Cap. 3

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Cap. 3

Itinerarium mentis in Deum · Cap. III: De speculatione Dei per suam imaginem naturalibus potentiis insignitam

Textus Latinus

p. 303

Cap. III. De speculatione Dei per suam imaginem naturalibus potentiis insignitam.

1. Quoniam autem duo gradus praedicti, ducendo nos in Deum per vestigia sua, per quae in cunctis creaturis relucet, manuduxerunt nos usque ad hoc, ut ad nos reintraremus, in mentem scilicet nostram, in qua divina relucet imago; hinc est, quod iam tertio loco, ad nosmetipsos intrantes et quasi atrium forinsecus relinquentes, in sanctis³, scilicet anteriori parte tabernaculi, conari debemus per speculum videre Deum; ubi ad modum candelabri relucet lux veritatis in facie nostrae mentis, in qua scilicet resplendet imago beatissimae Trinitatis.

Intra igitur ad te et vide, quoniam mens tua amat ferventissime semetipsam; nec se posset amare, nisi se nosset; nec se nosset, nisi sui meminisset, quia nihil capimus per intelligentiam, quod non sit praesens apud nostram memoriam; et ex hoc advertis, animam tuam triplicem habere potentiam, non oculo carnis, sed oculo rationis⁴. Considera igitur harum trium potentiarum operationes et habitudines, et videre poteris Deum per te tanquam per imaginem, quod est videre per speculum in aenigmate.

2. Operatio autem memoriae est retentio et repraesentatio non solum praesentium, corporalium et temporalium, verum etiam succedentium, simplicium et sempiternalium. — Retinet namque memoria praeterita per recordationem, praesentia per susceptionem, futura per praevisionem. — Retinet etiam simplicia, sicut principia quantitatum continuarum et discretarum⁵, ut punctum, instans et unitatem, sine quibus impossibile est meminisse aut cogitare ea quae principiantur per haec. — Retinet nihilominus scientiarum principia et dignitates ut sempiternalia et sempiternaliter, quia nunquam potest sic oblivisci eorum, dum ratione utatur, quin ea audita approbet et eis assentiat, non tanquam de novo percipiat, sed tanquam sibi innata et familiaria recognoscat; sicut patet, si proponatur alicui: « De quolibet affirmatio, vel negatio »; vel: « Omne totum est maius sua parte », vel quaecumque alia dignitas, cui non est contradicere « ad interius rationem⁶ ».

Ex prima igitur retentione actuali omnium temporalium, praeteritorum scilicet, praesentium et futurorum, habet effigiem aeternitatis, cuius praesens indivisibile ad omnia tempora se extendit. — Ex secunda apparet, quod ipsa non solum habet ab exteriori formari per phantasmata, verum etiam a superiori suscipiendo et in se habendo simplices formas, quae non possunt introire per portas sensuum et sensibilium phantasias⁷. — Ex tertia habetur, p. 304 quod ipsa habet lucem incommutabilem sibi praesentem, in qua meminit invariabilium veritatum. — Et sic per operationes memoriae apparet, quod ipsa anima est imago Dei et similitudo adeo sibi praesens et eum habens praesentem, quod eum actu capit et per potentiam « capax eius est et particeps esse potest¹ ».

3. Operatio autem virtutis intellectivae est in perceptione intellectus terminorum, propositionum et illationum. — Capit autem intellectus terminorum significata, cum comprehendit, quid est unumquodque per definitionem. Sed definitio habet fieri per superiora, et illa per superiora definiri habent, usquequo veniatur ad suprema et generalissima, quibus ignoratis, non possunt intelligi definitive inferiora². Nisi igitur cognoscatur, quid est ens per se, non potest plene sciri definitio alicuius specialis substantiae. Nec ens per se cognosci potest, nisi cognoscatur cum suis conditionibus, quae sunt: unum, verum, bonum. Ens autem, cum possit cogitari ut diminutum et ut completum, ut imperfectum et ut perfectum, ut ens in potentia et ut ens in actu, ut ens secundum quid et ut ens simpliciter, ut ens in parte et ut ens totaliter, ut ens transiens et ut ens manens, ut ens per aliud et ut ens per se, ut ens permixtum non-enti et ut ens purum, ut ens dependens et ut ens absolutum, ut ens posterius et ut ens prius, ut ens mutabile et ut ens immutabile, ut ens simplex et ut ens compositum: cum « privationes et defectus nullatenus possint cognosci nisi per positiones »³, non venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicuius entium creatorum, nisi iuvetur ab intellectu entis purissimi, actualissimi, completissimi et absoluti; quod est ens simpliciter et aeternum, in quo sunt rationes omnium in sua puritate. Quomodo autem sciret intellectus, hoc esse ens defectivum et incompletum, si nullam haberet cognitionem entis absque omni defectu? Et sic de aliis conditionibus praelibatis.

Intellectum autem propositionum tunc intellectus dicitur veraciter comprehendere, cum certitudinaliter scit, illas veras esse; et hoc scire est scire, quoniam non potest falli in illa comprehensione. Scit enim, quod veritas illa non potest aliter se habere; scit igitur, illam veritatem esse incommutabilem. Sed cum ipsa mens nostra sit commutabilis, illam sic incommutabiliter relucentem non potest videre nisi per aliquam lucem omnino incommutabiliter radiantem, quam impossibile est esse creaturam mutabilem. Scit igitur in illa luce, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, quae est lux vera et Verbum in principio apud Deum⁴.

Intellectum vero illationis tunc veraciter percipit noster intellectus, quando videt, quod conclusio necessario sequitur ex praemissis; quod non solum videt in terminis necessariis, verum etiam in contingentibus, ut: si homo currit, homo movetur. Hanc autem necessariam habitudinem percipit non solum in rebus entibus, verum etiam in non-entibus. Sicut enim, homine existente, sequitur: si homo currit, homo movetur; sic etiam, non existente. Huiusmodi igitur illationis necessitas non venit ab existentia rei in materia, quia est contingens, nec ab existentia rei in anima, quia tunc esset fictio, si non esset in re: venit igitur ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna, secundum quam res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem secundum illius aeternae artis repraesentationem. Omnis igitur, ut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione⁵, vere ratiocinantis lumen accenditur ab illa veritate et ad ipsam nititur pervenire.

— Ex quo manifeste apparet, quod coniunctus sit intellectus noster ipsi aeternae veritati, dum non nisi per illam docentem nihil verum potest certitudinaliter capere. Videre igitur per te potes veritatem, quae te docet, si te concupiscentiae et phantasmata non impediant et se tanquam nubes inter te et veritatis radium non interponant.

4. Operatio autem virtutis electivae attenditur in consilio, iudicio et desiderio. — Consilium autem est in inquirendo, quid sit melius, hoc an illud. Sed melius non dicitur nisi per accessum ad optimum; accessus autem est secundum maiorem assimilationem⁶: nullus ergo scit, utrum hoc sit illo melius, nisi sciat, illud optimo magis assimilari. Nullus autem p. 305 scit, aliquid alii magis assimilari, nisi illud cognoscat; non enim scio, hunc esse similem Petro, nisi sciam vel cognoscam Petrum: omni igitur consilianti necessario est impressa notio summi boni¹.

Iudicium autem certum de consiliabilibus est per aliquam legem. Nullus autem certitudinaliter iudicat per legem, nisi certus sit, quod illa lex recta est, et quod ipsam iudicare non debet; sed mens nostra iudicat de se ipsa: cum igitur non possit iudicare de lege, per quam iudicat; lex illa superior est mente nostra, et per hanc iudicat, secundum quod sibi impressa est. Nihil autem est superius mente humana, nisi solus ille qui fecit eam²: igitur in iudicando deliberativa nostra pertingit ad divinas leges, si plena resolutione dissolvat.

Desiderium autem principaliter est illius quod maxime ipsum movet. Maxime autem movet quod maxime amatur; maxime autem amatur esse beatum; beatum autem esse non habetur nisi per optimum et finem ultimum: nihil igitur appetit humanum desiderium nisi quia summum bonum, vel quia est ad illud, vel quia habet aliquam effigiem illius. Tanta est vis summi boni, ut nihil nisi per illius desiderium a creatura possit amari, quae tunc fallitur et errat, cum effigiem et simulacrum pro veritate acceptat³.

Vide igitur, quomodo anima Deo est propinqua, et quomodo memoria in aeternitatem, intelligentia in veritatem, electiva potentia ducit in bonitatem summam secundum operationes suas.

5. Secundum autem harum potentiarum ordinem et originem et habitudinem ducit in ipsam beatissimam Trinitatem. — Nam ex memoria oritur intelligentia ut ipsius proles, quia tunc intelligimus, cum similitudo, quae est in memoria, resultat in acie intellectus, quae nihil aliud est quam verbum; ex memoria et intelligentia spiratur amor tanquam nexus amborum. Haec tria, scilicet mens generans, verbum et amor, sunt in anima quoad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae sunt consubstantiales, coaequales et coaevae, se invicem circumincedentes⁴. Si igitur Deus perfectus est spiritus, habet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, habet et Verbum genitum et Amorem spiratum, qui necessario distinguuntur, cum unus ab altero producatur, non essentialiter, non accidentaliter, ergo personaliter.

Dum igitur mens se ipsam considerat, per se tanquam per speculum consurgit ad speculandam Trinitatem beatam, Patris, Verbi et Amoris, trium personarum coaeternarum, coaequalium et consubstantialium, ita quod quilibet in quolibet est aliorum, unus tamen non est alius, sed ipsi tres sunt unus Deus.

6. Ad hanc speculationem, quam habet anima de suo principio trino et uno per trinitatem suarum potentiarum, per quas est imago Dei, iuvatur per lumina scientiarum, quae ipsam perficiunt et informant et Trinitatem beatissimam tripliciter repraesentant. — Nam omnis philosophia aut est naturalis, aut rationalis, aut moralis. Prima agit de causa essendi, et ideo ducit in potentiam Patris; secunda de ratione intelligendi, et ideo ducit in sapientiam Verbi; tertia de ordine vivendi, et ideo ducit in bonitatem Spiritus sancti⁵.

Rursus, prima dividitur in metaphysicam, mathematicam et physicam. Et prima est de rerum essentiis, secunda de numeris et figuris, tertia de naturis, virtutibus et operationibus diffusivis. Et ideo prima in primum principium, Patrem, secunda in eius imaginem, Filium, tertia ducit in Spiritus sancti donum.

Secunda dividitur in grammaticam, quae facit potentes ad exprimendum; in logicam, quae facit perspicaces ad arguendum; in rhetoricam, quae facit habiles ad persuadendum sive movendum. Et hoc similiter insinuat mysterium ipsius beatissimae Trinitatis.

Tertia dividitur in monasticam, oeconomicam et politicam. Et ideo prima insinuat primi principii innascibilitatem, secunda Filii familiaritatem, tertia Spiritus sancti liberalitatem.

7. Omnes autem hae scientiae habent regulas certas et infallibiles tanquam lumina et radios descendentes a lege aeterna in mentem nostram. Et ideo mens nostra tantis splendoribus irradiata et superfusa, nisi sit caeca, manuduci potest per semetipsam ad contemplandam illam lucem aeternam. Huius autem lucis irradiatio et consideratio sapientes suspendit in admirationem et econtra insipientes, qui non p. 306 credunt, ut intelligant, ducit in perturbationem, ut impleatur illud propheticum¹: Illuminans tu mirabiliter a montibus aeternis, turbati sunt omnes insipientes corde.

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English Translation

Ch. III. On the speculation of God through his image stamped with the natural powers.

1. But since the two aforesaid steps, by leading us into God through his vestiges, through which he shines back in all creatures, have led us by the hand as far as this, that we should re-enter into ourselves, that is, into our mind, in which the divine image shines back; hence it is that now in the third place, entering into our very selves and as it were leaving the outer court behind, we ought to strive to see God through a mirror in the holy place³, that is, in the forward part of the tabernacle; where, after the manner of a candlestick, the light of truth shines back upon the face of our mind, in which, namely, the image of the most blessed Trinity shines forth.

Enter therefore into yourself and see, since your mind loves itself most ardently; nor could it love itself unless it knew itself; nor would it know itself unless it remembered itself, because we grasp nothing through the understanding which is not present to our memory; and from this you advert that your soul has a threefold power, not by the eye of the flesh, but by the eye of reason⁴. Consider therefore the operations and the relations of these three powers, and you will be able to see God through yourself as through an image, which is to see through a mirror in an obscure manner.

2. Now the operation of memory is the retention and representation not only of things present, corporeal and temporal, but also of things successive, simple and sempiternal. — For memory retains things past by recollection, things present by reception, things future by foresight. — It retains also simple things, such as the principles of continuous and discrete quantities⁵, as the point, the instant and the unit, without which it is impossible to remember or to think of those things which take their beginning from these. — It retains nonetheless the principles and axioms of the sciences as sempiternal and sempiternally, since it can never so forget them, so long as it uses reason, but that it approves them when heard and assents to them, not as though it perceived them anew, but as recognizing them as innate and familiar to itself; as is clear if there be proposed to anyone: « Of anything whatever, affirmation or negation »; or: « Every whole is greater than its part », or any other axiom whatever, which one cannot contradict « as regards the interior discourse⁶ ».

From the first retention, therefore, the actual retention of all temporal things — of the past, that is, the present and the future — it has the effigy of eternity, whose indivisible present extends itself to all times. — From the second it appears that it has not only to be formed from without through phantasms, but also from above, by receiving and holding within itself simple forms, which cannot go in through the gates of the senses and the phantasies of sensible things⁷. — From the third it is had that it has an unchangeable light present to itself, in which it remembers unvarying truths. — And thus through the operations of memory it appears that the soul itself is the image of God and a likeness so present to itself, and having him present, that it actually grasps him and by its power « is capable of him and can be a partaker of him¹ ».

3. Now the operation of the intellective power lies in the perception of the intellect of terms, of propositions and of inferences. — The intellect grasps the things signified by terms when it comprehends what each thing is through its definition. But a definition has to be made through higher things, and those have to be defined through higher, until one comes to the highest and most general, which being unknown, the lower cannot be understood definitively². Unless therefore it be known what being per se is, the definition of any particular substance cannot be fully known. Nor can being per se be known unless it be known together with its conditions, which are: one, true, good. But since being can be thought of as diminished and as complete, as imperfect and as perfect, as being in potency and as being in act, as being in a certain respect and as being simply, as being in part and as being totally, as being transient and as being abiding, as being through another and as being through itself, as being mixed with non-being and as being pure, as being dependent and as being absolute, as being posterior and as being prior, as being mutable and as being immutable, as being simple and as being composite: since « privations and defects can in no way be known except through positions »³, our intellect does not come to fully resolve the understanding of any created being unless it be aided by the understanding of the being most pure, most actual, most complete and absolute; which is being simply and eternal, in which are the accounts of all things in their purity. But how would the intellect know that this is a defective and incomplete being, if it had no knowledge of the being that is without any defect? And so of the other conditions touched on above.

Now the intellect is said truly to comprehend the understanding of propositions when it knows with certitude that they are true; and to know this is to know, since it cannot be deceived in that comprehension. For it knows that that truth cannot be otherwise; it knows therefore that that truth is unchangeable. But since our mind itself is changeable, it cannot see that truth shining back thus unchangeably except through some light radiating altogether unchangeably, which it is impossible should be a mutable creature. It knows therefore in that light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, which is the true light and the Word in the beginning with God⁴.

But our intellect truly perceives the understanding of an inference when it sees that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses; which it sees not only in necessary terms, but also in contingent ones, as: if a man runs, a man is moved. And it perceives this necessary relation not only in things that are, but also in things that are not. For as, when a man exists, it follows: if a man runs, a man is moved; so also when he does not exist. The necessity of an inference of this sort, therefore, does not come from the existence of the thing in matter, since that is contingent, nor from the existence of the thing in the soul, since it would then be a fiction if it were not in the thing: it comes therefore from exemplarity in the eternal art, according to which things have an aptitude and a relation to one another according to the representation of that eternal art. Therefore, as Augustine says in On True Religion⁵, the light of everyone truly reasoning is kindled from that truth and strives to arrive at it.

— From which it manifestly appears that our intellect is conjoined to that eternal truth itself, since it can grasp nothing true with certitude except through her teaching. You can therefore see through yourself the truth which teaches you, if concupiscences and phantasms do not impede you and interpose themselves like clouds between you and the ray of truth.

4. Now the operation of the elective power is attended to in counsel, in judgement and in desire. — Counsel lies in inquiring which is better, this or that. But nothing is called better except by approach to the best; and approach is according to greater assimilation⁶: no one therefore knows whether this be better than that unless he knows that it is more assimilated to the best. But no one knows that something is more assimilated to another unless he knows that other; for I do not know that this man is like Peter unless I know or am acquainted with Peter: to everyone taking counsel, therefore, the notion of the highest good is necessarily impressed¹.

Now certain judgement about the matters of counsel is through some law. But no one judges with certitude through a law unless he is certain that that law is right, and that he ought not to judge it; yet our mind judges concerning itself: since therefore it cannot judge concerning the law through which it judges, that law is higher than our mind, and through this it judges, according as it has been impressed upon it. But nothing is higher than the human mind except he alone who made it²: therefore in judging our deliberative power reaches to the divine laws, if it resolves by a full resolution.

Desire, however, is principally of that which most of all moves it. Now that most moves which is most loved; and what is most loved is to be blessed; and to be blessed is not had except through the best and the ultimate end: nothing therefore does human desire seek after except because it is the highest good, or because it is toward it, or because it has some effigy of it. So great is the force of the highest good that nothing can be loved by a creature except through desire of it, which creature is then deceived and errs when it accepts the effigy and the simulacrum for the truth³.

See therefore how near the soul is to God, and how memory leads into eternity, understanding into truth, and the elective power into the highest goodness, according to their operations.

5. Now according to the order, the origin and the relation of these powers it leads into the most blessed Trinity itself. — For from memory arises understanding as its offspring, since we then understand when the likeness which is in the memory issues forth in the edge of the intellect, which is nothing other than a word; and from memory and understanding love is breathed forth as the bond of both. These three, namely the generating mind, the word and love, are in the soul as regards memory, understanding and will, which are consubstantial, coequal and coeval, mutually interpenetrating one another⁴. If therefore God is a perfect spirit, he has memory, understanding and will; he has also a Word begotten and a Love breathed forth, which are necessarily distinguished, since one is produced by the other — not essentially, not accidentally, therefore personally.

While therefore the mind considers itself, it rises through itself as through a mirror to speculate upon the blessed Trinity of the Father, the Word and Love — three persons coeternal, coequal and consubstantial, in such wise that each one is in each of the others, yet one is not the other, but those three are one God.

6. For this speculation, which the soul has of its principle three and one through the trinity of its powers, by which it is the image of God, it is aided by the lights of the sciences, which perfect and inform it and represent the most blessed Trinity in a threefold way. — For all philosophy is either natural, or rational, or moral. The first treats of the cause of being, and therefore leads into the power of the Father; the second, of the ground of understanding, and therefore leads into the wisdom of the Word; the third, of the order of living, and therefore leads into the goodness of the Holy Spirit⁵.

Again, the first is divided into metaphysics, mathematics and physics. And the first is concerned with the essences of things, the second with numbers and figures, the third with natures, powers and diffusive operations. And therefore the first leads into the first principle, the Father, the second into his image, the Son, the third into the gift of the Holy Spirit.

The second is divided into grammar, which makes men able to express; into logic, which makes them keen to argue; into rhetoric, which makes them apt to persuade or to move. And this likewise intimates the mystery of the most blessed Trinity itself.

The third is divided into the monastic, the economic and the political. And therefore the first intimates the unbegottenness of the first principle, the second the familiarity of the Son, the third the liberality of the Holy Spirit.

7. Now all these sciences have certain and infallible rules, as lights and rays descending from the eternal law into our mind. And therefore our mind, irradiated and suffused with such splendours, unless it be blind, can be led by the hand through its very self to contemplating that eternal light. But the irradiation and consideration of this light suspends the wise in admiration, and on the contrary leads the unwise, who do not believe that they may understand, into disturbance, that there may be fulfilled that word of the prophet¹: Thou enlightenest wonderfully from the everlasting hills; all the foolish of heart were troubled.

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Apparatus Criticus

3
Cfr. Exod. 26, ubi describitur tabernaculum Moysaicum, et Breviloq. p. II. c. 12.
Cf. Exodus 26, where the Mosaic tabernacle is described, and Breviloquium, part II, ch. 12.
4
Ita fere August., X. de Trin. c. 11. seq. et XIV. c. 6. seqq. — Superius pro nec se posset amare plures codd. nec se amaret.
So too, nearly in these words, Augustine, On the Trinity X, ch. 11 f., and XIV, ch. 6 ff. — Above, for nec se posset amare several codices have nec se amaret.
5
Quomodo memoriae sit praevisio futurorum, exponit August., XV. de Trin. c. 7. n. 13: Nec ex futuris praeterita, sed futura ex praeteritis, non tamen firma cognitione coniicimus... Ut praevideamus, non providentia nos instruit, sed memoria etc. — Inferius pro dum ratione edd. et aliquot codd. dummodo ratione.
How foresight of future things belongs to memory Augustine sets out in On the Trinity XV, ch. 7, n. 13: Nor do we conjecture past things from future, but future from past, and that not with firm knowledge... It is not providence that instructs us to foresee, but memory, etc. — Below, for dum ratione the editions and several codices have dummodo ratione.
6
Ut ait Aristot., I. Poster. c. 8. (c. 10.), huic dictioni opponendo alteram, scil. « ad exterius orationem (πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον) », contra quam licet semper instantiam ferre (cfr. tom. I. pag. 155, nota 10.). Vat., 3, 4 cum pluribus codd. admittitur ratione. — Prima dignitas: de quolibet affirmatio etc., exhibetur ab Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 15. (III. c. 4.); secunda colligitur ex V. Metaph. text. 30. seq. (IV. c. 25. seq.). — Per verba superius posita: « quin ea audita approbet » etc., respicitur a Boethio data et supra pag. 79, nota 6. allata definitio communis animi conceptionis, qualis secundum Euclid., I. Geomet., est: Omne totum est maius sua parte (n. 9.).
As Aristotle says, Posterior Analytics I, ch. 8 (ch. 10), setting against this phrase another, namely « as regards the exterior discourse (πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον) », against which one may always bring an objection (cf. tome I, p. 155, note 10). The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, with several codices, have admittitur ratione. — The first axiom, of anything whatever, affirmation, etc., is set forth by Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 15 (III, ch. 4); the second is gathered from Metaphysics V, text 30 f. (IV, ch. 25 f.). — By the words set above, « but that it approves them when heard », etc., reference is made to the definition of a common conception of the mind given by Boethius and brought forward above at p. 79, note 6 — such as, according to Euclid, Geometry I, is: Every whole is greater than its part (n. 9).
7
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. in fine et IV. d. 49. p. I. q. 2. ad 1-3. — De seq. propositione vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 4.
Cf. II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, at the end, and IV, d. 49, p. 1, q. 2, ad 1–3. — On the following proposition see above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 4.
1
August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.
Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, ch. 8, n. 11.
2
Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). Cfr. etiam Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, ex quo supra pag. 71, nota 3. quaedam allata sunt. — De conditionibus entis vide supra pag. 215, nota 1.
According to Aristotle, Topics VI, ch. 3 (ch. 4). Cf. also Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Species, from which some things were brought forward above at p. 71, note 3. — On the conditions of being see above, p. 215, note 1.
3
Averroes, in III. de Anima, text. 25: Et universaliter omnes privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per contraria, scilicet per cognitionem habitus et per cognitionem defectus habitus. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 802, nota 8. et supra pag. 19, nota 8. — De rationibus rerum in Deo agitur supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2. seq. — Multi codd., 1 et 2 positionem.
Averroes, on On the Soul III, text 25: And universally all privations are not known except through their contraries, that is, through knowledge of the habit and through knowledge of the lack of the habit. Cf. tome III, p. 802, note 8, and above, p. 19, note 8. — Of the accounts of things in God there is treatment above, in the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 2 f. — Many codices, and editions 1 and 2, have positionem.
4
Ioan. 1, 1. et 9. Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 4. — Pro in illa luce D G H K L M N illam lucem. Vocibus aliquam lucem edd. interserunt aliam.
John 1:1 and 9. See above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 4. — For in illa luce D G H K L M N have illam lucem. Into the words aliquam lucem the editions insert aliam.
5
Cap. 39. n. 72: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcende et te ipsum. Sed memento, cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere. Illuc ergo tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. Quo enim pervenit omnis bonus ratiocinator nisi ad veritatem? cum ad se ipsam veritas non utique ratiocinando perveniat, sed quod ratiocinantes appetunt ipsa sit (Pro Omnis D F G H K L M Omne, et pro vere ratiocinantis D F G M verae rationis). — Haec de triplici operatione virtutis intellectivae doctrina refertur quasi ad verbum a Fr. Matthaeo ab Aquasparta, Quaest. prima disputata in corp. a nobis edita in opusculo: de Humanae Cognitionis ratione (pag. 98 seq.); ubi notanda sunt quae ibid. praemittuntur contra ontologismum. — Superius pro quia est et quia tunc non pauci codd. quae est et quae tunc.
Ch. 39, n. 72: Go not outside; return into yourself; truth dwells in the inner man; and if you find your own nature to be mutable, transcend even yourself. But remember, when you transcend yourself, that you transcend the reasoning soul. Strive therefore thither, whence the very light of reason is kindled. For whither does every good reasoner arrive but at truth? — since truth does not arrive at itself by reasoning, but is that which those who reason seek after (For Omnis D F G H K L M have Omne, and for vere ratiocinantis D F G M verae rationis). — This doctrine on the threefold operation of the intellective power is reported almost word for word by Friar Matthew of Aquasparta, in the body of the first Disputed Question, published by us in the opuscule On the Ground of Human Knowledge (p. 98 f.); where what is there set out beforehand against ontologism is to be noted. — Above, for quia est and quia tunc not a few codices have quae est and quae tunc.
6
Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 18. (III. c. 4.): Ipsum magis et minus inest entium naturae... Si igitur quod magis est propinquius est, profecto erit aliquid verum, cui propinquius est quod magis verum est.
Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 18 (III, ch. 4): The very more and less is present in the nature of beings... If therefore what is more is nearer, assuredly there will be something true, to which that is nearer which is more true.
1
August., VIII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 4: Bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle hoc et illud et vide ipsum bonum, si potes; ita Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Neque enim in his omnibus bonis... diceremus aliud alio melius, cum vere iudicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni, secundum quod et probaremus aliquid et aliud illi praeponeremus. — Pro notio Vat., 3 et 4 notitia.
Augustine, On the Trinity VIII, ch. 3, n. 4: This good and that good — take away this and that and see the good itself, if you can; so will you see God, not good by another good, but the good of every good. For among all these goods... we should not say that one is better than another, when we judge truly, unless there were impressed upon us the notion of the good itself, according to which we both approve something and set another before it. — For notio the Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 have notitia.
2
Secundum August. locc. superius pag. 302, nota 1. allegatis. — Mox pro deliberativa H K L deliberate mens.
According to Augustine, in the places cited above at p. 302, note 1. — Soon after, for deliberativa H K L have deliberate mens.
3
Haec ratio exponitur a Boeth., III. de Consol. per totum. Cfr. August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26, et Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. seqq. — Superius pro igitur, quod D G M omittunt, A enim, edd. autem; deinde post nisi supplevimus ex A B C E P quia, pro quo B F G H L M N propter.
This reasoning is set out by Boethius, On the Consolation III, throughout. Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice II, ch. 9, n. 26, and Aristotle, Ethics I, ch. 1 ff. — Above, for igitur, which D G M omit, A has enim, the editions autem; then after nisi we have supplied quia from A B C E P, for which B F G H L M N have propter.
4
Vide I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 2. seq., ubi loci ex Augustino allati sunt; cfr. ibid. Comment. p. II. et supra Breviloq. p. II. c. 12. — D F G L M N se invicem non excedentes (de circumincessione cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 4.). Mox post spiritus D F H N addunt qui, L quia.
See I Sent., the Master's text, d. 3, ch. 2 f., where passages from Augustine are brought forward; cf. ibid., the Commentary, p. 2, and above, Breviloquium, part II, ch. 12. — D F G L M N have se invicem non excedentes (on circumincession cf. I Sent., d. 19, p. 1, q. 4). Soon after spiritus D F H N add qui, L quia.
5
Vide supra pag. 19, nota 7. verba Augustini. — De divisione philosophiae cfr. infra opusculum de Reductione artium ad theologiam. — Superius pro per quas est imago Dei F G H K L M N per quas imago Dei exprimitur; subinde plures codd., inter quos B P, omittunt ducit secunda et tertia vice.
See above, p. 19, note 7, for the words of Augustine. — On the division of philosophy cf. below, the opuscule On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology. — Above, for per quas est imago Dei F G H K L M N have per quas imago Dei exprimitur; thereupon several codices, among them B P, omit ducit the second and third time.
1
Psalm. 75, 5. seq. — Superius pro ut intelligant A vel non intelligunt; cfr. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 36. n. 7, ubi ostenditur, credendum esse, ut intelligatur, quia credendo homo fit idoneus ad intelligendum (Isai. 7, 9. secundum septuaginta interpretes: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis).
Psalm 75:5 f. — Above, for ut intelligant A has vel non intelligunt; cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 36, n. 7, where it is shown that one must believe in order that one may understand, since by believing a man becomes fit for understanding (Isaiah 7:9 according to the Seventy interpreters: Unless you believe, you will not understand). ---