Quaest. 1, Art. 1

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Quaest. 1, Art. 1

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio I: De certitudine, qua existentia Dei cognoscitur, et de fide, qua eiusdem Trinitas creditur

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Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis

Volentes circa mysterium Trinitatis aliquid indagare, divina praevia gratia, duo praemittimus tanquam praeambula; quorum primum est fundamentum omnis cognitionis certitudinalis; secundum est fundamentum omnis cognitionis fidelis.

Primum est, utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile.

Secundum est, utrum Deum esse trinum sit verum credibile.

Quaestio I. De certitudine, qua existentia Dei cognoscitur, et de fide, qua eiusdem Trinitas creditur.

Articulus I. Utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile.

Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile? Et quod sic, ostenditur triplici via. Prima est ista: omne verum omnibus mentibus impressum est verum indubitabile. — Secunda est ista: omne verum, quod omnis creatura proclamat, est verum indubitabile. — Tertia est ista: omne verum in se ipso certissimum et evidentissimum est verum indubitabile¹.

Circa igitur primam viam sic proceditur et ostenditur tam auctoritatibus quam rationibus, quod Deum esse sit omnibus mentibus rationalibus impressum.

1. Damascenus, in libro primo², capitulo tertio: « Cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter nobis inserta est ».

2. Item, Hugo³: « Deus sic notitiam suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam quid esset totum poterat comprehendi, ita nunquam quia esset prorsus posset ignorari ».

3. Item, Boethius⁴: « Inserta est mentibus hominum veri bonique cupiditas »; sed affectio veri boni praesupponit cognitionem eiusdem: ergo mentibus hominum impressa est cognitio veri boni et cupiditas maxime desiderabilis. Hoc autem bonum Deus est: ergo etc.

4. Item, Augustinus de Trinitate in pluribus locis⁵ dicit, quod imago consistit in mente, notitia et amore, et quod ratio imaginis attenditur in anima per comparationem ad Deum: si ergo impressum est animae a natura esse imaginem Dei; habet ergo naturaliter sibi insertam notitiam Dei. Sed primum cognoscibile de Deo est, Deum esse: ergo illud naturaliter insertum est menti humanae.

5. Item, Philosophus⁶ dicit, quod « inconveniens esset, nos habere nobilissimos habitus, et illos latere nos »: ergo cum Deum esse sit verum nobilissimum, nobis praesentissimum, inconveniens est, illud verum latere intellectum humanum.

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6. Item, insertus est mentibus hominum appetitus sapientiae, quia dicit Philosophus¹: « Omnes homines natura scire desiderant »; sed sapientia maxime appetibilis est sapientia aeterna: ergo illius sapientiae potissime insertus est appetitus menti humanae. Sed non est amor, ut dictum est prius, nisi aliquo modo cogniti; ergo oportet, quod illius summae sapientiae notitia qualiscumque sit menti humanae impressa. Sed hoc est primo scire, ipsum Deum vel sapientiam esse: ergo etc.

7. Item, appetitus beatitudinis adeo est nobis insertus, ut nullus possit dubitare de altero, utrum velit esse beatus, ut in pluribus locis dicit Augustinus²; sed beatitudo consistit in summo bono, quod Deus est: ergo si talis appetitus sine aliquali notitia esse non potest, necesse est, quod notitia, qua scitur, summum bonum sive Deum esse, sit inserta ipsi animae.

8. Item, insertus est ipsi animae appetitus pacis, et adeo insertus, ut quaeratur per suum contrarium, nec etiam ipse appetitus auferri potest ab ipsis damnatis et daemonibus, secundum quod ostenditur decimo nono de Civitate Dei³. Si ergo pax mentis rationalis non est nisi in ente immutabili et aeterno, et appetitus praesupponit notionem vel notitiam; notitia entis immutabilis et aeterni inserta est spiritui rationali.

9. Item, insertum est animae odium falsi; sed omne odium habet ortum ex amore: ergo multo fortius insertus est animae amor veri, et illius potissime, ad quod iam anima facta est. Si ergo illud est verum primum, necessario sequitur, quod notitia primi veri sit inserta menti rationali. — Quod autem odium falsi sit insertum menti humanae, apparet per hoc, quod nullus vult falli, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo Confessionum⁴. — Quod iterum odium causetur ex amore, ostendit Augustinus decimo quarto de Civitate Dei; nullus enim odit aliquid, nisi quia amat eius oppositum.

10. Item, inserta est animae rationali notitia sui, eo quod anima sibi praesens est et se ipsa cognoscibilis⁵; sed Deus praesentissimus est ipsi animae et se ipso cognoscibilis: ergo inserta est ipsi animae notitia Dei sui. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia anima est sibi proportionalis, non sic Deus proportionalis animae; contra: nulla est instantia: quia, si ad cognitionem necessario requireretur proportionalitas, anima nunquam ad Dei notitiam perveniret, quia proportionari ei non potest, nec per naturam nec per gratiam nec per gloriam.

His igitur rationibus ostenditur, quod Deum esse sit menti humanae indubitabile, tanquam sibi naturaliter insertum; nullus enim dubitat nisi de eo, de quo non habet certam notitiam.

Item ostenditur hoc ipsum secunda via sic: omne verum, quod clamat omnis creatura, est verum indubitabile; sed Deum esse clamat omnis creatura: ergo etc. — Quod autem omnis creatura clamet, Deum esse, ostenditur ex decem conditionibus et suppositionibus per se notis.

11. Prima est ista: si est ens posterius, est et ens prius, quia posterius non est nisi a priori⁶: si ergo est universitas posteriorum, necesse est, esse ens primum. Si ergo necesse est ponere, aliquid esse prius et posterius in creaturis; necesse est, universitatem creaturarum inferre et clamare primum principium.

12. Item, si est ens ab alio, est ens non ab alio: quia nihil educit se ipsum de non-esse in esse⁷: ergo prima ratio educendi necesse est, quod sit in ente primo, quod ab alio non educitur. Si ergo ens ab alio dicitur ens creatum, et ens non ab alio dicitur ens increatum, quod Deus est; omnes entis differentiae inferunt, Deum esse.

13. Item, si est ens possibile, est ens necessarium: quia possibile dicit indifferentiam ad esse et non-esse; nihil autem indifferens ad esse et non-esse potest esse nisi per aliquid, quod est omnino determinatum ad esse⁸. Si ergo ens necessarium, nihil habens omnino de possibilitate ad non-esse non est nisi Deus, omne autem aliud habet aliquid de possibilitate, quaelibet entis differentia infert, Deum esse.

14. Item, si est ens respectivum, est ens absolutum: quia respectivum nunquam terminatur nisi ad absolutum⁹; sed ens absolutum a nullo dependens non potest esse nisi quod nihil recipit aliunde; hoc autem est ens primum, omne autem aliud ens est habens aliquid de dependentia: ergo necesse est, quod quaelibet entis differentia inferat, Deum esse.

15. Item, si est ens diminutum sive secundum quid, est ens simpliciter: quia ens secundum quid nec esse nec intelligi potest, nisi intelligatur per ens

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simpliciter, nec ens diminutum nisi per ens perfectum, sicut privatio non intelligitur nisi per habitum¹. Si ergo omne ens creatum est ens secundum partem, solum autem ens increatum est ens simpliciter et perfectum; necesse est, quod quaelibet entis differentia inferat et concludat, Deum esse.

16. Item, si est ens propter aliud, est ens propter se ipsum, alioquin nihil esset bonum²; sed ens propter se ipsum non est nisi ens illud, quo nihil est melius, quod quidem est ipse Deus: ergo cum universitas aliorum entium sit ordinata ad illud; universitas entium infert Deum et secundum esse et secundum intellectum.

17. Item, si est ens per participationem, est ens per essentiam: quia participatio non dicitur nisi respectu alicuius essentialiter habiti ab aliquo, cum omne per accidens reducatur ad per se³; sed quodlibet ens aliud a primo ente, quod Deus est, habet esse per participationem, illud autem solum habet esse per essentiam: ergo etc.

18. Item, si est ens in potentia, est ens in actu: quia nunquam potentia est reducibilis ad actum nisi per ens in actu, nec esset potentia, nisi esset reducibilis ad actum⁴: si ergo ens, quod est actus purus, nihil habens de possibilitate, non est nisi Deus; necesse est, quod omne aliud a primo ente inferat, Deum esse.

19. Item, si est ens compositum, est ens simplex: quia compositum non habet esse a se⁵, ergo necesse est, quod a simplici recipiat originem; sed ens simplicissimum, nihil de compositione habens non est nisi ens primum: ergo omne aliud ens infert Deum.

20. Item, si est ens mutabile, est ens immutabile: quia, secundum quod probat Philosophus⁶, motus est ab ente quieto et propter ens quietum: si ergo ens omnino immutabile non est nisi illud ens primum, quod Deus est, cetera autem creata, eo ipso quod creata, sunt mutabilia; necesse est, quod Deum esse inferatur a qualibet entis differentia.

Ex his igitur decem suppositionibus necessariis et manifestis infertur, quod omnes entis differentiae sive partes inferunt et clamant, Deum esse. Si ergo omne tale verum est verum indubitabile: ergo necesse est, quod Deum esse sit indubitabile verum.

Hoc idem monstratur tertia via sic. Omne verum, quod est adeo certum, quod non potest cogitari non esse, est verum indubitabile; sed Deum esse est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Prima per se nota est, secunda ostenditur multipliciter.

21 Nam Anselmus, Proslogii capitulo quarto: « Bone Domine, gratias tibi, quia quod credidi prius, te donante, iam sic intelligo, te illustrante, ut si nolim te esse credere, non possim non intelligere ».

22. Item, hoc ipsum probat Anselmus⁷ sic: Deus est quo nihil maius cogitari potest; sed quod sic est, quod non potest cogitari non esse, verius est, quam quod cogitari potest non esse: ergo si Deus est quo nihil maius cogitari potest, Deus non poterit cogitari non esse.

23. Item, ens, quo nihil maius potest cogitari, est talis naturae, quod non potest cogitari, nisi sit in re; quia, si est in cogitatione sola, iam ergo non est ens, quo nihil maius cogitari possit: ergo si tale ens cogitatur esse, necesse est, quod tale ens sit in re, quod non posset cogitari non esse⁸.

24. Item, Anselmus⁹: « Tu solus es quidquid esse melius est quam non esse »; sed omne verum indubitabile melius est quam omne verum dubitabile; ergo Deo magis est attribuendum esse indubitabiliter quam dubitabiliter.

25. Item, Augustinus dicit in Soliloquiis¹⁰, quod nulla veritas videri potest nisi per primam veritatem; sed verum, per quod omne aliud verum videtur, est verum maxime indubitabile; ergo Deum esse, est verum non solum indubitabile, sed etiam quo nihil indubitabilius cogitari potest: ergo est tale verum, quod non potest cogitari non esse.

26. Item, hoc ipsum sic probat¹¹: quidquid contingit cogitare contingit enuntiare; sed nullo modo contingit enuntiare, Deum non esse, quin cum hoc enuntietur, Deum esse. Et hoc patet sic: quia, si nulla veritas est, verum est, nullam veritatem esse; et si hoc est verum, aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, primum verum est: ergo si non potest enuntiari, Deum non esse, nec cogitari.

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27. Item, quanto veritas est prior et universalior, tanto notior¹; sed haec veritas, qua dicitur primum ens esse, est prima omnium veritatum et secundum rem et secundum rationem intelligendi: ergo necesse est, ipsam esse certissimam et evidentissimam. Sed veritates dignitatum seu communium animi conceptionum adeo sunt evidentes propter suam prioritatem, quod non possunt cogitari non esse: ergo nullus intellectus potest ipsam primam veritatem cogitare non esse, seu de ipsa dubitare.

28. Item, « nulla propositio est verior illa, in qua idem de se praedicatur² »; sed cum dico, Deum esse, esse dictum de Deo est idem omnino quod Deus, quia Deus est ipsum esse suum: ergo nulla verior et evidentior est illa, qua dicitur, Deum esse; ergo nullus potest cogitare, ipsam esse falsam, sive de ipsa dubitare.

29. Item, nullus potest ignorare, hanc esse veram: optimum est optimum, seu cogitare, ipsam esse falsam; sed optimum est ens completissimum, omne autem ens completissimum hoc ipso est ens actu: ergo si optimum est optimum, optimum est. — Similiter argui potest: si Deus est Deus, Deus est; sed antecedens est adeo verum, quod non potest cogitari non esse; ergo Deum esse est verum indubitabile³.

Sed e contrario obiicitur, quod Deum esse possit cogitari non esse et quod sit verum dubitabile. Quod enim possit cogitari non esse, ostenditur sic.

1. Psalmus⁴: Dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus; sed dicere in corde est cogitare: ergo Deum non esse potest cogitari, saltem ab insipiente.

2. Item, Damascenus, in primo libro⁵, capitulo tertio: « In tantum praevaluit perniciosa malitia humanae naturae, ut quosdam in irrationabilissimum et omnium malorum pessimum perditionis deduceret barathrum, ut dicant, Deum non esse »: ergo saltem a malignis hominibus cogitari potest, Deum non esse.

3. Item, idolum nihil est, sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios octavo⁶: ergo idem est cogitare, Deum esse idolum, et Deum non esse; sed cogitabile est et aliquando cogitatur, Deum esse idolum: ergo cogitabile est, Deum nihil esse.

4. Item, quod contingit significare contingit et cogitare; sed contingit significare, Deum non esse, ut per hanc orationem: Deus non est: ergo contingit illud cogitare.

5. Item, obiicitur contra rationem Augustini, quando probat, quod per hanc propositionem: nulla veritas est, infertur, aliquam veritatem esse. Si enim est haec propositio vera: aliqua veritas est, habet ergo contradictoriam; sed nulla contradictoria infert vel ponit, immo potius privat suam contradictoriam; ergo per hoc quod est, nullam veritatem esse, non concluditur, aliquam veritatem esse.

6. Item, obiicitur contra rationem Anselmi, qua probat, Deum esse, per hoc, quod ens, quo nihil maius cogitari potest, est in cogitatione; quia pari ratione cogitari potest, si aliquis cogitet insulam, qua nihil maius cogitari potest, quod illa insula sit in re⁷: ergo si illa ratio nulla est, nulla igitur est ratio, quam facit Anselmus.

7. Item, quaeritur: pro quanto dicitur, quod Deum esse non potest cogitari non esse? Si quia nullo modo potest cadere in cogitatione, illud est manifeste falsum; si quia non potest vere cogitari, pari ratione et omne verum necessarium erit tale verum.

Item, ostenditur, quod Deum esse sit verum dubitabile.

8. Richardus de Sancto Victore⁸: « Nihil certius tenemus, quam quod fide apprehendimus »; sed de his quae fide apprehendimus potest esse dubitatio: ergo multo fortius de omni alio cognito.

9. Item, quod maxime latet maxime admittit dubitationem; sed Deus est maxime latens, cum habitet lucem inaccessibilem⁹: ergo de ipso et circa ipsum maxime contingit dubitare: ergo si de aliis contingit dubitare, utrum sint, multo fortius de Deo.

10. Item, contingit dubitare de his quae sunt infra animam et iuxta animam; sed haec sunt animae magis accessibilia, quam illa quae sunt supra animam: si ergo Deum esse est verum, quod est supra intellectum humanum; videtur, quod de ipso maxime contingit dubitare.

11. Item, idem est Deo Deum esse et iustum esse; sed contingit de Deo dubitare, an sit iustus: ergo pari ratione contingit dubitare, an sit.

12. Item, frustra nititur quis probare illud, circa quod non potest incidere dubitatio¹⁰: si ergo Deum esse a nullo potest dubitari, frustra nititur quis illud ostendere: si ergo non frustra conati sunt Sancti et doctores illud ostendentes, constat, quod de ipso contingit dubitare.

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13. Item, nullus scit hoc principium: omne totum est maius sua parte, nisi cognoscat, quid sit totum¹: ergo nullus scit, Deum esse, nisi sciat, quid sit Deus: si ergo dubitabile est, quid sit Deus, dubitabile est igitur, an sit.

14. Item, si non posset esse de hoc vero, quod est, Deum esse, aliqua dubitatio, nullum esset meritum illud credere; sed hoc est principium omnis meriti, credere Deum esse, quia dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo²: Accedentem oportet credere, quia est etc.: si ergo hoc cadit sub merito, et cadere poterit sub dubitatione.

Conclusio. Non est dubitabile, Deum esse, si dubitabile intelligitur aliquod verum, cui deficit ratio evidentiae sive in se, sive in comparatione ad medium probans, sive in comparatione ad intellectum apprehensivum. Dubitari tamen de eo potest ex parte cognoscentis, scilicet ob defectum in actibus vel apprehendendi, vel conferendi, vel resolvendi.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod indubitabile dicitur per privationem dubitabilis; dubitabile autem dupliciter dicitur: vel per rationis decursum, vel per rationis defectum. Primo modo dicit aliquid ex parte cognoscibilis et cognoscentis; secundo modo solum ex parte cognoscentis. Primo modo dubitabile dicitur aliquod verum, quia deficit ei ratio evidentiae sive in se, sive in comparatione ad medium probans, sive in comparatione ad intellectum apprehensivum. Nullo autem istorum modorum deest certitudo isti vero, quod est, Deum esse.

Est enim certum ipsi comprehendenti, quia cognitio huius veri innata est menti rationali, in quantum tenet rationem imaginis, ratione cuius insertus³ est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et memoria illius, ad cuius imaginem facta est, in quem naturaliter tendit, ut in illo possit beatificari.

Est etiam magis certum in comparatione ad rationem probantem. Omnes enim creaturae, sive considerentur secundum proprietates completivas, sive secundum defectivas, fortissimis et altissimis vocibus clamant, Deum esse, quo indigent propter suum defectum et a quo suscipiunt complementum. Unde secundum maiorem et minorem completionem, quam habent, quaedam magnis, quaedam maioribus, quaedam maximis vocibus clamant, Deum esse.

Est etiam illud verum certissimum secundum se, pro eo quod est verum primum et immediatissimum, in quo non tantum causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, sed id ipsum est omnino esse⁴, quod praedicatur, et subiectum, quod subiicitur. Unde sicut unio summe distantium est omnino repugnans nostro intellectui, quia nullus intellectus potest cogitare, aliquid unum simul esse et non esse; sic divisio omnino unius et indivisi est omnino repugnans eidem, ac per hoc sicut idem esse et non esse, simul⁵ summe esse et nullo modo esse est evidentissimum in sua falsitate; sic primum et summum ens esse est evidentissimum in sua veritate. — Et ideo, si accipitur indubitabile, prout privat dubitationem per rationis decursum; Deum esse est verum indubitabile, quia sive intellectus ingrediatur intra se, sive egrediatur extra se, sive aspiciat supra se; si rationabiliter decurrit, certitudinaliter et indubitanter Deum esse cognoscit.

Si autem dicatur indubitabile secundo modo, secundum quod privat dubitationem, quae est per rationis defectum; sic concedi potest, quod propter defectum hominum dubitari ab aliquo potest, an Deus sit, et hoc secundum triplicem defectum intellectus cognoscentis⁶: vel quantum ad actum apprehendendi, vel quantum ad actum conferendi, vel quantum ad actum resolvendi. — Quantum ad actum apprehendendi incidit dubitatio, quando non recte et plene accipitur significatum huius nominis Deus, sed solum secundum aliquam sui conditionem; sicut gentiles Deum cogitabant quidquid supra hominem erat et futurum aliquod praevidere poterat; et ideo idola deos esse credebant et illa tanquam deos adorabant, quia aliqua responsa de futuris vera dabant. — Quantum ad actum conferendi dubitatio incidit, quando ex parte fit collatio, utpote cum insipiens videt, non manifestam fieri iustitiam de impio; infert ex hoc, quod non est regimen in universo, ac per hoc, quod in ipso non sit rector primus et summus, qui est Deus excelsus et gloriosus. — Similiter quantum ad defectum in actu resolvendi incidit dubitatio, quando intellectus carnalis nescit resolvere nisi usque ad ea quae patent sensibus, sicut sunt ista corporalia; ex qua ratione putaverunt aliqui, solem istum visibilem, qui obtinet principatum inter creaturas corporales, esse Deum, quia nescierunt resolvere usque ad substantiam incorpoream nec usque ad rerum prima principia. — Et hoc modo circa hoc quod est, Deum esse, dubitatio potest incidere ex defectu ipsius intellectus apprehendentis, vel conferentis, vel resolventis; et secundum istum intellectum cogitari po-

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test ab aliquo¹ intellectu, Deum non esse, quia non sufficienter et integre accipitur ab illo significatum huius nominis Deus. — Sed ab eo intellectu, qui plene apprehendit significatum huius nominis Deus, cogitando, Deum esse, quo nihil maius cogitari potest, non solum non dubitari, an Deus sit, sed etiam nullo modo potest cogitari, Deum non esse. Unde et rationes concedendae sunt hoc probantes.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Psalmo et de Damasceno, iam patet responsio: quia procedit de dubitatione, quae venit ex rationis defectu, cuiusmodi est in intellectu insipiente, qui sua caligine obscuratus nec sufficienter resolvit nec recte confert nec integre apprehendit significatum huius nominis Deus. Ipse enim intellectus intra se habet lumen sufficiens ex propria conditione², per quod posset dubitationem istam longius propulsare et se ab insipientia eripere. Unde in hac defectiva consideratione insipientis intellectus potius voluntarie deficit quam coacte, non propter defectum ex parte cogniti, sed propter defectum ex parte sui.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de idolo. Ideo enim gentilis cogitat, Deum esse idolum, quia ipsius apprehensio de Deo est defectiva; non enim apprehendit ipsum ut summum et optimum, sed ut aliquid potens, quod homo non potest; et hinc venit in eo error deceptionis et nutatio dubitationis, in quem errorem ipse se propria pertinacia praecipitat, ut prorsus inexcusabilis fiat³; nec tamen ipse omnino privatus est a cognitione Dei, quia, quamvis ex sua perversitate velit colere idolum, instinctum tamen naturalem habet ad colendum Deum, contra quem pugnat se praecipitando in errorem voluntarium.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod contingit significare contingit et cogitare; dicendum, quod cogitari potest aliquid dupliciter: vel cogitatione nuda, vel cogitatione cum assensu. Nuda cogitatione potest cogitari ita falsum, sicut verum, et manifeste falsum, sicut manifeste verum. Cogitatione cum assensu non cogitatur nisi verum vel aliquid simile vero. Prima cogitatio se extendit ad quaecumque se extendit sermo; secunda vero cogitatio non ad tot se extendit; et de hac cogitatione intelligit tam Anselmus quam Augustinus, et de hac cogitatione dicitur, quod Deus non potest cogitari non esse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur contra rationem Augustini, quod contradictoria non infert suam contradictoriam; dicendum, quod verum est secundum quod contradictoria; sed intelligendum est, quod propositio affirmativa duplicem habet affirmationem: unam, qua asserit praedicatum de subiecto; aliam, qua asserit, se esse veram. In prima distinguitur a propositione negativa, quae removet praedicatum a subiecto; in secunda vero communicat cum illa, quia tam propositio negativa quam affirmativa asserit, se esse veram. Quantum ad primam attenditur contradictio, non quantum ad secundam. Cum vero dicitur: nulla veritas est, haec propositio, in quantum negat praedicatum a subiecto, non infert suam oppositam, quae est, aliquam veritatem esse. In quantum autem asserit, se esse veram, infert, aliquam veritatem esse; nec mirum, quia, sicut omne malum praesupponit bonum, sic falsum infert verum. Et ideo hoc falsum, quod est, nullam veritatem esse — cum propter remotionem praedicati a subiecto destruat omne verum, et propter assertionem⁴, qua asserit, se esse veram, ponat, aliquam veritatem esse — includit utramque partem contradictionis; ideo utraque ex illa potest inferri, et ipsum in se esse falsum et inintelligibile ab intellectu recte apprehendente. Et hoc est quod vult dicere Augustinus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ratione Anselmi de insula, qua nulla melior vel maior cogitari potest; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, cum dico ens, quo nihil maius cogitari potest, hic nulla est repugnantia inter subiectum et implicationem; et ideo rationabiliter potest cogitari. Sed cum dico insulam, qua nulla potest melior cogitari; hic est repugnantia inter subiectum et implicationem. Insula enim dicit ens defectivum, implicatio vero est entis perfectissimi; et ideo, quia ibi est « oppositio in adiecto⁵ », irrationabiliter cogitatur, et intellectus sibi ipsi in cogitando repugnat: et ideo non est mirum, si non potest inferri, quod istud quod cogitatur sit extra in re. Secus autem est in ente vel in Deo, cui non repugnat talis implicatio⁶.

7. Ad illud quod quaeritur: pro quanto dicitur, quod Deum esse non possit cogitari non esse? iam patet responsio: non quia non possit cogitari, « quid est quod per nomen dicitur⁷ », sive significatum huius orationis: Deus non est; sed quia ipsum adeo est evidens in se et certum cognoscenti, quod si recte considerare velit, non est aliquid, per quod possit ab hac veritate avelli. Est enim verum evidentissimum et praesentissimum, quod nulli deest loco, nulli tempori, nulli rei, nulli cogitationi; nec sic est de aliis veris creatis.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil certius tenemus, quam quod fide comprehendimus; dicen-

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dum, quod illud est verum de certitudine adhaerentiae, non de certitudine intelligentiae, sicut manifeste consideranti apparet¹.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud est verum latens, ergo maxime dubitabile; dicendum, quod licet Deus sit simplex et uniformiter in se, tamen quodam modo latet et quodam modo patet, sicut insinuat Apostolus ad Romanos primo²: Quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis. Aliquibus enim manifesta est trinitas appropriatorum, quibus non est manifesta trinitas personarum; et alicui manifesta est unitas essentiae, cui non est manifesta trinitas appropriatorum; et alicui manifesta est ipsa Dei trinitas, cui non est manifesta ipsa essentiae unitas. Hoc autem est, quod primo manifestum est de Deo, scilicet ipsius entitas, et quantum ad hoc non latet, sed patet; et ideo non est dubitabile, sed indubitabile.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima dubitans de iis infra se et iuxta etc.; dicendum, quod non valet: quia, licet Deum esse sit supra animam secundum naturam, est tamen intra animam secundum notitiam, et extra secundum repraesentationem et persuasionem, quam sibi facit omnis creatura, quia haec veritas est in omni veritate clausa et intellecta.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est Deo esse et iustum esse; dicendum, quod non sequitur: quia, licet sit idem in se et secundum se, non tamen est idem secundum rationem apprehendentem et secundum effectum repraesentantem; et ideo possibile est, unum patere, altero non patente.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frustra quis nititur probare illud, de quo nemo dubitat; dicendum, quod, sicut iam patet, hoc verum non indiget probatione propter defectum evidentiae ex parte sua, sed propter defectum considerationis ex parte nostra. Unde huiusmodi ratiocinationes potius sunt quaedam exercitationes³ intellectus, quam rationes dantes evidentiam et manifestantes ipsum verum probatum.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus cognoscit principia, nisi cognoscat terminos; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quorundam terminorum notitia est occulta, quorundam vero manifesta. Et rursus, de significato termini potest haberi notitia plena, plenior et plenissima. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod potest sciri, quid est Deus, perfecte et plene et per modum comprehensivum, et sic non cognoscitur nisi a solo Deo; vel clare et perspicue, et sic cognoscitur a Beatis; vel ex parte et in aenigmate⁴, et sic cognoscitur, quod Deus est primum et summum principium omnium mundanorum; et istud, quantum est de se, potest esse omnibus manifestum: quia, cum quilibet sciat, se non semper fuisse, scit, se habuisse principium, pari ratione et de aliis; et quia haec notitia omnibus se offert, et hac cognita, scitur, Deum esse: ideo est indubitabile omnibus, quantum est de se.

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credere indubitabile non est meritorium; dici potest, quod credere, Deum esse, quantum est de se, non est meritorium nisi per hoc, quod substernitur ei quod est, Deum esse trinum, vel aliis articulis fidei, cum supra istum fundantur; et ratione illorum potest fieri meritorium, quia, si per se nude credatur, non est efficax ad merendum. Apostolus autem loquitur de hoc quod est, Deum esse, prout est substramentum aliorum credibilium; et hoc substramentum est homini a natura insitum, ne, si intellectus humanus de natura propria nihil de Deo cognosceret, excusare se posset per ignorantiam. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister Hugo⁵: « Propterea Deus a principio naturae nec totus conscientiae humanae voluit esse manifestus, nec totus absconditus, ne, si totus manifestus esset, meritum fides non haberet, nec infidelitas locum; infidelitas enim de manifesto convinceretur, et fides de occulto non exerceretur. Si vero absconditus totus esset, fides a scientia non iuvaretur, et infidelitas de ignorantia excusaretur. Quocirca oportuit, ut proderet se occultum Deus, ne, si totus celaretur, prorsus nesciretur, et rursum ad aliquid proditum se et agnitum occultaret, ne totus manifestaretur; ut aliquid esset, quod ingenium hominis enutriret cognitum, et rursum aliquid, quod absconditum provocaret ».

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English Translation

Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity

Wishing to search out something concerning the mystery of the Trinity, with the divine grace going before us, we set down two things beforehand as preambles; of which the first is the foundation of all knowledge that is certain, the second the foundation of all knowledge that is of faith.

The first is, whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth.

The second is, whether the truth that God is three is credible.

Question I. On the certitude by which the existence of God is known, and on the faith by which his Trinity is believed.

Article I. Whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth.

It is asked, then, first, whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth. And that it is, is shown by a threefold way. The first is this: every truth impressed upon all minds is an indubitable truth. — The second is this: every truth which every creature proclaims is an indubitable truth. — The third is this: every truth most certain and most evident in itself is an indubitable truth¹.

Concerning the first way, then, the procedure is as follows, and it is shown both by authorities and by reasons that the existence of God is impressed upon all rational minds.

1. Damascene, in the first book², chapter three: "The knowledge that God exists is naturally implanted in us."

2. Likewise, Hugh³: "God so tempered the knowledge of himself in man that, just as what he is could never be comprehended entire, so that he is could never be utterly unknown."

3. Likewise, Boethius⁴: "There is implanted in the minds of men a desire for the true and the good"; but the affection for the true good presupposes the cognition of the same: therefore there is impressed upon the minds of men the cognition of the true good and a desire for what is most desirable. Now this good is God: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine, in many places in On the Trinity⁵, says that the image consists in mind, knowledge and love, and that the character of the image is regarded in the soul by comparison to God: if, therefore, it is impressed upon the soul by nature to be the image of God, it therefore has naturally implanted in it the knowledge of God. But the first knowable thing about God is that God exists: therefore that is naturally implanted in the human mind.

5. Likewise, the Philosopher⁶ says that "it would be unfitting that we should have the noblest habits and that they should lie hidden from us": therefore, since the existence of God is the noblest truth and most present to us, it is unfitting that this truth should lie hidden from the human understanding.

6. Likewise, there is implanted in the minds of men a desire for wisdom, for the Philosopher says¹: "All men by nature desire to know"; but the wisdom most to be desired is eternal wisdom: therefore the desire for that wisdom is implanted in the human mind above all. But there is no love, as was said before, except of something in some way known; therefore it must be that some knowledge whatever of that highest wisdom is impressed upon the human mind. But this is to know first, that God himself, or wisdom, exists: therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, the desire for beatitude is so implanted in us that no one can doubt of another whether he wishes to be happy, as Augustine says in many places²; but beatitude consists in the highest good, which is God: therefore, if such a desire cannot exist without some knowledge, it must be that the knowledge by which it is known that the highest good, or God, exists is implanted in the soul itself.

8. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul itself a desire for peace, and so implanted that it is sought even through its contrary, nor can that desire be taken away even from the damned and the demons, according to what is shown in the nineteenth book of On the City of God³. If, therefore, the peace of the rational mind is only in an immutable and eternal being, and desire presupposes a notion or knowledge, then the knowledge of an immutable and eternal being is implanted in the rational spirit.

9. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul a hatred of the false; but all hatred takes its rise from love: therefore much more strongly is there implanted in the soul a love of the true, and of that truth above all for which the soul has been made. If, therefore, that is the first truth, it necessarily follows that the knowledge of the first truth is implanted in the rational mind. — Now that the hatred of the false is implanted in the human mind appears from this, that no one wishes to be deceived, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the Confessions⁴. — And that hatred is in turn caused by love, Augustine shows in the fourteenth book of On the City of God; for no one hates anything except because he loves its opposite.

10. Likewise, there is implanted in the rational soul a knowledge of itself, in that the soul is present to itself and knowable by itself⁵; but God is most present to the soul itself and knowable by himself: therefore there is implanted in the soul itself the knowledge of God, who is its own. If you say that the case is not alike, because the soul is proportioned to itself, whereas God is not so proportioned to the soul; on the contrary: there is no counter-instance: because, if proportionality were necessarily required for cognition, the soul would never arrive at the knowledge of God, since it cannot be proportioned to him, neither by nature nor by grace nor by glory.

By these reasons, then, it is shown that the existence of God is indubitable to the human mind, as being naturally implanted in it; for no one doubts save concerning that of which he has no certain knowledge.

Likewise this same thing is shown by the second way thus: every truth which every creature cries out is an indubitable truth; but that God exists every creature cries out: therefore, etc. — And that every creature cries out that God exists is shown from ten conditions and suppositions known through themselves.

11. The first is this: if there is a posterior being, there is also a prior being, because the posterior is only from a prior⁶: if, therefore, there is a whole company of posterior things, it must be that a first being exists. If, therefore, it is necessary to posit that something is prior and posterior among creatures, it is necessary that the whole company of creatures infers and cries out a first principle.

12. Likewise, if there is a being from another, there is a being not from another: because nothing draws itself out of non-being into being⁷: therefore the first ground of drawing forth must be in a first being, which is not drawn forth by another. If, therefore, a being from another is called a created being, and a being not from another is called an uncreated being, which is God, then all the differences of being infer that God exists.

13. Likewise, if there is a possible being, there is a necessary being: because the possible states an indifference to being and non-being; but nothing indifferent to being and non-being can exist except through something which is altogether determined to being⁸. If, therefore, a necessary being, having nothing at all of possibility toward non-being, is none other than God, while everything else has something of possibility, then every difference of being infers that God exists.

14. Likewise, if there is a relative being, there is an absolute being: because the relative is never terminated save at the absolute⁹; but an absolute being depending on nothing can only be that which receives nothing from elsewhere; and this is the first being, whereas every other being has something of dependence: therefore it must be that every difference of being infers that God exists.

15. Likewise, if there is a diminished being, or a being in a certain respect, there is a being simply: because a being in a certain respect can neither be nor be understood unless it is understood through being

simply, nor a diminished being except through a perfect being, just as a privation is not understood except through a habit¹. If, therefore, every created being is a being in part, while the uncreated being alone is being simply and perfect, it must be that every difference of being infers and concludes that God exists.

16. Likewise, if there is a being for the sake of another, there is a being for its own sake, otherwise nothing would be good²; but a being for its own sake is none other than that being than which nothing is better, which indeed is God himself: therefore, since the whole company of other beings is ordered to that one, the whole company of beings infers God both according to being and according to understanding.

17. Likewise, if there is a being by participation, there is a being by essence: because participation is not spoken of except in respect of something possessed essentially by another, since everything per accidens is reduced to what is per se³; but every being other than the first being, which is God, has being by participation, while that one alone has being by essence: therefore, etc.

18. Likewise, if there is a being in potency, there is a being in act: because potency is never reducible to act except through a being in act, nor would it be a potency unless it were reducible to act⁴: if, therefore, the being which is pure act, having nothing of possibility, is none other than God, it must be that everything other than the first being infers that God exists.

19. Likewise, if there is a composite being, there is a simple being: because a composite does not have being from itself⁵, therefore it must receive its origin from what is simple; but the most simple being, having nothing of composition, is none other than the first being: therefore every other being infers God.

20. Likewise, if there is a mutable being, there is an immutable being: because, according to what the Philosopher proves⁶, motion is from a being at rest and for the sake of a being at rest: if, therefore, the wholly immutable being is none other than that first being which is God, while the rest, being created, are for that very reason mutable, it must be that the existence of God is inferred from every difference of being.

From these ten necessary and manifest suppositions, then, it is inferred that all the differences or parts of being infer and cry out that God exists. If, therefore, every such truth is an indubitable truth, it must therefore be that the existence of God is an indubitable truth.

This same thing is shown by the third way thus. Every truth which is so certain that it cannot be thought not to be is an indubitable truth; but the existence of God is of this sort: therefore, etc. The first is known through itself, the second is shown in many ways.

21 For Anselm, in the fourth chapter of the Proslogion: "Good Lord, I give thee thanks, because what I first believed by thy gift I now so understand by thy illumination that, if I were unwilling to believe that thou art, I could not fail to understand it."

22. Likewise, Anselm proves this same thing⁷ thus: God is that than which nothing greater can be thought; but that which is such that it cannot be thought not to be is more truly than that which can be thought not to be: therefore, if God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, God will not be able to be thought not to be.

23. Likewise, a being than which nothing greater can be thought is of such a nature that it cannot be thought unless it is in reality; because, if it is in thought alone, then it is not a being than which nothing greater can be thought: therefore, if such a being is thought to be, it must be that such a being is in reality, and that it could not be thought not to be⁸.

24. Likewise, Anselm⁹: "Thou alone art whatever it is better to be than not to be"; but every indubitable truth is better than every dubitable truth; therefore being is to be attributed to God indubitably rather than dubitably.

25. Likewise, Augustine says in the Soliloquies¹⁰ that no truth can be seen except through the first truth; but the truth through which every other truth is seen is a truth in the highest degree indubitable; therefore the existence of God is a truth not only indubitable, but such that nothing more indubitable can be thought: therefore it is such a truth as cannot be thought not to be.

26. Likewise, he proves this same thing thus¹¹: whatever it is possible to think it is possible to utter; but in no way is it possible to utter that God is not, without its being uttered along with this that God is. And this appears thus: because, if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, the first truth exists: therefore, if it cannot be uttered that God is not, neither can it be thought.

27. Likewise, the prior and more universal a truth is, the better known it is¹; but this truth, by which the first being is said to be, is the first of all truths both according to the thing and according to the account of understanding: therefore it must be that it is most certain and most evident. But the truths of axioms, or of common conceptions of the mind, are so evident by reason of their priority that they cannot be thought not to be: therefore no understanding can think that first truth not to be, or doubt concerning it.

28. Likewise, "no proposition is truer than that in which the same is predicated of itself"²; but when I say that God is, the being said of God is altogether the same as God, because God is his own being: therefore none is truer and more evident than that by which it is said that God is; therefore no one can think it to be false, or doubt concerning it.

29. Likewise, no one can be ignorant that this is true — the best is the best — or think it to be false; but the best is the most complete being, and every most complete being is by that very fact a being in act: therefore, if the best is the best, the best exists. — Likewise it can be argued: if God is God, God exists; but the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be; therefore the existence of God is an indubitable truth³.

But on the contrary it is objected that the existence of God can be thought not to be, and that it is a dubitable truth. That it can be thought not to be is shown thus.

1. The Psalm⁴: The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God; but to say in the heart is to think: therefore it can be thought that God is not, at least by the fool.

2. Likewise, Damascene, in the first book⁵, chapter three: "So far has the pernicious malice of human nature prevailed that it has led some down into the most irrational and worst of all evils, the pit of perdition, so that they say that God is not": therefore at least by malicious men it can be thought that God is not.

3. Likewise, an idol is nothing, as is said in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter eight⁶: therefore it is the same to think that God is an idol and that God is not; but it is thinkable, and sometimes thought, that God is an idol: therefore it is thinkable that God is nothing.

4. Likewise, what it is possible to signify it is possible also to think; but it is possible to signify that God is not, as by this sentence: God is not: therefore it is possible to think it.

5. Likewise, it is objected against the reason of Augustine, when he proves that by this proposition — there is no truth — it is inferred that there is some truth. For if this proposition is true — there is some truth — it therefore has a contradictory; but no contradictory infers or posits, but rather takes away, its own contradictory; therefore by the fact that there is no truth it is not concluded that there is some truth.

6. Likewise, it is objected against the reason of Anselm, by which he proves that God exists on the ground that a being than which nothing greater can be thought is in thought; because by parity of reasoning it can be thought, if someone thinks of an island than which nothing greater can be thought, that that island is in reality⁷: therefore, if that reasoning is null, then null also is the reasoning which Anselm makes.

7. Likewise, it is asked: in what sense is it said that the existence of God cannot be thought not to be? If it is because it can in no way fall under thought, that is manifestly false; if it is because it cannot be truly thought, then by parity of reasoning every necessary truth will be such a truth.

Likewise, it is shown that the existence of God is a dubitable truth.

8. Richard of Saint Victor⁸: "We hold nothing more certainly than what we apprehend by faith"; but concerning those things which we apprehend by faith there can be doubt: therefore much more concerning everything else that is known.

9. Likewise, what lies most hidden most admits of doubt; but God is most hidden, since he dwelleth in light inaccessible⁹: therefore concerning him and about him it is most possible to doubt: therefore, if it is possible to doubt of other things whether they are, much more of God.

10. Likewise, it is possible to doubt concerning those things which are below the soul and beside the soul; but these are more accessible to the soul than those which are above the soul: if, therefore, the existence of God is a truth which is above the human understanding, it seems that concerning it doubt is most possible.

11. Likewise, in God it is the same to be God and to be just; but it is possible to doubt of God whether he is just: therefore by parity of reasoning it is possible to doubt whether he is.

12. Likewise, in vain does anyone strive to prove that concerning which doubt cannot arise¹⁰: if, therefore, the existence of God can be doubted by no one, in vain does anyone strive to show it: if, therefore, the Saints and doctors have not striven in vain in showing it, it is clear that concerning it doubt is possible.

13. Likewise, no one knows this principle — every whole is greater than its part — unless he knows what a whole is¹: therefore no one knows that God is unless he knows what God is: if, therefore, it is dubitable what God is, it is therefore dubitable whether he is.

14. Likewise, if there could be no doubt concerning this truth, that God is, there would be no merit in believing it; but this is the principle of all merit, to believe that God is, because it is said in the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews²: He that cometh must believe that he is, etc.: if, therefore, this falls under merit, it will also be able to fall under doubt.

Conclusio. It is not dubitable that God is, if by dubitable is understood some truth which lacks the ground of evidence, whether in itself, or in comparison to the middle term that proves it, or in comparison to the apprehending understanding. It can nevertheless be doubted on the part of the knower, namely by reason of a defect in the acts either of apprehending, or of comparing, or of resolving.

Respondeo: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the indubitable is so called by the privation of the dubitable; and the dubitable is spoken of in two ways: either by the running of reason, or by the failure of reason. In the first way it says something on the part both of the knowable and of the knower; in the second way only on the part of the knower. In the first way some truth is called dubitable because the ground of evidence is lacking to it, whether in itself, or in comparison to the middle term that proves it, or in comparison to the apprehending understanding. But by none of these ways is certitude lacking to this truth, that God is.

For it is certain to the one comprehending, because the cognition of this truth is innate in the rational mind, inasmuch as it holds the character of an image, by reason of which there is implanted³ in it a natural desire and knowledge and memory of him to whose image it was made, toward whom it naturally tends, that in him it may be beatified.

It is also more certain in comparison to the reason that proves it. For all creatures, whether they be considered according to their completive properties or according to their defective ones, cry out with the strongest and highest voices that God is, of whom they stand in need by reason of their defect and from whom they receive their completion. Whence, according to the greater and lesser completion which they have, some cry out with great, some with greater, some with the greatest voices that God is.

That truth is also most certain according to itself, in that it is the first and most immediate truth, in which not only is the cause of the predicate enclosed in the subject, but the being which is predicated and the subject which is subjected are altogether one and the same⁴. Whence, just as the union of things utterly distant is altogether repugnant to our understanding, because no understanding can think that some one thing at once is and is not; so the division of what is altogether one and undivided is altogether repugnant to the same, and thereby, just as to be and not to be the same, and at once⁵ to be in the highest degree and in no way to be, is most evident in its falsity; so that the first and highest being is is most evident in its truth. — And therefore, if indubitable is taken as it takes away doubt through the running of reason, then the existence of God is an indubitable truth, because whether the understanding enters within itself, or goes out beyond itself, or looks above itself, if it runs on rationally it knows with certitude and without doubt that God is.

But if indubitable is said in the second way, according as it takes away the doubt which comes through the failure of reason, then it can be granted that, by reason of the defect of men, it can be doubted by someone whether God is; and this according to a threefold defect of the understanding of the knower⁶: either as to the act of apprehending, or as to the act of comparing, or as to the act of resolving. — As to the act of apprehending, doubt arises when the meaning of this name God is not rightly and fully taken, but only according to some condition of it; as the gentiles thought God to be whatever was above man and could foresee something future; and therefore they believed idols to be gods and adored them as gods, because they gave certain true answers about things to come. — As to the act of comparing, doubt arises when the comparison is made in part, as when the fool sees that justice is not manifestly done upon the wicked man; he infers from this that there is no governance in the universe, and thereby that there is not in it a first and highest ruler, who is God most high and glorious. — Likewise, as to a defect in the act of resolving, doubt arises when the carnal understanding does not know how to resolve except as far as those things which lie open to the senses, such as these bodily things; for which reason some have supposed this visible sun, which holds the chief place among bodily creatures, to be God, because they did not know how to resolve as far as incorporeal substance nor as far as the first principles of things. — And in this way, concerning this, that God is, doubt can arise from a defect of the understanding itself as apprehending, or as comparing, or as resolving; and according to this understanding it can be thought

by some¹ understanding that God is not, because the meaning of this name God is not sufficiently and entirely taken by it. — But by that understanding which fully apprehends the meaning of this name God, thinking that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, not only can it not be doubted whether God is, but in no way can it be thought that God is not. Whence also the reasons proving this are to be granted.

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected first on the contrary side from the Psalm and from Damascene, the answer is already clear: because it proceeds from the doubt which comes from the failure of reason, of which sort is that in the understanding of the fool, who, darkened by his own gloom, neither resolves sufficiently nor compares rightly nor apprehends entirely the meaning of this name God. For the understanding itself has within itself a sufficient lumen^tr. from its own condition², by which it could drive that doubt further off and rescue itself from folly. Whence in this defective consideration the understanding of the fool fails rather willingly than by compulsion, not by reason of a defect on the part of the thing known, but by reason of a defect on the part of itself.

And by this the answer to what is objected about the idol is clear. For the gentile thinks God to be an idol because his apprehension of God is defective; for he does not apprehend him as highest and best, but as something powerful which man is not; and hence there comes to be in him the error of deception and the wavering of doubt, into which error he casts himself by his own obstinacy, so that he becomes utterly inexcusable³; nor yet is he altogether deprived of the cognition of God, because, although out of his own perversity he wills to worship an idol, he nevertheless has a natural instinct toward worshipping God, against whom he fights by casting himself into a voluntary error.

4. To that which is objected — that what it is possible to signify it is possible also to think — it must be said that something can be thought in two ways: either by bare thought, or by thought with assent. By bare thought the false can be thought just as the true, and the manifestly false just as the manifestly true. By thought with assent nothing is thought except the true or something like the true. The first thought extends to whatever speech extends to; but the second thought does not extend to so many things; and it is of this thought that both Anselm and Augustine understand, and of this thought it is said that God cannot be thought not to be.

5. To that which is objected against the reason of Augustine, that a contradictory does not infer its own contradictory, it must be said that this is true according as it is a contradictory; but it must be understood that an affirmative proposition has a twofold affirmation: one by which it asserts the predicate of the subject; another by which it asserts that it is itself true. In the first it is distinguished from a negative proposition, which removes the predicate from the subject; in the second it has that in common with it, because a negative proposition as well as an affirmative asserts that it is itself true. Contradiction is attended to as regards the first, not as regards the second. But when it is said, there is no truth, this proposition, inasmuch as it denies the predicate of the subject, does not infer its opposite, which is that there is some truth. But inasmuch as it asserts that it is itself true, it does infer that there is some truth; nor is this surprising, because, just as every evil presupposes a good, so the false infers the true. And therefore this falsehood, that there is no truth — since by the removal of the predicate from the subject it destroys every truth, and by the assertion⁴ by which it asserts that it is itself true it posits that there is some truth — includes both parts of the contradiction; therefore either can be inferred from it, and it is itself in itself false and unintelligible to an understanding rightly apprehending. And this is what Augustine means to say.

6. To that which is objected concerning Anselm's reasoning about the island than which no better or greater can be thought, it must be said that the case is not alike: because, when I say a being than which nothing greater can be thought, here there is no repugnance between the subject and what is implied; and therefore it can be rationally thought. But when I say an island than which none better can be thought, here there is a repugnance between the subject and what is implied. For an island states a defective being, whereas what is implied is of a most perfect being; and therefore, because there is there an "opposition in the adjunct"⁵, it is irrationally thought, and the understanding is repugnant to itself in thinking: and therefore it is no wonder if it cannot be inferred that what is thought is outside in reality. But it is otherwise in a being, or in God, to whom such an implication is not repugnant⁶.

7. To that which is asked — in what sense is it said that the existence of God cannot be thought not to be? — the answer is already clear: not because there cannot be thought "what it is that is said by the name"⁷, that is, the meaning of this sentence: God is not; but because it is itself so evident in itself and certain to the knower that, if he is willing to consider rightly, there is nothing by which he could be torn away from this truth. For it is a truth most evident and most present, which is lacking to no place, to no time, to no thing, to no thought; and it is not so with other created truths.

8. To that which is objected, that we hold nothing more certainly than what we comprehend by faith, it must be said

that this is true of the certitude of adherence, not of the certitude of understanding, as appears to one considering the matter manifestly¹.

9. To that which is objected, that this truth is hidden, and therefore most dubitable, it must be said that, although God is simple and uniform in himself, nevertheless in one way he lies hidden and in another way he lies open, as the Apostle intimates in the first chapter to the Romans²: That which is known of God is manifest in them. For to some the trinity of the appropriated attributes is manifest to whom the trinity of persons is not manifest; and to one the unity of essence is manifest to whom the trinity of the appropriated attributes is not manifest; and to another the very trinity of God is manifest to whom the very unity of essence is not manifest. Now this is what is first manifest about God, namely his very entity, and as regards this he does not lie hidden but lies open; and therefore it is not dubitable, but indubitable.

10. To that which is objected, that the soul doubts of the things below it and beside it, and so forth, it must be said that this does not hold: because, although the existence of God is above the soul according to nature, it is nevertheless within the soul according to knowledge, and outside it according to the representation and persuasion which every creature makes to it, since this truth is enclosed and understood in every truth.

11. To that which is objected, that in God it is the same to be and to be just, it must be said that it does not follow: because, although it is the same in itself and according to itself, it is nevertheless not the same according to the account that apprehends it and according to the effect that represents it; and therefore it is possible for the one to lie open while the other does not lie open.

12. To that which is objected, that in vain does anyone strive to prove that of which no one doubts, it must be said that, as is already clear, this truth does not stand in need of proof by reason of a defect of evidence on its own part, but by reason of a defect of consideration on our part. Whence reasonings of this kind are rather certain exercises³ of the understanding than reasons giving evidence and making manifest the truth itself that is proved.

13. To that which is objected, that no one knows principles unless he knows the terms, it must be said that this is true; but the knowledge of some terms is hidden, of others manifest. And again, of the meaning of a term there can be a full, a fuller and a fullest knowledge. According to this it must be understood that it can be known what God is perfectly and fully and in the mode of comprehension, and thus he is not known save by God alone; or clearly and plainly, and thus he is known by the Blessed; or in part and in a dark manner⁴, and thus it is known that God is the first and highest principle of all the things of the world; and this, so far as it is of itself, can be manifest to all: because, since anyone knows that he has not always been, he knows that he had a beginning, and by parity of reasoning so of other things; and since this knowledge offers itself to all, and when it is known it is known that God is, therefore it is indubitable to all, so far as it is of itself.

14. To that which is objected, that to believe what is indubitable is not meritorious, it can be said that to believe that God is, so far as it is of itself, is not meritorious except in this, that it is laid down as a substratum for that which is, that God is three, or for the other articles of faith, since they are founded upon it; and by reason of those it can be made meritorious, because, if it is believed by itself and bare, it is not efficacious for meriting. But the Apostle is speaking of this, that God is, inasmuch as it is the substratum of the other things to be believed; and this substratum is implanted in man by nature, lest, if the human understanding knew nothing of God from its own nature, it might excuse itself through ignorance. And this is what Master Hugh says⁵: "Therefore God from the beginning of nature willed to be neither wholly manifest to the human conscience nor wholly hidden, lest, if he were wholly manifest, faith should have no merit, nor unbelief any place; for unbelief would be convicted by what is manifest, and faith would not be exercised upon what is hidden. But if he were wholly hidden, faith would not be helped by knowledge, and unbelief would be excused by ignorance. Wherefore it was fitting that God should betray himself as hidden, lest, if he were wholly concealed, he should be utterly unknown, and again that, having betrayed and made himself known in some measure, he should conceal himself, lest he be wholly manifested; so that there might be something known to nourish the wit of man, and again something hidden to provoke it."

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Similis quaestio solvitur I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.
A similar question is settled at I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.
2
De Fide orthod. Cfr. ibid. c. 1.
On the Orthodox Faith. Compare ibid., c. 1.
3
Libr. I. de Sacram. p. III. c. 1: Deus enim sic ab initio notitiam sui ab homine etc.
Book I On the Sacraments, p. III, c. 1: "For God from the beginning so [tempered] the knowledge of himself by man," etc.
4
Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 2: Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas. — De minori cfr. August., X. de Trin. c. 1. et 2. n. 1-4.
Book III On Consolation, prose 2: "For there is naturally implanted in the minds of men a desire for the true good." — On the minor premiss compare Augustine, X On the Trinity, cc. 1 and 2, nn. 1–4.
5
Libr. IX. c. 2. n. 2. seqq.; XII. c. 4. n. 4. seqq.; XIV. c. 8. n. 11. seqq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II, a. 1.
Book IX, c. 2, n. 2 and following; XII, c. 4, n. 4 and following; XIV, c. 8, n. 11 and following. Compare I Sentences, d. 3, p. II, a. 1.
6
Libr. II. Poster. c. 18. (c. 15.).
Book II Posterior Analytics, c. 18 (c. 15).
1
Libr. I. Metaph. c. 1. — Quod amor supponat cognitionem, docet August. (supra pag. 45, nota 4.) pro minori 3. arg.
Book I Metaphysics, c. 1. — That love presupposes cognition Augustine teaches (above, p. 45, note 4) for the minor of the third argument.
2
Praeter locos citt. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 2. cfr. XIII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3. et c. 4. n. 7. (in fine) seqq. et c. 20. n. 25.
Besides the places cited at IV Sentences, d. 49, p. I, q. 2, compare XIII On the Trinity, c. 3, n. 3, and c. 4, n. 7 (at the end) and following, and c. 20, n. 25.
3
Cap. 13. n. 1. seq. Cfr. ibid. c. 11. et 12, ubi August. ostendit, pacem in rebus terrenis esse bonum gratissimum, et ad illud obtinendum geri bella. — Superius post quaeratur F supplet pax et post ipse appetitus addit pacis.
Chapter 13, n. 1 and following. Compare ibid., cc. 11 and 12, where Augustine shows that peace in earthly things is a most welcome good, and that wars are waged to obtain it. — Above, after quaeratur, F supplies pax, and after ipse appetitus it adds pacis.
4
Cap. 23. n. 33. seq. — Seq. sententia habetur XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2. — Superius posuimus cum F H odium falsi, in aliis odium mali.
Chapter 23, n. 33 and following. — The following sentence is found at XIV On the City of God, c. 7, n. 2. — Above we have set, with F H, odium falsi; in the others, odium mali.
5
Ut ostendit August. IX. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3. seqq. et X. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. — Aliquanto inferius voci nunquam cum F praemisimus anima.
As Augustine shows at IX On the Trinity, c. 3, n. 3 and following, and X, c. 3, n. 5 and following. — Somewhat below, before the word nunquam, we have placed anima with F.
6
Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.), II. Metaph. text. 10. (I. brevior c. 2.) et V. text. 16. (IV. c. 11.). — Mox pro posteriorum A B posterior.
Compare Aristotle, IV Physics, text 7 (c. 1); II Metaphysics, text 10 (I, the shorter, c. 2); and V, text 16 (IV, c. 11). — Shortly after, in place of posteriorum, A B have posterior.
7
Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum. Cfr. August., I. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1.
Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 47 (c. 4): "But nothing generates its very self." Compare Augustine, I On the Trinity, c. 1, n. 1.
8
Vide Avicennam, Metaph. tr. 1. c. 7.
See Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 1, c. 7.
9
Aristot., I. Ethic. 6: Quod vero per se est et substantia prius eo natura est, quod est ad aliquid [i. e. relativum]; esse enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est.
Aristotle, I Ethics, 6: "But that which is per se and a substance is prior in nature to that which is toward something [i.e. relative]; for this being seems to be a kind of appendage and accident of that which is."
1
Cfr. tom. III. pag. 802, nota 8. Vide etiam supra pag. 19, nota 8.
Compare tome III, p. 802, note 8. See also above, p. 19, note 8.
2
Vide Boeth., de Hebdomadibus, sive Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint etc.; Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 52. (XI. c. 10.). — Mox post nisi F prosequitur illud bonum, quo nihil est neque excogitari potest melius etc.
See Boethius, On the Hebdomads, or How Substances Are Good in That They Are, etc.; Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, text 52 (XI, c. 10). — Shortly after, following nisi, F continues illud bonum, quo nihil est neque excogitari potest melius, etc.
3
Aristot., II. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.): Nihil autem secundum accidens est prius iis quae per se sunt. IV. Metaph. text. 18. (III. c. 4.) ait: Si igitur quod magis est propinquius est, profecto erit aliquid verum, cui propinquius est quod magis verum est.
Aristotle, II Physics, text 66 (c. 6): "But nothing per accidens is prior to those things which are per se." IV Metaphysics, text 18 (III, c. 4), says: "If, then, what is more is nearer, there will assuredly be something true, to which that which is more true is nearer."
4
Cfr. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. (VIII. c. 8.).
Compare Aristotle, IX Metaphysics, text 13 (VIII, c. 8).
5
Vide Lib. de Causis, propos. 21. seq., et Richard. a S. Vict., V. de Trin. c. 4, ex quo tom. II. pag. 867, nota 1. quaedam allata sunt. — Inferius post nisi F addit Deus quod est. In fine arg. G supplet esse, H legit infert primum vel Deum.
See the Book of Causes, proposition 21 and following, and Richard of Saint Victor, V On the Trinity, c. 4, from which certain things were adduced at tome II, p. 867, note 1. — Below, after nisi, F adds Deus quod est. At the end of the argument G supplies esse, H reads infert primum vel Deum.
6
Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 33. seqq. (c. 5.). et XII. Metaph. text. 35. seqq. (XI. c. 7.). Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. 18,
Book VIII Physics, text 33 and following (c. 5), and XII Metaphysics, text 35 and following (XI, c. 7). Compare the Book of Causes, proposition 18,
7
Proslog. c. 3. 4. et 15. Libro contra Insipientem etc. c. 1. seqq. His locis insinuatur etiam seq. arg.
Proslogion, cc. 3, 4 and 15. The book Against the Fool, etc., c. 1 and following. In these places the following argument also is intimated.
8
F ergo si tale ens est Deus, necesse est, quod ipsum non possit cogitari non esse.
F: ergo si tale ens est Deus, necesse est, quod ipsum non possit cogitari non esse ("therefore, if such a being is God, it must be that it cannot be thought not to be").
9
Proslog. c. 5: Tu es itaque iustus, verax, beatus et quidquid melius est esse quam non esse. Cfr. ibid. c. 11. in fine.
Proslogion, c. 5: "Thou art therefore just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better to be than not to be." Compare ibid., c. 11, at the end.
10
Libr. I. c. 8. n. 15. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 153, nota 5.
Book I, c. 8, n. 15. Compare tome I, p. 153, note 5.
11
Libr. I. Soliloq. c. 15. n. 27. seqq. et II. c. 2. n. 2. c. 15. n. 28. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 18. in fine. — In fine arg. pro ergo si G ergo sic.
Book I of the Soliloquies, c. 15, n. 27 and following, and II, c. 2, n. 2; c. 15, n. 28. Compare Anselm, Monologion, c. 18, at the end. — At the end of the argument, in place of ergo si, G has ergo sic.
1
Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. et I. Phys. text. 2. seqq.
Compare Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 2, and I Physics, text 2 and following.
2
Secundum Boeth., in II. Periherm. Aristot. c. 4. (c. 14.); cfr. tom. I. pag. 590, nota 5.
According to Boethius, on II of Aristotle's On Interpretation, c. 4 (c. 14); compare tome I, p. 590, note 5.
3
H brevius ergo et consequens. Deinde addit hoc arg.: Item nullus potest cogitare, quando fuit, postquam fuit, non fuisse; ergo si in Deo idem esse, fuisse et fore, nullus potest cogitare, Deum non esse; si ergo omne, quod non potest cogitari non esse, est verum indubitabile, et Deum esse, ut patet, non potest cogitari non esse: ergo etc.
H, more briefly, ergo et consequens. Then it adds this argument: "Likewise, no one can think that what has been, after it has been, has not been; therefore, if in God to be, to have been and to be about to be are the same, no one can think that God is not; if, therefore, everything which cannot be thought not to be is an indubitable truth, and the existence of God, as is clear, cannot be thought not to be, therefore, etc."
4
Psalm. 13, 1.
Psalm 13:1.
5
De Fide orthod. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 153, nota 9.
On the Orthodox Faith. Compare tome I, p. 153, note 9.
6
Vers. 4: Nihil est idolum in mundo etc.
Verse 4: "An idol is nothing in the world," etc.
7
Hoc exemplum (de insula perdita) inducit Gaunilo in libro « Pro insipiente » adversus Anselmi ratiocinationem in Proslogio.
This example (of the lost island) Gaunilo brings forward in the book "On Behalf of the Fool" against Anselm's reasoning in the Proslogion.
8
Libr. I. de Trin. c. 2.
Book I On the Trinity, c. 2.
9
Epist. I. Tim. 6, 16: Lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem.
The epistle, I Timothy 6:16: "He dwelleth in light inaccessible."
10
Sicut sunt prima principia, quae non possunt demonstrari, ut probat Aristot. I. Poster. c. 3. — Inferius pro ostendentes G ostendere.
Such as are the first principles, which cannot be demonstrated, as Aristotle proves at I Posterior Analytics, c. 3. — Below, in place of ostendentes, G has ostendere.
1
Aristot., I. Poster. c. 3: Principium scientiae esse quoddam dicimus, in quantum terminos cognoscimus. — F addit et pars.
Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, c. 3: "We say that there is a certain principle of knowledge, inasmuch as we know the terms." — F adds et pars.
2
Vers. 6: Credere enim oportet accedentem ad Deum, quia est etc.
Verse 6: "For he that cometh to God must believe that he is," etc.
3
Ita G, in aliis insertum.
So G; in the others, insertum.
4
Ita H, A B D E F et omnino esse, G et [i. e. etiam] est omnino esse. — Fortasse legendum et omnino idem est pro lectione et omnino esse.
So H; A B D E F have et omnino esse, G et [i.e. etiam] est omnino esse. — Perhaps et omnino idem est is to be read in place of the reading et omnino esse.
5
F vel, H similiter. Paulo superius pro divisio F differentia. A pro decursum constanter substituit discursum.
F has vel, H similiter. A little above, in place of divisio, F has differentia. A consistently substitutes discursum for decursum.
6
D E cogitantis. Subinde pro conferendi F hic et inferius inferendi.
D E have cogitantis. Thereupon, in place of conferendi, F has here and below inferendi.
1
Pro aliquo, quod F omittit, E illo.
In place of aliquo, which F omits, E has illo.
2
Psalm. 4, 7: Signatum est super nos lumen etc. — H Ipse tamen intellectus... lumen sibi sufficiens etc. Inferius pro insipientis F (B primitus) insipiens.
Psalm 4:7: "The lumen [of thy countenance] is signed upon us," etc. — H: Ipse tamen intellectus... lumen sibi sufficiens, etc. Below, in place of insipientis, F (B originally) has insipiens.
3
Rom. 1, 20: Ita ut sint inexcusabiles. — Pro pertinacia D pervicacia, F pravitate.
Romans 1:20: "So that they are inexcusable." — In place of pertinacia, D has pervicacia, F pravitate.
4
F affirmationem.
F has affirmationem.
5
Qua dictione utitur Aristot. II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11.). De ipsa solut. cfr. Anselm., contra Insipientem, c. 3.
Which expression Aristotle uses at II On Interpretation, c. 2 (c. 11). On the solution itself compare Anselm, Against the Fool, c. 3.
6
De arg. Anselmi cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. scholion.
On Anselm's argument compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, the scholion.
7
His verbis Aristot., II. Poster. c. 7. et 10. (c. 9.), describit vim definitionis nominalis.
In these words Aristotle, II Posterior Analytics, cc. 7 and 10 (c. 9), describes the force of a nominal definition.
1
Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 4.
Compare III Sentences, d. 23, a. 1, q. 4.
2
Vers. 19. — De seqq. cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 4, ubi docetur, philosophos cognoscere posse trinitatem appropriatorum, scil. unitatis, veritatis, bonitatis.
Verse 19. — On what follows compare I Sentences, d. 3, p. I, q. 4, where it is taught that the philosophers can know the trinity of the appropriated attributes, namely of unity, truth and goodness.
3
F determinationes.
F has determinationes.
4
Respicitur I. Cor. 13, 9. seqq.
Reference is made to I Corinthians 13:9 and following.
5
Libr. I. de Sacram. p. III. c. 2, ubi textus originalis fides quidem ad scientiam non adiuvaretur pro fides a scientia non iuvaretur et cor pro ingenium.
Book I On the Sacraments, p. III, c. 2, where the original text has fides quidem ad scientiam non adiuvaretur in place of fides a scientia non iuvaretur, and cor in place of ingenium.

Translator’s Notes

tr.
Translator’s note: lumen is left untranslated here and throughout, against lux rendered "light". Lux is light at its source; lumen is light as given off and possessed, and possession is what this reply needs. The fool’s understanding is darkened, but it has a lumen of its own, sufficient by its very condition — something it holds and could use — and that is why his doubt is called voluntary rather than forced. "A sufficient light" would read as a metaphor for native wit instead of the given thing the argument is pointing at. ---

Cited by

18 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

On the gift of wisdom

Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti · Collatio IX: De dono sapientiae

pag. 50

On the gift of understanding

Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti · Collatio VIII: De dono intellectus

supra pag. 49, nota 1

On the first vision, which is that of the understanding implanted by nature: the first treatment

Collationes in Hexaëmeron · Collatio IV: De visione prima, quae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae, tractatio prima

supra pag. 47, nota 11

On the first vision, the second treatment, which is on the third ray or on the truth of morals, and on the wisdom of contemplation