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Quaest. 6, Art. 2

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio VI: Utrum trinitas possit stare cum summa immutabilitate

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas.

Deinde quaeritur, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur.

1. Impossibile est, speciem esse sine genere4; sed generatio sive productio est species motus sive mutationis: ergo ubi generatio, ibi mutatio; sed

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trinitas non est, nisi quia una persona per generationem procedit ab alia: ergo etc.

2. Item, generatio in creaturis dicit relationem et dicit mutationem et essentialius et principalius dicit mutationem quam relationem; sed non potest poni in summa Trinitate sine relatione, alioquin non diceret veram distinctionem: ergo pari vel fortiori ratione non potest poni sine mutatione.

3. Item, impossibile est, esse nec intelligi alicuius corruptionem sine mutatione; sed generatio vel productio opponitur directe corruptioni, quia, sicut illa ad esse, ita ista ad non-esse1: ergo nusquam est sine mutatione: ergo nec in divinis personis.

4. Item, si aliquid sequitur ad aliquid, eodem addito, utrobique adhuc sequitur; sed sequitur: est generatio in tempore, ergo mutatio in tempore: ergo pari ratione vel fortiori generatio in aeternitate infert mutationem in aeternitate: ergo non stat cum immutabilitate.

5. Item, Augustinus2 dicit, quod sequitur: si Spiritus sanctus possit generari, quod posset mutari: ergo in divinis generari infert mutari, ergo non potest stare cum eius opposito; sed eius oppositum est summa immutabilitas: ergo etc.

6. Item, si productio est in divinis, aut ergo necessitate, aut voluntate. Si necessitate: ergo non est ibi summa liberalitas nec potestas; si voluntate: ergo qui producitur potest non produci, ergo non esse, ac per hoc mutari: ergo idem quod prius.

7. Item, quod repugnat alicui propter statum imperfectum multo fortius secundum statum perfectum; sed in creatura non est immutabilitas nisi semiplena, et tamen in substantiis perpetuis et incorporalibus non potest esse plurificatio per productionem similis ex simili3: ergo nec in Deo.

8. Item, quod repugnat causae repugnat causato; sed causa, quare vis generativa data est rebus, est « propter longe distare a primo et propter corruptionem »: ergo si immutabilitas summa repugnat corruptioni, ergo productioni per generationem. Minor probatur per Philosophum4.

9. Item, impossibile est, quod Deus producat aliquid de aliena substantia sine illius substantiae mutatione; sed tantum Deus potest super alia, sicut super se, sive circa se: ergo nec de sua substantia sine suae substantiae mutatione: ergo si trinitas est per productionem etc.

10. Item, plus recedit a ratione mutabilitatis nihil quam aliquid, ergo et productio rei de nihilo quam productio de aliquo; nihil enim nullo modo mutabile est5; sed impossibile est, aliquid produci de nihilo sine eius mutabilitate: ergo similiter de aliquo.

11. Item, secundum rationem intelligendi simplicior et prior est forma quam suppositum, et natura quam persona6; sed impossibile est, formam aliquam produci de aliquo sine mutatione sui et eius, de quo est: ergo pari ratione impossibile est, suppositum sive personam sine mutatione esse productam.

12. Item, sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita se habet totum ad totum; sed si Pater produceret Filium de parte substantiae, necesse esset, substantiam mutari secundum partem: ergo cum producit de tota, necesse est, ipsam mutari secundum totum: ergo etc.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Productio personae de persona in Trinitate stat cum summa simplicitate, ut patet ex praecedentibus7; sed ubi summa simplicitas, ibi omnimoda invariabilitas et immutabilitas: ergo trinitas et ei competens emanatio non repugnat immutabilitati.

2. Item, emanatio personae de persona stat cum summa actualitate; sed ubi summa actualitas, omnimoda est immutabilitas, quia « motus est entelechia entis in potentia8 », et omne mutabile aliquo modo possibile; sed quod stat cum antecedente necessario stat cum consequente: ergo etc.

3. Item, in summa aeternitate nulla potest esse variabilitas, quia omnis motus stat cum priori et posteriori vel tempore, vel natura9; sed trinitas personarum et earundem productio stat cum aeternitate: ergo cum summa immutabilitate.

4. Item, « in ad aliquid non est motus10 »; sed trinitatem et personarum pluralitatem facit relatio, secundum quod dicit Boethius: « Relatio multiplicat

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Trinitatem »; ergo impossibile est ibi ex hac causa ponere mutationem nec motum: stat ergo cum summa immutabilitate.

5. Item, in eo, in quo est simul produci et productum esse, non est prius et posterius, nec duratione1 nec natura nec re; sed hoc reperitur in omni mutatione: ergo etc.

6. Item, possibile est, Deum producere creaturam sine sui mutatione, quia producit se ipso2: ergo similiter Pater potest producere personam sine mutatione suae personae vel naturae: ergo pari ratione et Filius sine mutatione produci: ergo productio non cogit aliquid ibi mutari.

7. Item, Deus intelligit se sine aliqua sui mutatione; sed intelligendo se dicit et dicendo Verbum generat: ergo absque omni mutatione habet Verbum generare, pari ratione et Spiritum sanctum spirare: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

Trinitas personarum stat cum summa immutabilitate.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod trinitas personarum, quae in divinis est per emanationem unius ab alia, stat cum immutabilitate summa. — Et huius ratio duplex est, scilicet summa aeternitas et summa simplicitas. Summa aeternitas non patitur, ibi esse aliquam mutationem, summa simplicitas non patitur ibi esse aliquod mutabile. Si ergo trinitas est cum simplicitate et aeternitate; et ubi aeternitas, nulla mutatio, ubi simplicitas summa, nihil mutabile; et iis ablatis, tollitur omnis mutabilitas: necessario simul stant trinitas et summa immutabilitas.

Et hoc patet sic. Ubi enim est aeternitas, nihil est incipiens, nihil succedens; nulla igitur inceptio, nulla successio, nulla defectio. Omnis autem mutatio aut est a non-esse in esse, aut ab esse in non-esse, aut ab uno esse in aliud esse3; mutatio autem ad esse non est sine inceptione, mutatio vero ab esse non est sine defectione, mutatio in esse non potest esse sine qualicumque successione, quia non est sine variatione. Aeternitas igitur excludit omnem mutationem; haec autem stat cum trinitate: ergo in excellentia Trinitatis nulla mutatio ratione aeternitatis. — Nihil inest mutabile ratione simplicitatis. Est enim ibi summa simplicitas naturae et personae et utriusque invicem comparatae. Propter simplicitatem naturae nulla potest esse ibi decisio in eo, de quo est productio; propter simplicitatem personae nulla potest esse compositio in producto; ratione simplicitatis in utraque nulla potest esse abiectio a principio productivo. Ex hoc ergo colligitur, quod nihil est ibi mutabile, nec ille qui producitur, nec ille qui producit, nec illud, de quo producitur. Ex hoc enim, quod non fit abiectio habiti ex parte principii, nec introductio novi ex parte producti, nec decisio indivisi ex parte fundamenti, de quo intelligitur produci, nec materialiter nec causaliter, sed substantialiter; nihil est quod possit mutari. — Si igitur intelligitur summa trinitas in summa simplicitate et aeternitate, necessario oportet pariter intelligi, ut consistat in omnimoda immutabilitate4. — Amplius, quoniam actualis immutabilitas cum summa simplicitate et aeternitate ponit summam actualitatem, et actualitas summa est per plenam conversionem eiusdem supra se intelligendo et amando, et intellectus includit verbum, et amor includit nexum; sicut immutabilitati primi principii non solum non repugnat se ipsum intelligere et amare, quin potius est consonans, sic non repugnat, immo consonat generare Verbum et spirare Amorem. Immutabiliter enim sibi competit utrumque et semper in actu. Ideo, si recte immutabilitas intelligatur, non solum non excludit, sed includit5 beatissimam Trinitatem; et hoc, quia summe immutabile necesse est esse simplex, aeternum et actuale secundum plenitudinem actualitatis interminatae et perfectae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ubi generatio, ibi mutatio; dicendum, quod illud verum est in creaturis, ubi generatio est exitus ab ente in potentia in ens in actu, ubi etiam per consequens est mutatio, quia quod generatur se habet aliter nunc quam prius. Secus autem est in divinis, quia alia generatio est omnimodae actualitatis et a parte principii et termini et ipsius productionis et eius, de quo fit productio. Unde quia nulla est ibi acquisitio novi esse, et est tamen acceptio veri et actualis et sempiterni esse; ideo, licet sit vera productio, non tamen est ibi vera mutatio6.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generatio dicit mutationem et relationem; dicendum, quod ea quae sunt in creaturis, si ponantur in Creatore, poni debent secundum illud quod completionis habent, non secundum illud quod incompletionis. Motus autem et mutatio semper incompletionem dicunt, relatio autem dicit ut pluries complementum, maxime illa, quae originem dicit in nobilissimis7 sine dependentia aliqua; et hoc modo in illa productione aeterna.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corruptio non potest intelligi sine mutatione; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia corruptio dicit amissionem esse, quae quidem non potest intelligi, nisi fiat post esse prius habitum; ac per hoc de necessitate mutationem includit, quae non potest esse nisi in re mutabili et variabili propter defectum, quem dicit. Sed generatio est datio vel acceptio esse per consubstantialitatem; et hoc potest esse circa nobilissimum ens et actualissimum, quia hoc nullum dicit defectum, ac per hoc non de necessitate includit mutationem, sicut corruptio. Nam tali generationi non opponitur corruptio, sed illi soli, quae erat in creatura, quam quidem corruptio quodam modo sequitur et quodam modo antecedit. « Generatio enim unius corruptio est alterius », sicut dicit Philosophus1.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod generatio in tempore ponit mutationem in tempore: ergo et generatio in aeternitate infert mutationem in aeternitate; dicendum, quod ille modus inferendi tenet, ubi non est determinatio distrahens; non sic autem est in proposito: quia generatio in aeternitate est alterius modi quam generatio in tempore, sicut dictum est; non fit de ente in potentia, sicut illa quae tempore mensuratur2. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi ad hanc consequitur motus, quod ad illam consequatur, immo potius oppositum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi Spiritus sanctus generaretur, quod mutaretur; dicendum, quod illud argumentum sequitur, non quia generari sit mutari, sed quia, posito quod non oportet, accidit quod non oportet3. Posito enim, quod Spiritus sanctus, qui accipit esse per spirationem, quae realiter differt a generatione, accipiat esse per viam generationis; ponitur de necessitate, quod transeat ab uno modo emanandi ad alterum modum realiter differentem; et sic ponitur de necessitate mutari, non quia illi modi oriundi seu emanandi dicant motus vel mutationes, sed quia transitus ab uno in alterum non potest intelligi sine motu. Et quoniam mutatio in divino esse non admittitur, hinc est, quod impossibile est, quod persona, quae per spirationem producitur, generetur. Et hinc est, quod licet Pater generet et spiret, non tamen mutatur, quia simul ista duo stant circa personam Patris, spirare scilicet et generare, neque oportet ab uno in alterum transire. Sed hi duo modi non possunt simul competere eidem personae productae, ac per hoc, si per impossibile intelligatur poni circa aliquam illarum personarum, per idem impossibile ponitur et motus, quia ponitur variari producendi modus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod scilicet productio est in divinis, aut ergo necessitate, aut voluntate; dicendum, quod, sicut in quaestione de necessitate4 melius apparebit, ibi est quodam modo necessitate et quodam modo voluntate. Non est enim per necessitatem coactionis, sed immutabilitatis; non per voluntatem eligentem, sed per voluntatem sempiternaliter acceptantem, secundum quam producens in productione nobilissima sibi complacet et etiam delectatur. Et ideo non sequitur, quod possit ibi esse variatio mutabilitatis et coarctatio potestatis, quia simul ille qui producitur producitur necessario, liberaliter et potenter.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod immutabilitas creaturae excludit generationem, sicut patet in Angelo, ergo et in Deo; dicendum, quod illud non valet, quia creatura in generando non potest totam dare substantiam suam, propter hoc quod deficit a summa simplicitate et actualitate et communicabilitate; ideo impossibile est, quod aliquid de substantia sua generetur, quin mutetur. Secus autem est in proposito, sicut praedictum est5, quia generans in divinis generato non dat suae essentiae partem, sed totam essentiam dat simplicissimam et perfectam. — Posset tamen dici, quod et creatura spiritualis generationem habet intrinsecam, quae quidem est ipsius verbi a mente, quae inter cetera creata potissime gerit similitudinem generationis aeternae.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod causa generationis et corruptionis est longe distare a primo; dicendum, quod illa non est tota ratio. Nam homo, si stetisset in statu innocentiae, nunquam corrumperetur, et tamen generaret. Unde generatio potius est ex perfectione summa et fecunditate et actualitate ipsius primi principii, quam sit ad supplementum defectus corruptionis ipsius principii productivi. Loquitur ergo Philosophus de causa generationis secundum statum deficientis naturae, non generaliter et secundum modum generationis illius completissimae, quae est origo omnis productionis. Nam speciei generator omnia haec constituit6, et ipse, qui generationem aliis tribuit, non potest sterilis esse, secundum quod dicitur ultimo Isaiae.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non potest producere aliquid de aliqua creatura sine illius commutatione; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, cum creatura sit mutabilis et non omnino simplex,

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cum ponitur aliquid de ea produci, ponitur per consequens commutari, quia non potest esse idem ibi per omnimodam indifferentiam quod datur et quod accipitur et actus1 intermedius; in divinis autem est omnino oppositum, secundum quod manifeste liquet ex praecedentibus.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest aliquid produci de nihilo sine mutatione; dicendum, quod illud non est simile: quia non potest aliquid produci de nihilo, quin habeat esse post non-esse, quin etiam habeat esse a2 principio essentialiter differente. Unde quamvis nihil non sit mutabile de se, tamen eductio, qua aliquid, quod prius non erat ens, efficitur ens, de necessitate ponit inceptionem et mutationem. Non sic autem est de ea productione, qua persona producitur de substantia sempiterna personae sempiternaliter producentis, quia ibi nec aliud esse accipitur de novo, nec aliquid incipit, ac per hoc nec aliquid variatur.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod forma non potest produci sine mutatione, ergo nec suppositum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia productio formae dicit differentiam substantialem inter producentem et productum; nihil enim producit se ipsum3; et ideo, cum forma producitur, oportet, quod ab alia forma producatur, quae, cum sit alia ab ipsa, erit vere causa producens et prior naturaliter, quam sit ipsa forma producta; et ideo in illa productione necesse est includi mutationem. Non sic autem est in productione suppositi vel personae, pro eo quod una est natura et essentia in utrisque, et ideo simul sunt; nec est ibi mutatio seu motus, quia ibi non est prius nec posterius nec aliquid novum.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet pars ad partem, ita totum ad totum; dicendum, quod in divinis proprie nec est pars neque totum, secundum quod totum dicitur quod continet partem et partem4. Nec valet, quodsi res producta de parte ponit mutationem in parte, quod similiter res producta de tota substantia ponat mutationem secundum totum: quia, ut prius tactum est, productio in parte ponit decisionem, ponit alicuius amissionem et alicuius acquisitionem, quae de necessitate mutationem includunt; productio autem de tota substantia nihil talium dicit, quin potius excludit omne illud, ad quod consequitur motus, sicut ex principali solutione fuit ostensum. Nam nec in principio producente est decisio, nec compositio in producto, nec in productione innovatio, nec variatio aliqua circa aliquod praedictorum.

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English Translation
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Article II. Whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together.

Next it is asked whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together. And that they are incompossible, it seems.

1. It is impossible that a species be without its genus4; but generation or production is a species of motion or of change: therefore where there is generation, there is change; but

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trinity is not, except because one person proceeds from another through generation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, generation in creatures says relation and says change, and says change more essentially and more principally than relation; but it cannot be posited in the supreme Trinity without relation, otherwise it would not say a true distinction: therefore by equal or stronger reason it cannot be posited without change.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the corruption of anything either be or be understood without change; but generation or production is directly opposed to corruption, because, just as the one is toward being, so the other is toward non-being1: therefore it is nowhere without change: therefore not in the divine persons either.

4. Likewise, if something follows upon something, the same thing being added on both sides, it still follows; but this follows: there is generation in time, therefore change in time: therefore by equal or stronger reason generation in eternity infers change in eternity: therefore it does not stand with immutability.

5. Likewise, Augustine2 says that it follows: if the Holy Spirit could be generated, that He could be changed: therefore in the divine things to be generated infers to be changed, therefore it cannot stand with its opposite; but its opposite is supreme immutability: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if there is production in the divine things, then it is either by necessity or by will. If by necessity: then there is not supreme liberality there, nor power; if by will: then he who is produced can not be produced, therefore not be, and through this be changed: therefore the same as before.

7. Likewise, what is repugnant to something on account of an imperfect state is much more so according to a perfect state; but in the creature there is no immutability except a half-full one, and yet in perpetual and incorporeal substances there cannot be plurification through the production of like from like3: therefore not in God either.

8. Likewise, what is repugnant to the cause is repugnant to the caused; but the cause why the generative power was given to things is "on account of being far distant from the first and on account of corruption": therefore if supreme immutability is repugnant to corruption, then to production through generation. The minor is proved through the Philosopher4.

9. Likewise, it is impossible that God produce something from an alien substance without the change of that substance; but God has as much power over other things as over Himself, or concerning Himself: therefore neither from His own substance without the change of His own substance: therefore if trinity is through production etc.

10. Likewise, nothing recedes further from the account of mutability than something, therefore also the production of a thing from nothing further than production from something; for nothing is in no mode mutable5; but it is impossible that something be produced from nothing without its mutability: therefore likewise from something.

11. Likewise, according to the account of understanding, form is simpler and prior to the supposit, and nature to the person6; but it is impossible that any form be produced from something without change of itself and of that from which it is: therefore by equal reason it is impossible that a supposit or person be produced without change.

12. Likewise, as part is related to part, so whole is related to whole; but if the Father were to produce the Son from part of the substance, it would be necessary that the substance be changed according to the part: therefore since He produces from the whole, it is necessary that it be changed according to the whole: therefore etc.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. The production of person from person in the Trinity stands with supreme simplicity, as is clear from the preceding7; but where there is supreme simplicity, there is invariability and immutability in every mode: therefore trinity and the emanation befitting it are not repugnant to immutability.

2. Likewise, the emanation of person from person stands with supreme actuality; but where there is supreme actuality, immutability is in every mode, because "motion is the entelechy of a being in potency8," and everything mutable is in some mode possible; but what stands with the antecedent necessarily stands with the consequent: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in supreme eternity there can be no variability, because every motion stands with a prior and a posterior, either in time or in nature9; but the trinity of persons and their production stands with eternity: therefore with supreme immutability.

4. Likewise, "in relation to something there is no motion10"; but relation makes the trinity and the plurality of persons, according to what Boethius says: "Relation multiplies

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the Trinity"; therefore it is impossible there, for this cause, to posit change or motion: it stands therefore with supreme immutability.

5. Likewise, in that in which to be produced and to have been produced are together, there is no prior and posterior, neither in duration1 nor in nature nor in reality; but this is found in every change: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is possible for God to produce a creature without change of Himself, because He produces by Himself2: therefore likewise the Father can produce a person without change of His person or nature: therefore by equal reason the Son also can be produced without change: therefore production does not force anything there to be changed.

7. Likewise, God understands Himself without any change of Himself; but by understanding Himself He speaks, and by speaking He generates the Word: therefore without any change whatever He has it to generate the Word, and by equal reason to spirate the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

The trinity of persons stands with supreme immutability.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the trinity of persons, which is in the divine things through the emanation of one from another, stands with supreme immutability. — And the reason for this is twofold, namely supreme eternity and supreme simplicity. Supreme eternity does not suffer any change to be there, supreme simplicity does not suffer anything mutable to be there. If therefore trinity is with simplicity and eternity; and where there is eternity, there is no change, where there is supreme simplicity, nothing mutable; and these being taken away, all mutability is removed: trinity and supreme immutability necessarily stand together.

And this is clear thus. For where there is eternity, nothing is beginning, nothing succeeding; no beginning, therefore, no succession, no failing. But every change is either from non-being into being, or from being into non-being, or from one being into another being3; but change to being is not without beginning, change from being is not without failing, change in being cannot be without succession of some kind, because it is not without variation. Eternity therefore excludes every change; but this stands with trinity: therefore in the excellence of the Trinity there is no change, by reason of eternity. — Nothing mutable is in it by reason of simplicity. For there is there a supreme simplicity of nature and of person and of both compared to one another. On account of the simplicity of the nature there can be no cutting off there in that from which the production is; on account of the simplicity of the person there can be no composition in the product; by reason of simplicity in both there can be no casting off from the productive principle. From this therefore it is gathered that nothing there is mutable, neither he who is produced, nor he who produces, nor that from which he is produced. For from this, that there comes about no casting off of what was had on the part of the principle, nor introduction of anything new on the part of the product, nor cutting off of the undivided on the part of the foundation from which he is understood to be produced, neither materially nor causally, but substantially — there is nothing that could be changed. — If therefore the supreme trinity is understood in supreme simplicity and eternity, it is necessary equally to understand that it consists in immutability in every mode4. — Further, since actual immutability with supreme simplicity and eternity posits supreme actuality, and supreme actuality is through a full conversion of the same upon itself by understanding and loving, and understanding includes a word, and love includes a bond; just as it is not only not repugnant to the immutability of the first principle to understand and to love itself, but rather is consonant with it, so it is not repugnant, nay it is consonant, to generate the Word and to spirate Love. For both belong to it immutably and always in act. Therefore, if immutability be rightly understood, it not only does not exclude, but includes5 the most blessed Trinity; and this, because the supremely immutable must be simple, eternal and actual according to the fullness of an actuality unterminated and perfect. — Whence the reasons which are for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that where there is generation there is change; it must be said that this is true in creatures, where generation is a going forth from a being in potency into a being in act, where also consequently there is change, because what is generated is otherwise now than before. But it is otherwise in the divine things, because that other generation is of actuality in every mode, both on the part of the principle and of the term and of the production itself and of that from which the production comes about. Whence, because there is there no acquisition of a new being, and there is nevertheless a receiving of a true and actual and everlasting being; therefore, although there is true production, there is nevertheless not true change there6.

2. To that which is objected, that generation says change and relation; it must be said that those things which are in creatures, if they are posited in the Creator, ought to be posited according to that which they have of completion, not according to that which they have of incompletion. But motion and change always say incompletion, whereas relation says for the most part a complement, especially that relation which says origin in the noblest things7 without any dependence; and in this mode in that eternal production.

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3. To that which is objected, that corruption cannot be understood without change; it must be said that it is not similar: because corruption says the loss of being, which indeed cannot be understood unless it come about after being previously had; and through this it of necessity includes change, which cannot be except in a mutable and variable thing, on account of the defect that it says. But generation is the giving or receiving of being through consubstantiality; and this can be concerning the noblest and most actual being, because this says no defect, and through this it does not of necessity include change, as corruption does. For to such a generation corruption is not opposed, but only to that which was in the creature, which corruption indeed in a certain mode follows and in a certain mode precedes. "For the generation of one is the corruption of another," as the Philosopher says1.

4. To that which is objected, that generation in time posits change in time: therefore also generation in eternity infers change in eternity; it must be said that that mode of inferring holds where there is no distracting determination; but it is not so in the case proposed: because generation in eternity is of another mode than generation in time, as has been said; it does not come about from a being in potency, as that which is measured by time2. And therefore it does not follow that, if motion follows upon this one, it follows upon that one — rather the opposite.

5. To that which is objected, that if the Holy Spirit were generated, He would be changed; it must be said that that argument follows, not because to be generated is to be changed, but because, when what ought not to be is posited, there results what ought not to be3. For if it is posited that the Holy Spirit, who receives being through spiration, which really differs from generation, receives being by way of generation; it is of necessity posited that He passes from one mode of emanating to another mode really differing; and so He is of necessity posited to be changed, not because those modes of arising or emanating say motions or changes, but because the passage from one into the other cannot be understood without motion. And since change in the divine being is not admitted, hence it is that it is impossible that the person who is produced through spiration be generated. And hence it is that although the Father generates and spirates, He is nevertheless not changed, because these two stand together at once concerning the person of the Father, namely to spirate and to generate, nor is it necessary to pass from one into the other. But these two modes cannot belong at once to the same produced person, and through this, if by an impossibility it is understood to be posited concerning any of those persons, by the same impossibility motion also is posited, because the mode of producing is posited to vary.

6. To that which is objected, namely that production is in the divine things, then either by necessity or by will; it must be said that, as will better appear in the question on necessity4, it is there in a certain mode by necessity and in a certain mode by will. For it is not through a necessity of coercion, but of immutability; not through an electing will, but through a will everlastingly accepting, according to which the producer in the most noble production is well pleased in himself and even delights. And therefore it does not follow that there can be there a variation of mutability and a constraint of power, because he who is produced is produced at once necessarily, liberally and powerfully.

7. To that which is objected, that the immutability of the creature excludes generation, as is clear in the Angel, therefore also in God; it must be said that this does not hold, because the creature in generating cannot give its whole substance, on account of this, that it falls short of supreme simplicity and actuality and communicability; therefore it is impossible that anything be generated from its substance without its being changed. But it is otherwise in the case proposed, as has been said before5, because the one generating in the divine things does not give to the one generated a part of his essence, but gives the whole essence, most simple and perfect. — It could, however, be said that the spiritual creature too has an intrinsic generation, which indeed is that of the word from the mind, which among the other created things most of all bears the likeness of the eternal generation.

8. To that which is objected, that the cause of generation and corruption is being far distant from the first; it must be said that that is not the whole account. For man, if he had stood in the state of innocence, would never have been corrupted, and yet he would have generated. Whence generation is rather from the supreme perfection and fecundity and actuality of the first principle itself than it is for the supplying of the defect of the corruption of the productive principle itself. The Philosopher therefore speaks of the cause of generation according to the state of deficient nature, not generally and according to the mode of that most complete generation which is the origin of all production. For the begetter of beauty established all these things6, and He who gives generation to others cannot be sterile, according to what is said in the last chapter of Isaias.

9. To that which is objected, that God cannot produce something from some creature without its alteration; it must be said that it is not similar: because, since the creature is mutable and not altogether simple,

p. 106

when something is posited to be produced from it, it is consequently posited to be altered, because there cannot there be the same, through an indifference in every mode, that which is given and that which is received and the intermediate act1; but in the divine things it is altogether the opposite, according as is manifestly evident from the preceding.

10. To that which is objected, that something cannot be produced from nothing without change; it must be said that that is not similar: because something cannot be produced from nothing without having being after non-being, without also having being from2 a principle essentially differing. Whence, although nothing is not mutable of itself, yet the eduction by which something that before was not a being is made a being of necessity posits beginning and change. But it is not so with that production by which a person is produced from the everlasting substance of the person everlastingly producing, because there neither is another being received anew, nor does anything begin, and through this neither is anything varied.

11. To that which is objected, that a form cannot be produced without change, therefore neither a supposit; it must be said that it is not similar: because the production of a form says a substantial difference between the producer and the product; for nothing produces itself3; and therefore, when a form is produced, it must be produced by another form, which, since it is other than it, will truly be the producing cause and prior by nature to the produced form itself; and therefore in that production it is necessary that change be included. But it is not so in the production of a supposit or person, for this reason, that there is one nature and essence in both, and therefore they are together; nor is there change or motion there, because there is there no prior nor posterior nor anything new.

12. To that which is objected, that as part is to part, so whole is to whole; it must be said that in the divine things there is properly neither part nor whole, according as a whole is called that which contains part and part4. Nor does it hold that, if a thing produced from a part posits change in the part, a thing produced from the whole substance likewise posits change according to the whole: because, as was touched on before, production in part posits a cutting off, posits the loss of something and the acquisition of something, which of necessity include change; but production from the whole substance says nothing of the kind, but rather excludes all that upon which motion follows, as was shown from the principal solution. For neither is there a cutting off in the producing principle, nor composition in the product, nor innovation in the production, nor any variation concerning any of the aforesaid.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 4
    Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et speciei: Genera [speciebus] praeiacere oporet... unde et priora sunt naturaliter genera... et species quidem cum sit, est et genus omnino, genus vero cum sit, non omnino erit species. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1. — Minor insinuatur ab Aristot., de Pradicam. c. de Motu. Vide tom. I. pag. 664, nota 4.
    Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. On the common features and differences of genus and species: "Genera must [sic] lie before [the species]... whence also genera are naturally prior... and when the species is, the genus also altogether is, but when the genus is, the species will not altogether be." Compare Aristotle, IV Topics, c. 1. — The minor is intimated by Aristotle, Categories, c. On Motion. See vol. I, p. 664, note 4.
  2. 1
    Cfr. supra pag. 93, nota 3.
    Compare above, p. 93, note 3.
  3. 2
    Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 4. m. 1: Item I. Sent. d. VII. [c. 1.] Magister: Si Spiritus sanctus nasci potuit, potuit esse Filius; et si potuit esse Filius, mutabilis esse potuit. (Magister loc. cit. praemiserat quaedam verba Augustini. S. Bonav. I. Sent. d. 7. dub. 4. ait: Item quaeritur de ista illatione Magistri: Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius etc.).
    Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 4, m. 1: "Likewise, I Sentences, d. VII [c. 1], the Master: If the Holy Spirit could be born, He could be the Son; and if He could be the Son, He could be mutable." (The Master, in the place cited, had set certain words of Augustine before this. St. Bonaventure, I Sentences, d. 7, dub. 4, says: "Likewise, it is asked about this inference of the Master: the Holy Spirit could have been the Son, etc.")
  4. 3
    Id est: generatione. Richard. a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 14: In angelica autem natura nulla est propagatio, sed sola simplexque creatio. Cfr. supra pag. 75, nota 7. — Superius pro immutabilitas, quod habet E, alii perperam mutabilitas.
    That is: by generation. Richard of St. Victor, IV On the Trinity, c. 14: "But in the angelic nature there is no propagation, but only simple creation." Compare above, p. 75, note 7. — Above, for immutabilitas, which E has, the others wrongly have mutabilitas.
  5. 4
    Libr. II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 180, nota 8. Dictio a primo idem ac a principio.
    Book II On Generation and Corruption, text 59 (c. 10). Compare vol. I, p. 180, note 8. The expression a primo ("from the first") is the same as a principio ("from the principle").
  6. 5
    Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.), ubi docet, quod nihili nulla sit differentia. — Post pauca pro aliquid, quod praebet A, alii aliquem.
    Compare Aristotle, IV Physics, text 67 (c. 8), where he teaches that of nothing there is no difference. — A little after, for aliquid, which A offers, the others have aliquem.
  7. 6
    Vide supra q. 2. a. 2. in corp.
    See above, q. 2, a. 2, in the body.
  8. 7
    Quaest. 3. a. 2.
    Question 3, a. 2.
  9. 8
    Aristot., III. Phys. text. 6. (c. 1.). Entelechia (ἐντελέχεια) idem est ac actus.
    Aristotle, III Physics, text 6 (c. 1). Entelechia (ἐντελέχεια) is the same as act.
  10. 9
    Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 99. et 131. (c. 11. et 14.): Prius autem et posterius in motu est. — De priori tempore vel natura cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori et c. de Simul. — Minor probata est supra q. 5. a. 2.
    Compare Aristotle, IV Physics, text 99 and 131 (c. 11 and 14): "But the before and after are in motion." — On the prior in time or in nature compare Aristotle, Categories, c. On the Prior and c. On the Simultaneous. — The minor was proved above, q. 5, a. 2.
  11. 10
    Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.) et XI. Metaph. c. 11. (X. c. 12.). — Verba Boethii habentur in libro de Trin. c. 6.
    Aristotle, V Physics, text 10 (c. 2), and XI Metaphysics, c. 11 (X, c. 12). — The words of Boethius are found in the book On the Trinity, c. 6.
  12. 1
    E G H totam praecedentem propositionem hic repetunt, mutato Item in ergo.
    E G H repeat the whole preceding proposition here, Item being changed into ergo.
  13. 2
    Vide supra a. 1. ad 5. et 6. — Mox pro personam A Filium.
    See above, a. 1, replies 5 and 6. — Just after, for personam A has Filium.
  14. 3
    Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.).
    Compare Aristotle, V Physics, text 7 (c. 1).
  15. 4
    Hic desinunt omnes codd., excepto D (continuato ab alia, tamen suppari manu); loca nonnulla ipsius corrupta coniectura corrigenda nobis erant, ut ex notis adiectis intelligi potest.
    Here all the codices break off, except D (continued by another, though nearly contemporary, hand); some corrupt passages of it we have had to correct by conjecture, as can be understood from the notes added.
  16. 5
    Supplevimus sed includit, quod D omittit.
    We have supplied sed includit, which D omits.
  17. 6
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1.
    Compare I Sentences, d. 9, q. 1.
  18. 7
    D corrupte relatio autem dicitur ut pluries... originem dicitur nobilissimis.
    D corruptly reads relatio autem dicitur ut pluries... originem dicitur nobilissimis.
  19. 1
    Libr. I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 20. (c. 3.) et II. Metaph. text. 7. (I. brevior, c. 2.). — Superius inter verba sicut corruptio suppressimus et.
    Book I On Generation and Corruption, text 20 (c. 3), and II Metaphysics, text 7 (I brevior, c. 2). — Above, between the words sicut corruptio, we have suppressed et.
  20. 2
    Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 114. seq. (c. 12.), ubi explicatur, quid sit in tempore esse et tempore mensurari.
    Compare Aristotle, IV Physics, text 114 and following (c. 12), where it is explained what it is to be in time and to be measured by time.
  21. 3
    Simili modo ait Aristot. VIII. Phys. text. 36. (c. 5.): Si ergo ponamus possibile esse, nullum impossibile accidet, falsum autem fortassis. — In hac solut., de qua cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. dub. 4, paulo superius voci quia praefiximus sed, et inferius quae voci realiter.
    In a similar way Aristotle says, VIII Physics, text 36 (c. 5): "If therefore we posit that it is possible, nothing impossible will result, though perhaps something false." — In this solution, on which compare I Sentences, d. 7, dub. 4, a little above we have prefixed sed to the word quia, and below quae to the word realiter.
  22. 4
    Quaest. seq. a. 2, licet in hoc cod., in principio posita, ordine praecedat. — In fine solut. D semel omittit producitur.
    The following question, a. 2 — although in this codex, being placed at the beginning, it comes first in order. — At the end of the solution D omits producitur once.
  23. 5
    Quaest. 2. a. 2. in corp. et ad 3.
    Question 2, a. 2, in the body and reply 3.
  24. 6
    Sap. 13, 3: Speciei enim generator etc. — Verba Isai. 66, 9. sunt: Si ego, qui generationem ceteris tribuo, sterilis ero, ait Dominus Deus tuus?
    Wisdom 13:3: For the begetter of beauty etc. — The words of Isaias 66:9 are: Shall I, that give generation to others, myself be barren, saith the Lord thy God?
  25. 1
    D quod dicitur et quod accipitur ut [nec?] actus..
    D reads quod dicitur et quod accipitur ut [nec?] actus..
  26. 2
    Supplevimus a.
    We have supplied a.
  27. 3
    Vide supra pag. 46, nota 7. — Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.): Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa.
    See above, p. 46, note 7. — Aristotle, II Posterior Analytics, c. 17 (c. 14): "For the cause is prior to that of which it is the cause."
  28. 4
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 1. — De toto et parte vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 30. seq. (IV. c. 25. seq.). — Post dicendum, quod additum a D nec suppressimus, quia superfluere videtur.
    Compare I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 1. — On whole and part see Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 30 and following (IV, c. 25 and following). — After dicendum, quod we have suppressed the nec added by D, because it seems superfluous.
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