.

4. Likewise, the lack of a completion sounds of a defect; beginning and end bespeak completion: therefore in God

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there is no positing of the privation of these; but eternity bespeaks the privation of these: therefore it ought not to be posited about the divine being.

5. Likewise, eternity is the lack of past and future; but God truly was and is and will be: therefore the divine being does not have the account of the eternal.

6. Likewise, let A be past time, B future; it is true to say that God was in A and will be in B, and false conversely: therefore A truly passed away with God, and B is truly future: therefore the divine being has past and future: therefore it is not eternal.

7. Likewise, where there is eternity, there is interminability, because according to Boethius¹ "eternity is the possession of interminable life"; where interminability, there circularity; but the circular is posterior to the straight, and nothing except what is simply first is to be attributed to the divine being: therefore neither is the duration of eternity.

8. Likewise, according to the account of understanding and the order of nature the circumference is posterior to the centre; but what the circumference is to the centre, this eternity is to time: therefore much more strongly is time to be attributed to God than eternity: therefore if it is unfitting to attribute temporality to God, therefore eternity also.

9. Likewise, where eternity, there totality also; which is plain from the reasoning of Boethius²: "Eternity is the possession of interminable life, whole all at once"; but where there is totality, there is partibility and divisibility; but in God this cannot be, since there is supreme simplicity: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, nowhere is a continuity of extension to be found without partibility: therefore nowhere does it happen that a continuation of duration is found without true totality, and therefore without divisibility; hence an impartible being does not have the account of duration nor is it called whole all at once: therefore etc.

11. Likewise, where eternity, there simultaneity, by the definition³; but where simultaneity, there distinction, because simultaneity bespeaks a relation, and relation bespeaks distinction; but the divine being is altogether undistinguished: therefore it is not eternal.

12. Likewise, if in the divine being there is simultaneity in every mode, therefore being, having been and being about to be are together; but among things which are together, what accompanies one of them accompanies the other also: if therefore the aeviternal always accompanies the divine being about to be, therefore by parity of reasoning its having been also: therefore as it lacks an end, so it lacks a beginning also. But this is impossible: therefore it is impossible to posit in God the perfect duration of eternity: it is therefore not to be posited that the divine being is eternal.

13. Likewise, either eternity adds something over the now of eternity, or nothing. If nothing: therefore what coexists with the now⁴ of eternity is eternal; but the now of time coexists with the now of eternity: therefore it coexists with the whole of eternity, therefore it is eternal. If something: therefore eternity is composite: therefore it does not belong to God.

14. Likewise, although a point is the beginning and middle and term of an extension, yet it is impossible that an extension be understood within a point: therefore by parity of reasoning neither a duration within a now⁵: therefore if eternity bespeaks a duration, it bespeaks something outside the now of eternity: therefore it is repugnant to supreme simplicity: therefore it is impossible that it be about God's most simple being.

15. Likewise, by the same measure are measured the divine being and the divine power, knowing and willing or foreknowing; but the divine foreknowing is not measured by eternity, since God ceases to foreknow some things: therefore neither is the divine being measurable through eternity.

16. Likewise, by the same measure are measured the divine being and operating, because in God substance, power and operation are the same⁶: if therefore the divine being is measured by eternity, therefore the divine creating also: therefore God creates from eternity and eternally, and thereby the creature is eternally created; but this is false: therefore that also from which it follows.

17. Likewise, every truth is measured by time, or by aeviternity, or by eternity⁷; but that the world was to be created was true in God before the constitution of the world; either therefore it is measured by eternity, or by time; not by time, because time then was not: therefore by eternity. But this truth ceased to be true: therefore it seems that eternity has a term; but the divine being is unterminated: therefore eternity cannot be posited about the divine being.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

The divine being is eternal, because it is simple and infinite at once.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the divine being is eternal, by the very fact that it is simple and infinite. — For because it is infinite, therefore it lacks beginning and end; for if it had either of these, it would assuredly have on that side a termination and limitation, and so would not be of supreme immensity. But because it is simple, it lacks prior and posterior, which necessarily bring in diversity and some composition. Supreme simplicity, therefore, posits simultaneity in every mode; and supreme immensity interminability in every mode; and these two joined together constitute eternity. For

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eternity is nothing else than "the possession of life, interminable and whole all at once"; and because in nothing else is it possible to find these two together, namely immensity and simplicity, save in God alone: therefore the condition of eternity cannot be communicated to anything else other than God. — Again, because these two are above our imagination and estimation, therefore the duration of eternity can be understood by no one soundly, unless all imagination be set aside. Let these two, therefore, be joined together, so that there may be understood a duration of the divine being most infinite and most simple, and thereby a true permanence, lacking inchoation and interpolation or delay, and division or termination, and lacking utterly and altogether all succession. And a reasoning of this kind necessarily syllogizes through the two aforesaid conditions joined together, although it may seem contrary to our imagination.

Now something like this can be found in God Himself. For just as God, simple and immense, is whole in distant places, and although those places are distant from one another, yet existing here and there He is not distant from Himself on account of His supreme unity and simplicity; so the divine being, which is eternal, although it be in diverse times on account of immensity — although those times have distance and delay, it nevertheless is undistant from itself on account of supreme simplicity. And just as the divine incircumscribability has all places present to itself, and is not itself extended through them, although they are truly extended; so the divine eternity has all times present to itself, nor does it itself succeed along with them, although they truly succeed.

In creatures, however, although what is wholly like cannot be found on account of their defect, yet something is found with some defect, which indeed, that defect being circumscribed by the understanding, leads by the hand to the understanding of eternity in the divine being. And this can in some way be observed both in the image and in the vestige. For in the soul, which is the image of God, there is memory of things past, intelligence of things present and foresight of things future¹; and these indeed are together in the soul, so that in the soul, which is a spiritual substance, there are gathered and joined together at once things which succeed through diverse times; yet because the soul itself is limited and receives something from a thing outside, it falls short of that perfect simultaneity. But God receives nothing whatever, nor has He in any mode to be limited; and therefore it is necessary that all things be understood by Him as present, and this without beginning and end²; and this is to understand eternity.

But in time, which is the vestige of eternity, there is a present, a past and a future, so that what was future afterwards becomes present and at length past, because it is rooted upon changeable and fluid being or upon motion itself. If therefore the present be understood to be rooted upon being immutable and fixed, which has neither a beginning nor a term, that will be understood as eternal. — And thus, if anyone by right consideration ascends from creatures into the Creator, taking away what is of incompletion and holding what is of completion, he will be able in some fashion to come to the understanding of the eternity of the divine being, yet not perfectly, so long as we are in the flesh; because while we live here, "our understanding is not without the continuous and time³," and thereby it is very far removed from eternity, unless perhaps it be raised higher by a special gift; for as Augustine says, "when we grasp something eternal with the mind, we are not in this world." — It is plain, therefore, that the divine being is assuredly eternal, and what the necessary reason of this is, and in what manner our consideration can grasp it. And the reasonings proving that eternity is in the divine being are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that eternity is a measure; it must be said that, although eternity according to the account of understanding bespeaks⁴ under the account of a measure, according to the thing and the truth it bespeaks nothing else than the being of the divine substance; and just as that being is immense, so eternity also is immense; and therefore it is said to be equalled to itself, not by co-termination, since the immense has no term, but by the privation of mutual excess. — And through this the answer is plain to that which is objected first and second concerning the account of a measure: because those reasonings proceed from a measure which differs from the thing measured, which is terminated and terminates, and thereby is only about a finite thing; all of which fail concerning the divine eternity, nor yet is it falsely called a measure according to the account of understanding, for the reason that it signifies the divine being under the mode of a duration, which duration indeed, although it exceeds every creature to infinity, is with respect to the divine being itself neither exceeded nor exceeds.

3. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of beginning and end; it must be said that beginning and end, according as they are taken in the account of eternity, are the same as the initial and final term in the duration of a thing; and these terms indeed are only about a thing which begins to be and ceases. When therefore I say that God is beginning and end, the account of beginning and end is there equivocal. Hence the defect of that reasoning is twofold: both because God is beginning and end with respect to things outside, and because He is beginning and end according to the account of causing. But when it is said that eternity is the lack

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of beginning and end, beginning and end are taken as within and according to the account of enduring.

4. To that which is objected, that the lack of these, namely of beginning and end, sounds of a defect, since they themselves bespeak completion, etc.; it must be said that beginning and end, according as they bespeak a term, although they seem to bespeak completion, nevertheless bespeak limitation with defect; and therefore conversely, although the lack of these seems to be a privation according to the account of understanding, it is nevertheless a true position on the side of the thing; for a duration which lacks beginning and end is so true that it has nothing of non-entity.

5. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of past and future; it must be said that past and future are attributed to something in two ways: either so that it be by mode of a disposition of the thing understood, or of the one understanding himself. Similarly, when something is said to have been in the past, or to be about to be in the future, this can be understood in two ways: either by mode of when-ness and inherence, or by mode of simultaneity and coexistence. When therefore it is said that eternity is the lack of past and future; it must be said that this is true according as past and future bespeak a disposition of the thing which is said to have passed away, so that in measuring it, it left in it a certain affection or disposition which is called when, according to what is said elsewhere¹, that "when is in everything that began to be." But when God is said to have been and to be about to be, the past is there not a disposition of the thing understood, but of the one understanding; nor is this said by commensuration, when-ness and inherence, but by duration, a certain simultaneity and coexistence. Hence all those locutions have a certain impropriety; and we stammer out eternity through various times, because our understanding does not ascend to the understanding of eternal things unless it be led by the hand through times, so long as we are on the way.

6. To that which is objected, that God is not said to have been in future time, nor to be about to be in past time; it must be said that this is not on account of this, that any succession or variation is in the divine being, but on account of the connotation of coexistence in past or future time, in which there is so great a variation that neither can the past be called future, nor the future be called past. Hence, since He is not said to be about to be in the past nor past in the future, this is not because having been and being about to be bespeak another being, or another mode of being, about the divine being, but only about created being.

7. 8. To that which is objected, that eternity is interminability; it must be said that this does not take the whole account of eternity, because it bespeaks not only interminability, but also simultaneity; and just as by mode of interminability it bespeaks a certain intelligible circumference² lacking beginning and end, so by mode of simultaneity it bespeaks simplicity and indivision after the mode of a centre; and these two are posited together about the divine being, because it is at once simple and infinite, and therefore circularity is understood in eternity; nor does it posit posteriority with respect to the straight, nor even with respect to the centre. — And through this the answer is plain to that which is objected concerning time, which holds the account of a centre with respect to interminable eternity. For just as the preceding reasoning, so this one also proceeds from what is insufficient: because it considers eternity insofar as it is the measure of immense being only, whereas it ought at the same time to be understood³ that eternity is the measure of what is simple and indivisible, which can in no way be found in the measure of time.

9. To that which is objected, that where eternity, there totality; it must be said that the totality which is posited in eternity is not regarded according to the quantity of mass, but according to the quantity of power, in which the account of magnitude and immensity stands together with the perfection of simplicity; and therefore it does not follow that where there is totality, there is divisibility; for it has true being only of that whole which is truly quantitative, in which, because totality bespeaks true quantity, it necessarily posits part and part. — Or it could be said that whole all at once is there said rather according to the account of perfection than according to the account of distribution into the parts of some integral whole⁴.

10. To that which is objected, that nowhere is a continuity of extension to be found without partibility; it must be said that the case is not alike: because extension always bespeaks part outside part, and thereby corporeity, quantity and partibility⁵; but duration bespeaks being not cut apart, which indeed is found not only in composite things, but also in simple ones.

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11. To that which is objected, that eternity bespeaks simultaneity; it must be said that simultaneity is there said not by the positing of the co-duration and coexistence of diverse durable things, but rather by the privation of succession in the continuity of the enduring thing; hence eternity is called whole all at once, because in it nothing whatever succeeds to anything else, not on account of this, that in it diverse and various things exist together. Hence simultaneity bespeaks nothing else than a presentiality supreme and simple and undivided, and this bespeaks no intrinsic diversity¹.

12. To that which is objected, that if in God being, being about to be and having been are the same, as a creature measures itself in its own mode with the divine being about to be, so also with the divine having been; it must be said that the case is not alike, nor ought the one be inferred from the other. And the reason of this is that, although in God to lack a beginning and to lack an end are the same, in a creature they differ much. For since a creature is from nothing, it is essential to it to have a beginning and an inception; but not to have an end and a termination is not repugnant to created nature; nor is the opposite of this essential to it, for the reason that the appetite of a creature is toward contraries². And on account of this it does not follow that, if it can be assimilated to God according to that which is being about to be, it can likewise be so according to that which is having been. For just as it does not follow: justice and immensity are the same in God; but a creature can be assimilated to God according as He is just: therefore according as He is immense; so neither does the aforesaid mode of arguing conclude or infer.

13. To that which is objected, that eternity either adds something over the now of eternity, or nothing; it must be said that, since in eternity there is simultaneity and interminability, or simplicity and immensity, the now of eternity names that duration as regards simple simultaneity, but eternity as regards interminable immensity. Just as, therefore, interminable immensity adds nothing indeed according to the thing over the indivisibility of the divine simplicity and simultaneity, but only according to the account of understanding; so also eternity over the now of eternity. And just as it does not follow that a creature grasps God as most simple: therefore it grasps God as immense; so it does not follow that, if something coexists with the now of eternity, it coexists with interminable eternity. For to those things which in God are the same there correspond in a creature things various and diverse, as is plain in goodness and wisdom, in justice and mercy, according to what was touched upon above³.

14. To that which is objected, that although a point is the beginning and middle and term of an extension, it is impossible to understand an extension within it; it must be said that the case is not alike: because, although a point is the beginning of an extension, yet it is not the whole essence of the extension, nor even a constitutive part; whereas the now is the whole essence of duration, not only in eternal and aeviternal things, but also in the duration of time. And the reason of this is: that extension has all its parts together, and because "a point is a posited substance⁴," whence it necessarily bespeaks position in matter; and therefore, since it is indivisible, it cannot be the essence of a divisible whole nor a constitutive part, since every part of the continuous is continuous. But it is otherwise with duration, because of it there is never anything but what is present and indivisible, even in successive duration. And therefore it is no wonder if in a now the essence of duration can be enclosed, and most of all of that duration in which essence and being do not differ, as is the case in eternity.

15. 16. To that which is objected, that by the same measure are measured the divine being and power and knowing and foreknowing; it must be said that this is true by reason of the principal thing signified, but is not true by reason of what is connoted. — And through this the answer is plain to what follows, which is objected concerning creation; for the intrinsic act is eternal, as is the substance also; but the effect is temporal, because it is a creature⁵.

17. To that which is objected, that it was true before the constitution of the world that the world was about to be; it must be said that that proposition, although it be one, nevertheless implies in itself a twofold truth. For if it be said that the world is about to be, before the world was made; this is not true except because the world in some mode has being in its cause; and as regards this, that saying is true with an eternal truth. Again, for this it does not suffice that the world have being only in its cause; nay rather it is required, in order that the proposition be true, that at some time it have being outside; and because that being was not yet created, before the world was made, but to be created: hence it is that, as regards this, it was not true with a created truth, but with a truth to be created. And because, when a thing begins to be created, it then ceases to be to be created: hence it is that that proposition, which signified a sentence true from eternity, ceases to be true, not on account of a termination in eternity, but on account of an inchoation in time, because along with the eternal it gave something temporal to be understood⁶. — And through this the answer is plain to the question set before us.

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Apparatus Criticus

4
Vers. 18. — Seq. locus est Rom. 1, 20.
Verse 18. — The following locus is Rom. 1:20.
5
Libr. I. de Trin. c. 6. 8. et 11.
Book I On the Trinity, c. 6, 8 and 11.
1
Boeth., in lib. Quomodo substantiae in 〈〉o, quod sint, bonae sint etc. ait: Ipsum vero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum... Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet.
Boethius, in the book How substances are good in that they are [sic], etc., says: "But being itself has nothing else mingled with it besides itself... Everything simple has its being and that which it is as one."
2
Vide supra pag. 47, nota 11, et Richard. a S. Vict. II. de Trin. c. 2.
See above, p. 47, note 11, and Richard of St. Victor, II On the Trinity, c. 2.
3
Ut ostensum est supra q. 4. a. 1. — Inferius pro immensitate A E infinitate. In B G desideratur hoc arg., B omittit etiam seq. arg.
As was shown above, q. 4, a. 1. — Below, in place of immensitate, A E have infinitate. In B G this argument is wanting, and B omits the following argument also.
4
Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27. — Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 39. (XI. c. 7.): Dicimus itaque Deum sempiternum optimumque vivens esse. Quare vita et aevum continuum et aeternum Deo inest; hoc enim est Deus.
Damascene, I On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3, and II, c. 27. — Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, text 39 (XI, c. 7): "We say, therefore, that God is an everlasting and best living being. Wherefore life and a continuous and eternal age belong to God; for this is God."
5
Cfr. August., de Beata Vita, c. 2. n. 11, ubi ostendit, beatum non esse qui timet, ne amittat quod possidet. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 11, de vita beata dicit, «quae procul dubio non nisi aeterna est aeternitatisque suae certa atque secura». Cfr. ibid. XIV. c. 25.
Compare Augustine, On the Happy Life, c. 2, n. 11, where he shows that he is not happy who fears lest he lose what he possesses. In XI On the City of God, c. 11, he says of the happy life that "it is beyond doubt not such unless it be eternal and certain and secure of its own eternity." Compare ibid. XIV, c. 25.
6
August., 83 Qq. q. 19: In aeterno enim, cum proprie dicitur, neque quidquam praeteritum, quasi transierit, neque quidquam futurum, quasi nondum sit, sed quidquid est tantummodo est. Cfr. ibid. q. 17.
Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 19: "For in the eternal, when it is properly so called, there is nothing past, as though it had gone by, nor anything future, as though it were not yet, but whatever is, only is." Compare ibid. q. 17.
7
Vide II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
See II Sentences, d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
8
Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. ult.
Compare the Book of Causes, last proposition.
9
Anselm., Monolog. c. 18: Deinde cogitet qui potest, quando incepit, aut quando non fuit hoc verum, scilicet quia futurum erat aliquid; aut quando desinet et non erit hoc verum, scilicet quia praeteritum erit aliquid. Quodsi neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest; impossibile est vel cogitare, quod veritas principium vel finem habeat.
Anselm, Monologion, c. 18: "Then let him think, who can, when it began, or when this was not true, namely that something was future; or when it will cease and this will not be true, namely that something will be past. But if neither of these can be thought, and neither of these truths can be without truth; it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning or an end."
10
Scilicet mensura durationis esse increati. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
Namely the measure of the duration of uncreated being. Compare II Sentences, d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
11
Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 9. — Aristot., de Mundo, in fine, ait: Enimvero Deus, ut est vetusto proverbio proditum, principium et finem et media omnium rerum tenens etc.
Compare above, p. 79, note 9. — Aristotle, On the World, at the end, says: "For indeed God, as has been handed down in an ancient proverb, holds the beginning and the end and the middle of all things," etc.
1
Libr. V. de Consolat. prosa 6. — Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 64. seqq. (c. 8.); I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 5. seqq. (c. 2.), probat, solum motum circularem esse posse infinitum et continuum.
Book V On Consolation, prose 6. — Aristotle, VIII Physics, text 64 and following (c. 8); I On the Heavens and the World, text 5 and following (c. 2), proves that only circular motion can be infinite and continuous.
2
Libr. V. de Consolat. prosa 6.
Book V On Consolation, prose 6.
3
A Boethio supra in arg. 9. datam. — De simultate cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Simul.
Given by Boethius above in argument 9. — On simultaneity compare Aristotle, On the Categories, the chapter On the Simultaneous.
4
G cum toto nunc.
G has with the whole now.
5
Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 103. seqq. (c. 11.). et VI. text. 24. seqq. (c. 3.), ostendit indivisibilitatem instantis.
Aristotle, IV Physics, text 103 and following (c. 11), and VI, text 24 and following (c. 3), shows the indivisibility of the instant.
6
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp.
Compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 2, in the body.
7
Vide II. Sent. d. II. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. — Dictio ante mundi constitutionem occurrit Ioan. 17, 24; Eph. 1, 4. et I. Petr. 1, 20.
See II Sentences, d. II, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1. — The expression before the constitution of the world occurs at John 17:24; Eph. 1:4 and I Pet. 1:20.
1
Quae secundum Ciceronem, II. Rhet. c. 54, sunt partes integrales prudentiae, si cum A B H substituatur providentia pro praevidentia. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 6.
Which according to Cicero, II Rhetoric, c. 54, are the integral parts of prudence, if with A B H providentia be substituted for praevidentia. Compare tome III, p. 728, note 6.
2
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. — De tempore cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1. — Vocibus est intelligi A interserit simul.
Compare I Sentences, d. 39, a. 2, q. 3. — On time compare II Sentences, d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 1. — Between the words est intelligi A inserts simul.
3
Ut dicit Aristot., supra pag. 21, nota 8. allegatus. — Verba Augustini paulo inferius adducta inveniuntur in IV. de Trin. c. 20. n. 28. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 8, et ibid. Commentar. p. II. dub. 5.
As Aristotle says, cited above on p. 21, note 8. — The words of Augustine adduced a little below are found in IV On the Trinity, c. 20, n. 28. Compare I Sentences, the text of the Master, d. XV, c. 8, and the Commentary on the same place, p. II, dub. 5.
4
Supplendum: durationem, vel substituendum dicatur (D G omittunt dicat).
To be supplied: durationem; or dicatur to be substituted (D G omit dicat).
1
A Gilbert. Porret., in lib. Sex Principiorum, c. de Quando, ubi textus originalis incipit pro coepit. Ibid. etiam dicitur: Quando vero est quod ex adiacentia temporis relinquitur; tempus vero quando non est, utriusque autem ratio coniuncta est, ut tempus quidem praeteritum quando non est, effectus autem eius [temporis praeteriti] et affectio, secundum quam dicitur aliquid fuisse, quando est... Est igitur quando aliud ex eo quod abiit, aliud ex eo quod instat, aliud vero ex eo quod necesse est contingere. Dictum est enim in Categoriis [sive Praedicam. Aristot. c. de Quanto] praeteritum et futurum esse quantitates, et quod magis est continuans ad praesens etc. — Superius termino quandoitatis utitur G, et inferius ipsi accedit E, dum ponunt quandoitatem, alii his substituunt quantitatis et quantitatem. — Circa finem solut. respicitur illud Gregorii, quod Deum «aliquatenus balbutiendo resonamus» (V. Moral. c. 36. n. 66; cfr. tom. III. pag. 175, nota 2.). — De ipsa solutione vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. dub. 7. et d. 9. dub. 5.
From Gilbert Porretanus, in the book Of the Six Principles, the chapter On When, where the original text has incipit for coepit. In the same place it is also said: "But when is what is left over from the adjacency of time; time, however, is not when, but the account of the two is conjoined, so that past time indeed is not when, but its effect [that is, of the past time] and the affection, according to which something is said to have been, is when... When is therefore one thing from that which has gone away, another from that which is at hand, and another from that which must come to pass. For it has been said in the Categories [or Predicaments of Aristotle, the chapter On Quantity] that past and future are quantities, and that what is more continuous with the present," etc. — Above, G uses the term quandoitatis, and below E joins it, when they set down quandoitatem; others substitute for these quantitatis and quantitatem. — Toward the end of the solution there is a reference to that saying of Gregory, that we "in some fashion resound God by stammering" (V Morals c. 36, n. 66; compare tome III, p. 175, note 2). — On the solution itself see I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, dub. 7, and d. 9, dub. 5.
2
Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regul. 7: Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam. Infra post nec ponit supple: aeternitas.
Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 7: "God is an intelligible sphere, whose centre is everywhere, whose circumference nowhere." Below, after nec ponit, supply: aeternitas.
3
Ita G; A B legunt simul debeant haec [immensitas sive interminabilitas et simultas sive simplicitas] intelligi, cum. Post pauca pro indivisibilis D G H interminabilis.
So G; A B read simul debeant haec [immensity or interminability, and simultaneity or simplicity] intelligi, cum. A little after, in place of indivisibilis, D G H have interminabilis.
4
Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 30. seq. (IV. c. 25. seq.). — Cfr. supra q. 4. a. 1. in corp. et ad 2.
See Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 30 and following (IV, c. 25 and following). — Compare above, q. 4, a. 1, in the body and at reply 2.
5
Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto.
Compare Aristotle, On the Categories, the chapter On Quantity.
1
Eodem modo exponit ipse Boeth., V. de Consolat. prosa 6.
Boethius himself expounds it in the same way, V On Consolation, prose 6.
2
Sensus videtur esse, quod non hac ratione, quia appetitus creaturae tendit ad esse, incorruptibilitas sit creaturae essentialis. Hoc explicatur II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. et I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8. Pro est B non est.
The sense seems to be that it is not for this reason, because the appetite of a creature tends toward being, that incorruptibility is essential to a creature. This is explained at II Sentences, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, at reply 5, and I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, at replies 7 and 8. In place of est, B has non est.
3
Quaest. 3. a. 1. in corp. et ad 6. seqq.
Question 3, a. 1, in the body and at reply 6 and following.
4
Aristot., I. Poster. c. 23. (c. 27.), I. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 447, nota 2. et tom. II. pag. 81, nota 4. — Superius post pars cum A B adiecimus constitutiva.
Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 23 (c. 27); I On the Soul, text 68 (c. 4), and V Metaphysics, text 12 (IV, c. 6). Compare tome I, p. 447, note 2, and tome II, p. 81, note 4. — Above, after pars, we have added constitutiva with A B.
5
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. q. 3. et 4.
Compare I Sentences, d. 7, q. 3 and 4.
6
Vide I. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq., d. 39. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. et dub. 4.
See I Sentences, d. 30, q. 1 and following; d. 39, a. 2, q. 2; and d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, and dub. 4. ---