Quaest. 6, Art. 1

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Quaest. 6, Art. 1

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio VI: Utrum trinitas possit stare cum summa immutabilitate

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Quaestio VI. Utrum trinitas possit stare cum summa immutabilitate.

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum possit stare trinitas cum summa immutabilitate; et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum divinum esse sit immutabile.

Secundum, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas.

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Articulus I. Utrum esse divinum sit immutabile.

Circa primum sic proceditur. Quod divinum esse sit immutabile, ostenditur sic:

1. Primo auctoritate, Malachiae tertio¹: Ego Deus et non mutor; Glossa: «Hoc dicit, ne putaretur aliquid mutabilitatis esse in Deo». Psalmo: Mutabis eos, et mutabuntur, tu autem idem ipse es; Glossa: «immutabilis».

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione sic. Divinum esse est simpliciter et universaliter primum; sed immutabile prius est mutabili, quia mutabile ad immutabile habet reduci²: si ergo est universaliter primum et principaliter, ergo universaliter est immutabile.

3. Item, divinum esse est ultimum, ad quod cetera tendunt sicut ad finem summum³; sed in fine summo et ultimo cetera quiescunt; in nullo autem possunt cetera quietari, nisi illud sit omnino immutabile in se: ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, divinum esse, sicut dicunt philosophi⁴, et ratio convincit, est simpliciter et omnimode necessarium; omne autem, quod habet aliquam variationem, cadit aliquo modo a necessitate secundum id, secundum quod mutatur: ergo si necessarium est, et immutabile.

5. Item, divinum esse est perfectissimum; nihil autem perfectissimum proficit aut deficit; omne autem, quod mutatur, aut acquirit aliquid, aut perdit⁵: ergo divinum esse nullatenus mutari potest.

6. Item, divinum esse est simplicissimum⁶, ergo nihil habet naturae adventitiae; sed in omni, quod mutatur, aut aliquid advenit, aut recedit: ergo non stat mutabilitas cum simplicitate: ergo necesse est, eius oppositum stare: ergo immutabile.

7. Item, divinum esse est immensum; sed omne, quod mutatur, aut mutatur in statum meliorem, aut deteriorem, aut aequalem; immensum autem non potest esse maius nec minus nec habet aliquod aequale: ergo est simpliciter immutabile⁷.

8. Item, divinum esse est aeternum, sicut patet ex praecedentibus⁸; in omni autem mutatione est aliquo modo prius et posterius; hoc autem in aeternitate nullo modo potest esse: ergo nulla mutatio; restat igitur, quod sit immutabile omnino.

9. Item, omnis mutatio vel est ad esse, vel ab esse, vel in esse, quia omne, quod mutatur, vel esse accipit, vel esse perdit, vel ab uno esse in aliud transit, sive ab uno modo essendi in alium⁹; sed Deus est ipsum purum esse, cum sit se ipso et actus purus: ergo nullo praedictorum modorum mutari potest; nec alium est dare: ergo est immutabilis.

10. Item, omnis mutatio vel est secundum substantiam, vel secundum accidens¹⁰; sed Deus non mutatur secundum substantiam, cum sit incorruptibilis, nec secundum accidens, cum ei nihil omnino accidat: ergo nullam prorsus mutabilitatem admittit.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Sapientiae septimo¹¹: Omnium mobilium mobilior est sapientia; constat, quod loquitur de sapientia increata: ergo si ipsa est mobilissima, videtur divinum esse mutabilissimum inter omnia mutabilia. — Si dicas, quod hoc dicitur per causam; tunc obiicitur: mobilius est quod est mobile per causam et secundum formam, quam altero modo tantum.

2. Item, gradus attenditur in creaturis secundum maiorem mobilitatem, quia mobilius est elementum supremum quam infimum¹², et primum caelum quam aliae sphaerae, et corpus gloriosum quam caelum, et spiritus quam corpus gloriosum; sed quod est nobilitatis attribuendum est Deo: ergo etc.

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione secundum viam septiformem.

3. Et primo ex parte comparationis. Omne illud, cui aliquid advenit ex tempore, est mutabile; divinum esse est huiusmodi, quia ex tempore dicitur dominus, dicitur refugium, dicitur rex: ergo est mutabilis. — Si tu dicas, quod «in ad aliquid non

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est motus¹»; contra: Ambrosius arguit sic: si Pater fieret de non-patre pater, esset mutatus, et tamen pater dicit relationem: ergo hoc non solvit.

4. Item, huiusmodi nomina aut dicunt aliquid, quod sit Deus, et sic non incipiunt; aut aliquid creatum, et sic non dicuntur de Deo; aut nihil ponunt, et sic non magis dicuntur de Deo quam de alio; aut aliquid adveniens Deo; sed hoc necessario ponit motum: ergo etc.

5. Item, ostenditur hoc ex parte actionis. Omne illud, quod fit de non agente agens, exit «ab otio in actum²»; sed omne tale aliquo modo mutatur et alteratur; sed Deus est huiusmodi: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod hoc est ex parte creaturae; obiicitur contra hoc: quia non ideo Deus producit, quia creatura producitur; sed magis e converso: ergo ratio huius exitus primo ponenda est in Deo.

6. Item, omne agens, quod agit pluribus actionibus, ita quod modo una, modo alia, mutatur necessario; sed Deus est huiusmodi, quia modo producit, modo conservat, modo parcit, modo punit, et una harum actionum non est alia: ergo in Deo est mutatio aliqua.

7. Hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione missionis. Omnis vera missio et descensus est vera mutatio; sed Filius Dei secundum Scripturas missus est in carnem et de caelo descendit³, et hoc non potest esse secundum humanam naturam: ergo est mutatus et mutabilis secundum divinam.

8. Item, Filius Dei est aliquid secundum quod homo; sed impossibile est de non-tali fieri tale sine illius⁴ mutatione, ut de non-albo album; ergo multo fortius sequitur in his quae dicunt substantiam: ergo si Filius Dei est factus homo, necesse est, illam hypostasim esse mutatam.

9. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione inhabitationis. Omne illud, quod incipit esse in aliquo et desinit esse in illo, mutatur saltem per accidens; sed Deus per gratiam incipit esse in poenitente et desinit in peccante, et per essentiam incipit esse⁵ in natura generata et desinit in corrupta: ergo etc.

10. Item, si aliquid est inseparabiliter in aliquo, moto illo, necesse est, illud moveri, quia, ut dicit Philosophus⁶, «moventibus nobis» etc; sed Deus per essentiam est in qualibet creatura nec ullo modo separatur ab ea: ergo necesse est, quod moveatur, ipsa mota.

11. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione potestatis sic. Qui potuit aliquid prius, quod non potest modo, potestatem habet mutatam; sed Deus, antequam mundum crearet, potuit ipsum creare, et modo non potest: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod posse creare non est posse quid⁷; contra: sequitur: quidquid Pater potest, potest et Filius; sed Pater potest creare: ergo et Filius. — Praeterea, hoc non solvit, quia idem sequitur, si accipiatur qualecumque et quantumcumque et quodcumque aliud signum⁸. — Si dicas, quod debet inferri: potest creasse; similiter de caeco vere dicitur, quod potest vidisse.

12. Item, quidquid Deus potest est possibile; sed si quidquid potuit potest, quidquid fuit Deo possibile modo est possibile; sed hoc est falsum de impossibili per accidens, quod secundum Sanctos et doctores⁹ est Deo impossibile: ergo idem quod prius: igitur divinum posse mutatur.

13. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte cognitionis: quia qui desinit aliquid scire, quod scivit, vel incipit scire, patitur aliquam mutationem in scientia; sed Deus scivit mundum creandum, modo non scit, cum sit omnino falsum: ergo etc.

14. Item, necessario sequitur: si Deus scit aliquid, illud est verum¹⁰: ergo si quidquid scivit scit, quidquid verum fuit est verum; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur: restat igitur, quod divinum scire sit mutabile.

15. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte voluntatis. «Voluntas est causa proxima et immediata rerum», ut dicit Augustinus¹¹; sed posita causa, ponitur effectus: ergo divinum velle non praecedit duratione ipsum producere: ergo quando coepit producere, coepit et velle: ergo etc.

16. Item, qui vult aliquid et potest illud nolle necessario mutatur; sed Deus vult salvare aliquem viatorem: aut ergo potest nolle, aut non potest. Si non potest: ergo ille non potest damnari, aut frustrabitur voluntas Dei; si potest nolle; sed qui potest fieri de volente nolens, potest mutari: ergo etc.

17. Item, impossibile est, quod agens secundum voluntatem, cuius operatio conformatur voluntati,

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volendo unum contrariorum faciat reliquum, et e converso; sed Deus modo mortificat, modo vivificat¹ et multa alia facit incompossibilia: ergo necesse est, quod voluntas eius modo velit unum, modo contrarium. Sed omnis talis voluntas mutatur: ergo divinum velle² est mutabile; sed hoc est idem quod esse: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod hoc est ratione effectus; hoc nihil est, quia non ideo Deus vult aliquid, quia illud fit, sed magis e converso: restat ergo, quod ratio mutabilitatis principaliter venit a voluntate divina.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

Divinum esse est omnino incommutabile.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod absque dubio divinum esse est omnino incommutabile; et hoc quidem necesse est ponere, licet non possimus perfecte intelligere; unde in ponendo omnes concordant. Omnes enim recte intelligentes, non solum Sancti, sed etiam philosophi, ponunt divinum esse immutabile, eo quod simplicissimum, immensum et aeternum. — Eo enim, quod simplicissimum, est immutabile secundum formam; eo quod immensum, immutabile secundum situm; eo quod aeternum, immutabile secundum tempus; omnis autem motus et mutatio secundum Augustinum³ et Hugonem reducitur ad aliquam praedictarum differentiarum: et ideo divinum esse nullo modo potest compati mutationem vel motum.

Et iterum, eo quod simplex, est immutabile ex se ipso; nihil enim habet, quod non sit ipsum eius essentiale esse, quod quidem «non est accidens, sed subsistens veritas», ut dicit Hilarius⁴. Eo vero quod immensum, non est mutabile in alio vel ab alio; non enim potest aliud transferre ipsum, cum sit ubique totum. Ex eo autem, quod est aeternum, non est mutabile cum alio, quia ipsum manet fixum, aliis succedentibus.

Postremo, eo quod simplicissimum, ideo non mutatur comparatione nec operatione, quia neutrum dicit aliquid diversum vel accidens ad ipsum, ex cuius accessu vel recessu componatur aut mutetur esse divinum. Quia vero immensum, non mutatur nec missione nec inhabitatione, quia talis missio vel inhabitatio est nec per aliquam circumscriptionem nec per aliquam loci transitionem⁵, sed per praesentiam et manifestationem. Quia vero aeternum, non mutatur nec voluntate nec potestate nec scientia, pro eo quod quidquid potest, scit et vult, aeternaliter potest, scit et vult; unde sicut nulla est in aeternitate mutabilitas, sic nec in scientia, voluntate et potentia. — Omni igitur modo, sicut pertractanti apparet, necessarium est ponere, divinum esse incommutabilitatem habere; et hoc dicunt omnes.

Sicut autem ad intelligendam aeternitatem simul oportet intelligere Deum simplicem et immensum, sic ad intelligendam immutabilitatem oportet intelligere simul Dei summam simplicitatem, aeternitatem et immensitatem. Quia enim simplex est, nihil sibi accidit; quia aeternus, nihil sibi advenit, nihil recedit; quia immensus, omnis proprietas dignitatis convenit ei: et ideo se ipso sine aliquo accidente vel adveniente potest producere et non producere, velle et non velle, praescire et non praescire, exaudire et non exaudire, sicut decet eius summam nobilitatem. Et sicut multa potest, cum sit unus; et temporalia, cum sit aeternus; et finita, cum sit infinitus; et composita, cum sit simplex: sic variabilia et mutabilia, cum tamen ipse immutabilis perseveret. — Et hoc est quod dicit Hugo, prima parte de Sacramentis⁶: «Firmiter teneatur quod omni animae rationali naturaliter est insertum, scilicet incommutabilem esse Deum. Non enim augeri potest, quia immensus est, nec minui, quia unus est, nec loco mutari, quia ubique est, nec tempore, quia aeternus est, nec cognitione, quia sapientissimus est, nec affectione, quia optimus est». Ex quo apparet, qualiter et quare intelligimus Deum immutabilem in suo esse.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod illa quae dicuntur de Deo respectu creaturae significant divinam essentiam et aliquid connotant in creatura; et hoc potest esse dupliciter: actu vel habitu. Ex parte principalis significati sunt ipse Deus, qui non mutatur nec multiplicatur nec incipit⁷ nec desinit. Ex parte connotati sive cointellecti dicunt quid creatum vel creabile; et ex illa parte est inceptio et desitio et variatio, sed differenter secundum diversum modum connotandi. Cum enim illud quod dicitur de Deo connotat creatum in actu; tunc potest incipere et desinere, inesse et non inesse sine mutatione ex parte Dei, sed non sine mutatione ex parte creati; ut patet, cum dicimus, Deum conservare aliquid. Cum vero connotat creabile in

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habitu sive in aptitudine, tunc non potest esse inceptio, potest tamen esse desitio, potest etiam inesse et non inesse sine mutatione Dei et creaturae. Et ratio huius est connotatio futuri; futurum autem nunquam incipit esse futurum, ut dicit Anselmus¹, sed bene desinit esse futurum, cum fit praesens. — Et rursus, contingens futurum potest non esse sine mutatione, quia nihil actu ponit in re. — Ex his igitur patet, si quis capiat, quod Deo possunt attribui duo opposita sine ulla sui mutatione; sed quaedam sunt, in quibus exigitur mutatio creaturae, utpote in temporalibus, quaedam vero, in quibus minime. Qualitercumque igitur intelligatur, necesse est ponere divinum esse omnino immutabile². — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod omnium mobilium mobilior est sapientia; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur mobile tripliciter: vel per causalitatem efficientem, vel per exemplaritatem repraesentantem, vel per varietatem inhaerentem. Primo et secundo modo dicitur sapientia mobilissima, quia hoc est perfectionis; sed non tertio, quia hoc spectat ad incompletionem. — Vel potest dici, quod quia mobile secundum situm ex ipso motu praesens efficitur pluribus locis, et quod velocius movetur pluribus locis velocius praesentatur; hinc est, quod cum divina sapientia omnibus sit praesentissima, maxime mobilis dicitur inter omnia mobilia, non quia sit transiens de uno in aliud, sed quia est omnibus praesens. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo nono³: «Moveri Deum religiose existimandum est, non secundum portationem, aut mutationem, aut alterationem, aut modalem aut localem motum, non directum, non circularem, non ex ambobus, non intelligibilem, non animalem, non naturalem, sed quod ad substantiam agat Deus et contineat omnia et totaliter omnia provideat, et quod adsit omnibus omnium circuitu et ad existentia omnia provisivis processibus et operationibus».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gradus attenditur in creaturis secundum maiorem mobilitatem etc.; dicendum, quod quaedam sunt, quae conveniunt creaturis secundum plus et minus, ita quod de se non sonant in imperfectionem, sicut unitas, veritas, bonitas; et in talibus summum attribuendum est Deo, cui competit omnis perfectio. Quaedam autem sunt, quae dicunt dignitatem aliquam cum imperfectione, sicut mobilitas, quae dicit actualitatem quandam cum adiuncta possibilitate⁴, et talia ratione imperfectionis adiunctae Deo attribui non possunt nec debent, nec in termino nec citra terminum secundum sermonis proprietatem.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ex parte comparattonis, quod Deo aliquid advenit ex tempore; dicendum, quod in huiusmodi, sicut in solutione tactum est, est intelligere principale significatum et connotatum; et principale quidem significatum est ex parte Dei, ac per hoc aeternum et incommutabile; connotatum vero ex parte creaturae, et ideo temporale et mutabile. Quod ergo dicuntur ista incipere vel desinere, hoc non est ex parte eius quod ponitur in Deo, sed ex parte eius quod ponitur in effectu creato. — Et per hoc patet illud quod obiicitur, quod huiusmodi nomina dicunt aliquid, quod est Deus, et aliquid, quod est a Deo; et ratione primi praedicantur, non ratione secundi; et ratione secundi incipiunt et desinunt, non ratione primi; quia ad hoc, quod aliquod totum copulatum sit temporale vel contingens, sufficit, quod temporalitatem vel contingentiam habeat in aliqua sui parte⁵.

5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de actione, quod fit de non agente agens; dicendum, quod est agens, quod agit se ipso, et est agens, quod agit per aliquid aliud a se. Primum agens in agendo mutari non potest, quia nihil sibi advenit, nihil abscedit ex actione, cum sua actio sit idem quod ipsum. De alio vero agente, quod differt a sua actione, habet praedicta propositio veritatem. Deus autem est agens primo modo, non secundo, quia pro summa simplicitate ipse est sua actio. — Et si tu obiicias: si ipse est sua actio, sicut non incipit esse, sic non incipit agere; dicendum, quod non incipit agere ratione ipsius actus intrinseci, qui est idem quod ipse, sed ratione effectus extrinseci, qui se tenet ex parte creaturae, qui incipit et plurificatur secundum creaturarum varietatem. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens de pluralitate actionum. Quod enim ponantur in Deo plures actiones incompossibiles, hoc non est ratione pluralitatis actuum intrinsecorum, sed ratione pluralitatis effectuum et connotatorum. Nam actus intrinsecus, cum sit Deus, est unus et incommutabilis et aeternus; effectus vero extrinsecus, cum

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sit creatus, est multiplex et mutabilis et temporalis, largo modo accipiendo tempus¹; et hoc nullam inducit mutationem circa esse divinum.

7. 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de missione, quod omnis missio et descensus est mutatio; dicendum, quod missio in divinis non accipitur ibi proprie, sed translative; nec aliud dicunt in Deo quam emanationem unius ab altero et manifestationem in effectu creato². Unde cum Deus sit semper ubique praesens, Pater scilicet et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, secundum essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam; quia tamen in caelestibus habitat per gloriam et apparet per illustrationem apertam, quando in creaturis inferioribus incipit apparere, quasi de non praesente incipit esse praesens; et ideo dicitur mitti et descendere, non ratione alicuius innovationis seu novitatis ex parte sui, sed solum ratione ostensionis et manifestationis nobis exhibitae et in nobis factae. — Et si obiicit tunc, quod Filius Dei est factus homo de novo, et homo dicit aliquid, quod est in ipso; dicendum, quod homo praedicatur de Filio ratione unionis duarum naturarum in unam hypostasim; et ideo, cum unio dicatur per modum relationis et possit attribui alicui de novo absque mutatione facta in ipso, sed solum propter mutationem factam in altero extremo, sicut patet in dextro et sinistro³: hinc est, quod Filius Dei de novo factus est homo sine mutatione personae aeternae, ex sola mutatione naturae assumtae, quae simul formata fuit et Verbo unita; et sicut Verbum non mutatur in illius naturae formatione, sic nec in formatae assumtione.

9. 10. Ad illud quod obiicitur de habitatione, quod Deus per gratiam incipit esse in poenitente; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo dupliciter: vel ita, quod ab ipso aliquo modo dependet et per illud contrahitur et definitur; et quod hoc modo incipit esse in aliquo mutatur ex illa inceptione et movetur ad motum illius, in quo est; sicut patet de existentia universalis in particulari et formae in materia et locati in loco et accidentis in subiecto. Deus autem sic est in creatura per essentiam et influentiam, quod ipse a creatura non dependet nec in ea coarctatur nec definitur; et ideo, quod incipit habitare in aliquo, hoc non est propter mutationem factam in ipso, sed solum in creatura vel in influentia media, ratione cuius dicitur Deus in creatura habitare de novo, novam scilicet gratiam influendo. — Similiter, cum sit in creatura, non movetur tamen ad motum ipsius, sicut illa, de quibus dicit Philosophus, quod «moventibus nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis sunt», pro eo quod ipse in creatura non dependet nec coarctatur nec definitur. Unde sicut radius est in aëre, nec tamen movetur ad aëris motum; sicut anima in qualibet parte corporis tota, nec tamen movetur ad motum cuiuslibet partis, quia non in qualibet definitur: sic et in proposito intelligendum est. Et per hoc patet responsio ad praesens. — Et si obiiciat, quod non videtur intelligibile, quod aliquid sit in aliquo inseparabiliter, nec tamen moveatur ad eius mutationem; dicendum, quod illud intelligere possumus, si simul intelligamus Deum simplicissimum et immensum. Quia enim immensus est, sic est intra, quod extra⁴; quia simplicissimus est, nullatenus distat a se ipso, quantacumque sit in rebus, in quibus est, localis distantia et separatio. Et hinc est, quod quantumcumque res, in quibus Deus est, intelligantur mutari, nullo modo, nec re nec intellectu, ponitur ex hoc Deus mutabilis. In omni enim motu et mutatione necesse est intelligere accessum et recessum, ac per hoc aliquam distantiam extremorum; quod nullatenus poni potest circa esse divinum, nec per se nec per accidens, cum simul sit infinitum et simplex. Et ideo fallitur hic imaginatio phantasiae.

11. 12. Ad illud quod obiicitur de potestate, quod non quidquid potuit potest; dicendum, quod aliquis dicitur non posse quod potuit dupliciter: vel propter defectum aliquem subintroductum ex parte ipsius potentiae producentis, vel propter mutationem conditionis ex parte ipsius possibilis. Quod enim est possibile et verum effici potest impossibile per rei mutationem; sicut me non legisse, antequam legam, est verum, sed postquam legero, factum est impossibile, quod dicitur impossibile per accidens; quod etiam, ut dicit Augustinus contra Faustum⁵, est Deo impossibile, quia illud posse non est potentiae, sed magis impotentiae, cum sit contra summam veritatem, facere scilicet, quod fuit, postquam fuit, non fuisse. Quoniam ergo divina potentia semper uniformiter perseverat, quaecumque et qualiacumque et quodcumque et quantacumque potuit et nunc potest, quantum est de se; quia vero multa vera facta sunt falsa, et possibilia facta sunt impossibilia: hinc est, quod quantum est ex parte ipsorum, non quaecumque potuit potest, quia non quaecumque fuerunt possibilia sunt possibilia, et hoc non per mutationem circa efficientem⁶ potentiam, sed circa possibilia effecta. — Et per hoc patet

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responsio ad sequens de impossibili per accidens. — Et si tu obiicias, quod divina potentia nullatenus pendet ex possibili, cum ex nihilo possit omnia producere; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter dependentiam, sed propter connotationem: quia, cum dicitur, Deum posse aliquid, simul et insinuatur, quod illud sit possibile sibi, ac per hoc, quod nihil habeat repugnans divinae potentiae, sapientiae et bonitati, quin possit in esse produci, salva omni nobilitate posse divini.

13. 14. Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia, dicendum, quod cum dicitur Deus scire aliquid, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: vel quia habet cognitionem de illo, vel quia iudicat, illud esse verum. Primo modo scire Dei non connotat existentiam veritatis in scito; et hoc modo quidquid scivit scit, quia de omni eo habet notitiam, de quo ab aeterno habuit. Secundo modo connotat veritatem circa cognitum; et hoc modo non quidquid scivit scit, sicut non quidquid egit agit; et hoc non propter mutationem ex parte scientis, sed solum ex parte cogniti¹. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod consequenter obiicit de veritate cogniti: quia divinum scire ponit veritatem in cognito secundum unam acceptionem, non secundum aliam, sicut patet per distinctionem praehabitam.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur ex parte divinae voluntatis; dicendum, quod causa proxima et immediata dicitur tripliciter: aut respectu substantiae, aut dispositionis, aut actus; ratione substantiae, inter quam et effectum non cadit alia substantia causans media; ratione dispositionis, cui non additur nova dispositio ad effectum producendum; ratione vero actus, quia ipsi actui coniungitur. Sed actus divinus dupliciter accipitur, scilicet ut intra et ut efficiens aliquid extra. Est igitur divina² voluntas causa proxima et immediata rerum producendarum ratione substantiae et dispositionis et actus intrinseci, sed non ratione efficientiae exterioris nisi pro eo tempore, pro quo vult. Et hoc habet divina voluntas, quia simul est omnipotentissima et liberrima; et ideo, licet ab aeterno voluerit producere mundum, quia tamen non voluit, quod mundi productio esset ab aeterno, sed solum in tempore: hinc est, quod in tempore produxit, nulla facta mutatione in voluntate, et incepit effectus, non incipiente causa. Et quod obiicitur de causa proxima et immediata, intelligitur de illa quae est causa proxima et immediata secundum triplicem rationem praedictam.

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus, qui vult aliquid, potest illud nolle; dicendum, quod divinum velle connotat respectum et ordinem ad aliquod futurum, et illud futurum potest esse vel non esse sine mutatione, sicut prius dictum est in principali solutione; hinc est, quod respectu futurorum contingentium Deus potest dici volens, vel non volens, nullatenus facta mutatione in ipso volente.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus sic est agens secundum voluntatem, ita quod eius operatio voluntati configuratur etc.; dicendum, quod agens secundum voluntatem duplex est: unum, cuius voluntas determinatur ad aliquod volitum, ita quod non simul et semel fertur super universitatem suorum effectuum, sed modo vult hoc, modo illud; et in hoc³ agente secundum voluntatem illud quod obiicit habet veritatem. Aliud est agens secundum voluntatem, cuius voluntas fertur super omne illud, quod disposuit sapientia dictans; et huiusmodi agens sicut omnia simul disposuit, quae successive producuntur, ita quod ipsa dispositio non variatur secundum variationem producendorum; sic et voluntas, quae illi dispositioni prorsus est consona, remanet non mutata. Unde sicut divina ars et divinum consilium, secundum quod diversa fiunt et praecipiuntur, semper in se ipso remanet non mutatum; sic et divinum beneplacitum semper remanet non mutatum, quamvis illa mutentur, quae ab ipso procedunt; pro eo quod simul et semel et aeternaliter et immutabiliter respicit omnia, quae aeternaliter producuntur, sicut et ars, ratio et exemplar, verbum et sapientia et cetera consimilia; in quibus nulla fit variatio propter mutationem factam in rebus extra, respectu quarum nulla est in Deo prorsus dependentia, licet omnia ab eius sapientia et voluntate et potentia dependeant tanquam a causa nobilissima, stabilissima, sufficientissima, primaria et suprema.

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English Translation

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Question VI. Whether trinity can stand with supreme immutability.

Next it is asked whether trinity can stand with supreme immutability; and concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is immutable.

The second, whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together.

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Article I. Whether the divine being is immutable.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus. That the divine being is immutable is shown thus:

1. First by authority, Malachias, chapter 3¹: I am God, and I change not; the Gloss: "He says this, lest anything of mutability should be thought to be in God." The Psalm: Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed, but thou art the selfsame; the Gloss: "immutable."

2. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason thus. The divine being is simply and universally first; but the immutable is prior to the mutable, because the mutable has to be reduced to the immutable²: if therefore it is universally and principally first, therefore it is universally immutable.

3. Likewise, the divine being is last, that to which all other things tend as to their supreme end³; but in the supreme and last end all other things come to rest; and all other things can be brought to rest in nothing unless it be wholly immutable in itself: therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, the divine being, as the philosophers say⁴, and as reason proves, is simply and in every mode necessary; but everything that has any variation falls away in some manner from necessity according to that according to which it is changed: therefore if it is necessary, it is also immutable.

5. Likewise, the divine being is most perfect; but nothing most perfect advances or falls short; but everything that is changed either acquires something or loses something⁵: therefore the divine being can in no way be changed.

6. Likewise, the divine being is most simple⁶, therefore it has nothing of an adventitious nature; but in everything that is changed, either something comes to it or something departs from it: therefore mutability does not stand with simplicity: therefore it is necessary that its opposite stand: therefore it is immutable.

7. Likewise, the divine being is immense; but everything that is changed is changed either into a better state, or a worse, or an equal; but the immense cannot be greater or less, nor has it anything equal: therefore it is simply immutable⁷.

8. Likewise, the divine being is eternal, as is clear from the preceding⁸; but in every change there is in some manner a before and an after; and this can in no way be in eternity: therefore there is no change; it remains therefore that it is wholly immutable.

9. Likewise, every change is either to being, or from being, or in being, because everything that is changed either receives being, or loses being, or passes from one being into another, that is, from one mode of being into another⁹; but God is pure being itself, since He is by Himself and pure act: therefore He cannot be changed in any of the aforesaid modes; nor is there another to be given: therefore He is immutable.

10. Likewise, every change is either according to substance or according to accident¹⁰; but God is not changed according to substance, since He is incorruptible, nor according to accident, since nothing whatever is accidental to Him: therefore He admits no mutability at all.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Wisdom, chapter 7¹¹: Of all moving things wisdom is more moving; it is evident that it speaks of uncreated wisdom: therefore if it is most moving, the divine being seems to be the most mutable among all mutable things. — If you say that this is said by way of cause; then it is objected: that which is movable by way of cause and according to form is more movable than that which is so in the other mode only.

2. Likewise, rank is regarded in creatures according to greater mobility, because the highest element is more movable than the lowest¹², and the first heaven than the other spheres, and the glorious body than the heaven, and spirit than the glorious body; but what belongs to nobility is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason according to a sevenfold way.

3. And first on the part of comparison. Everything to which something comes from time is mutable; the divine being is such, because from time He is called lord, is called refuge, is called king: therefore He is mutable. — If you say that "in relation to something there

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is no motion¹"; on the contrary: Ambrose argues thus: if the Father were to become father from non-father, He would have been changed, and yet father says a relation: therefore this does not resolve it.

4. Likewise, names of this kind either say something that is God, and thus they do not begin; or something created, and thus they are not said of God; or they posit nothing, and thus they are not said of God more than of another; or something coming to God; but this necessarily posits motion: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this is shown on the part of action. Everything that becomes an agent from a non-agent goes forth "from rest into act²"; but everything such is in some manner changed and altered; but God is such: therefore etc. — If you say that this is on the part of the creature; it is objected against this: because God does not produce on this account, that the creature is produced; but rather the converse: therefore the ground of this going forth is to be placed first in God.

6. Likewise, every agent that acts by several actions, so that now by one, now by another, is necessarily changed; but God is such, because now He produces, now He conserves, now He spares, now He punishes, and one of these actions is not another: therefore in God there is some change.

7. This very thing is shown by reason of mission. Every true mission and descent is a true change; but the Son of God according to the Scriptures was sent into the flesh and descended from heaven³, and this cannot be according to human nature: therefore He was changed and is mutable according to the divine.

8. Likewise, the Son of God is something according as He is man; but it is impossible that such come to be from non-such without a change of that thing⁴, as white from non-white; therefore much more strongly does it follow in those things that say substance: therefore if the Son of God was made man, it is necessary that that hypostasis was changed.

9. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason of indwelling. Everything that begins to be in something and ceases to be in it is changed at least accidentally; but God by grace begins to be in the penitent and ceases to be in the sinner, and by essence begins to be⁵ in a nature generated and ceases to be in one corrupted: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, if something is inseparably in something, when that is moved it is necessary that the former be moved, because, as the Philosopher says⁶, "when we are moved" etc; but God is by essence in every creature and is in no way separated from it: therefore it is necessary that He be moved, when it is moved.

11. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason of power thus. One who could do something before which he cannot do now has a changed power; but God, before He created the world, could create it, and now He cannot: therefore etc. — If you say that to be able to create is not to be able to do what⁷; on the contrary: it follows: whatever the Father can do, the Son also can do; but the Father can create: therefore the Son also. — Moreover, this does not resolve it, because the same follows if one takes "of whatever kind" and "however much" and any other sign whatever⁸. — If you say that what ought to be inferred is: He can have created; similarly it is truly said of a blind man that he can have seen.

12. Likewise, whatever God can do is possible; but if whatever He could do He can do, whatever was possible to God is now possible; but this is false of what is impossible by accident, which according to the Saints and the doctors⁹ is impossible to God: therefore the same as before: therefore the divine being able is changed.

13. Likewise, this very thing is shown on the part of cognition: because one who ceases to know something that he knew, or begins to know, undergoes some change in knowledge; but God knew that the world was to be created, now He does not know it, since it is wholly false: therefore etc.

14. Likewise, it follows necessarily: if God knows something, that thing is true¹⁰: therefore if whatever He knew He knows, whatever was true is true; but this is false: therefore that also from which it follows: it remains therefore that the divine knowing is mutable.

15. Likewise, this very thing is shown on the part of will. "Will is the proximate and immediate cause of things," as Augustine says¹¹; but when the cause is posited, the effect is posited: therefore the divine willing does not precede in duration the producing itself: therefore when He began to produce, He began also to will: therefore etc.

16. Likewise, one who wills something and can not-will it is necessarily changed; but God wills to save some wayfarer: either therefore He can not-will it, or He cannot. If He cannot: therefore that man cannot be damned, or the will of God will be frustrated; if He can not-will it; but one who can come to be not-willing from willing can be changed: therefore etc.

17. Likewise, it is impossible that an agent according to will, whose operation is conformed to the will,

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should by willing one of two contraries do the other, and conversely; but God now kills, now gives life¹, and does many other incompossible things: therefore it is necessary that His will now will one thing, now its contrary. But every such will is changed: therefore the divine willing² is mutable; but this is the same as being: therefore etc. — If you say that this is by reason of the effect; this is nothing, because God does not will something on this account, that it comes to be, but rather the converse: it remains therefore that the ground of mutability comes principally from the divine will.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

The divine being is wholly incommutable.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that without doubt the divine being is wholly incommutable; and this indeed it is necessary to posit, although we cannot perfectly understand it; whence in positing it all agree. For all who understand rightly, not only the Saints but also the philosophers, posit the divine being as immutable, by the fact that it is most simple, immense and eternal. — For by the fact that it is most simple, it is immutable according to form; by the fact that it is immense, immutable according to site; by the fact that it is eternal, immutable according to time; but every motion and change, according to Augustine³ and Hugh, is reduced to one of the aforesaid differences: and therefore the divine being can in no way admit change or motion.

And again, by the fact that it is simple, it is immutable of itself; for it has nothing that is not its essential being itself, which indeed "is not an accident, but subsisting truth," as Hilary says⁴. But by the fact that it is immense, it is not mutable in another or by another; for nothing else can transfer it, since it is everywhere whole. And from the fact that it is eternal, it is not mutable with another, because it itself remains fixed while other things succeed one another.

Lastly, by the fact that it is most simple, it is therefore not changed by comparison nor by operation, because neither says anything diverse from it or accidental to it, from whose coming or departing the divine being would be composed or changed. But because it is immense, it is not changed either by mission or by indwelling, because such mission or indwelling is neither through any circumscription nor through any passage of place⁵, but through presence and manifestation. And because it is eternal, it is not changed either by will or by power or by knowledge, for this reason, that whatever it can do, knows and wills, it eternally can do, knows and wills; whence, just as there is no mutability in eternity, so neither in knowledge, will and power. — In every way therefore, as appears to one who treats it through, it is necessary to posit that the divine being has incommutability; and all say this.

But just as, to understand eternity, it is necessary to understand God together as simple and immense, so, to understand immutability, it is necessary to understand together God's supreme simplicity, eternity and immensity. For because He is simple, nothing is accidental to Him; because He is eternal, nothing comes to Him, nothing departs; because He is immense, every property of dignity befits Him: and therefore of Himself, without anything accidental or supervening, He can produce and not produce, will and not will, foreknow and not foreknow, hear and not hear, as befits His supreme nobility. And just as He can do many things, though He is one; and temporal things, though He is eternal; and finite things, though He is infinite; and composite things, though He is simple: so He can do variable and mutable things, while He Himself nonetheless perseveres immutable. — And this is what Hugh says, in the first part On the Sacraments⁶: "Let it be firmly held that it is naturally implanted in every rational soul, namely that God is incommutable. For He cannot be increased, because He is immense, nor diminished, because He is one, nor changed in place, because He is everywhere, nor in time, because He is eternal, nor in cognition, because He is most wise, nor in affection, because He is most good." From which it appears how and why we understand God to be immutable in His being.

But for the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that those things that are said of God with respect to the creature signify the divine essence and connote something in the creature; and this can be in two ways: in act or in habit. On the part of the principal significate they are God Himself, who is not changed nor multiplied nor begins⁷ nor ceases. On the part of the connoted, or co-understood, they say something created or creatable; and on that part there is beginning and ceasing and variation, but differently according to the diverse mode of connoting. For when that which is said of God connotes a created thing in act, then it can begin and cease, be in and not be in, without change on the part of God, but not without change on the part of the created thing; as is clear when we say that God conserves something. But when it connotes the creatable in

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habit, that is, in aptitude, then there cannot be a beginning, yet there can be a ceasing; there can also be being in and not being in without change of God and of the creature. And the ground of this is the connotation of the future; the future, however, never begins to be future, as Anselm says¹, but it does indeed cease to be future when it becomes present. — And again, a contingent future can not be without change, because it posits nothing in the thing in act. — From these things therefore it is clear, if one grasps it, that two opposites can be attributed to God without any change of Him; but there are some in which a change of the creature is required, as in temporal things, and others in which it is not at all. However it is understood, therefore, it is necessary to posit the divine being as wholly immutable². — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that of all moving things wisdom is more moving; it must be said that something is called movable in three ways: either through efficient causality, or through representing exemplarity, or through inhering variety. In the first and second mode wisdom is called most moving, because this belongs to perfection; but not in the third, because this pertains to incompleteness. — Or it can be said that, because what is movable according to site is by the motion itself made present to several places, and what is moved more swiftly is more swiftly presented to several places, hence it is that since the divine wisdom is most present to all things, it is called most movable among all movable things, not because it passes from one thing into another, but because it is present to all things. And this is what Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, chapter nine³: "That God is moved is to be reverently thought, not according to conveyance, or change, or alteration, or modal or local motion, not straight, not circular, not from both, not intelligible, not animal, not natural; but that God brings to substance and contains all things and wholly provides for all things, and that He is present to all things by the encompassing of all things, and to all existing things by provident processions and operations."

2. To that which is objected, that rank is regarded in creatures according to greater mobility etc.; it must be said that there are some things that belong to creatures according to more and less in such a way that of themselves they do not sound of imperfection, as unity, truth, goodness; and in such things the highest is to be attributed to God, to whom all perfection belongs. But there are some that say a certain dignity with imperfection, as mobility, which says a certain actuality with a possibility joined to it⁴, and such things, by reason of the imperfection joined to them, neither can nor ought to be attributed to God, neither at the term nor short of the term, according to the proper sense of speech.

3. 4. To that which is objected on the part of comparison, that something comes to God from time; it must be said that in things of this kind, as was touched on in the solution, one is to understand the principal significate and the connoted; and the principal significate is on the part of God, and through this eternal and incommutable; but the connoted is on the part of the creature, and therefore temporal and mutable. That these things are said to begin or to cease, therefore, is not on the part of that which is posited in God, but on the part of that which is posited in the created effect. — And through this that which is objected is clear, that names of this kind say something that is God and something that is from God; and by reason of the first they are predicated, not by reason of the second; and by reason of the second they begin and cease, not by reason of the first; because for a whole that is joined together to be temporal or contingent, it suffices that it have temporality or contingency in some part of it⁵.

5. 6. To that which is objected about action, that one becomes an agent from a non-agent; it must be said that there is an agent that acts by itself, and there is an agent that acts through something other than itself. The first agent cannot be changed in acting, because nothing comes to it and nothing departs from it by the action, since its action is the same as itself. But of the other agent, which differs from its action, the aforesaid proposition holds true. And God is an agent in the first mode, not the second, because on account of His supreme simplicity He Himself is His action. — And if you object: if He Himself is His action, then just as He does not begin to be, so He does not begin to act; it must be said that He does not begin to act by reason of the intrinsic act itself, which is the same as Himself, but by reason of the extrinsic effect, which stands on the part of the creature, which begins and is plurified according to the variety of creatures. — And through this the response to the following, about the plurality of actions, is clear. For that several incompossible actions are posited in God is not by reason of a plurality of intrinsic acts, but by reason of a plurality of effects and connoted things. For the intrinsic act, since it is God, is one and incommutable and eternal; but the extrinsic effect, since it

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is created, is manifold and mutable and temporal, taking time in a broad way¹; and this induces no change concerning the divine being.

7. 8. To that which is objected about mission, that every mission and descent is a change; it must be said that mission in divine things is not taken there properly but by transference; nor do they say anything else in God than the emanation of one from another and a manifestation in a created effect². Whence, since God is always everywhere present — the Father, that is, and the Son and the Holy Spirit — by essence, power and presence; yet because He dwells in the heavens through glory and appears through open illumination, when He begins to appear in lower creatures it is as though from not present He begins to be present; and therefore He is said to be sent and to descend, not by reason of any innovation or newness on His part, but only by reason of the showing and manifestation displayed to us and made in us. — And if one objects then that the Son of God was made man anew, and man says something that is in Him; it must be said that man is predicated of the Son by reason of the union of two natures in one hypostasis; and therefore, since union is said by way of relation and can be attributed to something anew without a change made in it, but only on account of a change made in the other extreme, as is clear in right and left³: hence it is that the Son of God was newly made man without change of the eternal person, from the change alone of the nature assumed, which was at once formed and united to the Word; and just as the Word is not changed in the forming of that nature, so neither in the assuming of it once formed.

9. 10. To that which is objected about dwelling, that God by grace begins to be in the penitent; it must be said that something is said to be in something in two ways: either so that it depends on it in some way and is contracted and defined by it; and what begins to be in something in this way is changed by that beginning and is moved with the motion of that in which it is; as is clear of the existence of the universal in the particular, and of form in matter, and of what is placed in its place, and of the accident in its subject. But God is in the creature by essence and influence in such a way that He does not depend on the creature nor is He confined or defined in it; and therefore, that He begins to dwell in something is not on account of a change made in Himself, but only in the creature or in the mediating influence, by reason of which God is said to dwell in the creature anew, namely by pouring in new grace. — Likewise, though He is in the creature, He is nevertheless not moved with its motion, as those things are of which the Philosopher says that "when we are moved, the things that are in us are moved," for this reason, that He does not depend on the creature nor is He confined or defined in it. Whence, just as a ray is in the air and yet is not moved with the motion of the air; as the soul is whole in every part of the body and yet is not moved with the motion of each part, because it is not defined in each: so is it to be understood in the matter at hand. And through this the response to the present argument is clear. — And if one objects that it does not seem intelligible that something be inseparably in something and yet not be moved with its change; it must be said that we can understand this if we understand God together as most simple and immense. For because He is immense, He is as much within as without⁴; because He is most simple, He is in no way distant from Himself, however great the local distance and separation in the things in which He is. And hence it is that however much the things in which God is are understood to be changed, in no way, neither in reality nor in understanding, is God posited as mutable on this account. For in every motion and change it is necessary to understand an approach and a withdrawal, and through this some distance of the extremes; which can in no way be posited concerning the divine being, neither by itself nor by accident, since it is at once infinite and simple. And therefore the imagination of the fantasy is deceived here.

11. 12. To that which is objected about power, that He cannot do whatever He could do; it must be said that someone is said not to be able to do what he could do in two ways: either on account of some defect brought in on the part of the producing power itself, or on account of a change of condition on the part of the possible thing itself. For what is possible and true can be made impossible through a change in the thing; as that I have not read, before I read, is true, but after I have read has become impossible, which is called impossible by accident; which also, as Augustine says against Faustus⁵, is impossible to God, because that being able belongs not to power but rather to impotence, since it is against the supreme truth — namely, to make what was, after it was, not to have been. Since therefore the divine power always perseveres uniformly, whatever things and of whatever kind and whatever and however great He could do, He can do now also, as far as it is of itself; but because many true things have been made false, and possible things have been made impossible, hence it is that as far as it is on the part of those things, He cannot do whatever He could do, because not whatever things were possible are possible, and this not through a change concerning the efficient⁶ power, but concerning the possible things effected. — And through this

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the response to the following, about the impossible by accident, is clear. — And if you object that the divine power in no way depends on the possible, since it can produce all things from nothing; it must be said that this is not on account of dependence but on account of connotation: because when it is said that God can do something, it is at the same time also suggested that it is possible to Him, and through this that it has nothing repugnant to the divine power, wisdom and goodness, such that it could not be produced into being, all the nobility of the divine being able being preserved.

13. 14. To that which is objected about knowledge, it must be said that when God is said to know something, this can be understood in two ways: either because He has cognition of it, or because He judges it to be true. In the first mode the knowing of God does not connote the existence of truth in the thing known; and in this mode whatever He knew He knows, because He has knowledge of everything of which He had it from eternity. In the second mode it connotes truth concerning the thing cognized; and in this mode not whatever He knew He knows, just as not whatever He did He does; and this not on account of a change on the part of the one knowing, but only on the part of the thing cognized¹. — And through this the response is clear to that which he objects next about the truth of the thing cognized: because the divine knowing posits truth in the thing cognized according to one acceptation, not according to the other, as is clear through the distinction had before.

15. To that which is objected on the part of the divine will; it must be said that a proximate and immediate cause is so called in three ways: either with respect to substance, or disposition, or act; by reason of substance, between which and the effect no other causing substance falls as a medium; by reason of disposition, to which no new disposition is added for producing the effect; and by reason of act, because it is joined to the act itself. But the divine act is taken in two ways, namely as within and as effecting something without. The divine² will, therefore, is the proximate and immediate cause of the things to be produced by reason of substance and disposition and intrinsic act, but not by reason of exterior efficiency except for that time for which it wills. And the divine will has this because it is at once most omnipotent and most free; and therefore, although it willed from eternity to produce the world, yet because it did not will that the production of the world be from eternity but only in time, hence it is that it produced in time, no change having been made in the will, and the effect began while the cause did not begin. And what is objected about the proximate and immediate cause is understood of that which is a proximate and immediate cause according to the threefold account aforesaid.

16. To that which is objected, that God, who wills something, can not-will it; it must be said that the divine willing connotes a respect and order to something future, and that future thing can be or not be without change, as was said before in the principal solution; hence it is that with respect to future contingents God can be called willing or not willing, no change whatever having been made in Him who wills.

17. To that which is objected, that God is an agent according to will in such a way that His operation is configured to His will etc.; it must be said that an agent according to will is twofold: one, whose will is determined to some thing willed, so that it is not borne at once and together upon the whole of its effects, but now wills this, now that; and in this³ agent according to will what he objects holds true. The other is an agent according to will whose will is borne upon all that which dictating wisdom has disposed; and just as an agent of this kind has disposed all things together that are produced successively, so that the disposition itself is not varied according to the variation of the things to be produced; so also the will, which is wholly consonant with that disposition, remains unchanged. Whence, just as the divine art and the divine counsel, according to which diverse things come to be and are commanded, always remain unchanged in themselves; so also the divine good pleasure always remains unchanged, although those things are changed that proceed from it; for this reason, that at once and together and eternally and immutably it regards all things that are eternally produced, as do also art, account and exemplar, word and wisdom and the other like things; in which no variation comes about on account of a change made in things without, with respect to which there is no dependence whatever in God, although all things depend on His wisdom and will and power as on a cause most noble, most stable, most sufficient, primary and supreme.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Vers. 6: Ego enim Dominus et non mutor. — Glossa, quae ordinaria est apud Strabum et Lyranum, est secundum Hieron. — Seq. locus est Ps. 101, 27. 28. Glossa habetur apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum (interlinearis). Cassiodor., in hunc loc., ait: Idem positum est contra illa quae dicta sunt; quoniam, dum illa sint commutabilia, Dominus semper immutabilis perseverat. Cfr. August. in hunc loc. — Eadem quaestio solvitur I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. seq.
Verse 6: For I am the Lord, and I change not. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one in Strabo and Lyra, is after Jerome. — The following passage is Ps. 101:27–28. The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard and Lyra (interlinear). Cassiodorus, on this passage, says: The selfsame is set against those things that have been said; for while those things are changeable, the Lord ever perseveres immutable. Compare Augustine on this passage. — The same question is solved in I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1 and following.
2
Cfr. supra pag. 47, nota 6.
Compare above, p. 47, note 6.
3
Vide supra pag. 47, nota 2.
See above, p. 47, note 2.
4
Cfr. supra pag. 68, nota 5. — Inferius cum A B E posuimus variationem, alii varietatem.
Compare above, p. 68, note 5. — Below, with A B E we have put variationem; the others have varietatem.
5
Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 40. (c. 5.), docet, quod aliquid mutari non possit, nisi a statu suo discedat seu ipsum relinquat.
Aristotle, VI Physics, text 40 (c. 5), teaches that a thing cannot be changed unless it departs from its state or leaves it.
6
Ut probatum est supra q. 3. a. 1.
As was proved above, q. 3, a. 1.
7
Hoc arg. insinuat Richard. a S. Vict., II. de Trin. c. 3. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 156, nota 3. — Maior ostensa est supra q. 4. a. 1.
Richard of St. Victor suggests this argument, II On the Trinity, c. 3. Compare tome I, p. 156, note 3. — The major was shown above, q. 4, a. 1.
8
Quaest. 5. a. 1.
Question 5, a. 1.
9
Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.).
Compare Aristotle, V Physics, text 7 (c. 1).
10
Ut insinuat Aristot., V. Phys. text. 1. seqq. et XI. Metaph. c. 10. (X. c. 11.).
As Aristotle suggests, V Physics, text 1 and following, and XI Metaphysics, c. 10 (X, c. 11).
11
Vers. 24: Omnibus enim mobilibus mobilior etc. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 1. ad oppos., ubi etiam dictio per causam explicatur per verba: «eo quod facit [sapientia increata] alia moveri».
Verse 24: For wisdom is more moving than all moving things etc. Compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, argument 1 to the opposite, where the expression by way of cause is also explained by the words: "because it [uncreated wisdom] makes other things to be moved."
12
Scilicet: ignis quam terra. — De caelo primo et sphaeris cfr. II. Sent. d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 3; de corpore glorioso vide IV. d. 49. p. II. sect. 2. a. 4. q. 1.
That is: fire than earth. — On the first heaven and the spheres compare II Sentences, d. 14, p. II, a. 1, q. 3; on the glorious body see IV, d. 49, p. II, sect. 2, a. 4, q. 1.
1
Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.). — Sententia Ambrosii est I. de Fide, c. 9. n. 59; cfr. tom. I. pag. 157, nota 5. — Superius ex E G posuimus comparationis pro compositionis, quod habent A B, alii operationis (sed vide infra in corp., ubi etiam A comparatione habet).
Aristotle, V Physics, text 10 (c. 2). — The judgement of Ambrose is in I On the Faith, c. 9, n. 59; compare tome I, p. 157, note 5. — Above, from E G we have put comparationis for compositionis, which A B have; the others have operationis (but see below in the body, where A too has comparatione).
2
Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 4.): Faber autem mutatur solum in actum ex otio. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 157, nota 6.
Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 45 (c. 4): But the craftsman is changed only into act from rest. Compare tome I, p. 157, note 6.
3
Rom. 8, 3; Gal. 4, 4. seq.; Ioan. 3, 13; Eph. 4, 9. seq.
Rom. 8:3; Gal. 4:4 and following; John 3:13; Eph. 4:9 and following.
4
A sui.
A has sui.
5
Cum G supplevimus incipit esse.
With G we have supplied incipit esse.
6
Libr. II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Vide tom. I. pag. 116, nota 8, ubi pro moventibus substituimus motis.
Book II of the Topics, c. 3 (c. 7). See tome I, p. 116, note 8, where we have substituted motis for moventibus.
7
Sed ad aliquid; aliis verbis posse creare non est aliquid absolutum, sed relativum, sicut aliquibus videtur de posse generare in Patre; cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. q. 1. seqq.
But in relation to something; in other words, to be able to create is not something absolute but relative, as it seems to some concerning to be able to generate in the Father; compare I Sentences, d. 7, q. 1 and following.
8
Signa divinae voluntatis ex I. Sent. d. 45. a. 3. q. 2. hoc exprimuntur versu: Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet.
The signs of the divine will, from I Sentences, d. 45, a. 3, q. 2, are expressed in this verse: He commands and forbids, permits, counsels, fulfils.
9
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3, ubi etiam pro impossibili per accidens haec afferuntur exempla: de corrupta non posse facere virginem (Hieronymi exemplum), de praeterito facere, quod non fuerit praeteritum.
Compare I Sentences, d. 42, q. 3, where these examples are also brought forward for the impossible by accident: not to be able to make a virgin of one corrupted (Jerome's example), and to make of the past that it was not past.
10
Vide supra pag. 4, nota 1. et pag. 16, nota 7.
See above, p. 4, note 1, and p. 16, note 7.
11
Libr. III. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9: Voluntas Dei est prima et summa causa omnium corporalium specierum atque motionum. Lib. I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 2. n. 4. ait, quod «voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt ipsa sit causa». — De minori cfr. supra pag. 93, nota 2.
Book III On the Trinity, c. 4, n. 9: The will of God is the first and highest cause of all bodily species and motions. In Book I On Genesis against the Manichaeans, c. 2, n. 4, he says that "the will of God is itself the cause of all things that are." — On the minor compare above, p. 93, note 2.
1
Libr. I. Reg. 2, 6: Dominus mortificat et vivificat.
Book I of Kings 2:6: The Lord killeth and maketh alive.
2
Hic quoad omnia reliqua deficit B.
Here B breaks off as to all the rest.
3
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. II. dub. 2. — Hug. a S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. III. c. 15: Omne enim corpus aut loco mutatur, aut forma, aut tempore. Libr. VII. Eruditionis didascalicae, c. 19, ait: Tribus modis fit omnis mutabilitas: loco, forma et tempore. — Inferius pro differentiarum, quod habent A G, alii differentiam.
Compare I Sentences, d. 37, p. II, dubium 2. — Hugh of St. Victor, I On the Sacraments, p. III, c. 15: For every body is changed either in place, or in form, or in time. In Book VII of the Eruditio didascalica, c. 19, he says: All mutability comes about in three modes: in place, form and time. — Below, for differentiarum, which A G have, the others have differentiam.
4
Libr. VII. de Trin. n. 11: Esse enim non est accidens nomen, sed subsistens veritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas. Cfr. supra pag. 88, nota 1. verba Boethii.
Book VII On the Trinity, n. 11: For being is not an accidental name, but subsisting truth and abiding cause and the natural property of the kind. Compare the words of Boethius above, p. 88, note 1.
5
A loci transmutationem; codd. excepto E, omittunt vel circumscriptionem, vel loci transitionem. Inferius pro potestate A E G potentia. Subinde pro dicunt, quod habet G, alii dant.
A has loci transmutationem; the codices, E excepted, omit either circumscriptionem or loci transitionem. Below, for potestate, A E G have potentia. Next, for dicunt, which G has, the others have dant.
6
Libr. I. p. III. c. 13: Et ascendit [ratio] et transit et probat, quoniam ita est, et quoniam variari et mutari non potest Deus omnino. Non enim augeri potest qui [textus originalis in seqq. constanter qui pro quia] immensus... nec affectu qui optimus est.
Book I, p. III, c. 13: And [reason] ascends and passes over and proves that it is so, and that God cannot be varied and changed at all. For He cannot be increased who [the original text in what follows constantly has qui for quia] is immense... nor in affection, who is most good.
7
Ita E G, alii incepit. Inferius pro tunc potest, quod praebent E G, alii vel non potest, vel non possit.
So E G; the others have incepit. Below, for tunc potest, which E G offer, the others have either non potest or non possit.
1
Monolog. c. 18. inter rationes probantes, quod summa natura [Deus] sit sine principio et sine fine, affertur etiam haec: Deinde cogitet qui potest, quando incepit aut quando non fuit hoc verum, scilicet quia futurum erat aliquid, aut quando desinet et non erit hoc verum, scilicet quia praeteritum erit aliquid. Quodsi neutrum horum cogitari potest... impossibile est vel cogitare, quod veritas principium vel finem habeat. Cfr. Dialog. de veritate, c. 10.
In the Monologion, c. 18, among the reasons proving that the supreme nature [God] is without beginning and without end, this one too is brought forward: Next let whoever can think when this began, or when it was not true, namely that something was going to be; or when it will cease and this will not be true, namely that something will be past. But if neither of these can be thought... it is impossible even to think that truth has a beginning or an end. Compare the Dialogue on Truth, c. 10.
2
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq., d. 38. a. 2. q. 2, d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.
Compare I Sentences, d. 30, q. 1 and following; d. 38, a. 2, q. 2; d. 39, a. 1, q. 3; and d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, reply 4.
3
Paragr. 9. Versio haec convenit cum illa, quae in operibus S. Thomae exhibetur. Textus originalis voci circuitu addit immensurabili (τῇ πάντων ἀσχέτῳ περιοχῇ). Dictio sed quod ad substantiam agat Deus (ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγειν τὸν Θεὸν) ab abbate Vercellensi sic proponitur: sed quod [Deus] omnia ad esse deducat. — Cfr. August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 23.
§ 9. This version agrees with the one given in the works of St. Thomas. The original text adds immeasurable to the word encompassing (τῇ πάντων ἀσχέτῳ περιοχῇ). The phrase but that God brings to substance (ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγειν τὸν Θεὸν) is set out thus by the Abbot of Vercelli: but that [God] leads all things to being. — Compare Augustine, IV On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 12, n. 23.
4
Vide infra a. 2. fundam. 2. verba Aristot. — De dictione in termino cfr. supra pag. 68, nota 2. — De ipsa solut. vide Anselm., Monolog. c. 15.
See the words of Aristotle below, a. 2, fundamentum 2. — On the expression at the term compare above, p. 68, note 2. — On the solution itself see Anselm, Monologion, c. 15.
5
Simili modo respectu syllogismi dicitur, quod peiorem [negationem et particularitatem] sequitur semper conclusio partem. Cfr. infra q. 7. ad 3. — Superius post et ratione primi codd. praeter E vel omittunt non ratione secundi, vel [ita D G] et ratione secundi.
In a like manner it is said with respect to the syllogism that the conclusion always follows the weaker part [negation and particularity]. Compare below, q. 7, reply 3. — Above, after et ratione primi, the codices other than E either omit non ratione secundi or [so D G] have et ratione secundi.
1
Quatenus scil. dicit mensuram cuiuslibet durationis creatae et non tantum corporales res, sed etiam spiritus respicit; cfr. II. Sent. d. 2. p. J. a. 2. q. 1.
That is, insofar as it says the measure of any created duration whatever and regards not only bodily things but spirits too; compare II Sentences, d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.
2
Vide I. Sent. d. 16. q. 1. — De modis existendi per essentiam etc. cfr. ibid. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. — Inferius cum A posuimus per gloriam, pro quo alii per gratiam.
See I Sentences, d. 16, q. 1. — On the modes of existing by essence etc. compare the same, d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2. — Below, with A we have put per gloriam, in place of which the others have per gratiam.
3
Boeth., de Trin. c. 5: Age enim, stet quisquam, ei igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus; non quod ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim etc. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.
Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 5: For come, let someone stand; if then I approach him on the right, he will be on the left compared with me; not that he himself is on the left, but that I have approached on the right etc. Compare III Sentences, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, reply 3.
4
Vide supra pag. 81, nota 3. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. — Superius pro praesens, quod habent A E G, alii sequens.
See above, p. 81, note 3. Compare I Sentences, d. 37, p. II, a. 1, q. 2. — Above, for praesens, which A E G have, the others have sequens.
5
Libr. XXVI. c. 4. seq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3, ubi etiam ipsa verba August. allata sunt, et d. 44. a. 2. — Superius vocibus ipsius possibilis A E G interserunt potentiae.
Book XXVI, c. 4 and following. Compare I Sentences, d. 42, q. 3, where Augustine's very words are also brought forward, and d. 44, a. 2. — Above, between the words ipsius possibilis A E G insert potentiae.
6
Ita E G, alii effectricem.
So E G; the others have effectricem.
1
Cfr. supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. ad 1. seq.
Compare above, Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 1, reply 1 and following.
2
G addit potentia vel. — De hac solut. cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2.
G adds potentia vel. — On this solution compare I Sentences, d. 45, a. 2, q. 2.
3
G de hoc. Inferius pro productorum posuimus cum E H producendorum; idem H in fine solut. pro stabilissima substituit sublimissima. Post suprema G addit et dignissima etc.
G has de hoc. Below, for productorum, with E H we have put producendorum; the same H at the end of the solution substitutes sublimissima for stabilissima. After suprema G adds et dignissima etc.