Quaest. 5, Art. 2
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio V: Utrum personarum trinitas simul stet cum summa aeternitate
Articulus II. Utrum simul stent trinitas et aeternitas.
Deinde quaeritur, utrum simul stent trinitas et aeternitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur sic.
1. Ubicumque est aeternitas, est omnimoda simultas1; ubi autem omnimoda simultas, ibi nullus ordo; ubi nullus ordo, nulla est emanatio; ubi non est emanatio, non potest esse personalis plurificatio: ergo a primo, si in divino esse est summa et vera aeternitas, impossibile est, quod sit vera trinitas sive personarum pluralitas.
2. Item, « causa est cuius esse sequitur aliud2 », scilicet effectus; sed constat, quod effectus sequitur causam, non ratione diversitatis, quia haec possunt esse simul: ergo ratione productionis. Ubi ergo est productio, ibi est antecessio et consecutio; sed ubi haec sunt, non est vera aeternitas: ergo etc.
3. Item, si tres personae sunt in Trinitate, aut sunt aeque primae, aut non sunt aeque primae. Si aeque primae: ergo non est una ab alia, ac per hoc non possunt esse in eadem natura. Si vero non sunt aeque primae: ergo nec simpliciter et aequaliter coaeternae; ergo idem quod prius.
4. Item, omnis corruptio necessario ponit terminum finalem3, ergo omnis productio vel emanatio initialem; sed non potest esse trinitas sine emanatione sive productione; ergo nec sine alicuius inchoatione. Sed hoc non potest stare cum aeternitate: ergo etc.
5. Item, aeternitas est duratio interminabilis4: ergo si in divinis est trinitas aeterna, ergo et interminabilis personarum productio sive emanatio; sed productio sive emanatio interminata nunquam est perfecta, quia nunquam est in productum esse: aut ergo trinitas non est perfecta, aut non est aeterna.
6. Item, in Deo idem est omnino esse et durare, ergo idem est habere principium essendi et durandi; sed non potest esse vera trinitas, quin aliqua persona habeat ibi principium existendi per productionem: ergo non potest esse, quin habeat principium durandi. Sed hoc non compatitur aeternitatem5: ergo etc.
7. Item, non est maioris virtutis nec actualitatis persona quam essentia; sed divina essentia non potest producere aliam essentiam sibi coaeternam: ergo nec persona personam; aut ergo in divina essentia non est personarum trinitas, aut non est ibi summa aeternitas.
8. Item, omne ens aut est creatum, aut increatum; similiter omne ens aut est a se, aut ab alio; sed omne creatum est ens ab alio: ergo omne increatum est ens a se ipso. Sed omne aeternum est increatum: ergo omne aeternum est a se ipso, nihil igitur aeternum, quod sit ab alio. Sed non potest esse trinitas, quin aliqua persona ab aliqua procedat: ergo ubi est trinitas, non est aeternitas.
9. Item, quotiescumque aliqua virtus, sive finita sive infinita, secundum omnem potentiae suae totalitatem exserit se in aliquem actum, impossibile est, quod simul et semel exserat se in alium; sed virtus paterna in generando6 omnino exserit totius suae virtutis immensitatem, cum tantus sit Filius, quantus est Pater: ergo simul et semel non potest aliam personam producere. Si ergo tertiam producit, hoc erit vel ante vel post; sed hoc non est in omnimoda aeternitate: aut igitur in divinis non est trinitas, aut non est vera aeternitas.
10. Item, ubicumque est productio, ibi est acceptio ab alio; sed nihil accipit quod iam habet: ergo si Filius producitur a Patre, accipit esse a Patre: ergo illud esse prius non habebat. Sed quod accipit esse prius non habitum accipit durandi initium; et nihil tale est aeternum: ergo non stat simul aeternitas cum productione, ergo nec cum trinitate.
11. Item, aeternitas dicit praesens; unde aeternum est semper praesens secundum suam propriam rationem; sed emanationes in divinis, et maxime generatio proprie insinuatur per praeteritum quam per praesens, quia melius dicitur semper genitus, semper natus, quam dicatur generari et nasci7: ergo videtur, quod haec duo simul stare non possint. Si igitur non potest esse trinitas sine vera productione, non ergo simul stare cum aeternitate.
Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ hoc sunt auctoritates innumerabiles tam in veteri quam in nova lege8; sed ratione ostenditur.
1. « Relativa enim sunt simul natura1 »; Pater et Filius sunt vere relativa, et Spirator et Spiritus; ergo simul natura: si ergo aliqua personarum est aeterna; cum aliae sint simul natura, necesse est, omnes esse aeternas. Et quod hoc sequatur, manifestum est, quia in Deo relatio non potest esse accidens nec aliunde adveniens propter summam simplicitatem: necesse est ergo, quod habeant omnimodam simultatem.
2. Item, mens paterna simul fuit et intellexit, quia suum esse est suum intelligere nec praecedit natura nec duratione aliqua; sed in mente intelligere est verbum ex se sumere: ergo simul fuit et Verbum genuit. Verbum autem non potest esse nisi placitum et amatum2; ergo et amanti connexum: ergo si divinum intelligere simul stat cum aeternitate, igitur et aeternitas cum trinitate.
3. Item, ad nobilitatem virtutis spectat cito producere; unde quaedam producunt in tempore imperceptibili3, quaedam subito, quaedam simul duratione, licet posterius natura; et haec omnia est reperire in creatura: si ergo divina virtus est potentissima, omnino superexcedens virtutem creatam; ergo sic potens producere et producet, quod productus simul sit natura cum producente.
4. Item, Pater potest Filio communicare deitatem et omnipotentiam, alioquin non esset Filius; sed deitas est ipsa aeternitas, nec potest esse Deus, nisi sit aeternus: ergo prima persona potest aliis aeternitatem communicare: ergo trinitas et aeternitas simul possunt stare.
5. Item, potentior est lux increata ad producendum suum splendorem quam lux creata; sed lux creata nunquam est sine splendore, ergo nec lux increata: ergo si splendor est persona producta, patet etc.
6. Item, trinitas simul stat cum immensitate, et immensitas necessario ponit aeternitatem4: ergo a primo, vera et perfecta trinitas simul est, ubi est vera et perfecta aeternitas: ergo non habent aliquam repugnantiam.
7. Item, trinitas simul stat cum summa aequalitate5; sed aequalitas est non tantum secundum virtutem, sed etiam secundum durationem, in qua nihil aequari potest aeterno, nisi sit illi coaeternum: si ergo stat cum summa aequalitate, ergo et cum aeternitate.
8. Item, ubicumque idem est potentia et actus, si potentia potest esse aeterna, et actus, maxime cum nihil connotetur extrinsecum nec creatum; sed in persona Patris idem est posse generare et generare; similiter verum est de potentia spirandi: si ergo necessarium est, Patrem aeternaliter potuisse generare, ergo necessario ponitur aeternaliter genuisse6.
9. Item, ubi idem prorsus est esse et referri, necessarium est illis eadem mensura mensurari; sed idem prorsus est in Patre esse et referri ad Filium, et e converso, quia nulla est ibi compositio7: si igitur esse est aeternum, ergo et respectus mutuus personarum.
10. Item, in imagine creata simul sunt essentia et potentia, et quaelibet trium potentiarum est alteri coaeva, sicut manifeste patet in anima: ergo cum maior sit convenientia inter divinas personas, multo fortius una erit alteri coaeterna — sicut enim se habet perpetuitas ad imaginem, sic aeternitas ad trinitatem creatricem; unde « ex perpetuitate rerum manifeste ostenditur Conditor aeternus8 » — ergo ex perpetuitate imaginis infertur et ostenditur aeternitas trinitatis.
Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.
Trinitas personarum necessario simul stat cum aeternitate.
Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod trinitas et aeternitas necessario simul stant; et hoc quidem colligitur ex parte conditionum essentialium et ex parte emanationum originalium et ex parte relationum personalium.
Ex parte, inquam, conditionum essentialium: quia trinitas stat cum summa essentiae unitate, simplicitate et immensitate, sicut in praecedentibus9 ostensum est; unde divinae personae habent esse unum, simplicissimum et immensum; aeternitas autem respicit ipsum esse, quod in trinitate nec habet numerari nec componi nec limitari; restat igitur, ut in tribus personis sit aeternitas vera propter immensitatem, sit aeternitas summa propter omnimodam simplicitatem, sit aeternitas unica propter essentiae unitatem; non igitur aeternitas excludit trinitatem, quia trinitas necessario includit aeternitatem.
Ex parte etiam emanationum originalium idem ipsum colligitur, tum ratione producentis, tum ratione producti, tum ratione modi producendi. Producens enim est in omnimoda virtutis actualitate propter summam perfectionem; productus vero in omnimoda aequalitate propter summam assimilationem; productio vero in omnimoda necessitate propter
naturalem diffusionem sive communicationem. Si igitur persona producens est aeterna, necesse est, ut aeternus sit producendi actus et ipse productus et producendi modus. Patet igitur, quod aeternitas et trinitas non solum non repugnant, sed mirabiliter consonant et necessario simul stant.
Ex parte vero relationum personalium hoc ipsum colligitur. Nam personae divinae suis relationibus distinguuntur, relationibus, inquam, non extrinsecis, sed intrinsecis; non adventitiis, sed mansivis; non diminutis, sed completissimis1. Quoniam autem relatio intrinseca, non adventitia, sed perfecta simul coëxistit cum suo supposito; et relatio et sua correlatio sunt simul natura: necessario huiusmodi relationes ponunt in divinis personis summam simultatem nec introducunt terminabilitatem, quia stant cum summa infinitate. Quoniam ergo ad aeternitatem nihil plus requiritur quam simultas cum omnimoda interminabilitate et summa interminabilitas cum omnimoda simultate; necessario simul stant trinitas cum aeternitate, et aeternitas cum trinitate, quia trinitas non excludit, sed includit aeternitatem. Unde Augustinus, undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo vigesimo octavo2: « Deus, ad cuius imaginem sumus creati, est vera aeternitas, aeterna veritas, aeterna et vera caritas; estque ipse aeterna et vera et cara Trinitas ». Sicut igitur aeternitas non repugnat caritati et veritati, sic etiam non repugnat trinitati, nec e converso. — Et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ubi est aeternitas, ibi est omnimoda simultas; dicendum, quod simultas aeternitatis excludit ordinem prioris et posterioris, non tamen ordinem originis. Cum autem dicitur, quod trinitas ponit ordinem, non intelligitur de ordine prioritatis et posterioritatis, sed de ordine originis et emanationis naturalis, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus3, quod « est ibi ordo, non quo alter prior, alter posterior, sed quo alter ex altero ».
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod effectus sequitur causam non ratione diversitatis, sed productionis; dicendum, quod neutrum illorum est tota causa sufficiens et perfecta, sed unum cum alio; ideo enim sequitur causam effectus, quia ab ipsa manat, ita quod ab ipsa differt secundum essentiam; et propter hoc nec ita nobile est, sicut causa, nec aequatur ei in duratione nec in virtute aequalitate omnimoda. Secus autem est in productione divina, ubi producens et qui producitur unam habent essentiam et eandem, ac per hoc aequalitatem omnimodam in duratione pariter et virtute4.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut personae sunt ibi aeque primae, aut non; dicendum, quod quantum ad privationem prioris et posterioris sunt aeque primae, quantum autem ad ordinem originis non sunt aeque primae5. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod non sint aequaliter coaeternae, quia, sicut supra ostensum est, nobilitas illarum emanationum perfectissimarum ratione simplicitatis et immensitatis coaeternitatem ponit producentium et productorum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de corruptione, quae ponit terminum finalem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia corruptio semper dicit defectum et processum a completo ad incompletum; generatio autem non sic: quia quaedam est per eductionem alicuius de potentia in actum, et ita ratione incompletionis necessario dicit terminum initialem; quaedam vero est per actualissimam communicationem secundum omnimodam completionem producentis et producti, et eius de quo producitur, et modi, secundum quem producitur. Et talis ponitur circa Deum, et haec, quia nullam dicit incompletionem, nullum ponit terminum initialem6.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas est duratio interminabilis; dicendum, quod terminus productionis dicitur dupliciter: unus principalis, scilicet productum esse, alius coannexus, scilicet iam non produci, et hic coannexus procedit in iis, in quibus differt produci et productum esse. Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum generatio in divinis sit terminata, vel non; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de termino primo modo, terminata est, quia sic generat Filium Pater, quod Filius est genitus; si autem secundo modo, sic non habet veritatem, quia Filius semper est genitus et semper generatur, quia idem est in eo produci et productum esse propter perfectionem simplicitatis et actualitatis summae7.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est in Deo esse et durare; dicendum, quod principium durandi dicitur dupliciter: uno modo per durationis productionem et communicationem, alio modo per durationis inchoationem. Si primo modo accipiatur principium; sicut Pater est principium essendi Filio, ita et durandi; sicut enim dat ei esse, sic dat ei semper esse. Si autem intelligatur secundo modo, sic non habet veritatem, nec concludit ratio illa propter diversam principii acceptionem8.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est maioris virtutis nec actualitatis persona quam essentia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia divina essentia non potest producere aliam essentiam de se ipsa nec de aliqua alia sibi coaeterna et aeque prima; ac per hoc necesse est, quod de nihilo producat: et hinc est, quod necesse est, illam essentiam sic productam habere esse post non-esse, et incipere esse, cum processerit de non-esse in esse. Secus autem est in productione personae a persona: quia persona producens et producta communicant in essentia et natura; ideo non oportet, quod sit ibi inceptio aliqua ratione productionis unius personae ab alia propter essentiam unicam et indivisam.
8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne ens aut est creatum, aut increatum, similiter omne ens aut est a se ipso, aut ab alio; dicendum, quod esse ab alio dupliciter dicitur: vel ab alio essentialiter, vel ab alio personaliter. Primo modo accipiendo secundum alietatem essentialem, correspondet alii divisioni, quae est entis per creatum et increatum, quae quidem sunt extrema essentialiter differentia. Secundo modo non correspondet, immo si procedatur ab una ad alteram, fit figura dictionis1 ex commutatione modi praedicandi, quia quid mutatur in quis; et talis modus praedicandi non tenet in divinis.
9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quando virtus infinita secundum totalitatem suae potentiae exserit se in actum aliquem, non potest simul et semel exire in alium; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet, quando totaliter se exserit quantum ad virtutem producentem et quantum ad modum producendi; sed tunc assumtio2 est falsa: quia, licet Pater Filium producat secundum virtutem suam immensam, ipsum tamen generat, non spirat; et ideo secundum alium modum producendi, qui est per spirationem, productio est simul cum Filio alterius personae, pro eo quod illae productiones non sunt repugnantes, sed naturaliter coannexae. Sicut patet in mente, quod actualis consideratio intellectus non impedit, sed potius inducit, quod affectus feratur in bonum cognitum et visum; sic nec generatio Verbi procedentis a mente impedit spirationem amoris complectentis utrumque3.
10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi est productio, ibi est acceptio ab alio; dicendum, quod sicut est productio quaedam, in qua differt produci et productum esse; quaedam, in qua omnino sunt idem; similiter et acceptio duplex: uno modo, in qua differt accipere et accepisse, alia, in qua omnino est idem; prima respondet productioni primae, secunda secundae. De prima habet veritatem quod obiicit, de secunda non; et hoc modo Filius a Patre accipit esse. Semper enim accepit et semper accipit, quia Pater eum semper generat et semper genuit, sicut manifeste colligitur ex praedictis.
11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeternitas dicit praesens, et generatio melius explicatur per praeteritum; dicendum, quod generatio illa aeterna semper est actualissima et completissima; licet autem actualitas alicuius actus melius exprimatur per praesens, completio et perfectio actus maxime exprimitur per praeteritum. Unde generatio illa aeterna per nullum tempus potest sufficienter explicari, quin immo oportet ad eius expressionem diversis temporibus uti, pro eo quod ipsa est supra omne tempus et in se habet quidquid completionis significari potest per aliquod tempus. Unde ratione completionis competit ei praeteritum, ratione actualitatis competit ei praesens, ratione continuationis et indesitionis competit ei futurum4. — Ea vero ratione, qua omnia haec in ipsa unum sunt, per nullum vocabulum sufficienter explicatur: quia non est mirum, si strepitus verborum temporalium non sufficit ad explicandum illius aeternitatis et aeternae generationis silentium quietissimum, quod melius intelligitur, quam dicatur; melius creditur in praesenti, quam intelligatur; melius etiam videbitur in futuro, quam etiam nunc credatur: quia, ut dicit Salvator5, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum; ad quod nequaquam pervenire possumus, nisi intellectus noster supra variationes temporum et supra nubilositates phantasmatum in libertatem supercaelestis quietis plenius elevetur.
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Article II. Whether trinity and eternity stand together.
Next it is asked whether trinity and eternity stand together. And that they are incompossible seems thus.
1. Wherever there is eternity, there is simultaneity in every mode1; but where there is simultaneity in every mode, there is no order; where there is no order, there is no emanation; where there is no emanation, there cannot be a personal plurification: therefore from the first, if in the divine being there is supreme and true eternity, it is impossible that there be a true trinity or plurality of persons.
2. Likewise, "a cause is that whose being another follows2," namely the effect; but it is agreed that the effect follows the cause not by reason of diversity, since these can be together: therefore by reason of production. Where, then, there is production, there is antecedence and consequence; but where these are, there is not true eternity: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, if three persons are in the Trinity, either they are equally first, or they are not equally first. If equally first: therefore one is not from another, and through this they cannot be in the same nature. But if they are not equally first: therefore neither are they simply and equally coeternal; therefore the same as before.
4. Likewise, every corruption necessarily posits a final term3, therefore every production or emanation an initial one; but there cannot be a trinity without emanation or production; therefore neither without the inchoation of something. But this cannot stand together with eternity: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, eternity is an interminable duration4: therefore if in the divine things there is an eternal trinity, therefore also an interminable production or emanation of the persons; but a production or emanation that is unterminated is never perfect, because it is never in the state of having been produced: either therefore the trinity is not perfect, or it is not eternal.
6. Likewise, in God to be and to endure are altogether the same, therefore to have a principle of being and of enduring is the same; but there cannot be a true trinity unless some person have there a principle of existing through production: therefore it cannot be but that it have a principle of enduring. But this is not compatible with eternity5: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, a person is not of greater power nor of greater actuality than the essence; but the divine essence cannot produce another essence coeternal with itself: therefore neither can a person produce a person; either therefore in the divine essence there is not a trinity of persons, or there is not there supreme eternity.
8. Likewise, every being is either created or uncreated; likewise every being is either from itself or from another; but every created thing is a being from another: therefore every uncreated thing is a being from itself. But everything eternal is uncreated: therefore everything eternal is from itself, and so nothing is eternal that is from another. But there cannot be a trinity unless some person proceed from some other: therefore where there is a trinity, there is not eternity.
9. Likewise, as often as any power, whether finite or infinite, puts itself forth into some act according to the whole totality of its potency, it is impossible that it put itself forth at once and at one time into another; but the paternal power in generating6 puts forth altogether the immensity of its whole power, since the Son is as great as the Father is: therefore at once and at one time it cannot produce another person. If therefore it produces a third, this will be either before or after; but this is not in eternity in every mode: either therefore in the divine things there is not a trinity, or there is not true eternity.
10. Likewise, wherever there is production, there is a receiving from another; but nothing receives what it already has: therefore if the Son is produced by the Father, He receives being from the Father: therefore that being He did not previously have. But what receives being not previously had receives a beginning of enduring; and nothing of that kind is eternal: therefore eternity does not stand together with production, therefore neither with the trinity.
11. Likewise, eternity says the present; whence the eternal is always present according to its own proper account; but the emanations in the divine things, and especially generation, are more properly intimated by the past than by the present, since it is better said always begotten, always born, than that it be said to be generated and to be born7: therefore it seems that these two cannot stand together. If, then, there cannot be a trinity without true production, it cannot therefore stand together with eternity.
Bᴜᴛ ᴀɢᴀɪɴsᴛ this there are authorities innumerable both in the old and in the new law8; but it is shown also by reason.
1. "For relatives are together by nature1"; the Father and the Son are truly relatives, and the Spirator and the Spirit; therefore they are together by nature: if therefore any of the persons is eternal, since the others are together with it by nature, it is necessary that all be eternal. And that this follows is manifest, because in God a relation cannot be an accident nor something coming from elsewhere, on account of supreme simplicity: it is necessary therefore that they have simultaneity in every mode.
2. Likewise, the paternal mind at once was and understood, because its being is its understanding, and neither precedes by nature nor by any duration; but in the mind to understand is to take a word from itself: therefore at once it was and begot the Word. But a word cannot be unless it be pleasing and loved2; therefore also connected with the lover: therefore if the divine understanding stands together with eternity, therefore also eternity with the trinity.
3. Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of a power to produce quickly; whence some things produce in an imperceptible time3, some suddenly, some together in duration, though later by nature; and all these things are to be found in the creature: if therefore the divine power is most powerful, altogether exceeding created power; therefore it will be able to produce in such a way, and will produce, that the product be together by nature with the producer.
4. Likewise, the Father can communicate to the Son deity and omnipotence, otherwise He would not be the Son; but deity is eternity itself, nor can He be God unless He be eternal: therefore the first person can communicate eternity to the others: therefore trinity and eternity can stand together.
5. Likewise, the uncreated light is more powerful for producing its own splendour than the created light; but the created light is never without splendour, therefore neither is the uncreated light: therefore if the splendour is a produced person, it is plain, etc.
6. Likewise, the trinity stands together with immensity, and immensity necessarily posits eternity4: therefore from the first, a true and perfect trinity is together where there is a true and perfect eternity: therefore they have no repugnance.
7. Likewise, the trinity stands together with supreme equality5; but equality is not only according to power, but also according to duration, in which nothing can be made equal to the eternal unless it be coeternal with it: if therefore it stands with supreme equality, therefore also with eternity.
8. Likewise, wherever potency and act are the same, if the potency can be eternal, the act also can, especially when nothing extrinsic nor created is connoted; but in the person of the Father to be able to generate and to generate are the same; the like is true of the potency of spirating: if therefore it is necessary that the Father was eternally able to generate, therefore it is necessarily posited that He eternally begot6.
9. Likewise, where to be and to be referred are altogether the same, it is necessary that they be measured by the same measure; but in the Father to be and to be referred to the Son are altogether the same, and conversely, because there is no composition there7: if therefore the being is eternal, therefore also the mutual regard of the persons.
10. Likewise, in the created image the essence and the potency are together, and each of the three potencies is coeval with the other, as manifestly appears in the soul: therefore since there is a greater agreement among the divine persons, much more strongly will one be coeternal with the other — for as perpetuity is to the image, so is eternity to the creating trinity; whence "from the perpetuity of things the eternal Founder is manifestly shown8" — therefore from the perpetuity of the image the eternity of the trinity is inferred and shown.
Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.
The trinity of persons necessarily stands together with eternity.
Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that trinity and eternity necessarily stand together; and this indeed is gathered from the side of the essential conditions, and from the side of the original emanations, and from the side of the personal relations.
From the side, I say, of the essential conditions: because the trinity stands together with the supreme unity, simplicity and immensity of the essence, as has been shown in the preceding9; whence the divine persons have a being one, most simple and immense; but eternity regards the being itself, which in the trinity has neither to be numbered nor to be composed nor to be limited; it remains, therefore, that in the three persons there be an eternity that is true on account of immensity, an eternity that is supreme on account of simplicity in every mode, an eternity that is unique on account of the unity of the essence; eternity therefore does not exclude the trinity, because the trinity necessarily includes eternity.
From the side also of the original emanations the same thing is gathered, both by reason of the producer, and by reason of the product, and by reason of the mode of producing. For the producer is in an actuality of power in every mode, on account of supreme perfection; the product in an equality in every mode, on account of supreme assimilation; the production in a necessity in every mode, on account of
natural diffusion or communication. If therefore the producing person is eternal, it is necessary that the act of producing be eternal, and the product itself, and the mode of producing. It is plain, therefore, that eternity and trinity not only are not repugnant, but wonderfully harmonize and necessarily stand together.
But from the side of the personal relations this same thing is gathered. For the divine persons are distinguished by their relations — by relations, I say, not extrinsic but intrinsic; not adventitious but abiding; not diminished but most complete1. But since an intrinsic relation, not adventitious but perfect, coexists together with its supposit; and a relation and its correlation are together by nature: necessarily relations of this kind posit in the divine persons the highest simultaneity, and do not introduce terminability, because they stand together with supreme infinity. Since, therefore, for eternity nothing more is required than simultaneity with interminability in every mode, and supreme interminability with simultaneity in every mode; necessarily the trinity stands together with eternity, and eternity with the trinity, because the trinity does not exclude but includes eternity. Whence Augustine, in the eleventh book On the City of God, chapter twenty-eight2: "God, to whose image we are created, is true eternity, eternal truth, eternal and true charity; and He Himself is the eternal and true and dear Trinity." As therefore eternity is not repugnant to charity and to truth, so neither is it repugnant to the trinity, nor conversely. — And therefore the reasons which show this are to be conceded.
1. To that, therefore, which is objected first on the contrary, that where there is eternity, there is simultaneity in every mode; it must be said that the simultaneity of eternity excludes the order of prior and posterior, but not however the order of origin. But when it is said that the trinity posits an order, this is not understood of the order of priority and posteriority, but of the order of origin and of natural emanation, according to what Augustine says3, that "there is there an order, not whereby one is prior and another posterior, but whereby one is from the other."
2. To that which is objected, that the effect follows the cause not by reason of diversity but of production; it must be said that neither of those is the whole sufficient and perfect cause, but the one with the other; for the effect follows the cause because it flows from it, in such a way that it differs from it according to essence; and on account of this it is neither so noble as the cause, nor is it equalled to it in duration nor in power by an equality in every mode. But it is otherwise in the divine production, where the producer and He who is produced have one and the same essence, and through this an equality in every mode in duration alike and in power4.
3. To that which is objected, that either the persons are there equally first, or not; it must be said that as regards the privation of prior and posterior they are equally first, but as regards the order of origin they are not equally first5. But from this it does not follow that they are not equally coeternal, because, as has been shown above, the nobility of those most perfect emanations, by reason of simplicity and of immensity, posits the coeternity of the producers and of the products.
4. To that which is objected concerning corruption, which posits a final term; it must be said that it is not alike: because corruption always says a defect and a process from the complete to the incomplete; generation, however, is not so: because one kind is through the drawing out of something from potency into act, and so by reason of incompletion it necessarily says an initial term; but another kind is through a most actual communication according to the completion in every mode of the producer and of the product, and of that from which it is produced, and of the mode according to which it is produced. And such a one is posited concerning God, and this one, because it says no incompletion, posits no initial term6.
5. To that which is objected, that eternity is an interminable duration; it must be said that the term of production is said in two ways: one principal, namely the being produced, the other coannexed, namely the now not being produced; and this coannexed one holds good in those things in which being produced and having been produced differ. When, therefore, it is asked whether generation in the divine things is terminated or not; it must be said that if it be understood of the term in the first way, it is terminated, because the Father so generates the Son that the Son is begotten; but if in the second way, so it does not hold true, because the Son is always begotten and is always generated, since in Him to be produced and to have been produced are the same, on account of the perfection of supreme simplicity and actuality7.
6. To that which is objected, that in God to be and to endure are the same; it must be said that a principle of enduring is said in two ways: in one way through the production and communication of duration, in another way through the inchoation of duration. If the principle be taken in the first way; as the Father is the principle of being to the Son, so also of enduring; for as He gives Him to be, so He gives Him always to be. But if it be understood in the second way, so it does not hold true, nor does that reason conclude, on account of the diverse acceptation of principle8.
7. To that which is objected, that a person is not of greater power nor of greater actuality than the essence; it must be said that it is not alike: because the divine essence cannot produce another essence out of itself, nor out of any other coeternal with itself and equally first; and through this it is necessary that it produce out of nothing: and hence it is that it is necessary that that essence so produced have being after non-being, and begin to be, since it will have proceeded from non-being into being. But it is otherwise in the production of a person from a person: because the producing person and the produced communicate in essence and in nature; therefore it is not required that there be there any inception by reason of the production of one person from another, on account of the unique and undivided essence.
8. To that which is objected, that every being is either created or uncreated, likewise every being is either from itself or from another; it must be said that to be from another is said in two ways: either from another essentially, or from another personally. Taking it in the first way according to essential otherness, it corresponds to that other division which is of being into created and uncreated, which indeed are extremes essentially differing. In the second way it does not correspond; nay rather, if one proceed from the one to the other, there arises a figure of speech1 from the exchange of the mode of predicating, because what is changed into who; and such a mode of predicating does not hold in the divine things.
9. To that which is objected, that when an infinite power puts itself forth into some act according to the totality of its potency, it cannot at once and at one time go out into another; it must be said that that holds true when it puts itself forth totally as regards the producing power and as regards the mode of producing; but then the assumption2 is false: because, although the Father produces the Son according to His immense power, He nevertheless generates Him and does not spirate Him; and therefore according to another mode of producing, which is by spiration, the production of another person is together with the Son, for the reason that those productions are not repugnant but naturally coannexed. As appears in the mind, that the actual consideration of the understanding does not hinder but rather induces that the affection be borne into the good known and seen; so neither does the generation of the Word proceeding from the mind hinder the spiration of the love embracing both3.
10. To that which is objected, that where there is production, there is a receiving from another; it must be said that just as there is a certain production in which to be produced and to have been produced differ, and a certain one in which they are altogether the same; so likewise receiving is twofold: in one way, in which to receive and to have received differ, another in which it is altogether the same; the first corresponds to the first production, the second to the second. Of the first what is objected holds true, of the second it does not; and in this way the Son receives being from the Father. For He always has received and always receives, because the Father always generates Him and always has begotten Him, as is manifestly gathered from what has been said.
11. To that which is objected, that eternity says the present, and that generation is better explained by the past; it must be said that that eternal generation is always most actual and most complete; but although the actuality of any act is better expressed by the present, the completion and perfection of an act is most expressed by the past. Whence that eternal generation cannot be sufficiently explained by any tense; nay rather it is necessary to use diverse tenses for its expression, for the reason that it is above all time and has in itself whatever of completion can be signified by any tense. Whence by reason of completion the past belongs to it, by reason of actuality the present belongs to it, by reason of continuation and of not ceasing the future belongs to it4. — But by that very reason by which all these are one in it, it is sufficiently explained by no word: for it is no wonder if the noise of temporal words does not suffice to explain the most quiet silence of that eternity and of that eternal generation, which is better understood than said; is better believed in the present than understood; will even be better seen in the future than it is now believed: because, as the Saviour says5, this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent; to which we can in no way attain unless our understanding be more fully raised above the variations of times and above the cloudiness of phantasms into the freedom of the supercelestial rest.
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- 1Ex definitione aeternitatis a Boethio data; cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 1. — Haec quaestio tangitur I. Sent. d. 9. q. 3.From the definition of eternity given by Boethius; compare above, p. 89, note 1. — This question is touched on in I Sentences, d. 9, q. 3.
- 2De hac definitione causae vide tom. I. pag. 118, nota 2; pag. 120, nota 7; tom. IV. pag. 102, nota 3; pag. 103, nota 10, ubi diversi loci ex Aristot. allati sunt; cfr. etiam Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 4. c. 1.On this definition of a cause see tom. I, p. 118, note 2; p. 120, note 7; tom. IV, p. 102, note 3; p. 103, note 10, where various passages from Aristotle are adduced; compare also Avicenna, Metaphysics, tr. 4, c. 1.
- 3Aristot. dicit V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.), quod mutatio « ex subiecto in non-subiectum corruptio est; simpliciter quidem, quae ex substantia ad ipsum non-esse etc. (et generatio ex non-subiecto in subiectum).Aristotle says, V Physics, text 7 (c. 1), that a change "from a subject into a non-subject is corruption; simply so, that which is from substance to non-being itself," etc. (and generation from a non-subject into a subject).
- 4Ut insinuat definitio aeternitatis a Boethio data; cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 1.As the definition of eternity given by Boethius intimates; compare above, p. 89, note 1.
- 5Vide supra pag. 79, nota 9. verba Richardi a S. Vict.See above, p. 79, note 9, the words of Richard of St. Victor.
- 6B E supplent personam.B and E supply personam.
- 7Gregor., XXIX. Moral. c. 1. n. 1: Dicamus verius semper natus; non autem possumus dicere semper nascitur, ne imperfectus videatur. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. IX. c. 4. — Superius ante proprie supple: magis. In fine arg. pro stare G stat.Gregory, XXIX Morals, c. 1, n. 1: "Let us say more truly always born; but we cannot say is always being born, lest He seem imperfect." Compare I Sentences, the text of the Master, d. IX, c. 4. — Above, before proprie, supply: magis. At the end of the argument, for stare G reads stat.
- 8Cfr. supra q. 1. a. 2, et I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 4. et 5.Compare above, q. 1, a. 2, and I Sentences, the text of the Master, d. II, c. 4 and 5.
- 1Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de His quae ad aliquid.Aristotle, On the Categories, the chapter On those things which are toward something.
- 2Secundum August., IX. de Trin. c. 10, et 11. n. 15. seq. Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 6. in corp. — Superius pro sumere D H generare.According to Augustine, IX On the Trinity, c. 10, and 11, n. 15 and following. See above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 6, in the body. — Above, for sumere D and H read generare.
- 3Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 127. (c. 14.): Repente autem [est], quod in insensibili tempore propter parvitatem remotum est (ἐκστάν. Ed. Firmin-Didot: de statu dimovetur). — Circa finem arg. cum G posuimus quod, alii cum.Aristotle, IV Physics, text 127 (c. 14): "Suddenly [is] that which is removed in an imperceptible time on account of its smallness" (ἐκστάν; the Firmin-Didot edition: is moved out of its state). — Near the end of the argument, with G we have set quod, others cum.
- 4Vide supra q. 4. a. 2. et hic a. 1.See above, q. 4, a. 2, and here, a. 1.
- 5Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 2. fundam. 10. — Inferius post virtutem B addit illi coaeternam.Compare above, q. 2, a. 2, fundamentum 10. — Below, after virtutem B adds illi coaeternam.
- 6Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.): Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis.Aristotle, III Physics, text 32 (c. 4): "For in perpetual things to be able differs in nothing from to be."
- 7Cfr. supra q. 3. a. 2.Compare above, q. 3, a. 2.
- 8Sicut dicitur I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1, posito creaturarum intelligitur pro rerum manifeste ostenditur. Expositionem huius verbi vide ibid. Comment. p. I. dub. 2.As it is said in I Sentences, the text of the Master, d. III, c. 1, where creaturarum intelligitur is set for rerum manifeste ostenditur. For the exposition of this word see, in the same place, the Commentary, p. I, dub. 2.
- 9Quaest. 2. 3. et 4.Questions 2, 3 and 4.
- 1Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. seqq. et d. 33. q. 1. seq.Compare I Sentences, d. 26, q. 1 and following, and d. 33, q. 1 and following.
- 2Textus originalis: Quoniam igitur homines sumus ad nostri Creatoris imaginem creati, cuius est vera aeternitas... caritas, estque ipsa [alias: ipse] aeterna... cara Trinitas, neque confusa neque separata.The original text: "Since therefore we are men created to the image of our Creator, whose is true eternity... charity, and she herself [otherwise: he himself] is the eternal... dear Trinity, neither confused nor separated."
- 3Libr. II. contra Maximinum Arian. c. 14. n. 8: Verum haec [missio Geniti a Genitore] non est inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae, non quod alter prior esset altero, sed quod alter esset ex altero. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XX. c. 3. in fine, et ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. 2.Book II Against Maximinus the Arian, c. 14, n. 8: "But this [the sending of the Begotten by the Begetter] is not an inequality of substance, but an order of nature, not that the one was prior to the other, but that the one was from the other." Compare I Sentences, the text of the Master, d. XX, c. 3, at the end, and, in the same place, the Commentary, a. 2, q. 2.
- 4Vide I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.See I Sentences, d. 20, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.
- 5Cfr. I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 1.Compare I Sentences, d. 20, a. 2, q. 1.
- 6Vide I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. et 3. ad 1.See I Sentences, d. 9, q. 1 and 3, ad 1.
- 7Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4.Compare I Sentences, d. 9, q. 4.
- 8Vide I. Sent. d. 9. q. 3. ad 3. Ibid. ad 2. tangitur seq. solut., in qua pro producat B producatur.See I Sentences, d. 9, q. 3, ad 3. In the same place, ad 2, the following solution is touched on, in which for producat B reads producatur.
- 1Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 5. Vide etiam supra q. 2. a. 2. ad 7. — Post pauca pro praedicandi A B arguendi, E argumentandi.Compare above, p. 14, note 5. See also above, q. 2, a. 2, ad 7. — A little after, for praedicandi A and B read arguendi, E argumentandi.
- 2Sive minor argumenti (cfr. Boeth., I. de Syllogismo hypothetico). — Inferius pro productio B E productus.That is, the minor of the argument (compare Boethius, I On the Hypothetical Syllogism). — Below, for productio B and E read productus.
- 3Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4. ad 1. et 2.Compare I Sentences, d. 2, q. 4, ad 1 and 2.
- 4Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. dub. 7. et d. 9. dub. 5.See I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, dub. 7, and d. 9, dub. 5.
- 5Ioan. 17, 3. — Paulo superius respicitur verbum August. supra pag. 71, nota 2. allatum. — Inferius ante libertatem posuimus fide A B in, pro quo E et in, alii et.John 17:3. — A little above, the word of Augustine adduced above, p. 71, note 2, is looked to. — Below, before libertatem we have set, on the faith of A and B, in, for which E reads et in, others et. ---